Commercial Real Estate Credit —
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV
The state of disclosed CRE credit in this market · DC, MD, VA
The read
$9.2B of CMBS across 238 loans. Office is both the largest book ($4.6B) and the most distressed (22.4% vs 11.3% national). Distress is rising in the filed record — 12.0% as of 2026-07. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2029 ($2.4B, 25% of the book). 190 on-the-ground distress events in the past year (9,763 jobs).
Overview
CMBS
Submarkets
Local Banks
Jobs & Demand
On The Ground
Loading map…
The CMBS properties our stress model flags here, plus recent store closures and layoffs. Stressed is a wider net than distressed — the distressed figure above counts only loans already in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, while these dots also include performing loans facing maturity or coverage pressure. Property dots sit at the center of their ZIP code, not the building — they show where stress concentrates, not which asset. Closures and layoffs are pinned to address where we have it. Open any dot to the building and the loan behind it →
In Washington, the distress is an office problem — and the record is turning up
The capital's securitized book runs to $9.2 billion across 238 loans, and the strain in it is concentrated in one sector. Office is both the largest exposure at $4.6 billion and the most distressed, with 22.4% of that book in special servicing or 60-plus days delinquent — roughly double the 11.3% national office rate. The rest of the metro reads far cleaner: retail sits at 2.6% against a 2.7% national mark, hospitality at 1.3%, and both mixed-use and industrial show no filed distress at all. This is not a broad-based downturn; it is an office story sitting inside an otherwise steady portfolio.
The filed record is moving in the wrong direction. The overall distress rate stood at 12.0% as of July 2026, and the trend is rising. The wall ahead is uneven: the heaviest maturity load lands in 2029, with $2.4 billion — a quarter of the book — coming due, though that vintage carries a low 6.5% distress rate today. The nearer 2027 slug, at $1.3 billion, is the more troubled one, with 42.5% already distressed.
The ground-level tally underscores the pressure: 190 distress events over the past year, split between 98 store closures and 92 layoff notices, the latter touching 9,763 jobs. Metro unemployment held at 4.0% in July 2026, down a tenth of a point from a year earlier, and median DSCR across the book sits at 1.77 — a reminder that the distress here is sector-specific rather than metro-wide.
CMBS Distressed UPB
$1.1B / 12.1%
in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent
CMBS Maturing ≤ 24mo
$2.6B
Local Banks (stressed)
3 / 24
Bank Early-Warning
7 flagged
Store Closures (1y)
98
Layoff Notices (1y)
92 / 9,763 jobs
0.39% of metro employment
CMBS Loans / UPB
238 / $9.2B
Unemployment · Jul 2026
4.0%
-0.1pp yr
How much CRE distress is there in Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV right now?
Distress in Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV is broad and mutually reinforcing: all four independent feeds read elevated, and all 6 of 6 pairs agree-hot with 0 pairs both quiet and 0 pairs disagreeing. Store closures run at 81 closures (3.27 per 100k jobs, 4th of 392 by count, 76th by rate), WARN notices at 107 notices (0.29% of employment, 6th of 386 by count, 76th by rate), bank CRE over the noncurrent line at $10,894.7mm (17.98% of lent CRE, 5th of 393 by count, 20th by rate), and securitized loans in special servicing at 20 rows (11.85% of securitized balance, 8th of 335 by count, 42nd by rate). The bank leg's 17.98% rate is computed off an allocation, since only 21.3% of its dollars sit at banks that lend in one metro and need no allocation; the rest is split by branch deposits, which the call report cannot confirm.
