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Commercial Real Estate Credit —
St. Louis, MO-IL
The state of disclosed CRE credit in this market · IL, MO
The read
$1.8B of CMBS across 76 loans. Retail is both the largest book ($650M) and the most distressed (38.6% vs 2.6% national). Distress is rising in the filed record — 33.6% as of 2026-07. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2028 ($702M, 40% of the book). 51 on-the-ground distress events in the past year (3,367 jobs).
Overview
CMBS
Submarkets
Local Banks
Jobs & Demand
On The Ground
Loading map…
The CMBS properties our stress model flags here, plus recent store closures and layoffs. Stressed is a wider net than distressed — the distressed figure above counts only loans already in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, while these dots also include performing loans facing maturity or coverage pressure. Property dots sit at the center of their ZIP code, not the building — they show where stress concentrates, not which asset. Closures and layoffs are pinned to address where we have it. Open any dot to the building and the loan behind it →
Retail Carries the Book, and Carries the Distress
St. Louis runs $1.8B of CMBS across 76 loans, and the strain is concentrated where the money is. Retail is both the largest book at $650M and the most distressed, at a 38.6% distress rate against a 2.6% national mark — the metro's dominant sector is also its weakest. Multifamily tells a similar story at 37.6% versus 7.9% nationally. The metro-wide rate sits at 36.1%, and the filed record has been rising: the latest reading, as of July 2026, stands at 33.6%.
The maturity wall is front-loaded. The heaviest load lands in 2028, where $702M comes due — 40% of the entire book — with another $0.4B behind it in 2029. The 2027 slice, at $0.2B, already carries a 23.3% distress rate. Median DSCR across the book is 1.69.
The on-the-ground record reinforces the servicer data: 51 distress events in the past year — 21 store closures and 30 layoff notices totaling 3,394 jobs. On the bank side, 10 of 44 lenders are distressed with another 8 flagged on early warning. Unemployment, at 3.9% as of August 2026, is down 0.4 points year over year, a note of ground-level stability against a CMBS book where more than a third of the balance is impaired.
Written 2026-10-27
CMBS Distressed UPB
$640M / 36.1%
in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent
CMBS Maturing ≤ 24mo
$614M
Banks HQ’d Here (stressed)
10 / 44
Bank Early-Warning
8 flagged
Store Closures (1y)
21
Layoff Notices (1y)
30 / 3,367 jobs
0.29% of metro employment
CMBS Loans / UPB
76 / $1.8B
Unemployment · Aug 2026
3.9%
-0.4pp yr
How much CRE distress is there in St. Louis, MO-IL right now?
St. Louis shows distress across all four feeds: store closures at 21 closures, or 1.79 per 100k jobs, which is elevated on the count but below the median of its own rate ranking — a size effect rather than stress per unit of the metro; layoff notices (WARN) at 35 notices, or 0.24%; bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line at $4.19bn, or 11.86%; and securitized loans in special servicing at 12 loan records, or 36.14%. All four legs are elevated, with 6 of 6 pairs of legs compared reading both legs elevated and 0 pairs where the legs disagree, and the caveat that a blind leg is not a quiet one does not apply here since no leg is blind. The bank leg carries a stated caveat about allocation by branch deposits, and the closures figure should be quoted beside its rate.
The figures behind this answer
| Signal | Level | Rate | Rank by count | Rank by rate | Reading |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| store closures store closures per 100,000 jobs |
21 closures | 1.79 per 100k jobs | 26 of 392 | 227 of 392 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| layoff notices (WARN) workers on layoff notices as a share of the metro's employment |
35 notices | 0.24% | 22 of 382 | 100 of 382 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line share of the CRE lent into this metro that sits at a lender over the blended-noncurrent line |
$4.19bn | 11.86% | 14 of 393 | 43 of 393 | elevated
allocated 2026-06-30
|
| securitized loans in special servicing share of the securitized balance read here that is in special servicing |
12 loan records | 36.14% | 14 of 335 | 8 of 335 | elevated 2026-09-29
|
6 pairs compared
6 both elevated
0 both quiet
0 disagreeing
0 unreadable — a side is blind
4 of four legs elevated
one metro, four independent feeds, each on its own denominator
124 of 447 metros have at least one blind leg and 54 are blind on all four. Those 54 are the same metros the board's map cannot place and the metro resolver cannot name: one ZIP-to-CBSA crosswalk boundary, showing up three ways.
