Commercial Real Estate Credit —
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL
The state of disclosed CRE credit in this market · FL
The read
$1.9B of CMBS across 102 loans. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2031 ($522M, 28% of the book). Retail is the largest book ($496M, 0.0% distressed). Distress is flat in the filed record — 0.5% as of 2026-07. 57 on-the-ground distress events in the past year (2,235 jobs).
Overview
CMBS
Submarkets
Local Banks
Jobs & Demand
On The Ground
Loading map…
The CMBS properties our stress model flags here, plus recent store closures and layoffs. Stressed is a wider net than distressed — the distressed figure above counts only loans already in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, while these dots also include performing loans facing maturity or coverage pressure. Property dots sit at the center of their ZIP code, not the building — they show where stress concentrates, not which asset. Closures and layoffs are pinned to address where we have it. Open any dot to the building and the loan behind it →
Tampa's filed record holds flat while the Main Street tally climbs
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater carries $1.9 billion of CMBS across 102 loans, and the filed distress record is quiet: 0.5% as of July 2026, flat, against a median DSCR of 1.96. Retail is the largest book at $496 million and shows 0.0% distressed — a striking read next to the 2.7% national retail rate. The pattern holds across the metro: office runs 2.4% versus 11.3% nationally, hospitality and multifamily both sit at 0.0% against 6.1% and 7.6%. On the servicer's books, Tampa is running well inside the national marks.
The maturity wall is a 2031 story. The heaviest load lands that year at $522 million, 28% of the book, and it carries a 0.0% distress rate today. The nearer years are lighter and mostly clean, with one exception worth flagging: the 2028 vintage shows a 3.1% distress rate, the only maturity band in the metro registering any strain. Only $0.4 billion comes due inside 24 months.
The on-the-ground tally is where the tension sits. The past year brought 57 distress events — 39 store closures and 18 layoff notices — touching 2,235 jobs, even as the securitized record stayed flat. Unemployment stands at 4.8%, up 0.7 points year over year, and office-using employment is down 1.6%. The filed distress hasn't moved; the ground-level record has been building underneath it.
CMBS Distressed UPB
$10M / 0.6%
in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent
CMBS Maturing ≤ 24mo
$377M
Local Banks (stressed)
1 / 11
Bank Early-Warning
3 flagged
Store Closures (1y)
39
Layoff Notices (1y)
18 / 2,235 jobs
0.17% of metro employment
CMBS Loans / UPB
102 / $1.9B
Unemployment · Jul 2026
4.8%
+0.7pp yr
Office-Using Jobs · 2024
368,144
-1.6% yr
How much CRE distress is there in Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL right now?
All four distress signals are running elevated in Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL right now, with 0 of 6 indicator pairs quiet and 0 of 6 disagreeing. Store closures are elevated, ranked 16th of 392 by count and 146th by rate (2.25 per 100k jobs); WARN layoff notices are elevated, ranked 22nd of 386 by count and 137th by rate (0.16% of employment); bank CRE over the noncurrent line is elevated, ranked 34th of 393 by count and 110th by rate (6.91% of the $21,004.0mm allocated to this metro); and securitized loans in special servicing are elevated, ranked 5th of 335 by count and 102nd by rate (0.54% of the $1,837.0mm current balance, though that rate is a floor measured over 2.9% of special-servicing rows). The unanimous agreement across all six pairs — closures with WARN, closures with bank, closures with CMBS, WARN with bank, WARN with CMBS, and bank with CMBS — points to broad-based stress across both the tenant and lender sides, not a single-sector story.
