Commercial Real Estate Credit —
San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, CA
The state of disclosed CRE credit in this market · CA
The read
$6.4B of CMBS across 99 loans. Distress is easing in the filed record — 8.0% as of 2026-07. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2027 ($1.4B). Office is the largest book ($5.1B, 1.4% distressed). 153 on-the-ground distress events in the past year (12,199 jobs).
Overview
CMBS
Submarkets
Local Banks
Jobs & Demand
On The Ground
Loading map…
The CMBS properties our stress model flags here, plus recent store closures and layoffs. Stressed is a wider net than distressed — the distressed figure above counts only loans already in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, while these dots also include performing loans facing maturity or coverage pressure. Property dots sit at the center of their ZIP code, not the building — they show where stress concentrates, not which asset. Closures and layoffs are pinned to address where we have it. Open any dot to the building and the loan behind it →
San Jose's Filed Distress Is Cooling, but the 2027 Wall Looms
San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara carries $6.4 billion of CMBS across 99 loans, and the filed record is moving the right way: the distress rate stood at 8.0% as of July 2026, down over the run. A median debt-service coverage ratio of 2.33 speaks to a book that, in aggregate, is covering its payments with room to spare. Office is the metro's dominant exposure at $5.1 billion, yet just 1.4% of it is distressed — a fraction of the 11.3% national office rate. The small retail book, at $0.3 billion, shows no distress against a 2.7% national mark.
The pressure point sits on the calendar. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2027, with $1.4 billion coming due — and 25.9% of that vintage is already distressed, the sharpest concentration in the schedule. Beyond it, the runway clears: the $1.1 billion maturing in 2030, $0.9 billion in 2031, and $0.8 billion in 2034 all carry no distress at present. Near-term, $1.7 billion matures within 24 months.
The on-the-ground signal runs hotter than the securitized book. The metro logged 153 distress events over the past year — 128 layoff notices touching 12,199 jobs, plus 25 store closures — even as the unemployment rate eased to 4.1% in July 2026, down 0.6 point year over year. On the bank side, the exposure is thin: two lenders tracked, none distressed, one flagged as early warning.
CMBS Distressed UPB
$516M / 8.0%
in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent
CMBS Maturing ≤ 24mo
$1.7B
Local Banks (stressed)
0 / 2
Bank Early-Warning
1 flagged
Store Closures (1y)
25
Layoff Notices (1y)
128 / 12,199 jobs
1.18% of metro employment
CMBS Loans / UPB
99 / $6.4B
Unemployment · Jul 2026
4.1%
-0.6pp yr
How much CRE distress is there in San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, CA right now?
All four of this metro's stress legs are reading high right now — that's 4 of 4 signals elevated, and all 6 pairwise comparisons agree hot, with 0 quiet and 0 disagreeing.
The strongest warning comes from layoff notices: WARN filings ran at 177 notices, or 1.16% of the metro's 1,011,902 employed persons — that's the metro ranking 4th by count and 9th by rate out of 386 metros, a genuinely stressed reading, not a size effect.
Store closures are also elevated, but here the size caveat matters: 13 closures over the trailing 365 days clears the flat threshold (rank 34th of 392 by count) yet sits below the median on rate, at 1.26 closures per 100,000 jobs (rank 242nd). So that leg is on the list because San Jose is big, not because it's stressed per unit of itself.
Bank CRE distress is elevated too: $3,095.4 million over the noncurrent line against $26,560.4 million allocated to the metro, an 11.65% rate that ranks 21st by count and 52nd by rate of 393 metros. A caveat applies here — the allocation is by branch deposits, which the call report can't confirm for most of the book.
The securitized tape shows 6 rows in special servicing against a $6,551.0 million current balance, an 8.58% rate, ranking 28th by count and 53rd by rate of 335 metros. That one is measured at the property, not allocated, so it's the tightest read of the four.
In short: widespread distress, with the WARN leg the most rate-driven and the closures leg the most size-driven of the four.