The figures behind this answer
| Signal | Level | Rate | Rank by count | Rank by rate | Reading |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| store closures store closures per 100,000 jobs |
81 closures | 3.27 per 100k jobs | 4 of 392 | 76 of 392 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| layoff notices (WARN) workers on layoff notices as a share of the metro's employment |
107 notices | 0.29% | 6 of 386 | 76 of 386 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line share of the CRE lent into this metro that sits at a lender over the blended-noncurrent line |
$10.89bn | 17.98% | 5 of 393 | 20 of 393 | elevated
allocated 2026-03-31
|
| securitized loans in special servicing share of the securitized balance read here that is in special servicing |
20 loan records | 11.85% | 8 of 335 | 42 of 335 | elevated 2026-07-29
|
6 pairs compared
6 both elevated
0 both quiet
0 disagreeing
0 unreadable — a side is blind
4 of four legs elevated
one metro, four independent feeds, each on its own denominator
{'coverage': "114 of 441 metros have at least one blind leg and 48 are blind on all four. Those 48 are the same metros the board's map cannot place and the metro resolver cannot name: one ZIP-to-CBSA crosswalk boundary, showing up three ways.", 'a_count_ranks_by_size': 'Elevation is computed on the COUNT, over a flat threshold, which is a size filter. New York is 2nd of 392 by store closures and 264th of the same 392 by closures per job — both true, and which one you lead with decides what the reader believes. Every leg carries both ranks over ONE population; quote the rate beside the count.', 'disagreement_is_not_severity': 'Where two legs disagree, that is usually a fact about WHICH mechanism is running, not an error in either feed and not a worse metro. The six pairs read different populations, and each note is a STRUCTURAL prior about those populations — nothing here measures a lead or a lag between two legs, so never report one as timing.', 'a_blind_leg_is_not_a_quiet_one': "A leg with no denominator, or whose numerator cannot be measured, reads LOW and means nothing. Each leg publishes a measurement state (allocated, floor, measured, no denominator, no rate, not measurable) for that reason. Never report a blind leg as 'no distress'."}
{'leg': 'closures', 'unit': 'jobs', 'as_of': 'trailing 365 days to today', 'value': 2476594, 'measures': 'store closures', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'window', 'what_it_is': "all metro jobs, QCEW annual average — a SIZE normaliser, not a matched population: the feed spans retail, food service and pharmacy and no single QCEW sector covers it. The MATCHED read sits beside it as this leg's second reading"}
{'leg': 'warn', 'unit': 'employed', 'as_of': 'trailing 365 days to today', 'value': 3318328, 'measures': 'layoff notices (WARN)', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'window', 'what_it_is': 'employed persons, BLS LAUS, not seasonally adjusted'}
{'leg': 'bank', 'unit': '$mm', 'as_of': '2026-03-31', 'value': 60582.1, 'measures': 'bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'stamp', 'what_it_is': 'bank CRE allocated to this metro by branch deposits'}
{'leg': 'cmbs', 'unit': '$mm', 'as_of': '2026-07-29', 'value': 9317.0, 'measures': 'securitized loans in special servicing', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'stamp', 'what_it_is': "current balance on the non-pari-passu rows of this tape — the trust's slice, not the whole loan, on both sides of the ratio"}
Written from the figures above · CBSA 47900 · stress_metro · last changed 28 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Which distress signals are elevated in Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV, and which cannot be read?
In Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV, elevated distress signals include bank distressed CRE exposure at $10.89bn (with bank CRE at risk at the 90th percentile reaching 15.4% of a $60.58bn portfolio), CMBS special servicing UPB of $1.10bn (11.8% of metro UPB), plus ground-level signals from closures and WARN notices. The reading on signal convergence is 4, but a reading on the exact share of bank assets allocated to CRE is unavailable.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS in special servicing
- $1.10bn
- … as a share of this metro's CMBS balance
- 11.8%
- Bank CRE lent into this metro
- $60.58bn
- … at risk at the 90th percentile
- 15.4%
- CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line
- $10.89bn
- Assets at those lenders
- $12.90bn
- … share needing no branch-deposit allocation
- 21.3%
- Signals reading elevated
- bank CRE over the noncurrent line, CMBS in special servicing, store closures, WARN layoff notices
- Legs agreeing
- 4
- Phase
- peak
- CMBS loans in special servicing
- 20
- Distressed banks
- 3
- Store closures (past year)
- 81
- WARN notices (past year)
- 107
leading (real-economy) and realized (credit) signals are firing together
$1B+ of CRE in special servicing or held at distressed local banks
credit distress AND ground-level distress, with real dollars behind the credit side
Written from the figures above · CBSA 47900 · geo_metro_signals · last changed 28 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Jobs & Demand — the labor market under the collateralWatch it change →
Every other zone on this page reads the credit — what the loan is doing.
This one reads the demand underneath it. Office jobs pay office rent;
office rent services the office loan. When the jobs go, the DSCR follows — but not for another year or two.
That lag is the whole point of looking here.
Unemployment · Jul 2026
4.0%
-0.1pp yr
Last 24 months
2.9%4.5%
Monthly metro unemployment (BLS LAUS) — the freshest labor signal there is,
about six weeks behind. Read the direction, not the level: a 4% metro that is rising and a 6% metro that is
falling are not telling you the same thing.