Elevation is computed on the COUNT, over a flat threshold, which is a size filter. New York is 2nd of 392 by store closures and 264th of the same 392 by closures per job — both true, and which one you lead with decides what the reader believes.
Where two legs disagree, that is usually a fact about WHICH mechanism is running, not an error in either feed and not a worse metro.
A leg with no denominator, or whose numerator cannot be measured, reads LOW and means nothing. Each leg publishes a measurement state (allocated, floor, measured, no denominator, no rate, not measurable) for that reason.
elevated by size, not by rate — store closures clear a flat count threshold while sitting below the median of their own rate ranking. Any reading that leans on them is a statement about how big this metro is.
Store closures: divided by 1,175,373 jobs
— all metro jobs, QCEW annual average — a SIZE normaliser, not a matched population: the feed spans retail, food service and pharmacy and no single QCEW sector covers it. The MATCHED read sits beside it as this leg's second reading (trailing 365 days to today).
Layoff notices (WARN): divided by 1,432,905 employed
— employed persons, BLS LAUS, not seasonally adjusted (trailing 365 days to today).
Bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line: divided by $35,315.8 mm
— bank CRE allocated to this metro by branch deposits (2026-06-30).
Securitized loans in special servicing: divided by $1,771.0 mm
— current balance on the non-pari-passu rows of this tape — the trust's slice, not the whole loan, on both sides of the ratio (2026-09-29).
Written from the figures above · CBSA 41180 · stress_metro · last changed 01 Nov 2026
· Ask your own question →
Which distress signals are elevated in St. Louis, MO-IL, and which cannot be read?
In St. Louis, MO-IL, the elevated distress signals span both credit and real-economy channels: bank CRE lent into this metro totals $35.32bn with 23.9% at risk at the 90th percentile, $4.19bn of CRE sits at lenders over the noncurrent line, CMBS in special servicing reaches $640.0mm or 36.1% share of this metro's CMBS balance in special servicing, while 35 warn notices and 21 store closures appear over the past year alongside assets at those lenders of $25.40bn; the share of bank CRE needing no branch-deposit allocation reads 36.6%. The reading on signals reading elevated cannot be summarized as a single count beyond the four flagged channels, and no figure is available here for legs agreeing beyond the stated 4.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS in special servicing
- $640.0mm
- … as a share of this metro's CMBS balance
- 36.1%
- Bank CRE lent into this metro
- $35.32bn
- … at risk at the 90th percentile
- 23.9%
- CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line
- $4.19bn
- Assets at those lenders
- $25.40bn
- … share needing no branch-deposit allocation
- 36.6%
- Signals reading elevated
- bank CRE over the noncurrent line, CMBS in special servicing, store closures, WARN layoff notices
- Legs agreeing
- 4
- Phase
- peak
- CMBS loans in special servicing
- 12
- Distressed banks
- 10
- Store closures (past year)
- 21
- WARN notices (past year)
- 35
leading (real-economy) and realized (credit) signals are firing together
hundreds of millions of distressed CRE exposure
credit distress AND ground-level distress, with real dollars behind the credit side
Written from the figures above · CBSA 41180 · geo_metro_signals · last changed 01 Nov 2026
· Ask your own question →
Jobs & Demand — the labor market under the collateralWatch it change →
Every other zone on this page reads the credit — what the loan is doing.
