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Commercial Real Estate Credit —
Tyler, TX
The state of disclosed CRE credit in this market · TX
The read
$40M of CMBS across 5 loans. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2034 ($13M, 34% of the book). 3 on-the-ground distress events in the past year (170 jobs).
Overview
CMBS
Submarkets
Local Banks
Jobs & Demand
On The Ground
Loading map…
The CMBS properties our stress model flags here, plus recent store closures and layoffs. Stressed is a wider net than distressed — the distressed figure above counts only loans already in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, while these dots also include performing loans facing maturity or coverage pressure. Property dots sit at the center of their ZIP code, not the building — they show where stress concentrates, not which asset. Closures and layoffs are pinned to address where we have it. Open any dot to the building and the loan behind it →
CMBS Distressed UPB
under $1M / 0.0%
in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent
CMBS Maturing ≤ 24mo
under $1M
Banks HQ’d Here (stressed)
0 / 3
Bank Early-Warning
1 flagged
Store Closures (1y)
1
Layoff Notices (1y)
2 / 170 jobs
0.17% of metro employment
CMBS Loans / UPB
5 / $40M
Unemployment · Aug 2026
4.2%
0.0pp yr
Office-Using Jobs · 2024
15,384
-0.3% yr
How much CRE distress is there in Tyler, TX right now?
Tyler, TX shows 0 signals elevated of four, with 3 pairs both quiet out of 6 pairs of legs compared and 3 pairs that cannot be read because a leg is blind; on the read legs, store closures run at 1.02 per 100k jobs, layoff notices (WARN) at 0.14%, and bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line at 0.05%, while securitized loans in special servicing are legs that cannot be read — a leg with an unmeasurable numerator is an absence of measurement, not a quiet reading, so the distress picture rests on three legs and the fourth contributes nothing either way.
The figures behind this answer
| Signal | Level | Rate | Rank by count | Rank by rate | Reading |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| store closures store closures per 100,000 jobs |
1 closures | 1.02 per 100k jobs | 284 of 392 | 301 of 392 | quiet trailing 365 days to today
|
| layoff notices (WARN) workers on layoff notices as a share of the metro's employment |
2 notices | 0.14% | 170 of 382 | 147 of 382 | quiet trailing 365 days to today
|
| bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line share of the CRE lent into this metro that sits at a lender over the blended-noncurrent line |
$2.3mm | 0.05% | 313 of 393 | 312 of 393 | quiet
allocated 2026-06-30
|
| securitized loans in special servicing share of the securitized balance read here that is in special servicing |
2 loan records | — | — | — | cannot be read
not measurable 2026-09-29
|
6 pairs compared
0 both elevated
3 both quiet
0 disagreeing
3 unreadable — a side is blind
0 of four legs elevated
blind: securitized loans in special servicing
one metro, four independent feeds, each on its own denominator
124 of 447 metros have at least one blind leg and 54 are blind on all four. Those 54 are the same metros the board's map cannot place and the metro resolver cannot name: one ZIP-to-CBSA crosswalk boundary, showing up three ways.
Elevation is computed on the COUNT, over a flat threshold, which is a size filter. New York is 2nd of 392 by store closures and 264th of the same 392 by closures per job — both true, and which one you lead with decides what the reader believes.
Where two legs disagree, that is usually a fact about WHICH mechanism is running, not an error in either feed and not a worse metro.
A leg with no denominator, or whose numerator cannot be measured, reads LOW and means nothing. Each leg publishes a measurement state (allocated, floor, measured, no denominator, no rate, not measurable) for that reason.
a blind leg is not a quiet one — securitized loans in special servicing cannot be read here. Their low numbers are an absence of MEASUREMENT.
Store closures: divided by 98,295 jobs
— all metro jobs, QCEW annual average — a SIZE normaliser, not a matched population: the feed spans retail, food service and pharmacy and no single QCEW sector covers it. The MATCHED read sits beside it as this leg's second reading (trailing 365 days to today).
Layoff notices (WARN): divided by 117,807 employed
— employed persons, BLS LAUS, not seasonally adjusted (trailing 365 days to today).
Bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line: divided by $4,861.4 mm
— bank CRE allocated to this metro by branch deposits (2026-06-30).