Sector Heat — CMBS distress rate by property type (metro vs national)See the loans behind the bar →
This metro's CMBS runs 12.1% distressed where its own property mix predicts 6.9% — $475M more than this book would carry at the rate each property type runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted and excluding this metro. The gap is measured; the cause is not. 1 of 6 property types here run a higher distress rate than the national average for that type (the tick on each bar).
Elimination — does the gap survive a control?
Each row re-prices this metro's book on a finer cell — its own property types, then those types split by loan size, then by vintage — always at the rate that cell runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted. A gap that shrinks toward zero is explained by the control; one that stays has ruled it out. What is measured is what survives, not a cause.
property mix alone
+5.2pp
… and loan size held fixed
+5.1pp
the gap is still there with loan size held fixed too
… and vintage held fixed
+5.5pp
the gap is still there with vintage held fixed too
The largest single contributor is Office: 76 loans, $4.6B, running 22.4% where the same type runs 10.5% elsewhere — worth 5.9pp of this metro's own rate.
Maturity Wall — CMBS coming due by year, distress within eachSee what’s maturing →
$2.6B — 28% of the metro's balance — matures within two years; the red slice of each bar is already distressed.
Distress Trend — is this market turning?Track it quarter by quarter →
Realized distress is RISING — 12.0% now (2026-07), +2.8pp over the year.
Same definition as the cards above — distressed means in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, dollar-weighted — on a different clock. The cards are today’s tape; this is the disclosed history panel, quarter by quarter, so you can read direction rather than level. Trusts file monthly, so a quarter is usually well covered within weeks of opening and the newest one shown is normally the current one; it is withheld only when its filed book falls below 60% of recent quarters.
Share of the metro’s CMBS in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, by quarter — a firmer, backward-looking read. A loan under 1.0x DSCR that is still paying is not counted here.
Submarket Heat — where in the metro the distress sitsOpen the submarket →
The top three submarkets hold $4.2B of the metro's $9.2B; each bar's colored share is its distress rate.
Bank Door — what the local bank sector could absorbSee it on every loan’s exit read →
$2.6B of CMBS matures here within two years.
The 35 regional and local banks that gather deposits here could write roughly
$2.4B more CRE before the 300% supervisory line, so the maturing balance is
1.09× that room.
The median metro sits at 0.12×.
Regional Bank Room
$2.4B
After Committed Draws
$1.0B / −57%
Maturing ÷ Room
1.09×
Banks In Footprint
35 / 11 at the line
The room above is already part-sold. Construction lending is a promise drawn
down over two or three years, and the undrawn part is an obligation the bank cannot decline while the borrower performs
— every one of those dollars lands in the same CRE book the 300% line governs. These banks
have $2.9B of construction committed and not yet
advanced, of which $1.4B
comes out of the room above, leaving $1.0B,
with 17 banks
whose entire remaining room is spoken for.
A bank with no room contributes zero here, never a negative one — capacity does not net
across balance sheets — so $1.5B of what has
been promised is not deducted at all, because there is nothing left to deduct it from. On today’s
capital that is funding already contracted which would cross the line as it draws.
SR 06-26 draws a second line at 100% of capital for construction and land:
2 of 35
are past it on drawn balances alone, and
10 more cross it
once their own commitments fund.