The figures behind this answer
| Signal | Level | Rate | Rank by count | Rank by rate | Reading |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| store closures store closures per 100,000 jobs |
13 closures | 1.26 per 100k jobs | 34 of 392 | 242 of 392 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| layoff notices (WARN) workers on layoff notices as a share of the metro's employment |
177 notices | 1.16% | 4 of 386 | 9 of 386 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line share of the CRE lent into this metro that sits at a lender over the blended-noncurrent line |
$3.10bn | 11.65% | 21 of 393 | 52 of 393 | elevated
allocated 2026-03-31
|
| securitized loans in special servicing share of the securitized balance read here that is in special servicing |
6 loan records | 8.58% | 28 of 335 | 53 of 335 | elevated 2026-07-29
|
6 pairs compared
6 both elevated
0 both quiet
0 disagreeing
0 unreadable — a side is blind
4 of four legs elevated
one metro, four independent feeds, each on its own denominator
{'coverage': "114 of 441 metros have at least one blind leg and 48 are blind on all four. Those 48 are the same metros the board's map cannot place and the metro resolver cannot name: one ZIP-to-CBSA crosswalk boundary, showing up three ways.", 'a_count_ranks_by_size': 'Elevation is computed on the COUNT, over a flat threshold, which is a size filter. New York is 2nd of 392 by store closures and 264th of the same 392 by closures per job — both true, and which one you lead with decides what the reader believes. Every leg carries both ranks over ONE population; quote the rate beside the count.', 'disagreement_is_not_severity': 'Where two legs disagree, that is usually a fact about WHICH mechanism is running, not an error in either feed and not a worse metro. The six pairs read different populations, and each note is a STRUCTURAL prior about those populations — nothing here measures a lead or a lag between two legs, so never report one as timing.', 'a_blind_leg_is_not_a_quiet_one': "A leg with no denominator, or whose numerator cannot be measured, reads LOW and means nothing. Each leg publishes a measurement state (allocated, floor, measured, no denominator, no rate, not measurable) for that reason. Never report a blind leg as 'no distress'."}
{'fork': 'elevated by size, not by rate', 'note': 'store closures clear a flat count threshold while sitting below the median of their own rate ranking. Any reading that leans on them is a statement about how big this metro is.'}
{'leg': 'closures', 'unit': 'jobs', 'as_of': 'trailing 365 days to today', 'value': 1034002, 'measures': 'store closures', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'window', 'what_it_is': "all metro jobs, QCEW annual average — a SIZE normaliser, not a matched population: the feed spans retail, food service and pharmacy and no single QCEW sector covers it. The MATCHED read sits beside it as this leg's second reading"}
{'leg': 'warn', 'unit': 'employed', 'as_of': 'trailing 365 days to today', 'value': 1011902, 'measures': 'layoff notices (WARN)', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'window', 'what_it_is': 'employed persons, BLS LAUS, not seasonally adjusted'}
{'leg': 'bank', 'unit': '$mm', 'as_of': '2026-03-31', 'value': 26560.4, 'measures': 'bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'stamp', 'what_it_is': 'bank CRE allocated to this metro by branch deposits'}
{'leg': 'cmbs', 'unit': '$mm', 'as_of': '2026-07-29', 'value': 6551.0, 'measures': 'securitized loans in special servicing', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'stamp', 'what_it_is': "current balance on the non-pari-passu rows of this tape — the trust's slice, not the whole loan, on both sides of the ratio"}
Written from the figures above · CBSA 41940 · stress_metro · last changed 28 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Which distress signals are elevated in San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, CA, and which cannot be read?