This one reads the demand underneath it. Office jobs pay office rent;
office rent services the office loan. When the jobs go, the DSCR follows — but not for another year or two.
That lag is the whole point of looking here.
Unemployment · Aug 2026
3.9%
-0.4pp yr
Last 24 months
3.2%4.6%
Monthly metro unemployment (BLS LAUS) — the freshest labor signal there is,
about six weeks behind. Read the direction, not the level: a 4% metro that is rising and a 6% metro that is
falling are not telling you the same thing.
Jobs by CRE-relevant sector · 2024
Annual employment by sector (BLS QCEW, 2024; 1,175,373 jobs in the metro).
QCEW lags — it is the structural read, not the current one, and we pair it with the monthly unemployment above on purpose.
Office-using sums five supersectors; where BLS withholds any one of them for
disclosure, we show nothing rather than a number we know is too low — so a missing sector here means
“suppressed at the source,” not “zero.”
Sector Heat — CMBS distress rate by property type (metro vs national)See the loans behind the bar →
This metro's CMBS runs 36.1% distressed where its own property mix predicts 4.9% — $553M more than this book would carry at the rate each property type runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted and excluding this metro. The gap is measured; the cause is not. 2 of 3 property types here run a higher distress rate than the national average for that type (the tick on each bar).
Elimination — does the gap survive a control?
Each row re-prices this metro's book on a finer cell — its own property types, then those types split by loan size, then by vintage — always at the rate that cell runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted. A gap that shrinks toward zero is explained by the control; one that stays has ruled it out. What is measured is what survives, not a cause.
property mix alone
+31.2pp
… and loan size held fixed
+31.3pp
the gap is still there with loan size held fixed too
… and vintage held fixed
+30.0pp
the gap is still there with vintage held fixed too
The largest single contributor is Hospitality: 6 loans, $333M, where the same type runs 5.4% elsewhere. Its own rate and its part of the gap are not shown: fewer than 3 loans are distressed here, too few for the share to be a rate.
Maturity Wall — CMBS coming due by year, distress within eachSee what’s maturing →
$614M — 35% of the metro's balance — matures within two years; the red slice of each bar is already distressed.
Distress Trend — is this market turning?Track it quarter by quarter →
Realized distress is RISING — 33.6% now (2026-07), +31.0pp over the year.
Same definition as the cards above — distressed means in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, dollar-weighted — on a different clock. The cards are today’s tape; this is the disclosed history panel, quarter by quarter, so you can read direction rather than level. Trusts file monthly, so a quarter is usually well covered within weeks of opening and the newest one shown is normally the current one; it is withheld only when its filed book falls below 60% of recent quarters.
Share of the metro’s CMBS in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, by quarter — a firmer, backward-looking read. A loan under 1.0x DSCR that is still paying is not counted here.
Submarket Heat — where in the metro the distress sitsOpen the submarket →
The top three submarkets hold $1.0B of the metro's $1.8B; each bar's colored share is its distress rate.
Bank Door — what the local bank sector could absorbSee it on every loan’s exit read →
$614M of CMBS matures here within two years.
The 58 regional and local banks that gather deposits here could write roughly
$2.6B more CRE before the 300% supervisory line, so the maturing balance is
0.23× that room.
The median metro sits at 0.13×.
Regional Bank Room
$2.6B
After Committed Draws
$1.5B / −45%
Maturing ÷ Room
0.23×
Banks In Footprint
58 / 8 at the line
The room above is already part-sold. Construction lending is a promise drawn
down over two or three years, and the undrawn part is an obligation the bank cannot decline while the borrower performs
— every one of those dollars lands in the same CRE book the 300% line governs. These banks
have $1.9B of construction committed and not yet
advanced, of which $1.2B
comes out of the room above, leaving $1.5B,
with 20 banks
whose entire remaining room is spoken for.
A bank with no room contributes zero here, never a negative one — capacity does not net
across balance sheets — so $740M of what has
been promised is not deducted at all, because there is nothing left to deduct it from. On today’s
capital that is funding already contracted which would cross the line as it draws.
