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Commercial Real Estate Credit —
San Diego-Chula Vista-Carlsbad, CA
The state of disclosed CRE credit in this market · CA
The read
$3.1B of CMBS across 146 loans. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2029 ($564M). Distress is flat in the filed record — 0.0% as of 2026-07. 94 on-the-ground distress events in the past year (4,041 jobs).
Overview
CMBS
Submarkets
Local Banks
Jobs & Demand
On The Ground
Loading map…
The CMBS properties our stress model flags here, plus recent store closures and layoffs. Stressed is a wider net than distressed — the distressed figure above counts only loans already in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, while these dots also include performing loans facing maturity or coverage pressure. Property dots sit at the center of their ZIP code, not the building — they show where stress concentrates, not which asset. Closures and layoffs are pinned to address where we have it. Open any dot to the building and the loan behind it →
In San Diego, a Clean Filed Record and a Rising Count on the Ground
San Diego carries $3.1 billion of CMBS across 146 loans, and as of July 2026 the filed record shows no distress — a 0.0% rate that has held flat. That is clean air by any national yardstick. Office, the sector that has defined the cycle elsewhere, sits at 0.0% here against an 11.1% national rate on an $0.8 billion book; hospitality ($0.6 billion) and mixed-use ($0.4 billion) likewise read zero versus national marks of 6.2% and 5.4%. The metro's $0.9 billion retail book shows no filed distress against a 2.6% national rate, and industrial ($0.2 billion) is quiet as well. A median DSCR of 2.24 underscores how much cushion sits beneath the current book.
The maturity wall is deferred rather than absent. Only $0.7 billion comes due inside 24 months, and the heaviest single-year load lands in 2029 at $564 million, with 2030 ($0.5 billion), 2031 ($0.4 billion) and 2027 ($0.4 billion) behind it — none of it carrying filed distress today. Across nine banks with metro exposure, none are flagged distressed and one sits on early warning.
The tension in this read is between the ledger and the street. Ninety-six on-the-ground distress events landed in the past year — 25 store closures and 71 layoff notices accounting for 4,024 jobs — a tally that has not yet surfaced in the servicer-declared record. Office-using employment of 320,602 is down 3.7% year over year even as headline unemployment, at 4.9% in August 2026, eased 0.2 percentage point. The filed record is pristine; the labor signal underneath it is not.
Written 2026-10-27
CMBS Distressed UPB
Not reported
fewer than 3 loans are distressed here, too few for the share to be a rate — the book size and loan count above are unaffected
CMBS Maturing ≤ 24mo
$671M
Banks HQ’d Here (stressed)
0 / 9
Bank Early-Warning
1 flagged
Store Closures (1y)
26
Layoff Notices (1y)
68 / 4,041 jobs
0.31% of metro employment
CMBS Loans / UPB
146 / $3.1B
Unemployment · Aug 2026
4.9%
-0.2pp yr
Office-Using Jobs · 2024
320,602
-3.7% yr
How much CRE distress is there in San Diego-Chula Vista-Carlsbad, CA right now?
In San Diego-Chula Vista-Carlsbad, CA, 3 legs elevated out of four are reading right now, with 3 pairs with both legs elevated against 0 pairs with both legs quiet across 6 pairs of legs compared; store closures stand at 26 closures, or 2.01 per 100k jobs, layoff notices (WARN) at 136 notices, or 0.27%, bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line at $2.39bn, or 10.55%, and securitized loans in special servicing at 1 loan records, or 0.22%. One caveat the reader should carry: the closures leg is elevated by size, not by rate, sitting below the median of its own rate ranking, so any reading that leans on it is a statement about how big this metro is. The 3 pairs where the legs disagree are structural — different populations and different books — not a severity signal, and none of these figures measures timing between mechanisms.
The figures behind this answer
| Signal | Level | Rate | Rank by count | Rank by rate | Reading |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| store closures store closures per 100,000 jobs |
26 closures | 2.01 per 100k jobs | 21 of 392 | 204 of 392 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| layoff notices (WARN) workers on layoff notices as a share of the metro's employment |
136 notices | 0.27% | 4 of 382 | 85 of 382 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line share of the CRE lent into this metro that sits at a lender over the blended-noncurrent line |
$2.39bn | 10.55% | 22 of 393 | 56 of 393 | elevated
allocated 2026-06-30
|
| securitized loans in special servicing share of the securitized balance read here that is in special servicing |
1 loan records | 0.22% | 90 of 335 | 104 of 335 | quiet 2026-09-29
|
6 pairs compared
3 both elevated
0 both quiet
3 disagreeing
0 unreadable — a side is blind
3 of four legs elevated
one metro, four independent feeds, each on its own denominator
124 of 447 metros have at least one blind leg and 54 are blind on all four. Those 54 are the same metros the board's map cannot place and the metro resolver cannot name: one ZIP-to-CBSA crosswalk boundary, showing up three ways.