Counted — 35 regional & local CRE lenders
| Bank | Deposit share | CRE / Capital* | Room contributed | Noncurrent CRE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Atlantic Union Bank VA | 42.7% | 264% total 363%
|
🔒 | 0.42% |
| Eaglebank MD | 100.0% | 258% total 355%
|
🔒 | 2.20% |
| Primis Bank VA | 34.2% | 188% total 317%
|
🔒 | 3.31% |
| Industrial Bank DC | 74.3% | 131% total 212%
|
🔒 | 8.38% |
| The Freedom Bank Of Virginia VA | 100.0% | 175% total 290%
|
🔒 | 1.85% |
| Bank Of Clarke VA | 55.0% | 195% total 329%
|
🔒 | 1.45% |
| Amalgamated Bank NY | 17.0% | 235% total 239%
|
🔒 | 4.15% |
| Virginia National Bank VA | 42.8% | 226% total 289%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Fulton Bank, National Association PA | 1.5% | 184% total 283%
|
🔒 | 0.79% |
| Fvcbank VA | 98.2% | 284% total 354%
|
🔒 | 0.96% |
| The National Capital Bank Of Washington DC | 100.0% | 262% total 327%
|
🔒 | 2.45% |
| First United Bank & Trust MD | 13.4% | 201% total 285%
|
🔒 | 0.19% |
| Woodsboro Bank MD | 100.0% | 232% total 415%
|
🔒 | 0.16% |
| Acnb Bank PA | 11.8% | 232% total 333%
|
🔒 | 0.21% |
| Jefferson Security Bank WV | 65.6% | 210% total 257%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Middletown Valley Bank MD | 40.7% | 249% total 381%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Potomac Bank WV | 80.5% | 276% total 389%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| City National Bank Of West Virginia WV | 2.9% | 206% total 241%
|
🔒 | 0.30% |
| The Harbor Bank Of Maryland MD | 14.5% | 226% total 313%
|
🔒 | 2.37% |
| Blue Ridge Bank, National Association VA | 3.3% | 255% total 315%
|
🔒 | 0.14% |
| Citizens And Farmers Bank VA | 2.4% | 267% total 304%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Promiseone Bank GA | 17.5% | 284% total 364%
|
🔒 | 1.01% |
| First Bank VA | 6.3% | 283% total 391%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Somerset Trust Company PA | 0.8% | 206% total 290%
|
🔒 | 1.51% |
| Presidential Bank, Fsb MD | 100.0% | 321% total 336%
|
🔒 | 1.83% |
| Mainstreet Bank VA | 100.0% | 379% total 538%
|
🔒 | 3.26% |
| John Marshall Bank VA | 100.0% | 337% total 439%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Trustar Bank VA | 100.0% | 422% total 499%
|
🔒 | 0.63% |
| Old Dominion National Bank VA | 73.7% | 312% total 365%
|
🔒 | 1.52% |
| City First Bank, National Association DC | 70.7% | 378% total 438%
|
🔒 | 1.20% |
| Burke & Herbert Bank & Trust Company VA | 46.6% | 335% total 424%
|
🔒 | 1.24% |
| Shore United Bank, National Association MD | 19.4% | 326% total 436%
|
🔒 | 1.78% |
| Hingham Institution For Savings MA | 7.4% | 525% total 552%
|
🔒 | 1.03% |
| Mvb Bank, Inc WV | 6.9% | 312% total 373%
|
🔒 | 0.25% |
| Carter Bank & Trust VA | 6.3% | 395% total 423%
|
🔒 | 0.84% |
Not counted — 34 banks with deposits here
These hold deposits in this metro but are left out of the capacity above, because for them deposit location stops indicating where they lend — or they do not lend CRE at all. Real money that could refinance here is deliberately not counted.
no CRE book — CRE under 100% of capital — not a CRE lender
Capital One, National Association VA · Bank Of America, National Association NC · Truist Bank NC · Wells Fargo Bank, National Association SD · Citibank, National Association SD · Pnc Bank, National Association DE · Td Bank, National Association DE · Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Association OH · Hsbc Bank Usa, National Association VA · Chain Bridge Bank, National Association VA · Oak View National Bank VA · Citizens Bank, National Association RI · First-Citizens Bank & Trust Company NC · The Northern Trust Company IL · The Bank Of New York Mellon NY · Bny Mellon, National Association PA · Wilmington Trust, National Association DE · Cibc National Trust Company GA
national — operates in more than 5 states, so deposits stop indicating where it lends
Manufacturers And Traders Trust Company NY · Pinnacle Bank TN · City National Bank CA · First National Bank Of Pennsylvania PA · Wesbanco Bank, Inc. WV · Woori America Bank NY · Metro City Bank GA · Peoples Bank OH · Armed Forces Bank, National Association KS · United Bank VA · Cathay Bank CA · Woodforest National Bank TX · Capital Bank, National Association MD · Hanmi Bank CA
booked here — books nearly all deposits to one branch — a charter address, not a footprint
Forbright Bank MD · Founders Bank DC
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
How to read this. It is not whether any particular loan can refinance — a borrower also reaches
national banks, life companies, agencies and debt funds. It is how much of this metro’s maturing volume the local
bank sector could absorb if it were the only door.