The figures behind this answer
| Signal | Level | Rate | Rank by count | Rank by rate | Reading |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| store closures store closures per 100,000 jobs |
29 closures | 2.25 per 100k jobs | 16 of 392 | 146 of 392 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| layoff notices (WARN) workers on layoff notices as a share of the metro's employment |
43 notices | 0.16% | 22 of 386 | 137 of 386 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line share of the CRE lent into this metro that sits at a lender over the blended-noncurrent line |
$1.45bn | 6.91% | 34 of 393 | 110 of 393 | elevated
allocated 2026-03-31
|
| securitized loans in special servicing share of the securitized balance read here that is in special servicing |
35 loan records | 0.54% | 5 of 335 | 102 of 335 | elevated
floor 2026-07-29
|
6 pairs compared
6 both elevated
0 both quiet
0 disagreeing
0 unreadable — a side is blind
4 of four legs elevated
one metro, four independent feeds, each on its own denominator
{'coverage': "114 of 441 metros have at least one blind leg and 48 are blind on all four. Those 48 are the same metros the board's map cannot place and the metro resolver cannot name: one ZIP-to-CBSA crosswalk boundary, showing up three ways.", 'a_count_ranks_by_size': 'Elevation is computed on the COUNT, over a flat threshold, which is a size filter. New York is 2nd of 392 by store closures and 264th of the same 392 by closures per job — both true, and which one you lead with decides what the reader believes. Every leg carries both ranks over ONE population; quote the rate beside the count.', 'disagreement_is_not_severity': 'Where two legs disagree, that is usually a fact about WHICH mechanism is running, not an error in either feed and not a worse metro. The six pairs read different populations, and each note is a STRUCTURAL prior about those populations — nothing here measures a lead or a lag between two legs, so never report one as timing.', 'a_blind_leg_is_not_a_quiet_one': "A leg with no denominator, or whose numerator cannot be measured, reads LOW and means nothing. Each leg publishes a measurement state (allocated, floor, measured, no denominator, no rate, not measurable) for that reason. Never report a blind leg as 'no distress'."}
{'leg': 'closures', 'unit': 'jobs', 'as_of': 'trailing 365 days to today', 'value': 1287665, 'measures': 'store closures', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'window', 'what_it_is': "all metro jobs, QCEW annual average — a SIZE normaliser, not a matched population: the feed spans retail, food service and pharmacy and no single QCEW sector covers it. The MATCHED read sits beside it as this leg's second reading"}
{'leg': 'warn', 'unit': 'employed', 'as_of': 'trailing 365 days to today', 'value': 1619264, 'measures': 'layoff notices (WARN)', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'window', 'what_it_is': 'employed persons, BLS LAUS, not seasonally adjusted'}
{'leg': 'bank', 'unit': '$mm', 'as_of': '2026-03-31', 'value': 21004.0, 'measures': 'bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'stamp', 'what_it_is': 'bank CRE allocated to this metro by branch deposits'}
{'leg': 'cmbs', 'unit': '$mm', 'as_of': '2026-07-29', 'value': 1837.0, 'measures': 'securitized loans in special servicing', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'stamp', 'what_it_is': "current balance on the non-pari-passu rows of this tape — the trust's slice, not the whole loan, on both sides of the ratio"}
Written from the figures above · CBSA 45300 · stress_metro · last changed 28 Aug 2026
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Which distress signals are elevated in Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL, and which cannot be read?
The elevated distress signals in Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL are bank_distressed_cre, cmbs_ss, closures, and warn. Specifically, 24.6% of bank CRE allocations sit at the 90th percentile at risk, with $21.00bn in bank CRE exposure and $1.45bn in distressed lender CRE (backed by 1.2 distressed bank assets). CMBS special servicing shows $10.0mm in UPB, equal to 0.5% of metro UPB. Real-economy signals include 29 store closures and 43 WARN notices, with a convergence score of 4.
The securitized credit side cannot be read: the CMBS dollar figure is measured over only 2.9% of the metro’s 35 special-servicing loans (the rest carry no balance), so it is a floor, not a full reading. The phase is obscured — the ground is deteriorating, but whether CRE credit is truly hit is unreadable here, per the costume rationale: a real-economy signal, not yet a CRE-credit event.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS in special servicing
- $10.0mm
- … as a share of this metro's CMBS balance
- 0.5%
- Bank CRE lent into this metro
- $21.00bn
- … at risk at the 90th percentile
- 22.0%
- CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line
- $1.45bn
- Assets at those lenders
- $1.20bn
- … share needing no branch-deposit allocation
- 24.6%
- Signals reading elevated
- bank CRE over the noncurrent line, CMBS in special servicing, store closures, WARN layoff notices
- Legs agreeing
- 4
- Phase
- obscured
- CMBS loans in special servicing
- 35
- Distressed banks
- 1
- Store closures (past year)
- 29
- WARN notices (past year)
- 43
the ground is deteriorating, and whether CRE credit has been hit here CANNOT BE READ: the securitized dollars are measured over 2.9% of its 35 special-servicing rows — the securitized side is invisible here, which is not the same as quiet
little to no distressed CRE dollars behind the signals; measured over 2.9% of this metro's 35 special-servicing rows — the rest carry no balance, so the dollar figure is a FLOOR
the ground is wobbling (closures / layoffs) but little CRE-credit distress sits behind it yet — a real-economy signal, not (yet) a CRE-credit event
Written from the figures above · CBSA 45300 · geo_metro_signals · last changed 27 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Jobs & Demand — the labor market under the collateralWatch it change →
Every other zone on this page reads the credit — what the loan is doing.