Elevation is computed on the COUNT, over a flat threshold, which is a size filter. New York is 2nd of 392 by store closures and 264th of the same 392 by closures per job — both true, and which one you lead with decides what the reader believes.
Where two legs disagree, that is usually a fact about WHICH mechanism is running, not an error in either feed and not a worse metro.
A leg with no denominator, or whose numerator cannot be measured, reads LOW and means nothing. Each leg publishes a measurement state (allocated, floor, measured, no denominator, no rate, not measurable) for that reason.
elevated by size, not by rate — store closures clear a flat count threshold while sitting below the median of their own rate ranking. Any reading that leans on them is a statement about how big this metro is.
Store closures: divided by 1,291,034 jobs
— all metro jobs, QCEW annual average — a SIZE normaliser, not a matched population: the feed spans retail, food service and pharmacy and no single QCEW sector covers it. The MATCHED read sits beside it as this leg's second reading (trailing 365 days to today).
Layoff notices (WARN): divided by 1,559,604 employed
— employed persons, BLS LAUS, not seasonally adjusted (trailing 365 days to today).
Bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line: divided by $22,634.7 mm
— bank CRE allocated to this metro by branch deposits (2026-06-30).
Securitized loans in special servicing: divided by $3,120.0 mm
— current balance on the non-pari-passu rows of this tape — the trust's slice, not the whole loan, on both sides of the ratio (2026-09-29).
Written from the figures above · CBSA 41740 · stress_metro · last changed 01 Nov 2026
· Ask your own question →
Jobs & Demand — the labor market under the collateralWatch it change →
Every other zone on this page reads the credit — what the loan is doing.
This one reads the demand underneath it. Office jobs pay office rent;
office rent services the office loan. When the jobs go, the DSCR follows — but not for another year or two.
That lag is the whole point of looking here.
Unemployment · Aug 2026
4.9%
-0.2pp yr
Last 24 months
3.9%5.1%
Monthly metro unemployment (BLS LAUS) — the freshest labor signal there is,
about six weeks behind. Read the direction, not the level: a 4% metro that is rising and a 6% metro that is
falling are not telling you the same thing.
Jobs by CRE-relevant sector · 2024
Annual employment by sector (BLS QCEW, 2024; 1,291,034 jobs in the metro).
QCEW lags — it is the structural read, not the current one, and we pair it with the monthly unemployment above on purpose.
Office-using sums five supersectors; where BLS withholds any one of them for
disclosure, we show nothing rather than a number we know is too low — so a missing sector here means
“suppressed at the source,” not “zero.”
Sector Heat — CMBS distress rate by property type (metro vs national)See the loans behind the bar →
Fewer than 3 loans here are distressed, too few for a distress rate to mean anything — so there is no rate to test against this metro's property mix. 0 of 4 property types here run a higher distress rate than the national average for that type (the tick on each bar).
Maturity Wall — CMBS coming due by year, distress within eachSee what’s maturing →
$671M — 22% of the metro's balance — matures within two years; the red slice of each bar is already distressed.
Distress Trend — is this market turning?Track it quarter by quarter →
Realized distress is FLAT — 0.0% now (2026-07), +0.0pp over the year.
Same definition as the cards above — distressed means in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, dollar-weighted — on a different clock. The cards are today’s tape; this is the disclosed history panel, quarter by quarter, so you can read direction rather than level. Trusts file monthly, so a quarter is usually well covered within weeks of opening and the newest one shown is normally the current one; it is withheld only when its filed book falls below 60% of recent quarters.
Share of the metro’s CMBS in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, by quarter — a firmer, backward-looking read. A loan under 1.0x DSCR that is still paying is not counted here.
Submarket Heat — where in the metro the distress sitsOpen the submarket →
The top three submarkets hold $1.2B of the metro's $3.1B; each bar's colored share is its distress rate.
Bank Door — what the local bank sector could absorbSee it on every loan’s exit read →
$671M of CMBS matures here within two years.
The 15 regional and local banks that gather deposits here could write roughly
$345M more CRE before the 300% supervisory line, so the maturing balance is
1.95× that room.
The median metro sits at 0.13×.
Regional Bank Room
$345M
After Committed Draws
$211M / −38%
Maturing ÷ Room
1.95×
Banks In Footprint
15 / 4 at the line
The room above is already part-sold. Construction lending is a promise drawn
down over two or three years, and the undrawn part is an obligation the bank cannot decline while the borrower performs
— every one of those dollars lands in the same CRE book the 300% line governs. These banks
have $287M of construction committed and not yet
advanced, of which $127M
comes out of the room above, leaving $211M,
with 8 banks
whose entire remaining room is spoken for.