Banks are placed by deposit share (FDIC Summary of Deposits, June 2025) — a proxy for
where they lend, not a measurement; call reports carry no collateral geography. Room = 3× total risk-based capital less CRE held
(SR 06-26, the capital base the rule names — not book equity), from Q2 2026 call reports, apportioned by that share.
Committed construction comes from FFIEC Schedule RC-L as filed at 2026-06-30 —
the undrawn half of loans already written, which the balance sheet above does not show.
Banks in more than 5 states, single-branch bookers and banks that do not lend CRE are excluded —
313 banks holding $268.2B of national capacity not counted here.
Local Lenders — banks headquartered here, worst CRE noncurrent firstUnlock each bank’s early-warning flag →
| Bank | Total CRE | CRE / Capital* | Noncurrent CRE | Early Warning |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Industrial Bank | $266M | 131% total 212%
|
8.38% | 🔒 |
| Mainstreet Bank | $1.6B | 379% total 538%
|
3.26% | 🔒 |
| Hsbc Bank Usa, National Association | $1.6B | 7% total 8%
|
15.70% | 🔒 |
| Eaglebank | $4.7B | 258% total 355%
|
2.20% | 🔒 |
| Capital Bank, National Association | $1.5B | 304% total 419%
|
1.82% | 🔒 |
| Bank Of Clarke | $811M | 195% total 329%
|
1.45% | 🔒 |
| Burke & Herbert Bank & Trust Company | $5.5B | 335% total 424%
|
1.24% | 🔒 |
| City First Bank, National Association | $853M | 378% total 438%
|
1.20% | 🔒 |
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
Banks are matched to their HQ metro (a proxy for footprint). Noncurrent CRE = CRE-balance-weighted blend of multifamily / nonresidential / construction noncurrent (distress already arrived). Early Warning is a validated leading signal — the bank’s 30-89 early-delinquency rank among all CRE lenders this quarter, which has predicted ~2.3× forward CRE distress. Per-bank flags are on a plan.
Do the banks lending in Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV have the capacity to refinance its maturing CRE?
On the face of it, no — Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV carries $2.59bn of CMBS maturing within 24 months (64 loans) against room of $1.02bn after committed draws, a wall_to_room of 2.54, which is ABOVE the median of 0.20, so this metro is MORE strained than the typical ranked metro, ranking 24 of 270, counting from the MOST strained — a LOWER rank number means MORE strain. Before committed draws the picture is far less binding, with maturing_bal of $2.59bn against room_before_committed of $2.37bn and a wall_to_room_before_committed_draws of 1.09, so the strain largely reflects the $2.90bn of committed_draws absorbing capacity rather than an outsized maturity wall; note too that the $9.25bn cmbs_upb is the CMBS balance maturing within 24 months — the maturing debt this platform can see, not the metro's whole maturity load, and every ratio is an upper bound on how much of it local banks would have to absorb. Local capacity here rests on banks_qualifying of 35 against banks_excluded_here of 16, and since explained_by_exclusion is false, the reading is not dismissed as an exclusion artifact — though room remains a proxy built from deposit footprint, not a measurement of lending footprint, and $2.90bn of committed construction draws could still consume the remainder. A definitive capacity read would need the metro's full maturity load, which is unavailable here.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS maturing in the window
- $2.59bn
- … across this many loans
- 64
- Local bank room, before committed draws
- $2.37bn
- Committed construction draws
- $2.90bn
- Local bank room, after those draws
- $1.02bn
- Wall-to-room ratio
- 2.54
- Rank, most strained
- 24
- … out of this many metros ranked
- 270
- … before committed draws
- 1.09
- Population ranked against
- CMBS maturing within 24 months against regional/community bank room in this metro
- Qualifying local banks
- 35
- … excluded from the calculation
- 16
- Distressed share of this metro's CMBS
- 12.1%
- Total CMBS balance here
- $9.25bn
- Capacity band
- tight
Compared against a median wall-to-room ratio of
0.20 across the ranked metros.
