Start free trial
No credit card required
Commercial Real Estate Credit —
Savannah, GA
The state of disclosed CRE credit in this market · GA
The read
$463M of CMBS across 26 loans. Nothing in this book is distressed today; Hospitality is the largest exposure at $284M. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2031 ($159M, 34% of the book). Distress is flat in the filed record — 0.0% as of 2026-07. 1 on-the-ground distress event in the past year (120 jobs).
Overview
CMBS
Submarkets
Local Banks
Jobs & Demand
On The Ground
Loading map…
The CMBS properties our stress model flags here, plus recent store closures and layoffs. Stressed is a wider net than distressed — the distressed figure above counts only loans already in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, while these dots also include performing loans facing maturity or coverage pressure. Property dots sit at the center of their ZIP code, not the building — they show where stress concentrates, not which asset. Closures and layoffs are pinned to address where we have it. Open any dot to the building and the loan behind it →
A Clean Book Anchored by Hotels, With the Weight Pushed Out to 2031
Savannah carries $463 million of CMBS across 26 loans, and as of July 2026 none of it is distressed — a flat 0.0% in the filed record. Hospitality is the dominant exposure at $284 million, and against a national hospitality distress rate of 6.2%, the metro's hotel book shows nothing in special servicing or 60-plus days delinquent. Median debt service coverage sits at 1.78, and the servicer ledger has given no ground.
The maturity calendar is where the attention belongs. The heaviest load lands in 2031, with $159 million — 34% of the book — coming due in a single year, well beyond the near-term refinancing window. Smaller tranches are spread across 2027, 2029 and 2030, none currently distressed.
Away from the loan tapes, the local labor picture is firm: unemployment of 2.9% as of August 2026, down 0.3 point year over year. The on-the-ground record shows a single distress event in the past year, a layoff notice affecting 120 jobs, and no store closures. For a book this concentrated in hotels, the filed record is quiet.
Written 2026-10-27
CMBS Distressed UPB
under $1M / 0.0%
in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent
CMBS Maturing ≤ 24mo
$115M
Banks HQ’d Here (stressed)
0 / 3
Bank Early-Warning
1 flagged
Store Closures (1y)
0
Layoff Notices (1y)
1 / 120 jobs
0.07% of metro employment
CMBS Loans / UPB
26 / $463M
Unemployment · Aug 2026
2.9%
-0.3pp yr
How much CRE distress is there in Savannah, GA right now?
For Savannah, GA, the four distress feeds read uniformly quiet: store closures came in at 0 closures, or 0 per 100k jobs; layoff notices (WARN) at 1 notices, or a rate of 0.06%; bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line at $144.6mm, or 4.62% — a figure carrying the caveat that most of those dollars are split by branch deposits the call report cannot confirm; and securitized loans in special servicing at 0 loan records, which is 0%. That gives legs elevated out of four of 0, with pairs both elevated at 0, pairs both quiet at 6, pairs where the legs disagree at 0, and pairs that cannot be read because a leg is blind at 0, across 6 pairs of legs compared. Every leg was measurable here, so nothing in this reading rests on a blind leg, and the bank allocation caveat is the one qualification worth keeping in view.
The figures behind this answer
| Signal | Level | Rate | Rank by count | Rank by rate | Reading |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| store closures store closures per 100,000 jobs |
0 closures | 0 per 100k jobs | 363 of 392 | 363 of 392 | quiet trailing 365 days to today
|
| layoff notices (WARN) workers on layoff notices as a share of the metro's employment |
1 notices | 0.06% | 218 of 382 | 196 of 382 | quiet trailing 365 days to today
|
| bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line share of the CRE lent into this metro that sits at a lender over the blended-noncurrent line |
$144.6mm | 4.62% | 134 of 393 | 149 of 393 | quiet
allocated 2026-06-30
|
| securitized loans in special servicing share of the securitized balance read here that is in special servicing |
0 loan records | 0% | 220 of 335 | 220 of 335 | quiet 2026-09-29
|
6 pairs compared
0 both elevated
6 both quiet
0 disagreeing
0 unreadable — a side is blind
0 of four legs elevated
one metro, four independent feeds, each on its own denominator
124 of 447 metros have at least one blind leg and 54 are blind on all four. Those 54 are the same metros the board's map cannot place and the metro resolver cannot name: one ZIP-to-CBSA crosswalk boundary, showing up three ways.