In San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, CA, elevated distress signals include bank-distressed CRE, CMBS special servicing, store closures, and WARN notices. Bank-distressed CRE stands at $3.10bn, with 17.1% of bank CRE at risk (90th percentile), while CMBS special servicing UPB is $562.0mm, equal to 8.6% of metro UPB. Additionally, there were 13 store closures and 177 WARN notices over the past year. The reading is unavailable for distressed bank assets, which are listed as 0 (no dollar figure provided), and the number of CMBS loans in special servicing is 6 but without a stated dollar amount. The overall phase is confirmed at "peak," with the convergence score at 4.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS in special servicing
- $562.0mm
- … as a share of this metro's CMBS balance
- 8.6%
- Bank CRE lent into this metro
- $26.56bn
- … at risk at the 90th percentile
- 17.1%
- CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line
- $3.10bn
- Assets at those lenders
- $0.00bn
- … share needing no branch-deposit allocation
- 4.1%
- Signals reading elevated
- bank CRE over the noncurrent line, CMBS in special servicing, store closures, WARN layoff notices
- Legs agreeing
- 4
- Phase
- peak
- CMBS loans in special servicing
- 6
- Distressed banks
- 0
- Store closures (past year)
- 13
- WARN notices (past year)
- 177
leading (real-economy) and realized (credit) signals are firing together
hundreds of millions of distressed CRE exposure
credit distress AND ground-level distress, with real dollars behind the credit side
Written from the figures above · CBSA 41940 · geo_metro_signals · last changed 27 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Jobs & Demand — the labor market under the collateralWatch it change →
Every other zone on this page reads the credit — what the loan is doing.
This one reads the demand underneath it. Office jobs pay office rent;
office rent services the office loan. When the jobs go, the DSCR follows — but not for another year or two.
That lag is the whole point of looking here.
Unemployment · Jul 2026
4.1%
-0.6pp yr
Last 24 months
3.5%4.7%
Monthly metro unemployment (BLS LAUS) — the freshest labor signal there is,
about six weeks behind. Read the direction, not the level: a 4% metro that is rising and a 6% metro that is
falling are not telling you the same thing.
Jobs by CRE-relevant sector · 2024
Annual employment by sector (BLS QCEW, 2024; 1,034,002 jobs in the metro).
QCEW lags — it is the structural read, not the current one, and we pair it with the monthly unemployment above on purpose.
Office-using sums five supersectors; where BLS withholds any one of them for
disclosure, we show nothing rather than a number we know is too low — so a missing sector here means
“suppressed at the source,” not “zero.”
Sector Heat — CMBS distress rate by property type (metro vs national)See the loans behind the bar →
This metro's CMBS runs 8.0% distressed where its own property mix predicts 10.4% — $155M less than this book would carry at the rate each property type runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted and excluding this metro. The gap is measured; the cause is not. 0 of 2 property types here run a higher distress rate than the national average for that type (the tick on each bar).
Elimination — does the gap survive a control?
Each row re-prices this metro's book on a finer cell — its own property types, then those types split by loan size, then by vintage — always at the rate that cell runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted. A gap that shrinks toward zero is explained by the control; one that stays has ruled it out. What is measured is what survives, not a cause.
property mix alone
-2.4pp
… and loan size held fixed
-2.8pp
the gap is still there with loan size held fixed too
… and vintage held fixed
-4.8pp
the gap is still there with vintage held fixed too
The largest single contributor is Office: 67 loans, $5.1B, running 1.4% where the same type runs 12.0% elsewhere — worth 8.5pp of this metro's own rate.
Maturity Wall — CMBS coming due by year, distress within eachSee what’s maturing →
$1.7B — 26% of the metro's balance — matures within two years; the red slice of each bar is already distressed.
Distress Trend — is this market turning?Track it quarter by quarter →
Realized distress is FALLING — 8.0% now (2026-07), -2.4pp over the year.
Same definition as the cards above — distressed means in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, dollar-weighted — on a different clock. The cards are today’s tape; this is the disclosed history panel, quarter by quarter, so you can read direction rather than level. Trusts file monthly, so a quarter is usually well covered within weeks of opening and the newest one shown is normally the current one; it is withheld only when its filed book falls below 60% of recent quarters.
Share of the metro’s CMBS in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, by quarter — a firmer, backward-looking read. A loan under 1.0x DSCR that is still paying is not counted here.
Submarket Heat — where in the metro the distress sitsOpen the submarket →
The top three submarkets hold $4.7B of the metro's $6.4B; each bar's colored share is its distress rate.