2.54 is ABOVE the median of 0.20, so this metro is MORE strained than the typical ranked metro
24 of 270, counting from the MOST strained — a LOWER rank number means MORE strain
{'room_is_a_proxy': 'Room is what regional and community banks could still write before the SR 06-26 concentration line, after deducting construction draws already committed. Deposit footprint is a proxy for lending footprint, not a measurement of it.', 'ratio_is_not_size': 'The most extreme ratios belong to the smallest metros. Read maturing_bal_mm beside the ratio — the map sizes bubbles by the wall, not the strain, for exactly this reason.', 'wall_is_cmbs_only': "The wall is the CMBS balance maturing within 24 months — the maturing debt this platform can see, not the metro's whole maturity load. Every ratio is an upper bound on how much of it local banks would have to absorb.", 'exclusion_artifact': 'A high ratio is as often an exclusion artifact as a credit event. Banks whose deposits do not indicate where they lend (nationals, card and charter banks) are excluded from the room, so a metro served mainly by those reads strained while its credit is simply invisible here. Check banks_qualifying against banks_excluded_here, and explained_by_exclusion.'}
Written from the figures above · CBSA 47900 · capacity_metro · last changed 13 Sep 2026
· Ask your own question →
Apartment-REIT Operating Read — same-store disclosures for this metro · as of 2026-07-29Set against the loan book →
Same-Store NOI
+0.7%
Same-Store Revenue
+1.1%
Occupancy
95.6%
Rent Growth
+1.0%
| REIT | SS NOI | SS Revenue | Occupancy | Rent | As Of |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AVB | — | -0.2% | 94.5% | -1.5% | 2026-02-05 |
| EQR | +0.2% | +1.7% | 96.3% | +2.8% | 2026-04-28 |
| MAA | +1.1% | +1.7% | 96.1% | +1.8% | 2026-07-29 |
Same-store operating results disclosed by public apartment REITs (AVB · EQR · ESS · MAA · CPT · UDR) for this market in their quarterly supplements. Directional market context — an operating trend, not a Verstavo score.
On The Ground — recent closures, layoffs & CRE bankruptciesTie these events to loans →
190 local distress events in the past year (9,763 jobs) — store closures, layoffs, and commercial real estate bankruptcies near this metro's collateral.
2027-01-31
CLOSURE
College Park
2026-12-31
CLOSURE
Washington
2026-12-31
CLOSURE
Arlington
2026-09-30
CLOSURE
Reston
2026-09-11
LAYOFF
Washington
2026-08-28
LAYOFF
382 jobs · Germantown
2026-08-27
CLOSURE
Hyattsville
2026-08-26
CLOSURE
Washington
2026-08-26
CLOSURE
Washington
2026-08-24
LAYOFF
Washington
2026-08-14
LAYOFF
39 jobs
2026-08-14
LAYOFF
37 jobs
2026-08-11
CLOSURE
Washington
2026-08-09
CLOSURE
Germantown
2026-08-06
LAYOFF
38 jobs · Greenbelt
What has actually happened on the ground in Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV recently?
Over the trailing 365 days in the Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV metro, the on-the-ground record shows 98 store closures, 92 WARN notices, and 9,763 jobs affected, alongside 2 CRE-likely bankruptcy filings — though that last figure is a STATE PROXY — bankruptcy filings carry the filer's state, not the property's location, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count. Note also that affected_employees is nullable — notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, so this is a floor.
The figures behind this answer
- Store closures
- 98
- WARN layoff notices
- 92
- Jobs on those notices
- 9,763
- CRE-related bankruptcies
- 2
- Window, in days
- 365
STATE PROXY — bankruptcy filings carry the filer's state, not the property's location, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count.
affected_employees is nullable — notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, so this is a floor.
Closures are matched ZIP -> CBSA and only APPROVED rows count (a pending, machine-extracted row is not yet a closure). This mirrors the Metro Pulse page, not the convergence board — the board applies neither filter and counts higher. Layoffs take the same ZIP -> CBSA and review treatment, and a WARN notice counts if it affects >= 10 people or does not state a headcount (a NULL is not 'fewer than 10').
Written from the figures above · CBSA 47900 · geo_events · last changed 13 Sep 2026
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What this page can’t do
Everything above is a snapshot — one market, as it stands today, and
it’s yours to read. What a snapshot can’t tell you is when it moves: which loan slipped a DSCR band
this month, which bank’s early-warning rank crossed into the top quartile, which submarket started turning
while the headline number still looked fine. Distress doesn’t announce itself on the day you happen to check.
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CMBS covers the securitized slice of CRE; bank, closure and layoff signals widen the view.
“No data” in a zone means we don’t observe it here, not that there is no stress.
Employment is BLS (QCEW annual, LAUS monthly) — public data, and the demand leg under all of it.
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