A bank with no room contributes zero here, never a negative one — capacity does not net
across balance sheets — so $160M of what has
been promised is not deducted at all, because there is nothing left to deduct it from. On today’s
capital that is funding already contracted which would cross the line as it draws.
SR 07-1 draws a second line at 100% of capital for construction and land:
2 more cross it
once their own commitments fund.
2% of the room above sits at banks we could not
match to a commitment filing; they are left out of this deduction rather than assumed to have promised nothing.
Counted — 15 regional & local CRE lenders
| Bank | Deposit share | CRE / Capital* | Room contributed | Noncurrent CRE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Endeavor Bank CA | 100.0% | 182% total 416%
|
🔒 | 0.54% |
| Calprivate Bank CA | 50.3% | 252% total 431%
|
🔒 | 0.40% |
| Banner Bank WA | 6.4% | 253% total 379%
|
🔒 | 0.22% |
| First Bank MO | 2.9% | 184% total 273%
|
🔒 | 0.09% |
| Banc Of California CA | 5.8% | 291% total 334%
|
🔒 | 4.24% |
| Balboa Thrift And Loan Association CA | 56.4% | 235% total 238%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| State Bank Of India (California) CA | 15.7% | 276% total 327%
|
🔒 | 1.91% |
| First Pacific Bank CA | 23.4% | 243% total 395%
|
🔒 | 0.31% |
| Shinhan Bank America NY | 5.4% | 257% total 382%
|
🔒 | 0.88% |
| Citizens Business Bank, National Association CA | 0.9% | 281% total 406%
|
🔒 | 0.06% |
| Beach Cities Commercial Bank CA | 20.0% | 273% total 633%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| C3bank, National Association CA | 84.7% | 361% total 403%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| California Bank Of Commerce, National Association CA | 18.8% | 313% total 437%
|
🔒 | 0.22% |
| Poppy Bank CA | 2.7% | 360% total 557%
|
🔒 | 2.15% |
| Mechanics Bank CA | 1.1% | 340% total 362%
|
🔒 | 0.30% |
Not counted — 27 banks with deposits here
These hold deposits in this metro but are left out of the capacity above, because for them deposit location stops indicating where they lend — or they do not lend CRE at all. Real money that could refinance here is deliberately not counted.
no CRE book — CRE under 100% of capital — not a CRE lender
Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Association OH · Wells Fargo Bank, National Association SD · Bank Of America, National Association NC · U.s. Bank National Association OH · Citibank, National Association SD · Pnc Bank, National Association DE · Bmo Bank National Association IL · First-Citizens Bank & Trust Company NC · Fifth Third Bank, National Association OH · Monet Bank TX · Hatch Bank CA · The Northern Trust Company IL · Citizens Bank, National Association RI
national — operates in more than 5 states, so deposits stop indicating where it lends
Western Alliance Bank AZ · Zions Bancorporation, N.a. UT · Enterprise Bank & Trust MO · City National Bank CA · East West Bank CA · Midfirst Bank OK · Sunflower Bank, National Association TX · Cathay Bank CA · Columbia Bank OR · Bank Of Hope CA · Hanmi Bank CA
booked here — books nearly all deposits to one branch — a charter address, not a footprint
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 07-1 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
How to read this. It is not whether any particular loan can refinance — a borrower also reaches
national banks, life companies, agencies and debt funds. It is how much of this metro’s maturing volume the local
bank sector could absorb if it were the only door.
Banks are placed by deposit share (FDIC Summary of Deposits, June 2026) — a proxy for
where they lend, not a measurement; call reports carry no collateral geography. Room = 3× total risk-based capital less CRE held
(SR 07-1, the capital base the rule names — not book equity), from Q2 2026 call reports, apportioned by that share.
Committed construction comes from FFIEC Schedule RC-L as filed at 2026-06-30 —
the undrawn half of loans already written, which the balance sheet above does not show.
Banks in more than 5 states, single-branch bookers and banks that do not lend CRE are excluded —
315 banks holding $263.8B of national capacity not counted here.
Local Lenders — banks headquartered here, worst CRE noncurrent firstUnlock each bank’s early-warning flag →
| Bank | Total CRE | CRE / Capital* | Noncurrent CRE | Early Warning |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Balboa Thrift And Loan Association | $101M | 235% total 238%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
| Endeavor Bank | $433M | 182% total 416%
|
0.54% | 🔒 |
| Calprivate Bank | $1.4B | 252% total 431%
|
0.40% | 🔒 |
| California Bank Of Commerce, National Association | $2.3B | 313% total 437%
|
0.22% | 🔒 |
| Axos Bank | $5.6B | 188% total 194%
|
0.09% | 🔒 |
| C3bank, National Association | $407M | 361% total 403%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
| Home Bank Of California | $182M | 404% total 582%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
| Neighborhood National Bank | $139M | 298% total 541%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 07-1 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
Banks are matched to their HQ metro (a proxy for footprint). Noncurrent CRE = CRE-balance-weighted blend of multifamily / nonresidential / construction noncurrent (distress already arrived). Early Warning is a validated leading signal — the bank’s 30-89 early-delinquency rank among all CRE lenders this quarter, which has predicted ~2.3× forward CRE distress. Per-bank flags are on a plan.