SR 07-1 draws a second line at 100% of capital for construction and land:
10 of 58
are past it on drawn balances alone, and
19 more cross it
once their own commitments fund.
Counted — 58 regional & local CRE lenders
| Bank | Deposit share | CRE / Capital* | Room contributed | Noncurrent CRE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| First Bank MO | 47.7% | 184% total 273%
|
🔒 | 0.09% |
| Lindell Bank & Trust Company MO | 100.0% | 108% total 181%
|
🔒 | 0.72% |
| Cibc Bank Usa IL | 1.7% | 149% total 196%
|
🔒 | 1.24% |
| Carrollton Bank IL | 83.8% | 222% total 349%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| The Bank Of Missouri MO | 29.5% | 185% total 266%
|
🔒 | 0.40% |
| First State Community Bank MO | 25.5% | 225% total 300%
|
🔒 | 0.71% |
| Peoples Bank & Trust Co. MO | 90.4% | 174% total 309%
|
🔒 | 2.97% |
| United Community Bank IL | 16.8% | 179% total 287%
|
🔒 | 0.10% |
| First National Bank Of Waterloo IL | 92.4% | 214% total 278%
|
🔒 | 2.28% |
| Sterling Bank MO | 33.3% | 195% total 227%
|
🔒 | 0.83% |
| First Mid Bank & Trust, National Association IL | 19.1% | 271% total 350%
|
🔒 | 0.47% |
| Midland States Bank IL | 19.5% | 261% total 333%
|
🔒 | 1.61% |
| Midwest Bankcentre MO | 100.0% | 287% total 370%
|
🔒 | 0.94% |
| Farmers And Merchants Bank Of St. Clair MO | 100.0% | 196% total 239%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Bank Of Belleville IL | 100.0% | 211% total 391%
|
🔒 | 3.16% |
| Constitution Bank, National Association IL | 56.7% | 192% total 478%
|
🔒 | 0.68% |
| The Bank Of Old Monroe MO | 100.0% | 263% total 337%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| First Fsb Of Mascoutah IL | 100.0% | 136% total 160%
|
🔒 | 7.25% |
| Commercial Bank MO | 100.0% | 160% total 359%
|
🔒 | 0.84% |
| Heartland Bank And Trust Company IL | 9.6% | 262% total 321%
|
🔒 | 0.06% |
| Bank Of Franklin County MO | 100.0% | 228% total 403%
|
🔒 | 0.07% |
| The Missouri Bank MO | 70.8% | 234% total 250%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Bank Of Washington MO | 100.0% | 281% total 385%
|
🔒 | 5.01% |
| Peoples Savings Bank Of Rhineland MO | 32.5% | 189% total 393%
|
🔒 | 0.03% |
| Fcb Banks IL | 100.0% | 289% total 347%
|
🔒 | 0.73% |
| 1nb Bank IL | 99.7% | 222% total 249%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Jonesburg State Bank MO | 82.9% | 121% total 274%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Bloomsdale Bank MO | 37.6% | 145% total 243%
|
🔒 | 0.45% |
| Citizens Community Bank IL | 100.0% | 261% total 320%
|
🔒 | 8.82% |
| State Bank IL | 100.0% | 236% total 387%
|
🔒 | 1.05% |
| Community State Bank Of Missouri MO | 25.8% | 109% total 135%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Buena Vista National Bank IL | 24.2% | 121% total 206%
|
🔒 | 0.20% |
| Heritage Community Bank MO | 86.8% | 234% total 367%
|
🔒 | 0.16% |
| St. Johns Bank And Trust Company MO | 100.0% | 261% total 423%
|
🔒 | 4.67% |
| Bank & Trust Company IL | 9.1% | 132% total 175%
|
🔒 | 0.39% |
| Peoples Bank MO | 18.8% | 102% total 197%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Bank Of Springfield IL | 17.5% | 270% total 349%
|
🔒 | 2.60% |
| Montgomery Bank MO | 31.0% | 274% total 378%
|
🔒 | 0.73% |
| Hnb National Bank MO | 6.2% | 176% total 253%
|
🔒 | 0.02% |
| Academy Bank, National Association MO | 2.6% | 228% total 294%
|
🔒 | 1.11% |
| Prairie State Bank And Trust IL | 12.9% | 229% total 257%
|
🔒 | 0.52% |
| Legends Bank MO | 3.9% | 106% total 159%
|
🔒 | 0.24% |