Elevation is computed on the COUNT, over a flat threshold, which is a size filter. New York is 2nd of 392 by store closures and 264th of the same 392 by closures per job — both true, and which one you lead with decides what the reader believes.
Where two legs disagree, that is usually a fact about WHICH mechanism is running, not an error in either feed and not a worse metro.
A leg with no denominator, or whose numerator cannot be measured, reads LOW and means nothing. Each leg publishes a measurement state (allocated, floor, measured, no denominator, no rate, not measurable) for that reason.
Store closures: divided by 171,922 jobs
— all metro jobs, QCEW annual average — a SIZE normaliser, not a matched population: the feed spans retail, food service and pharmacy and no single QCEW sector covers it. The MATCHED read sits beside it as this leg's second reading (trailing 365 days to today).
Layoff notices (WARN): divided by 215,896 employed
— employed persons, BLS LAUS, not seasonally adjusted (trailing 365 days to today).
Bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line: divided by $3,128.2 mm
— bank CRE allocated to this metro by branch deposits (2026-06-30).
Securitized loans in special servicing: divided by $463.0 mm
— current balance on the non-pari-passu rows of this tape — the trust's slice, not the whole loan, on both sides of the ratio (2026-09-29).
Written from the figures above · CBSA 42340 · stress_metro · last changed 01 Nov 2026
· Ask your own question →
Which distress signals are elevated in Savannah, GA, and which cannot be read?
In Savannah, GA, the signals reading elevated list is empty, and legs agreeing stands at 0, with the phase characterized as an isolated signal rather than a convergence. The bank-side measures that are available show $3.13bn bank CRE lent into this metro, 43.5% bank CRE at risk at the 90th percentile, and $144.6mm CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line; CMBS in special servicing reads $0.0mm and 0.0% share of this metro's CMBS balance in special servicing. Distressed bank assets read unavailable in dollar terms beyond the stated $0.00bn, and the broader distress reads as immaterial, with little to no distressed CRE dollars behind the signals; any further reading on additional distress dimensions is unavailable from the figures provided.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS in special servicing
- $0.0mm
- … as a share of this metro's CMBS balance
- 0.0%
- Bank CRE lent into this metro
- $3.13bn
- … at risk at the 90th percentile
- 43.5%
- CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line
- $144.6mm
- Assets at those lenders
- $0.00bn
- … share needing no branch-deposit allocation
- 12.6%
- Legs agreeing
- 0
- Phase
- watch
- CMBS loans in special servicing
- 0
- Distressed banks
- 0
- Store closures (past year)
- 0
- WARN notices (past year)
- 1
an isolated signal, not a convergence
little to no distressed CRE dollars behind the signals
signals are present but neither credit-material nor ground-heavy
Written from the figures above · CBSA 42340 · geo_metro_signals · last changed 01 Nov 2026
· Ask your own question →
Jobs & Demand — the labor market under the collateralWatch it change →
Every other zone on this page reads the credit — what the loan is doing.
This one reads the demand underneath it. Office jobs pay office rent;
office rent services the office loan. When the jobs go, the DSCR follows — but not for another year or two.
That lag is the whole point of looking here.
Unemployment · Aug 2026
2.9%
-0.3pp yr
Last 24 months
2.4%3.5%
Monthly metro unemployment (BLS LAUS) — the freshest labor signal there is,
about six weeks behind. Read the direction, not the level: a 4% metro that is rising and a 6% metro that is
falling are not telling you the same thing.
Jobs by CRE-relevant sector · 2024
Annual employment by sector (BLS QCEW, 2024; 171,922 jobs in the metro).
QCEW lags — it is the structural read, not the current one, and we pair it with the monthly unemployment above on purpose.
Office-using sums five supersectors; where BLS withholds any one of them for
disclosure, we show nothing rather than a number we know is too low — so a missing sector here means
“suppressed at the source,” not “zero.”
