Commercial Real Estate Credit —
San Antonio-New Braunfels, TX
The state of disclosed CRE credit in this market · OK, TX
The read
$1.2B of CMBS across 68 loans. Retail is both the largest book ($328M) and the most distressed (4.4% vs 2.7% national). The heaviest maturity load lands in 2029 ($464M, 38% of the book). Distress is easing in the filed record — 5.8% as of 2026-07. 19 on-the-ground distress events in the past year (1,614 jobs).
Overview
CMBS
Submarkets
Local Banks
Jobs & Demand
On The Ground
Loading map…
The CMBS properties our stress model flags here, plus recent store closures and layoffs. Stressed is a wider net than distressed — the distressed figure above counts only loans already in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, while these dots also include performing loans facing maturity or coverage pressure. Property dots sit at the center of their ZIP code, not the building — they show where stress concentrates, not which asset. Closures and layoffs are pinned to address where we have it. Open any dot to the building and the loan behind it →
Retail Carries the Weight in San Antonio as the Distress Record Eases
San Antonio-New Braunfels runs a modest CMBS book — $1.2 billion across 68 loans — and the pressure inside it is concentrated in one sector. Retail is both the metro's largest exposure at $328 million and its most distressed, with a 4.4% distress rate that sits well above the 2.7% national mark for the sector. That is the tension worth watching here: the biggest book is also the one servicers have flagged hardest. Against it, multifamily and self-storage each carry no distressed balance at all, the former a notable contrast to a 7.6% national rate.
The maturity wall is loaded toward the back end. The heaviest single year is 2029, with $464 million coming due — 38% of the entire book — and none of it currently distressed. Only $0.2 billion matures inside the next 24 months, so the refinancing test is a later-decade question rather than an immediate one. Across the book, the median DSCR stands at 1.68.
The filed record is moving the right way. The metro's overall distress rate reads 5.8% as of July 2026, and the direction has been falling. On the ground, the past year brought 19 distress events — 11 store closures and 8 layoff notices — touching 1,614 jobs, with unemployment at 4.7% in July 2026, up half a point year over year. Among the 10 banks with local exposure, none are distressed, though three sit on early-warning footing.
CMBS Distressed UPB
$70M / 5.8%
in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent
CMBS Maturing ≤ 24mo
$212M
Local Banks (stressed)
0 / 10
Bank Early-Warning
3 flagged
Store Closures (1y)
11
Layoff Notices (1y)
8 / 1,614 jobs
0.17% of metro employment
CMBS Loans / UPB
68 / $1.2B
Unemployment · Jul 2026
4.7%
+0.5pp yr
How much CRE distress is there in San Antonio-New Braunfels, TX right now?
For San Antonio-New Braunfels, TX, three of the four distress signals are elevated, and none of the four are quiet. Store closures are running hot, but only because the metro is large: 8 closures clear the count threshold while ranking 277th of 392 by closures per 100,000 jobs. WARN notices are also elevated, at 8 notices (0.13% of employment). Bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line is elevated at $1,102.9mm, or 7.66% of the book allocated to this metro. The securitized tape is quiet, with 2 special-servicing rows at 5.73% of balance. Three pairs disagree: closures hot against a quiet tape reads as retail failing on buildings the tape doesn’t hold; WARN hot against the quiet tape reads as employers cutting while the securitized book hasn’t moved; and bank hot against the tape quiet reads as lenders stressed on a book the tape can’t see. The three agreeing pairs all sit hot, so this is a metro where size, not rate, carries the closures signal.