This one reads the demand underneath it. Office jobs pay office rent;
office rent services the office loan. When the jobs go, the DSCR follows — but not for another year or two.
That lag is the whole point of looking here.
Unemployment · Jul 2026
4.8%
+0.7pp yr
Last 24 months
3.3%5.1%
Monthly metro unemployment (BLS LAUS) — the freshest labor signal there is,
about six weeks behind. Read the direction, not the level: a 4% metro that is rising and a 6% metro that is
falling are not telling you the same thing.
Jobs by CRE-relevant sector · 2024
Annual employment by sector (BLS QCEW, 2024; 1,287,665 jobs in the metro).
QCEW lags — it is the structural read, not the current one, and we pair it with the monthly unemployment above on purpose.
Office-using sums five supersectors; where BLS withholds any one of them for
disclosure, we show nothing rather than a number we know is too low — so a missing sector here means
“suppressed at the source,” not “zero.”
Sector Heat — CMBS distress rate by property type (metro vs national)See the loans behind the bar →
This metro's CMBS runs 0.6% distressed where its own property mix predicts 6.0% — $101M less than this book would carry at the rate each property type runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted and excluding this metro. The gap is measured; the cause is not. 0 of 5 property types here run a higher distress rate than the national average for that type (the tick on each bar).
Elimination — does the gap survive a control?
Each row re-prices this metro's book on a finer cell — its own property types, then those types split by loan size, then by vintage — always at the rate that cell runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted. A gap that shrinks toward zero is explained by the control; one that stays has ruled it out. What is measured is what survives, not a cause.
property mix alone
-5.4pp
… and loan size held fixed
-5.7pp
the gap is still there with loan size held fixed too
… and vintage held fixed
-3.7pp
the gap is still there with vintage held fixed too
The largest single contributor is Office: 17 loans, $424M, running 2.4% where the same type runs 11.3% elsewhere — worth 2.0pp of this metro's own rate.
Maturity Wall — CMBS coming due by year, distress within eachSee what’s maturing →
$377M — 20% of the metro's balance — matures within two years; the red slice of each bar is already distressed.
Distress Trend — is this market turning?Track it quarter by quarter →
Realized distress is FLAT — 0.5% now (2026-07), +0.5pp over the year.
Same definition as the cards above — distressed means in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, dollar-weighted — on a different clock. The cards are today’s tape; this is the disclosed history panel, quarter by quarter, so you can read direction rather than level. Trusts file monthly, so a quarter is usually well covered within weeks of opening and the newest one shown is normally the current one; it is withheld only when its filed book falls below 60% of recent quarters.
Share of the metro’s CMBS in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, by quarter — a firmer, backward-looking read. A loan under 1.0x DSCR that is still paying is not counted here.
Submarket Heat — where in the metro the distress sitsOpen the submarket →
The top three submarkets hold $1.1B of the metro's $1.9B; each bar's colored share is its distress rate.
Bank Door — what the local bank sector could absorbSee it on every loan’s exit read →
$377M of CMBS matures here within two years.
The 23 regional and local banks that gather deposits here could write roughly
$1.7B more CRE before the 300% supervisory line, so the maturing balance is
0.22× that room.
The median metro sits at 0.12×.
Regional Bank Room
$1.7B
After Committed Draws
$1.2B / −28%
Maturing ÷ Room
0.22×
Banks In Footprint
23 / 3 at the line
The room above is already part-sold. Construction lending is a promise drawn
down over two or three years, and the undrawn part is an obligation the bank cannot decline while the borrower performs
— every one of those dollars lands in the same CRE book the 300% line governs. These banks
have $627M of construction committed and not yet
advanced, of which $468M
comes out of the room above, leaving $1.2B,
with 7 banks
whose entire remaining room is spoken for.