| Fcnb Bank MO | 23.4% | 112% total 265%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Peoples National Bank , N.a. IL | 8.4% | 260% total 381%
|
🔒 | 1.75% |
| The Farmers And Merchants National Bank Of Nashville IL | 11.3% | 189% total 207%
|
🔒 | 1.40% |
| Mrv Banks MO | 27.6% | 284% total 376%
|
🔒 | 6.36% |
| Southern Bank MO | 4.4% | 288% total 367%
|
🔒 | 0.49% |
| Bank Star MO | 100.0% | 285% total 360%
|
🔒 | 0.15% |
| Dieterich Bank IL | 40.8% | 299% total 390%
|
🔒 | 2.55% |
| Cnb St Louis Bank MO | 100.0% | 321% total 509%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| United Bank Of Union MO | 100.0% | 315% total 508%
|
🔒 | 3.69% |
| Citizens Bank MO | 100.0% | 304% total 353%
|
🔒 | 5.03% |
| New Frontier Bank MO | 100.0% | 317% total 525%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Royal Banks Of Missouri MO | 92.6% | 372% total 448%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Midwest Regional Bank MO | 91.4% | 336% total 512%
|
🔒 | 7.40% |
| American Bank Of Freedom MO | 71.2% | 381% total 440%
|
🔒 | 1.30% |
| Sullivan Bank MO | 67.7% | 324% total 444%
|
🔒 | 1.96% |
| Everbank, National Association FL | 0.0% | 169% total 175%
|
🔒 | 1.03% |
Not counted — 47 banks with deposits here
These hold deposits in this metro but are left out of the capacity above, because for them deposit location stops indicating where they lend — or they do not lend CRE at all. Real money that could refinance here is deliberately not counted.
no CRE book — CRE under 100% of capital — not a CRE lender
U.s. Bank National Association OH · Bank Of America, National Association NC · Stifel Bank MO · Stifel Bank And Trust MO · Commerce Bank MO · Regions Bank AL · Pnc Bank, National Association DE · Cass Commercial Bank MO · Bmo Bank National Association IL · Edward Jones Trust Company MO · Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Association OH · First State Bank Of St. Charles, Missouri MO · Stifel Trust Company, National Association MO · Germantown Trust & Savings Bank IL · The Bradford National Bank Of Greenville IL · Collinsville Building And Loan Association IL · Jersey State Bank IL · Bank Of Kampsville IL · The Northern Trust Company IL · Farmers State Bank Of Hoffman IL · The Fnb Community Bank IL · Ozarks Federal Savings And Loan Association MO · Warren-Boynton State Bank IL · The Peoples State Bank Of Newton, Illinois IL · Homebank MO · The First National Bank Of Raymond IL · The Huntington National Bank OH · Farmers State Bank IL · Town & Country Bank MO · Community Partners Savings Bank IL · Midwest National Bank IL · Peoples Bank & Trust IL · Wells Fargo Bank, National Association SD · Cibc National Trust Company GA
national — operates in more than 5 states, so deposits stop indicating where it lends
Enterprise Bank & Trust MO · Umb Bank, National Association MO · Busey Bank IL · Associated Bank, National Association WI · The Central Trust Bank MO · Woodforest National Bank TX · Great Southern Bank MO · Simmons Bank AR
booked here — books nearly all deposits to one branch — a charter address, not a footprint
Parkside Financial Bank & Trust MO · Bank Of O'fallon IL · Triad Bank MO · 1st Advantage Bank MO · St. Louis Bank MO
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 07-1 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
How to read this. It is not whether any particular loan can refinance — a borrower also reaches
national banks, life companies, agencies and debt funds. It is how much of this metro’s maturing volume the local
bank sector could absorb if it were the only door.