The figures behind this answer
| Signal | Level | Rate | Rank by count | Rank by rate | Reading |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| store closures store closures per 100,000 jobs |
8 closures | 0.86 per 100k jobs | 49 of 392 | 277 of 392 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| layoff notices (WARN) workers on layoff notices as a share of the metro's employment |
8 notices | 0.13% | 67 of 386 | 150 of 386 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line share of the CRE lent into this metro that sits at a lender over the blended-noncurrent line |
$1.10bn | 7.66% | 41 of 393 | 101 of 393 | elevated
allocated 2026-03-31
|
| securitized loans in special servicing share of the securitized balance read here that is in special servicing |
2 loan records | 5.73% | 66 of 335 | 65 of 335 | quiet 2026-07-29
|
6 pairs compared
3 both elevated
0 both quiet
3 disagreeing
0 unreadable — a side is blind
3 of four legs elevated
one metro, four independent feeds, each on its own denominator
{'coverage': "114 of 441 metros have at least one blind leg and 48 are blind on all four. Those 48 are the same metros the board's map cannot place and the metro resolver cannot name: one ZIP-to-CBSA crosswalk boundary, showing up three ways.", 'a_count_ranks_by_size': 'Elevation is computed on the COUNT, over a flat threshold, which is a size filter. New York is 2nd of 392 by store closures and 264th of the same 392 by closures per job — both true, and which one you lead with decides what the reader believes. Every leg carries both ranks over ONE population; quote the rate beside the count.', 'disagreement_is_not_severity': 'Where two legs disagree, that is usually a fact about WHICH mechanism is running, not an error in either feed and not a worse metro. The six pairs read different populations, and each note is a STRUCTURAL prior about those populations — nothing here measures a lead or a lag between two legs, so never report one as timing.', 'a_blind_leg_is_not_a_quiet_one': "A leg with no denominator, or whose numerator cannot be measured, reads LOW and means nothing. Each leg publishes a measurement state (allocated, floor, measured, no denominator, no rate, not measurable) for that reason. Never report a blind leg as 'no distress'."}
{'fork': 'elevated by size, not by rate', 'note': 'store closures clear a flat count threshold while sitting below the median of their own rate ranking. Any reading that leans on them is a statement about how big this metro is.'}
{'leg': 'closures', 'unit': 'jobs', 'as_of': 'trailing 365 days to today', 'value': 933122, 'measures': 'store closures', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'window', 'what_it_is': "all metro jobs, QCEW annual average — a SIZE normaliser, not a matched population: the feed spans retail, food service and pharmacy and no single QCEW sector covers it. The MATCHED read sits beside it as this leg's second reading"}
{'leg': 'warn', 'unit': 'employed', 'as_of': 'trailing 365 days to today', 'value': 1285786, 'measures': 'layoff notices (WARN)', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'window', 'what_it_is': 'employed persons, BLS LAUS, not seasonally adjusted'}
{'leg': 'bank', 'unit': '$mm', 'as_of': '2026-03-31', 'value': 14407.0, 'measures': 'bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'stamp', 'what_it_is': 'bank CRE allocated to this metro by branch deposits'}
{'leg': 'cmbs', 'unit': '$mm', 'as_of': '2026-07-29', 'value': 1222.0, 'measures': 'securitized loans in special servicing', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'stamp', 'what_it_is': "current balance on the non-pari-passu rows of this tape — the trust's slice, not the whole loan, on both sides of the ratio"}
Written from the figures above · CBSA 41700 · stress_metro · last changed 28 Aug 2026
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Which distress signals are elevated in San Antonio-New Braunfels, TX, and which cannot be read?
In San Antonio-New Braunfels, TX, the elevated distress signals are bank distressed CRE at $1.10bn, closures, and WARN notices. The special servicing reading is 5.7% of metro UPB ($70.0mm), while the bank CRE at-risk 90th percentile is 4.6%, and bank CRE allocations are 8.5% ($14.41bn). The bank distressed-assets figure is unavailable, as is the convergence reading.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS in special servicing
- $70.0mm
- … as a share of this metro's CMBS balance
- 5.7%
- Bank CRE lent into this metro
- $14.41bn
- … at risk at the 90th percentile
- 4.6%
- CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line
- $1.10bn
- Assets at those lenders
- $0.00bn
- … share needing no branch-deposit allocation
- 8.5%
- Signals reading elevated
- bank CRE over the noncurrent line, store closures, WARN layoff notices
- Legs agreeing
- 3
- Phase
- early
- CMBS loans in special servicing
- 2
- Distressed banks
- 0
- Store closures (past year)
- 8
- WARN notices (past year)
- 8
the ground is deteriorating but CRE credit has not yet been hit — the leading edge
tens of millions of distressed CRE exposure
the ground is wobbling (closures / layoffs) but little CRE-credit distress sits behind it yet — a real-economy signal, not (yet) a CRE-credit event
Written from the figures above · CBSA 41700 · geo_metro_signals · last changed 28 Aug 2026
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Jobs & Demand — the labor market under the collateralWatch it change →
Every other zone on this page reads the credit — what the loan is doing.
This one reads the demand underneath it. Office jobs pay office rent;
office rent services the office loan. When the jobs go, the DSCR follows — but not for another year or two.
That lag is the whole point of looking here.
