Commercial Real Estate Credit —
Tucson, AZ
The state of disclosed CRE credit in this market · AZ
The read
$828M of CMBS across 54 loans. Retail is the largest book ($467M) but runs below its national distress rate (0.0% vs 2.7%); the elevated risk is in Hospitality (13.5%, 2.2× national). Distress is rising in the filed record — 4.2% as of 2026-07. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2031 ($226M, 27% of the book). 25 on-the-ground distress events in the past year (1,470 jobs).
Overview
CMBS
Submarkets
Local Banks
Jobs & Demand
On The Ground
Loading map…
The CMBS properties our stress model flags here, plus recent store closures and layoffs. Stressed is a wider net than distressed — the distressed figure above counts only loans already in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, while these dots also include performing loans facing maturity or coverage pressure. Property dots sit at the center of their ZIP code, not the building — they show where stress concentrates, not which asset. Closures and layoffs are pinned to address where we have it. Open any dot to the building and the loan behind it →
Retail carries the book, but hospitality carries the risk in Tucson
Tucson holds $828M of CMBS across 54 loans, and the largest slice sits in retail at $467M — a book that runs clean, with a 0.0% distress rate against a 2.7% national mark. The pressure lies elsewhere. Hospitality, a far smaller position, is running distressed at 13.5%, roughly 2.2 times the national rate for the sector. That concentration of risk in the smaller book is the shape of this metro: the big line is quiet, the small line is not.
The filed record has been rising, reaching 4.2% as of July 2026. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2031, when $226M — 27% of the book — comes due. On the ground, the past year brought 25 distress events, split between store closures and layoff notices, touching 1,470 jobs.
The read for the desk: watch the hospitality exposure, where declared distress is running well above the national line, and keep the 2031 wall in view as the largest single-year concentration on the page.
CMBS Distressed UPB
$35M / 4.2%
in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent
CMBS Maturing ≤ 24mo
$106M
Local Banks (stressed)
0 / 0
Bank Early-Warning
0 flagged
Store Closures (1y)
7
Layoff Notices (1y)
18 / 1,470 jobs
0.47% of metro employment
CMBS Loans / UPB
54 / $828M
Unemployment · Jul 2026
5.6%
+0.7pp yr
Office-Using Jobs · 2024
56,382
-8.6% yr
How much CRE distress is there in Tucson, AZ right now?
Tucson, AZ is showing clear signs of CRE distress, with three of the four tracked signals currently elevated. Store closures are running at 2.23 per 100,000 jobs, and WARN layoff notices sit at 0.43 percent of employment — both hot. Bank CRE stress is elevated too, with 16.29 percent of the metro's bank CRE book over the noncurrent line. The securitized loan book, however, is not elevated, with only 4.21 percent of its balance in special servicing, and the reading there is that retail is failing on buildings this tape does not hold, while lenders are stressed on a book the tape cannot see. Three of the six pairings show both legs elevated, and none show both quiet, so the data meshes: this is a metro where tenant distress and lender distress are moving together on the bank side, even though the securitized market hasn't caught up yet.