Apartment-REIT Operating Read — same-store disclosures for this metro · as of 2026-07-30Set against the loan book →
Same-Store NOI
+0.4%
Same-Store Revenue
+1.4%
Occupancy
95.8%
Rent Growth
+1.3%
| REIT | SS NOI | SS Revenue | Occupancy | Rent | As Of |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AVB | — | +1.5% | 96.0% | +1.6% | 2026-07-30 |
| CPT | -0.2% | +1.3% | 95.5% | +0.7% | 2026-04-30 |
| EQR | +1.0% | +1.3% | 96.0% | +1.7% | 2026-04-28 |
| ESS | — | +1.5% | 95.7% | — | 2026-07-30 |
Same-store operating results disclosed by public apartment REITs (AVB · EQR · ESS · MAA · CPT · UDR) for this market in their quarterly supplements. Directional market context — an operating trend, not a Verstavo score.
On The Ground — recent closures, layoffs & CRE bankruptciesTie these events to loans →
94 local distress events in the past year (4,041 jobs) — store closures, layoffs, and commercial real estate bankruptcies near this metro's collateral.
2026-12-31
CLOSURE
Scheduled · El Cajon
2026-12-31
CLOSURE
Scheduled · El Cajon
2026-12-31
CLOSURE
Scheduled · Poway
2026-10-29
LAYOFF
100 jobs · Glendal
2026-10-28
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 7
2026-10-27
LAYOFF
131 jobs · San Diego
2026-10-25
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-10-25
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-10-25
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-10-25
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-10-22
LAYOFF
San Diego
2026-10-19
LAYOFF
San Diego
2026-10-15
CLOSURE
San Diego
2026-10-14
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 7
2026-10-13
LAYOFF
18 jobs · San Diego
What has actually happened on the ground in San Diego-Chula Vista-Carlsbad, CA recently?
Over the most recent 365 days in the window, the San Diego-Chula Vista-Carlsbad, CA metro recorded 68 WARN layoff notices affecting 4,041 jobs on those notices — a figure that is a floor, since notices stating no headcount are counted but contribute nothing to the total. Store closures matched to the metro came to 26, counting approved rows only, while cRE-related bankruptcies registered 67 on a state-proxy basis rather than a metro-native count, so that reading should not be treated as activity located within the metro itself.
The figures behind this answer
- Store closures
- 26
- WARN layoff notices
- 68
- Jobs on those notices
- 4,041
- CRE-related bankruptcies
- 67
- Window, in days
- 365
STATE PROXY — a court case counts in its filing district and an SEC 8-K in the filer's state, not where the property is, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count. Each court case is counted once even when both PACER and CourtListener carry it. A court case's state is its filing district; an SEC 8-K or news item carries the filer's state. Coverage widened to both court feeds on 2026-09-16, so counts before and after that date are not comparable.
affected_employees is nullable — notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, so this is a floor.
Closures are matched ZIP -> CBSA and only APPROVED rows count (a pending, machine-extracted row is not yet a closure). This mirrors the Metro Pulse page, not the convergence board — the board applies neither filter and counts higher. Layoffs take the same ZIP -> CBSA and review treatment, and a WARN notice counts if it affects >= 10 people or does not state a headcount (a NULL is not 'fewer than 10').
Written from the figures above · CBSA 41740 · geo_events · last changed 01 Nov 2026
· Ask your own question →
What this page can’t do
Everything above is a snapshot — one market, as it stands today, and
it’s yours to read. What a snapshot can’t tell you is when it moves: which loan slipped a DSCR band
this month, which bank’s early-warning rank crossed into the top quartile, which submarket started turning
while the headline number still looked fine. Distress doesn’t announce itself on the day you happen to check.
This page
One metro · one moment · you come looking.
Verstavo
Every metro · every month · it comes looking for you.
CMBS covers the securitized slice of CRE; bank, closure and layoff signals widen the view.
“No data” in a zone means we don’t observe it here, not that there is no stress.
Employment is BLS (QCEW annual, LAUS monthly) — public data, and the demand leg under all of it.
See the whole picture, not just the pulse.
Metro Pulse is the free, public read — one page for every market we cover. The platform goes loan‑by‑loan inside it: which buildings carry the stress, when their debt comes due, and your own portfolio benchmarked against the market you are standing in.