Unemployment · Jul 2026
4.7%
+0.5pp yr
Last 24 months
3.5%4.8%
Monthly metro unemployment (BLS LAUS) — the freshest labor signal there is,
about six weeks behind. Read the direction, not the level: a 4% metro that is rising and a 6% metro that is
falling are not telling you the same thing.
Jobs by CRE-relevant sector · 2024
Annual employment by sector (BLS QCEW, 2024; 933,122 jobs in the metro).
QCEW lags — it is the structural read, not the current one, and we pair it with the monthly unemployment above on purpose.
Office-using sums five supersectors; where BLS withholds any one of them for
disclosure, we show nothing rather than a number we know is too low — so a missing sector here means
“suppressed at the source,” not “zero.”
Sector Heat — CMBS distress rate by property type (metro vs national)See the loans behind the bar →
This metro's CMBS runs 5.8% distressed where its own property mix predicts 5.4% — $4M more than this book would carry at the rate each property type runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted and excluding this metro. The gap is measured; the cause is not. 1 of 3 property types here run a higher distress rate than the national average for that type (the tick on each bar).
Elimination — does the gap survive a control?
Each row re-prices this metro's book on a finer cell — its own property types, then those types split by loan size, then by vintage — always at the rate that cell runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted. A gap that shrinks toward zero is explained by the control; one that stays has ruled it out. What is measured is what survives, not a cause.
property mix alone
+0.4pp
… and loan size held fixed
+0.8pp
there is no gap here to explain
… and vintage held fixed
+0.2pp
there is no gap here to explain
The largest single contributor is Office: 7 loans, $296M, running 18.9% where the same type runs 11.2% elsewhere — worth 1.9pp of this metro's own rate.
Maturity Wall — CMBS coming due by year, distress within eachSee what’s maturing →
$212M — 17% of the metro's balance — matures within two years; the red slice of each bar is already distressed.
Distress Trend — is this market turning?Track it quarter by quarter →
Realized distress is FALLING — 5.8% now (2026-07), -1.4pp over the year.
Same definition as the cards above — distressed means in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, dollar-weighted — on a different clock. The cards are today’s tape; this is the disclosed history panel, quarter by quarter, so you can read direction rather than level. Trusts file monthly, so a quarter is usually well covered within weeks of opening and the newest one shown is normally the current one; it is withheld only when its filed book falls below 60% of recent quarters.
Share of the metro’s CMBS in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, by quarter — a firmer, backward-looking read. A loan under 1.0x DSCR that is still paying is not counted here.
Submarket Heat — where in the metro the distress sitsOpen the submarket →
The top three submarkets hold $815M of the metro's $1.2B; each bar's colored share is its distress rate.
Bank Door — what the local bank sector could absorbSee it on every loan’s exit read →
$212M of CMBS matures here within two years.
The 36 regional and local banks that gather deposits here could write roughly
$4.6B more CRE before the 300% supervisory line, so the maturing balance is
0.05× that room.
The median metro sits at 0.12×.
Regional Bank Room
$4.6B
After Committed Draws
$3.1B / −33%
Maturing ÷ Room
0.05×
Banks In Footprint
36 / 8 at the line
The room above is already part-sold. Construction lending is a promise drawn
down over two or three years, and the undrawn part is an obligation the bank cannot decline while the borrower performs
— every one of those dollars lands in the same CRE book the 300% line governs. These banks
have $2.0B of construction committed and not yet
advanced, of which $1.5B
comes out of the room above, leaving $3.1B,
with 19 banks
whose entire remaining room is spoken for.
A bank with no room contributes zero here, never a negative one — capacity does not net
across balance sheets — so $457M of what has
been promised is not deducted at all, because there is nothing left to deduct it from. On today’s
capital that is funding already contracted which would cross the line as it draws.
SR 06-26 draws a second line at 100% of capital for construction and land:
9 of 36
are past it on drawn balances alone, and
12 more cross it
once their own commitments fund.