Securitized loans in special servicing: divided by $40.0 mm
— current balance on the non-pari-passu rows of this tape — the trust's slice, not the whole loan, on both sides of the ratio (2026-09-29).
Written from the figures above · CBSA 46340 · stress_metro · last changed 01 Nov 2026
· Ask your own question →
Which distress signals are elevated in Tyler, TX, and which cannot be read?
In Tyler, TX, the signals reading elevated are an empty set, and the convergence figure is 0, so no distress signal is elevated on the credit side. The bank-side readings that could carry weight are thin rather than alarming: bank CRE at risk at the 90th percentile is 1.1% of $4.86bn bank CRE lent into this metro, CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line is $2.3mm, and assets at those lenders is $0.00bn, with share of bank CRE needing no branch-deposit allocation at 18.6%. The securitized reading cannot be read: CMBS in special servicing shows $0.0mm and share of this metro's CMBS balance in special servicing shows 0.0%, but the tape rows for the 2 loans in special servicing carry no balance, so the $0 is a gap in the tape, not an absence of distress, and the securitized side is not measured here.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS in special servicing
- $0.0mm
- … as a share of this metro's CMBS balance
- 0.0%
- Bank CRE lent into this metro
- $4.86bn
- … at risk at the 90th percentile
- 1.1%
- CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line
- $2.3mm
- Assets at those lenders
- $0.00bn
- … share needing no branch-deposit allocation
- 18.6%
- Legs agreeing
- 0
- Phase
- watch
- CMBS loans in special servicing
- 2
- Distressed banks
- 0
- Store closures (past year)
- 1
- WARN notices (past year)
- 2
an isolated signal, not a convergence
little to no distressed CRE dollars behind the signals; and the securitized side is NOT MEASURED here — all 2 loans in special servicing sit on tape rows carrying no balance, so the $0 is a gap in the tape, not an absence of distress
signals are present but neither credit-material nor ground-heavy
Written from the figures above · CBSA 46340 · geo_metro_signals · last changed 01 Nov 2026
· Ask your own question →
Jobs & Demand — the labor market under the collateralWatch it change →
Every other zone on this page reads the credit — what the loan is doing.
This one reads the demand underneath it. Office jobs pay office rent;
office rent services the office loan. When the jobs go, the DSCR follows — but not for another year or two.
That lag is the whole point of looking here.
Unemployment · Aug 2026
4.2%
0.0pp yr
Last 24 months
3.3%4.8%
Monthly metro unemployment (BLS LAUS) — the freshest labor signal there is,
about six weeks behind. Read the direction, not the level: a 4% metro that is rising and a 6% metro that is
falling are not telling you the same thing.
Jobs by CRE-relevant sector · 2024
Annual employment by sector (BLS QCEW, 2024; 98,295 jobs in the metro).
QCEW lags — it is the structural read, not the current one, and we pair it with the monthly unemployment above on purpose.
Office-using sums five supersectors; where BLS withholds any one of them for
disclosure, we show nothing rather than a number we know is too low — so a missing sector here means
“suppressed at the source,” not “zero.”
Sector Heat — CMBS distress rate by property type (metro vs national)See the loans behind the bar →
Too few CMBS loans here (5) to say whether this metro's rate is explained by its property mix — that comparison needs 25.
No CMBS sector data for this metro.
Maturity Wall — CMBS coming due by year, distress within eachSee what’s maturing →
under $1M — 0% of the metro's balance — matures within two years; the red slice of each bar is already distressed.
Distress Trend — is this market turning?Track it quarter by quarter →
Realized distress is FLAT — 0.0% now (2026-10), +0.0pp over the year.
Same definition as the cards above — distressed means in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, dollar-weighted — on a different clock. The cards are today’s tape; this is the disclosed history panel, quarter by quarter, so you can read direction rather than level. Trusts file monthly, so a quarter is usually well covered within weeks of opening and the newest one shown is normally the current one; it is withheld only when its filed book falls below 60% of recent quarters.
Share of the metro’s CMBS in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, by quarter — a firmer, backward-looking read. A loan under 1.0x DSCR that is still paying is not counted here.