The figures behind this answer
| Signal | Level | Rate | Rank by count | Rank by rate | Reading |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| store closures store closures per 100,000 jobs |
7 closures | 2.23 per 100k jobs | 58 of 392 | 148 of 392 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| layoff notices (WARN) workers on layoff notices as a share of the metro's employment |
19 notices | 0.43% | 36 of 386 | 39 of 386 | elevated
floor trailing 365 days to today
|
| bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line share of the CRE lent into this metro that sits at a lender over the blended-noncurrent line |
$390.9mm | 16.29% | 77 of 393 | 28 of 393 | elevated
allocated 2026-03-31
|
| securitized loans in special servicing share of the securitized balance read here that is in special servicing |
2 loan records | 4.21% | 66 of 335 | 75 of 335 | quiet 2026-07-29
|
6 pairs compared
3 both elevated
0 both quiet
3 disagreeing
0 unreadable — a side is blind
3 of four legs elevated
one metro, four independent feeds, each on its own denominator
{'coverage': "114 of 441 metros have at least one blind leg and 48 are blind on all four. Those 48 are the same metros the board's map cannot place and the metro resolver cannot name: one ZIP-to-CBSA crosswalk boundary, showing up three ways.", 'a_count_ranks_by_size': 'Elevation is computed on the COUNT, over a flat threshold, which is a size filter. New York is 2nd of 392 by store closures and 264th of the same 392 by closures per job — both true, and which one you lead with decides what the reader believes. Every leg carries both ranks over ONE population; quote the rate beside the count.', 'disagreement_is_not_severity': 'Where two legs disagree, that is usually a fact about WHICH mechanism is running, not an error in either feed and not a worse metro. The six pairs read different populations, and each note is a STRUCTURAL prior about those populations — nothing here measures a lead or a lag between two legs, so never report one as timing.', 'a_blind_leg_is_not_a_quiet_one': "A leg with no denominator, or whose numerator cannot be measured, reads LOW and means nothing. Each leg publishes a measurement state (allocated, floor, measured, no denominator, no rate, not measurable) for that reason. Never report a blind leg as 'no distress'."}
{'leg': 'closures', 'unit': 'jobs', 'as_of': 'trailing 365 days to today', 'value': 313855, 'measures': 'store closures', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'window', 'what_it_is': "all metro jobs, QCEW annual average — a SIZE normaliser, not a matched population: the feed spans retail, food service and pharmacy and no single QCEW sector covers it. The MATCHED read sits beside it as this leg's second reading"}
{'leg': 'warn', 'unit': 'employed', 'as_of': 'trailing 365 days to today', 'value': 453367, 'measures': 'layoff notices (WARN)', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'window', 'what_it_is': 'employed persons, BLS LAUS, not seasonally adjusted'}
{'leg': 'bank', 'unit': '$mm', 'as_of': '2026-03-31', 'value': 2399.7, 'measures': 'bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'stamp', 'what_it_is': 'bank CRE allocated to this metro by branch deposits'}
{'leg': 'cmbs', 'unit': '$mm', 'as_of': '2026-07-29', 'value': 831.0, 'measures': 'securitized loans in special servicing', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'stamp', 'what_it_is': "current balance on the non-pari-passu rows of this tape — the trust's slice, not the whole loan, on both sides of the ratio"}
Written from the figures above · CBSA 46060 · stress_metro · last changed 27 Aug 2026
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Which distress signals are elevated in Tucson, AZ, and which cannot be read?
For Tucson, AZ, the distress signals that are elevated include bank-distressed CRE ("distressed_lender_cre": $390.9mm), closures (store_closures_1y: 7) and WARN notices (warn_notices_1y: 19). The reading for CMBS special servicing is available but not elevated ("cmbs_ss_share_of_metro_upb": 4.2%), and bank CRE at risk is low (bank_cre_at_risk_p90: 1.2%). The signal that cannot be read is unclear from the provided data—no figure for distressed banks is given, but the count shows 0 distressed banks, so the bank distressed-asset figure is unavailable.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS in special servicing
- $35.0mm
- … as a share of this metro's CMBS balance
- 4.2%
- Bank CRE lent into this metro
- $2.40bn
- … at risk at the 90th percentile
- 1.2%
- CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line
- $390.9mm
- Assets at those lenders
- $0.00bn
- … share needing no branch-deposit allocation
- 0.0%
- Signals reading elevated
- bank CRE over the noncurrent line, store closures, WARN layoff notices
- Legs agreeing
- 3
- Phase
- early
- CMBS loans in special servicing
- 2
- Distressed banks
- 0
- Store closures (past year)
- 7
- WARN notices (past year)
- 19
the ground is deteriorating but CRE credit has not yet been hit — the leading edge
tens of millions of distressed CRE exposure
the ground is wobbling (closures / layoffs) but little CRE-credit distress sits behind it yet — a real-economy signal, not (yet) a CRE-credit event
Written from the figures above · CBSA 46060 · geo_metro_signals · last changed 27 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Jobs & Demand — the labor market under the collateralWatch it change →
Every other zone on this page reads the credit — what the loan is doing.