Counted — 36 regional & local CRE lenders
| Bank | Deposit share | CRE / Capital* | Room contributed | Noncurrent CRE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Frost Bank TX | 31.1% | 123% total 208%
|
🔒 | 0.74% |
| Broadway National Bank TX | 78.2% | 176% total 244%
|
🔒 | 0.03% |
| International Bank Of Commerce TX | 15.4% | 215% total 236%
|
🔒 | 0.90% |
| Texas Capital Bank TX | 2.8% | 105% total 130%
|
🔒 | 0.77% |
| Jefferson Bank TX | 98.7% | 251% total 352%
|
🔒 | 1.04% |
| Prosperity Bank TX | 1.7% | 171% total 228%
|
🔒 | 0.18% |
| First Commercial Bank, National Association TX | 95.3% | 163% total 273%
|
🔒 | 0.67% |
| Txn Bank TX | 79.6% | 180% total 220%
|
🔒 | 1.55% |
| Castroville State Bank TX | 100.0% | 133% total 170%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Southtrust Bank, N.a. TX | 31.9% | 145% total 239%
|
🔒 | 0.16% |
| American Momentum Bank TX | 3.9% | 173% total 214%
|
🔒 | 4.40% |
| Texas Community Bank TX | 7.9% | 194% total 272%
|
🔒 | 0.17% |
| Third Coast Bank TX | 4.4% | 236% total 309%
|
🔒 | 0.43% |
| First United Bank And Trust Company OK | 6.1% | 280% total 344%
|
🔒 | 1.37% |
| Rio Bank TX | 22.7% | 242% total 329%
|
🔒 | 0.06% |
| Plainscapital Bank TX | 3.1% | 255% total 369%
|
🔒 | 0.54% |
| Security State Bank & Trust TX | 19.2% | 266% total 346%
|
🔒 | 3.45% |
| Susser Bank TX | 6.6% | 243% total 309%
|
🔒 | 0.44% |
| Hancock Whitney Bank MS | 0.2% | 146% total 229%
|
🔒 | 0.26% |
| Lone Star National Bank TX | 2.5% | 207% total 276%
|
🔒 | 1.31% |
| Security State Bank TX | 36.1% | 278% total 317%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| First National Bank Texas TX | 1.8% | 206% total 240%
|
🔒 | 0.07% |
| Falcon International Bank TX | 9.5% | 285% total 352%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Centennial Bank AR | 0.2% | 257% total 315%
|
🔒 | 0.46% |
| The Moody National Bank TX | 3.6% | 278% total 364%
|
🔒 | 1.18% |
| Ozona Bank TX | 1.4% | 174% total 237%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| The Bank And Trust, S.s.b. TX | 0.6% | 112% total 166%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Texas Regional Bank TX | 3.2% | 295% total 391%
|
🔒 | 0.02% |
| Schertz Bank & Trust TX | 93.9% | 345% total 467%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| The First National Bank Of Sonora TX | 25.3% | 327% total 439%
|
🔒 | 2.28% |
| Vantage Bank Texas TX | 16.6% | 314% total 424%
|
🔒 | 1.04% |
| Texas Champion Bank TX | 15.0% | 373% total 501%
|
🔒 | 0.48% |
| Sage Capital Bank, TX | 10.7% | 329% total 391%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Pinnacle Bank TX | 2.7% | 352% total 434%
|
🔒 | 0.10% |
| Wallis Bank TX | 2.6% | 419% total 676%
|
🔒 | 1.67% |
| Blue Sky Bank OK | 1.7% | 349% total 490%
|
🔒 | 3.42% |
Not counted — 24 banks with deposits here
These hold deposits in this metro but are left out of the capacity above, because for them deposit location stops indicating where they lend — or they do not lend CRE at all. Real money that could refinance here is deliberately not counted.
no CRE book — CRE under 100% of capital — not a CRE lender
Citibank, National Association SD · Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Association OH · Bank Of America, National Association NC · Wells Fargo Bank, National Association SD · Pnc Bank, National Association DE · The Falls City National Bank TX · Farm Bureau Bank Fsb NV · Truist Bank NC · Marion State Bank TX · The Lytle State Bank Of Lytle, Texas TX · Amarillo National Bank TX · First State Bank Of Uvalde TX · Trusttexas Bank, Ssb TX · First-Citizens Bank & Trust Company NC · Transpecos Banks, Ssb TX
national — operates in more than 5 states, so deposits stop indicating where it lends
Zions Bancorporation, N.a. UT · Bokf, National Association OK · Sunflower Bank, National Association TX · Midfirst Bank OK · Bank Ozk AR · Woodforest National Bank TX · Southstate Bank, National Association FL · Encore Bank AR · Simmons Bank AR
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
How to read this. It is not whether any particular loan can refinance — a borrower also reaches
national banks, life companies, agencies and debt funds. It is how much of this metro’s maturing volume the local
bank sector could absorb if it were the only door.