A bank with no room contributes zero here, never a negative one — capacity does not net
across balance sheets — so $159M of what has
been promised is not deducted at all, because there is nothing left to deduct it from. On today’s
capital that is funding already contracted which would cross the line as it draws.
SR 06-26 draws a second line at 100% of capital for construction and land:
9 more cross it
once their own commitments fund.
Counted — 23 regional & local CRE lenders
| Bank | Deposit share | CRE / Capital* | Room contributed | Noncurrent CRE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| The Bank Of Tampa FL | 96.4% | 156% total 309%
|
🔒 | 0.03% |
| Hancock Whitney Bank MS | 3.4% | 146% total 229%
|
🔒 | 0.26% |
| Republic Bank & Trust Company KY | 10.4% | 125% total 186%
|
🔒 | 0.25% |
| Bayfirst National Bank FL | 78.5% | 115% total 229%
|
🔒 | 3.43% |
| Everbank, National Association FL | 2.2% | 169% total 175%
|
🔒 | 1.03% |
| Centennial Bank AR | 5.4% | 257% total 315%
|
🔒 | 0.46% |
| Seacoast National Bank FL | 4.7% | 230% total 325%
|
🔒 | 0.57% |
| Bankunited, National Association FL | 1.5% | 194% total 243%
|
🔒 | 0.62% |
| Cogent Bank FL | 15.8% | 162% total 276%
|
🔒 | 0.32% |
| American Momentum Bank TX | 7.8% | 173% total 214%
|
🔒 | 4.40% |
| Climate First Bank FL | 65.4% | 261% total 347%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Capital City Bank FL | 4.6% | 122% total 193%
|
🔒 | 0.40% |
| First National Bank Of Pasco FL | 100.0% | 224% total 274%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Brannen Bank FL | 14.6% | 140% total 202%
|
🔒 | 0.01% |
| Citizens Bank And Trust FL | 6.2% | 164% total 313%
|
🔒 | 0.71% |
| Amerant Bank, National Association FL | 1.2% | 218% total 287%
|
🔒 | 1.61% |
| Stearns Bank National Association MN | 1.0% | 148% total 215%
|
🔒 | 4.13% |
| Bankflorida FL | 56.8% | 281% total 437%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Florida Capital Bank, National Association FL | 4.6% | 228% total 318%
|
🔒 | 0.24% |
| Bank Of Central Florida FL | 10.9% | 290% total 426%
|
🔒 | 0.35% |
| Flagship Bank FL | 100.0% | 419% total 548%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Central Bank FL | 55.1% | 398% total 588%
|
🔒 | 0.06% |
| Inb, National Association IL | 3.6% | 349% total 468%
|
🔒 | 1.48% |
Not counted — 30 banks with deposits here
These hold deposits in this metro but are left out of the capacity above, because for them deposit location stops indicating where they lend — or they do not lend CRE at all. Real money that could refinance here is deliberately not counted.
no CRE book — CRE under 100% of capital — not a CRE lender
Truist Bank NC · Bank Of America, National Association NC · Wells Fargo Bank, National Association SD · Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Association OH · Regions Bank AL · Fifth Third Bank, National Association OH · Pnc Bank, National Association DE · Td Bank, National Association DE · Third Federal Savings And Loan Association Of Cleveland OH · The Northern Trust Company IL · Tcm Bank, National Association FL · Bmo Bank National Association IL · First-Citizens Bank & Trust Company NC · Trustco Bank NY · Beal Bank Usa NV · Bny Mellon, National Association PA · Cibc National Trust Company GA
national — operates in more than 5 states, so deposits stop indicating where it lends
Bank Ozk AR · First Horizon Bank TN · Southstate Bank, National Association FL · Metro City Bank GA · Renasant Bank MS · United Community Bank SC · Encore Bank AR · Woodforest National Bank TX · Valley National Bank NJ · Servisfirst Bank AL
booked here — books nearly all deposits to one branch — a charter address, not a footprint
Raymond James Bank FL · Century Bank Of Florida FL · Waterfall Bank FL
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
How to read this. It is not whether any particular loan can refinance — a borrower also reaches
national banks, life companies, agencies and debt funds. It is how much of this metro’s maturing volume the local
bank sector could absorb if it were the only door.