This one reads the demand underneath it. Office jobs pay office rent;
office rent services the office loan. When the jobs go, the DSCR follows — but not for another year or two.
That lag is the whole point of looking here.
Unemployment · Jul 2026
5.6%
+0.7pp yr
Last 24 months
3.6%5.7%
Monthly metro unemployment (BLS LAUS) — the freshest labor signal there is,
about six weeks behind. Read the direction, not the level: a 4% metro that is rising and a 6% metro that is
falling are not telling you the same thing.
Jobs by CRE-relevant sector · 2024
Annual employment by sector (BLS QCEW, 2024; 313,855 jobs in the metro).
QCEW lags — it is the structural read, not the current one, and we pair it with the monthly unemployment above on purpose.
Office-using sums five supersectors; where BLS withholds any one of them for
disclosure, we show nothing rather than a number we know is too low — so a missing sector here means
“suppressed at the source,” not “zero.”
Sector Heat — CMBS distress rate by property type (metro vs national)See the loans behind the bar →
This metro's CMBS runs 4.2% distressed where its own property mix predicts 4.5% — $2M less than this book would carry at the rate each property type runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted and excluding this metro. The gap is measured; the cause is not. 1 of 2 property types here run a higher distress rate than the national average for that type (the tick on each bar).
Elimination — does the gap survive a control?
Each row re-prices this metro's book on a finer cell — its own property types, then those types split by loan size, then by vintage — always at the rate that cell runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted. A gap that shrinks toward zero is explained by the control; one that stays has ruled it out. What is measured is what survives, not a cause.
property mix alone
-0.3pp
… and loan size held fixed
+0.5pp
there is no gap here to explain
… and vintage held fixed
-0.4pp
there is no gap here to explain
The largest single contributor is Retail: 24 loans, $467M, running 0.0% where the same type runs 2.7% elsewhere — worth 1.5pp of this metro's own rate.
Maturity Wall — CMBS coming due by year, distress within eachSee what’s maturing →
$106M — 13% of the metro's balance — matures within two years; the red slice of each bar is already distressed.
Distress Trend — is this market turning?Track it quarter by quarter →
Realized distress is RISING — 4.2% now (2026-07), +4.2pp over the year.
Same definition as the cards above — distressed means in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, dollar-weighted — on a different clock. The cards are today’s tape; this is the disclosed history panel, quarter by quarter, so you can read direction rather than level. Trusts file monthly, so a quarter is usually well covered within weeks of opening and the newest one shown is normally the current one; it is withheld only when its filed book falls below 60% of recent quarters.
Share of the metro’s CMBS in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, by quarter — a firmer, backward-looking read. A loan under 1.0x DSCR that is still paying is not counted here.
Submarket Heat — where in the metro the distress sitsOpen the submarket →
The top three submarkets hold $522M of the metro's $828M; each bar's colored share is its distress rate.
Bank Door — what the local bank sector could absorbSee it on every loan’s exit read →
$106M of CMBS matures here within two years.
The 3 regional and local banks that gather deposits here could write roughly
$4M more CRE before the 300% supervisory line, so the maturing balance is
26.83× that room.
The median metro sits at 0.12×.
Regional Bank Room
$4M
After Committed Draws
$2M / −53%
Maturing ÷ Room
26.83×
Banks In Footprint
3 / 1 at the line
The room above is already part-sold. Construction lending is a promise drawn
down over two or three years, and the undrawn part is an obligation the bank cannot decline while the borrower performs
— every one of those dollars lands in the same CRE book the 300% line governs. These banks
have $21M of construction committed and not yet
advanced, of which $2M
comes out of the room above, leaving $2M,
with 1 bank
whose entire remaining room is spoken for.
A bank with no room contributes zero here, never a negative one — capacity does not net
across balance sheets — so $19M of what has
been promised is not deducted at all, because there is nothing left to deduct it from. On today’s
capital that is funding already contracted which would cross the line as it draws.