Banks are placed by deposit share (FDIC Summary of Deposits, June 2025) — a proxy for
where they lend, not a measurement; call reports carry no collateral geography. Room = 3× total risk-based capital less CRE held
(SR 06-26, the capital base the rule names — not book equity), from Q2 2026 call reports, apportioned by that share.
Committed construction comes from FFIEC Schedule RC-L as filed at 2026-06-30 —
the undrawn half of loans already written, which the balance sheet above does not show.
Banks in more than 5 states, single-branch bookers and banks that do not lend CRE are excluded —
313 banks holding $268.2B of national capacity not counted here.
Local Lenders — banks headquartered here, worst CRE noncurrent firstUnlock each bank’s early-warning flag →
| Bank | Total CRE | CRE / Capital* | Noncurrent CRE | Early Warning |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Txn Bank | $146M | 180% total 220%
|
1.55% | 🔒 |
| Frost Bank | $10.7B | 123% total 208%
|
0.74% | 🔒 |
| Schertz Bank & Trust | $537M | 345% total 467%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
| Vantage Bank Texas | $2.2B | 314% total 424%
|
1.04% | 🔒 |
| Jefferson Bank | $980M | 251% total 352%
|
1.04% | 🔒 |
| First Commercial Bank, National Association | $166M | 163% total 273%
|
0.67% | 🔒 |
| Broadway National Bank | $1.6B | 176% total 244%
|
0.03% | 🔒 |
| Castroville State Bank | $52M | 133% total 170%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
Banks are matched to their HQ metro (a proxy for footprint). Noncurrent CRE = CRE-balance-weighted blend of multifamily / nonresidential / construction noncurrent (distress already arrived). Early Warning is a validated leading signal — the bank’s 30-89 early-delinquency rank among all CRE lenders this quarter, which has predicted ~2.3× forward CRE distress. Per-bank flags are on a plan.
Do the banks lending in San Antonio-New Braunfels, TX have the capacity to refinance its maturing CRE?
San Antonio-New Braunfels, TX sits in slack territory: with 13 loans maturing and a maturing_bal of $211.7mm against room_after_committed of $3.10bn, the wall_to_room reading is 0.07, which is BELOW the median of 0.20, so this metro is LESS strained than the typical ranked metro. Room stands at room_before_committed of $4.61bn prior to deducting committed_draws of $1.97bn, and the ratio measured before those draws is wall_to_room_before_committed_draws of 0.05. The metro ranks rank_most_strained of 206 of 270, counting from the MOST strained — a LOWER rank number means MORE strain — and the banks_qualifying here number 36 against banks_excluded_here of 9, with explained_by_exclusion false. Note the caveat that the wall is only the CMBS balance maturing within 24 months, so this ratio is an upper bound on how much of it local banks would have to absorb; the underlying CRE maturity load beyond CMBS is not available in these figures.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS maturing in the window
- $211.7mm
- … across this many loans
- 13
- Local bank room, before committed draws
- $4.61bn
- Committed construction draws
- $1.97bn
- Local bank room, after those draws
- $3.10bn
- Wall-to-room ratio
- 0.07
- Rank, most strained
- 206
- … out of this many metros ranked
- 270
- … before committed draws
- 0.05
- Population ranked against
- CMBS maturing within 24 months against regional/community bank room in this metro
- Qualifying local banks
- 36
- … excluded from the calculation
- 9
- Distressed share of this metro's CMBS
- 5.8%
- Total CMBS balance here
- $1.22bn
- Capacity band
- slack
Compared against a median wall-to-room ratio of
0.20 across the ranked metros.