Banks are placed by deposit share (FDIC Summary of Deposits, June 2025) — a proxy for
where they lend, not a measurement; call reports carry no collateral geography. Room = 3× total risk-based capital less CRE held
(SR 06-26, the capital base the rule names — not book equity), from Q2 2026 call reports, apportioned by that share.
Committed construction comes from FFIEC Schedule RC-L as filed at 2026-06-30 —
the undrawn half of loans already written, which the balance sheet above does not show.
Banks in more than 5 states, single-branch bookers and banks that do not lend CRE are excluded —
313 banks holding $268.2B of national capacity not counted here.
Local Lenders — banks headquartered here, worst CRE noncurrent firstUnlock each bank’s early-warning flag →
| Bank | Total CRE | CRE / Capital* | Noncurrent CRE | Early Warning |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bayfirst National Bank | $257M | 115% total 229%
|
3.43% | 🔒 |
| Bankflorida | $259M | 281% total 437%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
| Flagship Bank | $485M | 419% total 548%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
| Raymond James Bank | $4.0B | 103% total 103%
|
1.49% | 🔒 |
| Central Bank | $210M | 398% total 588%
|
0.06% | 🔒 |
| The Bank Of Tampa | $1.1B | 156% total 309%
|
0.03% | 🔒 |
| Climate First Bank | $673M | 261% total 347%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
| Waterfall Bank | $289M | 441% total 515%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
Banks are matched to their HQ metro (a proxy for footprint). Noncurrent CRE = CRE-balance-weighted blend of multifamily / nonresidential / construction noncurrent (distress already arrived). Early Warning is a validated leading signal — the bank’s 30-89 early-delinquency rank among all CRE lenders this quarter, which has predicted ~2.3× forward CRE distress. Per-bank flags are on a plan.
Do the banks lending in Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL have the capacity to refinance its maturing CRE?
In Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL, the banks lending there appear to have ample capacity to absorb the visible maturity wall: regional and community bank room stands at $1.23bn after committed draws, against a CMBS wall of $376.5mm maturing within 24 months, giving a wall-to-room ratio of 0.31 (or 0.22 before committed draws), and only 19 maturing loans with a distressed share of 0.6%. Even so, the metro ranks 111 of 270, counting from the most strained — a lower rank number means more strain — and 0.31 is ABOVE the median of 0.20, so this metro is MORE strained than the typical ranked metro; the picture rests on 23 banks qualifying while 13 are excluded here, and because room is a proxy, the wall is CMBS only, and a high ratio can be an exclusion artifact, the true refinancing capacity is best read as slack but not unlimited.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS maturing in the window
- $376.5mm
- … across this many loans
- 19
- Local bank room, before committed draws
- $1.70bn
- Committed construction draws
- $627.4mm
- Local bank room, after those draws
- $1.23bn
- Wall-to-room ratio
- 0.31
- Rank, most strained
- 111
- … out of this many metros ranked
- 270
- … before committed draws
- 0.22
- Population ranked against
- CMBS maturing within 24 months against regional/community bank room in this metro
- Qualifying local banks
- 23
- … excluded from the calculation
- 13
- Distressed share of this metro's CMBS
- 0.6%
- Total CMBS balance here
- $1.86bn
- Capacity band
- slack
Compared against a median wall-to-room ratio of
0.20 across the ranked metros.