Submarket Heat — where in the metro the distress sitsOpen the submarket →
The top three submarkets hold $40M of the metro's $40M; each bar's colored share is its distress rate.
Local Lenders — banks headquartered here, worst CRE noncurrent firstUnlock each bank’s early-warning flag →
| Bank | Total CRE | CRE / Capital* | Noncurrent CRE | Early Warning |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Citizens 1st Bank | $363M | 194% total 208%
|
0.52% | 🔒 |
| American State Bank | $310M | 370% total 413%
|
1.78% | 🔒 |
| Southside Bank | $3.3B | 289% total 324%
|
0.09% | 🔒 |
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 07-1 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
Banks are matched to their HQ metro (a proxy for footprint). Noncurrent CRE = CRE-balance-weighted blend of multifamily / nonresidential / construction noncurrent (distress already arrived). Early Warning is a validated leading signal — the bank’s 30-89 early-delinquency rank among all CRE lenders this quarter, which has predicted ~2.3× forward CRE distress. Per-bank flags are on a plan.
On The Ground — recent closures, layoffs & CRE bankruptciesTie these events to loans →
3 local distress events in the past year (170 jobs) — store closures, layoffs, and commercial real estate bankruptcies near this metro's collateral.
2026-10-27
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-10-26
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-10-23
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-10-20
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-10-16
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-10-16
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-10-07
BANKRUPTCY
CRE-linked bankruptcy
2026-10-06
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-07-17
CLOSURE
Tyler
2026-06-12
LAYOFF
85 jobs · Tyler
2026-06-12
LAYOFF
85 jobs · Tyler
2025-09-28
CLOSURE
Tyler
2023-09-18
LAYOFF
163 jobs · Tyler
2023-07-17
LAYOFF
31 jobs · Tyler
2022-07-25
LAYOFF
72 jobs · Winona
What has actually happened on the ground in Tyler, TX recently?
Over the trailing 365-day window, Tyler, TX has seen 1 store closure, 2 WARN layoff notices affecting a floor of 170 jobs (notices without a stated headcount count but add no jobs), and the CRE-related bankruptcy reading for the states where this metro's collateral sits is 104, a state-level proxy rather than a metro-native count that also reflects a coverage change on 2026-09-16.
The figures behind this answer
- Store closures
- 1
- WARN layoff notices
- 2
- Jobs on those notices
- 170
- CRE-related bankruptcies
- 104
- Window, in days
- 365
STATE PROXY — a court case counts in its filing district and an SEC 8-K in the filer's state, not where the property is, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count. Each court case is counted once even when both PACER and CourtListener carry it. A court case's state is its filing district; an SEC 8-K or news item carries the filer's state. Coverage widened to both court feeds on 2026-09-16, so counts before and after that date are not comparable.
affected_employees is nullable — notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, so this is a floor.
Closures are matched ZIP -> CBSA and only APPROVED rows count (a pending, machine-extracted row is not yet a closure). This mirrors the Metro Pulse page, not the convergence board — the board applies neither filter and counts higher. Layoffs take the same ZIP -> CBSA and review treatment, and a WARN notice counts if it affects >= 10 people or does not state a headcount (a NULL is not 'fewer than 10').
Written from the figures above · CBSA 46340 · geo_events · last changed 30 Oct 2026
· Ask your own question →
What this page can’t do
Everything above is a snapshot — one market, as it stands today, and
it’s yours to read. What a snapshot can’t tell you is when it moves: which loan slipped a DSCR band
this month, which bank’s early-warning rank crossed into the top quartile, which submarket started turning
while the headline number still looked fine. Distress doesn’t announce itself on the day you happen to check.
This page
One metro · one moment · you come looking.
Verstavo
Every metro · every month · it comes looking for you.
CMBS covers the securitized slice of CRE; bank, closure and layoff signals widen the view.
“No data” in a zone means we don’t observe it here, not that there is no stress.
Employment is BLS (QCEW annual, LAUS monthly) — public data, and the demand leg under all of it.
See the whole picture, not just the pulse.
Metro Pulse is the free, public read — one page for every market we cover. The platform goes loan‑by‑loan inside it: which buildings carry the stress, when their debt comes due, and your own portfolio benchmarked against the market you are standing in.