0.07 is BELOW the median of 0.20, so this metro is LESS strained than the typical ranked metro
206 of 270, counting from the MOST strained — a LOWER rank number means MORE strain
{'room_is_a_proxy': 'Room is what regional and community banks could still write before the SR 06-26 concentration line, after deducting construction draws already committed. Deposit footprint is a proxy for lending footprint, not a measurement of it.', 'ratio_is_not_size': 'The most extreme ratios belong to the smallest metros. Read maturing_bal_mm beside the ratio — the map sizes bubbles by the wall, not the strain, for exactly this reason.', 'wall_is_cmbs_only': "The wall is the CMBS balance maturing within 24 months — the maturing debt this platform can see, not the metro's whole maturity load. Every ratio is an upper bound on how much of it local banks would have to absorb.", 'exclusion_artifact': 'A high ratio is as often an exclusion artifact as a credit event. Banks whose deposits do not indicate where they lend (nationals, card and charter banks) are excluded from the room, so a metro served mainly by those reads strained while its credit is simply invisible here. Check banks_qualifying against banks_excluded_here, and explained_by_exclusion.'}
Written from the figures above · CBSA 41700 · capacity_metro · last changed 13 Sep 2026
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Apartment-REIT Operating Read — same-store disclosures for this metro · as of 2026-07-29Set against the loan book →
Same-Store NOI
-7.2%
Same-Store Revenue
-3.3%
Occupancy
94.4%
Rent Growth
-2.5%
| REIT | SS NOI | SS Revenue | Occupancy | Rent | As Of |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| MAA | -7.2% | -3.3% | 94.4% | -2.5% | 2026-07-29 |
Same-store operating results disclosed by public apartment REITs (AVB · EQR · ESS · MAA · CPT · UDR) for this market in their quarterly supplements. Directional market context — an operating trend, not a Verstavo score.
On The Ground — recent closures, layoffs & CRE bankruptciesTie these events to loans →
19 local distress events in the past year (1,614 jobs) — store closures, layoffs, and commercial real estate bankruptcies near this metro's collateral.
2026-08-21
CLOSURE
New Braunfels
2026-08-21
CLOSURE
New Braunfels
2026-07-09
BANKRUPTCY
CRE-linked bankruptcy
2026-06-16
BANKRUPTCY
CRE-linked bankruptcy
2026-06-16
BANKRUPTCY
CRE-linked bankruptcy
2026-06-08
BANKRUPTCY
CRE-linked bankruptcy
2026-05-31
CLOSURE
San Antonio
2026-05-31
CLOSURE
San Antonio
2026-05-31
CLOSURE
San Antonio
2026-04-27
LAYOFF
648 jobs · San Antonio
2026-04-23
LAYOFF
372 jobs · Schertz
2026-04-23
LAYOFF
50 jobs · San Antonio
2026-03-30
CLOSURE
San Antonio
2026-03-06
LAYOFF
71 jobs · San Antonio
2026-02-23
CLOSURE
Bergheim
What has actually happened on the ground in San Antonio-New Braunfels, TX recently?
Over the trailing 365 days, the ground-level record for San Antonio-New Braunfels, TX shows 11 store closures, 8 WARN notices, and 1,614 jobs affected, alongside 4 CRE-likely bankruptcy filings — though that bankruptcy figure should be read as a STATE PROXY — bankruptcy filings carry the filer's state, not the property's location, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in, and is not a metro-native count. The closure and layoff counts reflect approved, ZIP-matched events, and the jobs figure is a floor since affected_employees is nullable — notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs.
The figures behind this answer
- Store closures
- 11
- WARN layoff notices
- 8
- Jobs on those notices
- 1,614
- CRE-related bankruptcies
- 4
- Window, in days
- 365
STATE PROXY — bankruptcy filings carry the filer's state, not the property's location, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count.
affected_employees is nullable — notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, so this is a floor.
Closures are matched ZIP -> CBSA and only APPROVED rows count (a pending, machine-extracted row is not yet a closure). This mirrors the Metro Pulse page, not the convergence board — the board applies neither filter and counts higher. Layoffs take the same ZIP -> CBSA and review treatment, and a WARN notice counts if it affects >= 10 people or does not state a headcount (a NULL is not 'fewer than 10').
Written from the figures above · CBSA 41700 · geo_events · last changed 13 Sep 2026
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What this page can’t do
Everything above is a snapshot — one market, as it stands today, and
it’s yours to read. What a snapshot can’t tell you is when it moves: which loan slipped a DSCR band
this month, which bank’s early-warning rank crossed into the top quartile, which submarket started turning
while the headline number still looked fine. Distress doesn’t announce itself on the day you happen to check.
This page
One metro · one moment · you come looking.
Verstavo
Every metro · every month · it comes looking for you.
CMBS covers the securitized slice of CRE; bank, closure and layoff signals widen the view.
“No data” in a zone means we don’t observe it here, not that there is no stress.
Employment is BLS (QCEW annual, LAUS monthly) — public data, and the demand leg under all of it.
See the whole picture, not just the pulse.
Metro Pulse is the free, public read. The Verstavo platform goes loan‑by‑loan — stress
scores, maturity walls, special‑servicing transfers, bank CRE, and your own portfolio benchmarked
against the market.