0.31 is ABOVE the median of 0.20, so this metro is MORE strained than the typical ranked metro
111 of 270, counting from the MOST strained — a LOWER rank number means MORE strain
{'room_is_a_proxy': 'Room is what regional and community banks could still write before the SR 06-26 concentration line, after deducting construction draws already committed. Deposit footprint is a proxy for lending footprint, not a measurement of it.', 'ratio_is_not_size': 'The most extreme ratios belong to the smallest metros. Read maturing_bal_mm beside the ratio — the map sizes bubbles by the wall, not the strain, for exactly this reason.', 'wall_is_cmbs_only': "The wall is the CMBS balance maturing within 24 months — the maturing debt this platform can see, not the metro's whole maturity load. Every ratio is an upper bound on how much of it local banks would have to absorb.", 'exclusion_artifact': 'A high ratio is as often an exclusion artifact as a credit event. Banks whose deposits do not indicate where they lend (nationals, card and charter banks) are excluded from the room, so a metro served mainly by those reads strained while its credit is simply invisible here. Check banks_qualifying against banks_excluded_here, and explained_by_exclusion.'}
Written from the figures above · CBSA 45300 · capacity_metro · last changed 13 Sep 2026
· Ask your own question →
Apartment-REIT Operating Read — same-store disclosures for this metro · as of 2026-07-30Set against the loan book →
Same-Store NOI
-1.7%
Same-Store Revenue
-1.2%
Occupancy
96.0%
Rent Growth
-1.1%
| REIT | SS NOI | SS Revenue | Occupancy | Rent | As Of |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CPT | +0.6% | -0.9% | 95.5% | -1.4% | 2026-07-30 |
| MAA | -2.0% | -0.9% | 95.8% | -0.3% | 2026-07-29 |
| UDR | -3.6% | -1.7% | 96.6% | -1.7% | 2026-07-27 |
Same-store operating results disclosed by public apartment REITs (AVB · EQR · ESS · MAA · CPT · UDR) for this market in their quarterly supplements. Directional market context — an operating trend, not a Verstavo score.
On The Ground — recent closures, layoffs & CRE bankruptciesTie these events to loans →
57 local distress events in the past year (2,235 jobs) — store closures, layoffs, and commercial real estate bankruptcies near this metro's collateral.
2026-09-02
BANKRUPTCY
CRE-linked bankruptcy
2026-08-19
CLOSURE
Tampa
2026-08-11
CLOSURE
Brandon
2026-08-11
CLOSURE
Tampa
2026-08-06
CLOSURE
Saint Petersburg
2026-08-06
CLOSURE
St. Petersburg
2026-08-04
CLOSURE
Clearwater
2026-08-04
CLOSURE
Tampa
2026-08-04
CLOSURE
Odessa
2026-08-04
CLOSURE
Palm Harbor
2026-08-04
CLOSURE
Clearwater
2026-08-04
CLOSURE
Tampa
2026-08-04
CLOSURE
Odessa
2026-07-21
LAYOFF
157 jobs · WIMAUMA
2026-07-02
BANKRUPTCY
CRE-linked bankruptcy
What has actually happened on the ground in Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL recently?
Over the trailing 365 days, the Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL metro has recorded 39 store closures and 18 warn_notices, with 2,235 jobs_affected — a floor, since affected_employees is nullable and notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs. CRE-side distress shows 4 cre_bankruptcies, though this is a STATE PROXY — bankruptcy filings carry the filer's state, not the property's location, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in, and is not a metro-native count.
The figures behind this answer
- Store closures
- 39
- WARN layoff notices
- 18
- Jobs on those notices
- 2,235
- CRE-related bankruptcies
- 4
- Window, in days
- 365
STATE PROXY — bankruptcy filings carry the filer's state, not the property's location, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count.
affected_employees is nullable — notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, so this is a floor.
Closures are matched ZIP -> CBSA and only APPROVED rows count (a pending, machine-extracted row is not yet a closure). This mirrors the Metro Pulse page, not the convergence board — the board applies neither filter and counts higher. Layoffs take the same ZIP -> CBSA and review treatment, and a WARN notice counts if it affects >= 10 people or does not state a headcount (a NULL is not 'fewer than 10').
Written from the figures above · CBSA 45300 · geo_events · last changed 13 Sep 2026
· Ask your own question →
What this page can’t do
Everything above is a snapshot — one market, as it stands today, and
it’s yours to read. What a snapshot can’t tell you is when it moves: which loan slipped a DSCR band
this month, which bank’s early-warning rank crossed into the top quartile, which submarket started turning
while the headline number still looked fine. Distress doesn’t announce itself on the day you happen to check.
This page
One metro · one moment · you come looking.
Verstavo
Every metro · every month · it comes looking for you.
CMBS covers the securitized slice of CRE; bank, closure and layoff signals widen the view.
“No data” in a zone means we don’t observe it here, not that there is no stress.
Employment is BLS (QCEW annual, LAUS monthly) — public data, and the demand leg under all of it.
See the whole picture, not just the pulse.
Metro Pulse is the free, public read. The Verstavo platform goes loan‑by‑loan — stress
scores, maturity walls, special‑servicing transfers, bank CRE, and your own portfolio benchmarked
against the market.