Sector Heat — CMBS distress rate by property type (metro vs national)See the loans behind the bar →
This metro's CMBS runs 0.0% distressed where its own property mix predicts 6.0% — $28M less than this book would carry at the rate each property type runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted and excluding this metro. The gap is measured; the cause is not. 0 of 1 property types here run a higher distress rate than the national average for that type (the tick on each bar).
Elimination — does the gap survive a control?
Each row re-prices this metro's book on a finer cell — its own property types, then those types split by loan size, then by vintage — always at the rate that cell runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted. A gap that shrinks toward zero is explained by the control; one that stays has ruled it out. What is measured is what survives, not a cause.
property mix alone
-6.0pp
… and loan size held fixed
-5.9pp
the gap is still there with loan size held fixed too
… and vintage held fixed
-4.5pp
the gap is still there with vintage held fixed too
The largest single contributor is Hospitality: 10 loans, $284M, running 0.0% where the same type runs 6.3% elsewhere — worth 3.9pp of this metro's own rate.
Maturity Wall — CMBS coming due by year, distress within eachSee what’s maturing →
$115M — 25% of the metro's balance — matures within two years; the red slice of each bar is already distressed.
Distress Trend — is this market turning?Track it quarter by quarter →
Realized distress is FLAT — 0.0% now (2026-07), +0.0pp over the year.
Same definition as the cards above — distressed means in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, dollar-weighted — on a different clock. The cards are today’s tape; this is the disclosed history panel, quarter by quarter, so you can read direction rather than level. Trusts file monthly, so a quarter is usually well covered within weeks of opening and the newest one shown is normally the current one; it is withheld only when its filed book falls below 60% of recent quarters.
Share of the metro’s CMBS in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, by quarter — a firmer, backward-looking read. A loan under 1.0x DSCR that is still paying is not counted here.
Submarket Heat — where in the metro the distress sitsOpen the submarket →
The top three submarkets hold $402M of the metro's $463M; each bar's colored share is its distress rate.
Bank Door — what the local bank sector could absorbSee it on every loan’s exit read →
$115M of CMBS matures here within two years.
The 11 regional and local banks that gather deposits here could write roughly
$166M more CRE before the 300% supervisory line, so the maturing balance is
0.69× that room.
The median metro sits at 0.13×.
Regional Bank Room
$166M
After Committed Draws
$50M / −70%
Maturing ÷ Room
0.69×
Banks In Footprint
11 / 1 at the line
The room above is already part-sold. Construction lending is a promise drawn
down over two or three years, and the undrawn part is an obligation the bank cannot decline while the borrower performs
— every one of those dollars lands in the same CRE book the 300% line governs. These banks
have $182M of construction committed and not yet
advanced, of which $116M
comes out of the room above, leaving $50M,
with 6 banks
whose entire remaining room is spoken for.
A bank with no room contributes zero here, never a negative one — capacity does not net
across balance sheets — so $67M of what has
been promised is not deducted at all, because there is nothing left to deduct it from. On today’s
capital that is funding already contracted which would cross the line as it draws.
SR 07-1 draws a second line at 100% of capital for construction and land:
1 of 11
is past it on drawn balances alone, and
8 more cross it
once their own commitments fund.
Counted — 11 regional & local CRE lenders
| Bank | Deposit share | CRE / Capital* | Room contributed | Noncurrent CRE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ameris Bank GA | 4.3% | 263% total 319%
|
🔒 | 0.12% |
| Queensborough National Bank & Trust Company GA | 9.5% | 162% total 327%
|
🔒 | 0.37% |
| Carver State Bank GA | 100.0% | 155% total 156%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Banksouth GA | 16.4% | 247% total 303%
|
🔒 | 0.54% |
| Great Oaks Bank GA | 49.1% | 248% total 337%
|
🔒 | 0.07% |
| First Bank Of Coastal Georgia GA | 100.0% | 253% total 264%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Southeastern Bank GA | 6.4% | 157% total 223%
|
🔒 | 0.08% |
| Coastal States Bank SC | 4.2% | 238% total 331%
|
🔒 | 1.53% |
| Colony Bank GA | 4.4% | 278% total 392%
|
🔒 | 0.49% |
| The Claxton Bank GA | 9.7% | 230% total 366%
|
🔒 | 3.03% |
| Bank Of Newington GA | 46.0% | 322% total 455%
|
🔒 | 0.68% |
Not counted — 13 banks with deposits here
These hold deposits in this metro but are left out of the capacity above, because for them deposit location stops indicating where they lend — or they do not lend CRE at all. Real money that could refinance here is deliberately not counted.