Counted — 3 regional & local CRE lenders
| Bank | Deposit share | CRE / Capital* | Room contributed | Noncurrent CRE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Academy Bank, National Association MO | 0.7% | 228% total 294%
|
🔒 | 1.11% |
| First National Bank Texas TX | 0.3% | 206% total 240%
|
🔒 | 0.07% |
| Southwest Heritage Bank AZ | 31.9% | 311% total 428%
|
🔒 | 0.28% |
Not counted — 14 banks with deposits here
These hold deposits in this metro but are left out of the capacity above, because for them deposit location stops indicating where they lend — or they do not lend CRE at all. Real money that could refinance here is deliberately not counted.
no CRE book — CRE under 100% of capital — not a CRE lender
Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Association OH · Wells Fargo Bank, National Association SD · Bank Of America, National Association NC · Pnc Bank, National Association DE · Bmo Bank National Association IL · U.s. Bank National Association OH · The Northern Trust Company IL · First-Citizens Bank & Trust Company NC
national — operates in more than 5 states, so deposits stop indicating where it lends
Zions Bancorporation, N.a. UT · Western Alliance Bank AZ · Busey Bank IL · First Interstate Bank MT · Glacier Bank MT · Wafd Bank WA
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
How to read this. It is not whether any particular loan can refinance — a borrower also reaches
national banks, life companies, agencies and debt funds. It is how much of this metro’s maturing volume the local
bank sector could absorb if it were the only door.
Banks are placed by deposit share (FDIC Summary of Deposits, June 2025) — a proxy for
where they lend, not a measurement; call reports carry no collateral geography. Room = 3× total risk-based capital less CRE held
(SR 06-26, the capital base the rule names — not book equity), from Q2 2026 call reports, apportioned by that share.
Committed construction comes from FFIEC Schedule RC-L as filed at 2026-06-30 —
the undrawn half of loans already written, which the balance sheet above does not show.
Banks in more than 5 states, single-branch bookers and banks that do not lend CRE are excluded —
313 banks holding $268.2B of national capacity not counted here.
Local Lenders — banks headquartered here, worst CRE noncurrent firstUnlock each bank’s early-warning flag →
No locally-headquartered banks in our FDIC data for this metro.
Do the banks lending in Tucson, AZ have the capacity to refinance its maturing CRE?
Tucson, AZ screens as the 5 of 270 most strained metro on this measure, with a wall_to_room of 56.97 against $106.1mm maturing_bal across 13 maturing_loans over the 24-month horizon. That reading is an upper bound on how much of the CMBS wall local banks would have to absorb, and it sits above the median of 0.20, so this metro is MORE strained than the typical ranked metro. But the capacity question turns on who is visible here: only 3 banks_qualifying against 6 banks_excluded_here, and this metro's ratio is described as explained_by_exclusion, meaning the extreme reading is as much an artifact of who this read can see as evidence that credit is scarce. Room is thin in absolute terms too — $4.0mm room_before_committed, falling to $1.9mm room_after_committed once $20.7mm in committed_draws is deducted — and the wall-to-room ratio climbs from 26.83 wall_to_room_before_committed_draws to 56.97 on the post-draw basis, though whether national, card and charter banks would step in cannot be read from this data.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS maturing in the window
- $106.1mm
- … across this many loans
- 13
- Local bank room, before committed draws
- $4.0mm
- Committed construction draws
- $20.7mm
- Local bank room, after those draws
- $1.9mm
- Wall-to-room ratio
- 56.97
- Rank, most strained
- 5
- … out of this many metros ranked
- 270
- … before committed draws
- 26.83
- Population ranked against
- CMBS maturing within 24 months against regional/community bank room in this metro
- Qualifying local banks
- 3
- … excluded from the calculation
- 6
- Distressed share of this metro's CMBS
- 4.2%
- Total CMBS balance here
- $828.0mm
- Capacity band
- tight
Compared against a median wall-to-room ratio of
0.20 across the ranked metros.