Bank Door — what the local bank sector could absorbSee it on every loan’s exit read →
$1.7B of CMBS matures here within two years.
The 19 regional and local banks that gather deposits here could write roughly
$461M more CRE before the 300% supervisory line, so the maturing balance is
3.59× that room.
The median metro sits at 0.12×.
Regional Bank Room
$461M
After Committed Draws
$395M / −14%
Maturing ÷ Room
3.59×
Banks In Footprint
19 / 7 at the line
The room above is already part-sold. Construction lending is a promise drawn
down over two or three years, and the undrawn part is an obligation the bank cannot decline while the borrower performs
— every one of those dollars lands in the same CRE book the 300% line governs. These banks
have $107M of construction committed and not yet
advanced, of which $66M
comes out of the room above, leaving $395M,
with 7 banks
whose entire remaining room is spoken for.
A bank with no room contributes zero here, never a negative one — capacity does not net
across balance sheets — so $41M of what has
been promised is not deducted at all, because there is nothing left to deduct it from. On today’s
capital that is funding already contracted which would cross the line as it draws.
SR 06-26 draws a second line at 100% of capital for construction and land:
2 more cross it
once their own commitments fund.
Counted — 19 regional & local CRE lenders
| Bank | Deposit share | CRE / Capital* | Room contributed | Noncurrent CRE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ctbc Bank Corp. (Usa) CA | 26.6% | 214% total 252%
|
🔒 | 2.90% |
| Evertrust Bank CA | 32.2% | 211% total 253%
|
🔒 | 0.44% |
| Pinnacle Bank CA | 75.9% | 228% total 409%
|
🔒 | 1.52% |
| First Commercial Bank (Usa) CA | 19.0% | 163% total 191%
|
🔒 | 1.96% |
| Safra National Bank Of New York NY | 1.9% | 102% total 102%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Fremont Bank CA | 5.7% | 217% total 329%
|
🔒 | 0.43% |
| First Bank MO | 1.0% | 184% total 273%
|
🔒 | 0.09% |
| State Bank Of India (California) CA | 12.3% | 276% total 327%
|
🔒 | 1.91% |
| Open Bank CA | 3.5% | 255% total 458%
|
🔒 | 3.02% |
| Gbc International Bank CA | 13.5% | 269% total 379%
|
🔒 | 0.12% |
| Everbank, National Association FL | 0.1% | 169% total 175%
|
🔒 | 1.03% |
| Metropolitan Bank CA | 12.7% | 340% total 421%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| United Business Bank CA | 10.5% | 402% total 555%
|
🔒 | 0.48% |
| Golden Bank, National Association TX | 6.9% | 327% total 505%
|
🔒 | 2.27% |
| West Coast Community Bank CA | 6.5% | 362% total 474%
|
🔒 | 0.58% |
| Poppy Bank CA | 4.5% | 360% total 557%
|
🔒 | 2.15% |
| Commercial Bank Of California CA | 1.7% | 470% total 592%
|
🔒 | 0.02% |
| Mechanics Bank CA | 0.8% | 340% total 362%
|
🔒 | 0.30% |
| Exchange Bank CA | 0.0% | 225% total 255%
|
🔒 | 0.59% |
Not counted — 21 banks with deposits here
These hold deposits in this metro but are left out of the capacity above, because for them deposit location stops indicating where they lend — or they do not lend CRE at all. Real money that could refinance here is deliberately not counted.
no CRE book — CRE under 100% of capital — not a CRE lender
First-Citizens Bank & Trust Company NC · Wells Fargo Bank, National Association SD · Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Association OH · Bank Of America, National Association NC · Citibank, National Association SD · U.s. Bank National Association OH · Bmo Bank National Association IL · Hsbc Bank Usa, National Association VA · Pnc Bank, National Association DE
national — operates in more than 5 states, so deposits stop indicating where it lends
Western Alliance Bank AZ · East West Bank CA · City National Bank CA · Zions Bancorporation, N.a. UT · Cathay Bank CA · Bank Of Hope CA · Columbia Bank OR · Valley National Bank NJ · Hanmi Bank CA · Wafd Bank WA · Flagstar Bank, National Association NY
booked here — books nearly all deposits to one branch — a charter address, not a footprint
Avidbank CA
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
How to read this. It is not whether any particular loan can refinance — a borrower also reaches
national banks, life companies, agencies and debt funds. It is how much of this metro’s maturing volume the local
bank sector could absorb if it were the only door.