no CRE book — CRE under 100% of capital — not a CRE lender
Truist Bank NC · Bank Of America, National Association NC · Wells Fargo Bank, National Association SD · The Huntington National Bank OH · Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Association OH · Regions Bank AL · First-Citizens Bank & Trust Company NC · Fifth Third Bank, National Association OH
national — operates in more than 5 states, so deposits stop indicating where it lends
United Community Bank SC · Pinnacle Bank TN · Southstate Bank, National Association FL · Bank Ozk AR · Renasant Bank MS
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 07-1 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
How to read this. It is not whether any particular loan can refinance — a borrower also reaches
national banks, life companies, agencies and debt funds. It is how much of this metro’s maturing volume the local
bank sector could absorb if it were the only door.
Banks are placed by deposit share (FDIC Summary of Deposits, June 2026) — a proxy for
where they lend, not a measurement; call reports carry no collateral geography. Room = 3× total risk-based capital less CRE held
(SR 07-1, the capital base the rule names — not book equity), from Q2 2026 call reports, apportioned by that share.
Committed construction comes from FFIEC Schedule RC-L as filed at 2026-06-30 —
the undrawn half of loans already written, which the balance sheet above does not show.
Banks in more than 5 states, single-branch bookers and banks that do not lend CRE are excluded —
315 banks holding $263.8B of national capacity not counted here.
Local Lenders — banks headquartered here, worst CRE noncurrent firstUnlock each bank’s early-warning flag →
| Bank | Total CRE | CRE / Capital* | Noncurrent CRE | Early Warning |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| First Bank Of Coastal Georgia | $56M | 253% total 264%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
| Great Oaks Bank | $159M | 248% total 337%
|
0.07% | 🔒 |
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 07-1 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
Banks are matched to their HQ metro (a proxy for footprint). Noncurrent CRE = CRE-balance-weighted blend of multifamily / nonresidential / construction noncurrent (distress already arrived). Early Warning is a validated leading signal — the bank’s 30-89 early-delinquency rank among all CRE lenders this quarter, which has predicted ~2.3× forward CRE distress. Per-bank flags are on a plan.
Do the banks lending in Savannah, GA have the capacity to refinance its maturing CRE?
Savannah's CMBS wall of $114.7mm across 8 loans sits against $50.3mm of local bank room after committed draws, a wall-to-room ratio of 2.28, which rises from 0.69 before the $182.4mm in committed construction draws; the metro ranks 35 of 275 on strain, its local capacity rests on 11 qualifying local banks against 5 local banks excluded from the calculation, and its total CMBS balance here is $462.7mm with a distressed share of this metro's CMBS of 0.0%.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS maturing in the window
- $114.7mm
- … across this many loans
- 8
- Local bank room, before committed draws
- $166.0mm
- Committed construction draws
- $182.4mm
- Local bank room, after those draws
- $50.3mm
- Wall-to-room ratio
- 2.28
- Rank, most strained
- 35
- … out of this many metros ranked
- 275
- … before committed draws
- 0.69
- Population ranked against
- CMBS maturing within 24 months against regional/community bank room in this metro
- Qualifying local banks
- 11
- … excluded from the calculation
- 5
- Distressed share of this metro's CMBS
- 0.0%
- Total CMBS balance here
- $462.7mm
- Capacity band
- over
Compared against a median wall-to-room ratio of
0.24 across the ranked metros.
2.28 is ABOVE the median of 0.24, so this metro is MORE strained than the typical ranked metro
35 of 275, counting from the MOST strained — a LOWER rank number means MORE strain
Room is what regional and community banks could still write before the SR 06-26 concentration line, after deducting construction draws already committed. Deposit footprint is a proxy for lending footprint, not a measurement of it.
The most extreme ratios belong to the smallest metros.
The wall is the CMBS balance maturing within 24 months — the maturing debt this platform can see, not the metro's whole maturity load. Every ratio is an upper bound on how much of it local banks would have to absorb.