56.97 is ABOVE the median of 0.20, so this metro is MORE strained than the typical ranked metro
5 of 270, counting from the MOST strained — a LOWER rank number means MORE strain
{'room_is_a_proxy': 'Room is what regional and community banks could still write before the SR 06-26 concentration line, after deducting construction draws already committed. Deposit footprint is a proxy for lending footprint, not a measurement of it.', 'ratio_is_not_size': 'The most extreme ratios belong to the smallest metros. Read maturing_bal_mm beside the ratio — the map sizes bubbles by the wall, not the strain, for exactly this reason.', 'wall_is_cmbs_only': "The wall is the CMBS balance maturing within 24 months — the maturing debt this platform can see, not the metro's whole maturity load. Every ratio is an upper bound on how much of it local banks would have to absorb.", 'exclusion_artifact': 'A high ratio is as often an exclusion artifact as a credit event. Banks whose deposits do not indicate where they lend (nationals, card and charter banks) are excluded from the room, so a metro served mainly by those reads strained while its credit is simply invisible here. Check banks_qualifying against banks_excluded_here, and explained_by_exclusion.'}
{'fork': 'exclusion, not scarcity', 'note': "More banks are excluded here (6) than qualify (3). This metro's ratio is an artifact of who this read can see, not evidence that credit is scarce."}
True
Written from the figures above · CBSA 46060 · capacity_metro · last changed 13 Sep 2026
· Ask your own question →
On The Ground — recent closures, layoffs & CRE bankruptciesTie these events to loans →
25 local distress events in the past year (1,470 jobs) — store closures, layoffs, and commercial real estate bankruptcies near this metro's collateral.
2026-07-21
CLOSURE
Tucson
2026-07-21
LAYOFF
99 jobs · Tucson
2026-07-09
LAYOFF
99 jobs · Tucson
2026-07-09
LAYOFF
Tucson
2026-07-07
CLOSURE
Tucson
2026-06-12
LAYOFF
Tucson
2026-06-12
LAYOFF
77 jobs · Tucson
2026-04-17
LAYOFF
312 jobs · Tucson
2026-04-17
LAYOFF
312 jobs · Tucson
2026-04-17
LAYOFF
Tucson
2026-04-17
LAYOFF
Tucson
2026-04-15
LAYOFF
85 jobs · Tucson
2026-04-15
LAYOFF
Tucson
2026-04-09
LAYOFF
203 jobs · Tucson
2026-03-31
CLOSURE
Tucson
What has actually happened on the ground in Tucson, AZ recently?
In the last 365 days, Tucson, AZ has recorded 7 store closures and 18 WARN notices, affecting 1,470 jobs, with 0 CRE-likely bankruptcies during the window. The jobs figure is a floor, as some notices lack stated headcounts, and the bankruptcy count is a state-proxy, not metro-native.
The figures behind this answer
- Store closures
- 7
- WARN layoff notices
- 18
- Jobs on those notices
- 1,470
- CRE-related bankruptcies
- 0
- Window, in days
- 365
STATE PROXY — bankruptcy filings carry the filer's state, not the property's location, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count.
affected_employees is nullable — notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, so this is a floor.
Closures are matched ZIP -> CBSA and only APPROVED rows count (a pending, machine-extracted row is not yet a closure). This mirrors the Metro Pulse page, not the convergence board — the board applies neither filter and counts higher. Layoffs take the same ZIP -> CBSA and review treatment, and a WARN notice counts if it affects >= 10 people or does not state a headcount (a NULL is not 'fewer than 10').
Written from the figures above · CBSA 46060 · geo_events · last changed 06 Sep 2026
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What this page can’t do
Everything above is a snapshot — one market, as it stands today, and
it’s yours to read. What a snapshot can’t tell you is when it moves: which loan slipped a DSCR band
this month, which bank’s early-warning rank crossed into the top quartile, which submarket started turning
while the headline number still looked fine. Distress doesn’t announce itself on the day you happen to check.
This page
One metro · one moment · you come looking.
Verstavo
Every metro · every month · it comes looking for you.
CMBS covers the securitized slice of CRE; bank, closure and layoff signals widen the view.
“No data” in a zone means we don’t observe it here, not that there is no stress.
Employment is BLS (QCEW annual, LAUS monthly) — public data, and the demand leg under all of it.
See the whole picture, not just the pulse.
Metro Pulse is the free, public read. The Verstavo platform goes loan‑by‑loan — stress
scores, maturity walls, special‑servicing transfers, bank CRE, and your own portfolio benchmarked
against the market.