Banks are placed by deposit share (FDIC Summary of Deposits, June 2026) — a proxy for
where they lend, not a measurement; call reports carry no collateral geography. Room = 3× total risk-based capital less CRE held
(SR 07-1, the capital base the rule names — not book equity), from Q2 2026 call reports, apportioned by that share.
Committed construction comes from FFIEC Schedule RC-L as filed at 2026-06-30 —
the undrawn half of loans already written, which the balance sheet above does not show.
Banks in more than 5 states, single-branch bookers and banks that do not lend CRE are excluded —
315 banks holding $263.8B of national capacity not counted here.
Local Lenders — banks headquartered here, worst CRE noncurrent firstUnlock each bank’s early-warning flag →
| Bank | Total CRE | CRE / Capital* | Noncurrent CRE | Early Warning |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Citizens Community Bank | $170M | 261% total 320%
|
8.82% | 🔒 |
| Midwest Regional Bank | $555M | 336% total 512%
|
7.40% | 🔒 |
| Citizens Bank | $183M | 304% total 353%
|
5.03% | 🔒 |
| St. Johns Bank And Trust Company | $156M | 261% total 423%
|
4.67% | 🔒 |
| United Bank Of Union | $285M | 315% total 508%
|
3.69% | 🔒 |
| Stifel Bank And Trust | $1.4B | 95% total 96%
|
6.60% | 🔒 |
| Bank Of Washington | $552M | 281% total 385%
|
5.01% | 🔒 |
| Bank Of Belleville | $196M | 211% total 391%
|
3.16% | 🔒 |
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 07-1 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
Banks are matched to their HQ metro (a proxy for footprint). Noncurrent CRE = CRE-balance-weighted blend of multifamily / nonresidential / construction noncurrent (distress already arrived). Early Warning is a validated leading signal — the bank’s 30-89 early-delinquency rank among all CRE lenders this quarter, which has predicted ~2.3× forward CRE distress. Per-bank flags are on a plan.
Do the banks lending in St. Louis, MO-IL have the capacity to refinance its maturing CRE?
St. Louis shows meaningful local bank capacity against its visible maturity wall: with a wall-to-room ratio of 0.42 and room after those draws of $1.45bn, the metro falls in the slack capacity band and ranks 93 of 275, counting from the most strained. The Wall-to-room ratio is 0.42, above the median, though the before-committed-draws reading of 0.23 shows how much the committed construction draws of $1.91bn absorb. The CMBS maturing in the window of $613.6mm across 23 loans looks well covered by the $1.45bn of local bank room after those draws, with $2.63bn available before them. Two caveats temper this: the distressed share of this metro's CMBS of 36.1% points to credit stress that capacity alone does not resolve, and the banks excluded from the calculation at 13 against 58 qualifying local banks mean the room figure rests on a deposit-footprint proxy rather than a measured lending footprint.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS maturing in the window
- $613.6mm
- … across this many loans
- 23
- Local bank room, before committed draws
- $2.63bn
- Committed construction draws
- $1.91bn
- Local bank room, after those draws
- $1.45bn
- Wall-to-room ratio
- 0.42
- Rank, most strained
- 93
- … out of this many metros ranked
- 275
- … before committed draws
- 0.23
- Population ranked against
- CMBS maturing within 24 months against regional/community bank room in this metro
- Qualifying local banks
- 58
- … excluded from the calculation
- 13
- Distressed share of this metro's CMBS
- 36.1%
- Total CMBS balance here
- $1.77bn
- Capacity band
- slack
Compared against a median wall-to-room ratio of
0.24 across the ranked metros.