A high ratio is as often an exclusion artifact as a credit event. Banks whose deposits do not indicate where they lend (nationals, card and charter banks) are excluded from the room, so a metro served mainly by those reads strained while its credit is simply invisible here.
Written from the figures above · CBSA 42340 · capacity_metro · last changed 01 Nov 2026
· Ask your own question →
Apartment-REIT Operating Read — same-store disclosures for this metro · as of 2026-07-29Set against the loan book →
Same-Store NOI
+0.4%
Same-Store Revenue
-1.8%
Occupancy
95.1%
Rent Growth
-2.0%
| REIT | SS NOI | SS Revenue | Occupancy | Rent | As Of |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| MAA | +0.4% | -1.8% | 95.1% | -2.0% | 2026-07-29 |
Same-store operating results disclosed by public apartment REITs (AVB · EQR · ESS · MAA · CPT · UDR) for this market in their quarterly supplements. Directional market context — an operating trend, not a Verstavo score.
On The Ground — recent closures, layoffs & CRE bankruptciesTie these events to loans →
1 local distress events in the past year (120 jobs) — store closures, layoffs, and commercial real estate bankruptcies near this metro's collateral.
2026-10-23
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-10-06
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-10-06
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-10-06
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-10-06
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-10-05
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-10-05
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-10-05
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-01-31
LAYOFF
120 jobs · Savannah
2025-10-20
LAYOFF
691 jobs · Savannah
2025-10-20
LAYOFF
101 jobs · Savannah
2025-08-15
LAYOFF
62 jobs · Savannah
2024-12-31
LAYOFF
58 jobs · Pooler
2024-08-19
LAYOFF
93 jobs · Bloomingdale
2024-07-01
LAYOFF
112 jobs · Garden City
What has actually happened on the ground in Savannah, GA recently?
Over the past 365 days, the on-the-ground reading for Savannah, GA shows 0 store closures, alongside 1 WARN notice covering 120 jobs affected—though that jobs figure is a floor, since notices stating no headcount are counted but contribute nothing to it. On the bankruptcy side, 80 CRE-likely filings are recorded, but this is a STATE PROXY — a court case counts in its filing district and an SEC 8-K in the filer's state, not where the property is, so it counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in, and it is not a metro-native count.
The figures behind this answer
- Store closures
- 0
- WARN layoff notices
- 1
- Jobs on those notices
- 120
- CRE-related bankruptcies
- 80
- Window, in days
- 365
STATE PROXY — a court case counts in its filing district and an SEC 8-K in the filer's state, not where the property is, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count. Each court case is counted once even when both PACER and CourtListener carry it. A court case's state is its filing district; an SEC 8-K or news item carries the filer's state. Coverage widened to both court feeds on 2026-09-16, so counts before and after that date are not comparable.
affected_employees is nullable — notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, so this is a floor.
Closures are matched ZIP -> CBSA and only APPROVED rows count (a pending, machine-extracted row is not yet a closure). This mirrors the Metro Pulse page, not the convergence board — the board applies neither filter and counts higher. Layoffs take the same ZIP -> CBSA and review treatment, and a WARN notice counts if it affects >= 10 people or does not state a headcount (a NULL is not 'fewer than 10').
Written from the figures above · CBSA 42340 · geo_events · last changed 25 Oct 2026
· Ask your own question →
What this page can’t do
Everything above is a snapshot — one market, as it stands today, and
it’s yours to read. What a snapshot can’t tell you is when it moves: which loan slipped a DSCR band
this month, which bank’s early-warning rank crossed into the top quartile, which submarket started turning
while the headline number still looked fine. Distress doesn’t announce itself on the day you happen to check.
This page
One metro · one moment · you come looking.
Verstavo
Every metro · every month · it comes looking for you.
CMBS covers the securitized slice of CRE; bank, closure and layoff signals widen the view.
“No data” in a zone means we don’t observe it here, not that there is no stress.
Employment is BLS (QCEW annual, LAUS monthly) — public data, and the demand leg under all of it.
See the whole picture, not just the pulse.
Metro Pulse is the free, public read — one page for every market we cover. The platform goes loan‑by‑loan inside it: which buildings carry the stress, when their debt comes due, and your own portfolio benchmarked against the market you are standing in.