Banks are placed by deposit share (FDIC Summary of Deposits, June 2025) — a proxy for
where they lend, not a measurement; call reports carry no collateral geography. Room = 3× total risk-based capital less CRE held
(SR 06-26, the capital base the rule names — not book equity), from Q2 2026 call reports, apportioned by that share.
Committed construction comes from FFIEC Schedule RC-L as filed at 2026-06-30 —
the undrawn half of loans already written, which the balance sheet above does not show.
Banks in more than 5 states, single-branch bookers and banks that do not lend CRE are excluded —
313 banks holding $268.2B of national capacity not counted here.
Local Lenders — banks headquartered here, worst CRE noncurrent firstUnlock each bank’s early-warning flag →
| Bank | Total CRE | CRE / Capital* | Noncurrent CRE | Early Warning |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Pinnacle Bank | $482M | 228% total 409%
|
1.52% | 🔒 |
| Avidbank | $1.1B | 265% total 325%
|
1.35% | 🔒 |
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
Banks are matched to their HQ metro (a proxy for footprint). Noncurrent CRE = CRE-balance-weighted blend of multifamily / nonresidential / construction noncurrent (distress already arrived). Early Warning is a validated leading signal — the bank’s 30-89 early-delinquency rank among all CRE lenders this quarter, which has predicted ~2.3× forward CRE distress. Per-bank flags are on a plan.
Do the banks lending in San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, CA have the capacity to refinance its maturing CRE?
San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, CA screens tight: maturing_bal of $1.66bn against $395.2mm of room_after_committed gives a wall_to_room of 4.19 — 19 of 270, counting from the MOST strained. That ratio is an upper bound, since the wall is CMBS-only while room reflects just 19 banks_qualifying (with 12 banks_excluded_here), and it improves only to 3.59 before committed draws. Note that this is not explained by exclusion (explained_by_exclusion is false), unlike many high-ratio metros, so the strain may be real rather than an artifact of invisible national lenders.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS maturing in the window
- $1.66bn
- … across this many loans
- 22
- Local bank room, before committed draws
- $461.2mm
- Committed construction draws
- $107.0mm
- Local bank room, after those draws
- $395.2mm
- Wall-to-room ratio
- 4.19
- Rank, most strained
- 19
- … out of this many metros ranked
- 270
- … before committed draws
- 3.59
- Population ranked against
- CMBS maturing within 24 months against regional/community bank room in this metro
- Qualifying local banks
- 19
- … excluded from the calculation
- 12
- Distressed share of this metro's CMBS
- 8.0%
- Total CMBS balance here
- $6.44bn
- Capacity band
- tight
Compared against a median wall-to-room ratio of
0.20 across the ranked metros.
4.19 is ABOVE the median of 0.20, so this metro is MORE strained than the typical ranked metro
19 of 270, counting from the MOST strained — a LOWER rank number means MORE strain
{'room_is_a_proxy': 'Room is what regional and community banks could still write before the SR 06-26 concentration line, after deducting construction draws already committed. Deposit footprint is a proxy for lending footprint, not a measurement of it.', 'ratio_is_not_size': 'The most extreme ratios belong to the smallest metros. Read maturing_bal_mm beside the ratio — the map sizes bubbles by the wall, not the strain, for exactly this reason.', 'wall_is_cmbs_only': "The wall is the CMBS balance maturing within 24 months — the maturing debt this platform can see, not the metro's whole maturity load. Every ratio is an upper bound on how much of it local banks would have to absorb.", 'exclusion_artifact': 'A high ratio is as often an exclusion artifact as a credit event. Banks whose deposits do not indicate where they lend (nationals, card and charter banks) are excluded from the room, so a metro served mainly by those reads strained while its credit is simply invisible here. Check banks_qualifying against banks_excluded_here, and explained_by_exclusion.'}
Written from the figures above · CBSA 41940 · capacity_metro · last changed 13 Sep 2026
· Ask your own question →
Apartment-REIT Operating Read — same-store disclosures for this metro · as of 2026-07-30Set against the loan book →
Same-Store NOI
—
Same-Store Revenue
+4.5%
Occupancy
96.7%
Rent Growth
+4.3%
| REIT | SS NOI | SS Revenue | Occupancy | Rent | As Of |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AVB | — | +4.6% | 96.6% | +4.3% | 2026-07-30 |
| ESS | — | +4.4% | 96.8% | — | 2026-07-30 |
Same-store operating results disclosed by public apartment REITs (AVB · EQR · ESS · MAA · CPT · UDR) for this market in their quarterly supplements. Directional market context — an operating trend, not a Verstavo score.