0.42 is ABOVE the median of 0.24, so this metro is MORE strained than the typical ranked metro
93 of 275, counting from the MOST strained — a LOWER rank number means MORE strain
Room is what regional and community banks could still write before the SR 06-26 concentration line, after deducting construction draws already committed. Deposit footprint is a proxy for lending footprint, not a measurement of it.
The most extreme ratios belong to the smallest metros.
The wall is the CMBS balance maturing within 24 months — the maturing debt this platform can see, not the metro's whole maturity load. Every ratio is an upper bound on how much of it local banks would have to absorb.
A high ratio is as often an exclusion artifact as a credit event. Banks whose deposits do not indicate where they lend (nationals, card and charter banks) are excluded from the room, so a metro served mainly by those reads strained while its credit is simply invisible here.
Written from the figures above · CBSA 41180 · capacity_metro · last changed 30 Oct 2026
· Ask your own question →
On The Ground — recent closures, layoffs & CRE bankruptciesTie these events to loans →
51 local distress events in the past year (3,367 jobs) — store closures, layoffs, and commercial real estate bankruptcies near this metro's collateral.
2026-12-31
CLOSURE
Scheduled · Bridgeton
2026-12-31
CLOSURE
Scheduled · St. Louis
2026-10-27
LAYOFF
107 jobs · Brentwood
2026-10-08
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-10-05
LAYOFF
Hazelwood
2026-09-30
LAYOFF
175 jobs · Edwardsville
2026-09-30
LAYOFF
84 jobs · St. Louis (city)
2026-09-23
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-09-23
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-09-22
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-09-16
CLOSURE
St. Louis
2026-09-11
LAYOFF
Belleville
2026-09-08
CLOSURE
St. Louis
2026-09-04
CLOSURE
St. Louis
2026-08-24
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 7
What has actually happened on the ground in St. Louis, MO-IL recently?
Over the past 365 days in St. Louis, MO-IL, the reviewed records show 30 WARN layoff notices affecting at least 3,367 (a floor, since notices without a stated headcount contribute zero), alongside 21 store closures; the CRE-related bankruptcies figure of 16 is a state-level proxy rather than a metro-native count and is not comparable across the coverage change of 2026-09-16.
The figures behind this answer
- Store closures
- 21
- WARN layoff notices
- 30
- Jobs on those notices
- 3,367
- CRE-related bankruptcies
- 16
- Window, in days
- 365
STATE PROXY — a court case counts in its filing district and an SEC 8-K in the filer's state, not where the property is, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count. Each court case is counted once even when both PACER and CourtListener carry it. A court case's state is its filing district; an SEC 8-K or news item carries the filer's state. Coverage widened to both court feeds on 2026-09-16, so counts before and after that date are not comparable.
affected_employees is nullable — notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, so this is a floor.
Closures are matched ZIP -> CBSA and only APPROVED rows count (a pending, machine-extracted row is not yet a closure). This mirrors the Metro Pulse page, not the convergence board — the board applies neither filter and counts higher. Layoffs take the same ZIP -> CBSA and review treatment, and a WARN notice counts if it affects >= 10 people or does not state a headcount (a NULL is not 'fewer than 10').
Written from the figures above · CBSA 41180 · geo_events · last changed 01 Nov 2026
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Everything above is a snapshot — one market, as it stands today, and
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this month, which bank’s early-warning rank crossed into the top quartile, which submarket started turning
while the headline number still looked fine. Distress doesn’t announce itself on the day you happen to check.
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CMBS covers the securitized slice of CRE; bank, closure and layoff signals widen the view.
“No data” in a zone means we don’t observe it here, not that there is no stress.
Employment is BLS (QCEW annual, LAUS monthly) — public data, and the demand leg under all of it.
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