On The Ground — recent closures, layoffs & CRE bankruptciesTie these events to loans →
153 local distress events in the past year (12,199 jobs) — store closures, layoffs, and commercial real estate bankruptcies near this metro's collateral.
2027-06-30
CLOSURE
Los Gatos
2027-06-30
CLOSURE
Los Gatos
2026-12-31
CLOSURE
Mountain View
2026-09-04
LAYOFF
95 jobs · Palo Alto
2026-09-04
LAYOFF
112 jobs · San Jose
2026-09-04
LAYOFF
250 jobs · San Jose
2026-08-31
CLOSURE
Sunnyvale
2026-08-31
CLOSURE
Santa Clara
2026-08-31
CLOSURE
Mountain View
2026-08-31
CLOSURE
Mountain View
2026-08-31
CLOSURE
San Jose
2026-08-31
CLOSURE
San Jose
2026-08-31
CLOSURE
San Jose
2026-08-31
LAYOFF
251 jobs · San Jose
2026-08-31
LAYOFF
128 jobs · Sunnyvale
What has actually happened on the ground in San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, CA recently?
In San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, CA over the trailing 365 days, the on-the-ground reading shows 25 store closures and 128 WARN notices, with the affected-employee count at a floor of 12,199; separately, CRE-likely bankruptcies total 3, but that figure is a STATE PROXY — bankruptcy filings carry the filer's state, not the property's location, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count.
The figures behind this answer
- Store closures
- 25
- WARN layoff notices
- 128
- Jobs on those notices
- 12,199
- CRE-related bankruptcies
- 3
- Window, in days
- 365
STATE PROXY — bankruptcy filings carry the filer's state, not the property's location, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count.
affected_employees is nullable — notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, so this is a floor.
Closures are matched ZIP -> CBSA and only APPROVED rows count (a pending, machine-extracted row is not yet a closure). This mirrors the Metro Pulse page, not the convergence board — the board applies neither filter and counts higher. Layoffs take the same ZIP -> CBSA and review treatment, and a WARN notice counts if it affects >= 10 people or does not state a headcount (a NULL is not 'fewer than 10').
Written from the figures above · CBSA 41940 · geo_events · last changed 13 Sep 2026
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What this page can’t do
Everything above is a snapshot — one market, as it stands today, and
it’s yours to read. What a snapshot can’t tell you is when it moves: which loan slipped a DSCR band
this month, which bank’s early-warning rank crossed into the top quartile, which submarket started turning
while the headline number still looked fine. Distress doesn’t announce itself on the day you happen to check.
This page
One metro · one moment · you come looking.
Verstavo
Every metro · every month · it comes looking for you.
CMBS covers the securitized slice of CRE; bank, closure and layoff signals widen the view.
“No data” in a zone means we don’t observe it here, not that there is no stress.
Employment is BLS (QCEW annual, LAUS monthly) — public data, and the demand leg under all of it.
See the whole picture, not just the pulse.
Metro Pulse is the free, public read. The Verstavo platform goes loan‑by‑loan — stress
scores, maturity walls, special‑servicing transfers, bank CRE, and your own portfolio benchmarked
against the market.