Commercial Real Estate Credit —
Sacramento-Roseville-Folsom, CA
The state of disclosed CRE credit in this market · CA
The read
$2.0B of CMBS across 100 loans. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2030 ($598M, 29% of the book). Office is the largest book ($684M, 5.0% distressed). Distress is flat in the filed record — 1.6% as of 2026-07. 75 on-the-ground distress events in the past year (4,175 jobs).
Overview
CMBS
Submarkets
Local Banks
Jobs & Demand
On The Ground
Loading map…
The CMBS properties our stress model flags here, plus recent store closures and layoffs. Stressed is a wider net than distressed — the distressed figure above counts only loans already in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, while these dots also include performing loans facing maturity or coverage pressure. Property dots sit at the center of their ZIP code, not the building — they show where stress concentrates, not which asset. Closures and layoffs are pinned to address where we have it. Open any dot to the building and the loan behind it →
Office Carries the Book, but Sacramento's Filed Record Holds Flat
Sacramento-Roseville-Folsom carries $2.0B of CMBS across 100 loans, and the filed distress record is holding flat — 1.6% as of July 2026. That is the number that matters most here: the servicer-declared record is not moving, and the metro's median DSCR sits at a comfortable 1.93. Bank exposure is thin, with three institutions tracked and none flagged.
Office is the largest book at $684M and the clearest pocket of stress, running 5.0% distressed — elevated for this metro, but well inside the 11.3% national office rate. Retail ($0.6B), self-storage ($0.2B) and hospitality ($0.1B) show no distress in the filed record. The maturity wall builds toward the back end: 2030 carries the heaviest load at $598M, or 29% of the book, and that vintage shows no distress today. The nearer 2028 slice is smaller but carries an 11.3% distress rate.
The on-the-ground signal is louder than the securitized one. The metro logged 75 distress events over the past year — 26 store closures and 49 layoff notices — touching 4,175 jobs. Unemployment stands at 5.0%, down 0.3 points year over year, while office-using employment of 169,915 has slipped 0.9%. The corporate footprint is thinning at the margin, even as the filed loan record stays put.
CMBS Distressed UPB
$34M / 1.7%
in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent
CMBS Maturing ≤ 24mo
$520M
Local Banks (stressed)
0 / 3
Bank Early-Warning
0 flagged
Store Closures (1y)
26
Layoff Notices (1y)
49 / 4,175 jobs
0.51% of metro employment
CMBS Loans / UPB
100 / $2.0B
Unemployment · Jul 2026
5.0%
-0.3pp yr
Office-Using Jobs · 2024
169,915
-0.9% yr
How much CRE distress is there in Sacramento-Roseville-Folsom, CA right now?
For Sacramento-Roseville-Folsom, CA, distress is elevated across three of the four measured legs. Store closures sit at 26 closures (3.18 per 100k jobs, ranked 20th by count and 80th by rate out of 392 metros), while WARN layoff notices total 85 (0.38% of employment, ranked 9th by count and 50th by rate out of 386 metros). Bank CRE over the noncurrent line stands at $1,262.3mm (6.6% of allocated CRE, ranked 38th by count and 113th by rate out of 393 metros), with only 21.7% of those dollars at lenders needing no branch-deposit allocation. The securitized loans in special servicing leg is unmeasurable—4 rows carry no balance, so the rate is unavailable and cannot be read as quiet. Among the three adjudicable pairs, all three agree on elevated conditions (closures-WARN, closures-bank, WARN-bank), while three pairs involving the blind CMBS leg are unadjudicated. No pair shows disagreement.
The figures behind this answer
| Signal | Level | Rate | Rank by count | Rank by rate | Reading |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| store closures store closures per 100,000 jobs |
26 closures | 3.18 per 100k jobs | 20 of 392 | 80 of 392 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| layoff notices (WARN) workers on layoff notices as a share of the metro's employment |
85 notices | 0.38% | 9 of 386 | 50 of 386 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line share of the CRE lent into this metro that sits at a lender over the blended-noncurrent line |
$1.26bn | 6.6% | 38 of 393 | 113 of 393 | elevated
allocated 2026-03-31
|
| securitized loans in special servicing share of the securitized balance read here that is in special servicing |
4 loan records | — | — | — | cannot be read
not measurable 2026-07-29
|
6 pairs compared
3 both elevated
0 both quiet
0 disagreeing
3 unreadable — a side is blind
3 of four legs elevated
blind: securitized loans in special servicing
one metro, four independent feeds, each on its own denominator
{'coverage': "114 of 441 metros have at least one blind leg and 48 are blind on all four. Those 48 are the same metros the board's map cannot place and the metro resolver cannot name: one ZIP-to-CBSA crosswalk boundary, showing up three ways.", 'a_count_ranks_by_size': 'Elevation is computed on the COUNT, over a flat threshold, which is a size filter. New York is 2nd of 392 by store closures and 264th of the same 392 by closures per job — both true, and which one you lead with decides what the reader believes. Every leg carries both ranks over ONE population; quote the rate beside the count.', 'disagreement_is_not_severity': 'Where two legs disagree, that is usually a fact about WHICH mechanism is running, not an error in either feed and not a worse metro. The six pairs read different populations, and each note is a STRUCTURAL prior about those populations — nothing here measures a lead or a lag between two legs, so never report one as timing.', 'a_blind_leg_is_not_a_quiet_one': "A leg with no denominator, or whose numerator cannot be measured, reads LOW and means nothing. Each leg publishes a measurement state (allocated, floor, measured, no denominator, no rate, not measurable) for that reason. Never report a blind leg as 'no distress'."}
{'fork': 'a blind leg is not a quiet one', 'note': 'securitized loans in special servicing cannot be read here. Their low numbers are an absence of MEASUREMENT.'}
{'leg': 'closures', 'unit': 'jobs', 'as_of': 'trailing 365 days to today', 'value': 816412, 'measures': 'store closures', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'window', 'what_it_is': "all metro jobs, QCEW annual average — a SIZE normaliser, not a matched population: the feed spans retail, food service and pharmacy and no single QCEW sector covers it. The MATCHED read sits beside it as this leg's second reading"}
{'leg': 'warn', 'unit': 'employed', 'as_of': 'trailing 365 days to today', 'value': 1126231, 'measures': 'layoff notices (WARN)', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'window', 'what_it_is': 'employed persons, BLS LAUS, not seasonally adjusted'}
{'leg': 'bank', 'unit': '$mm', 'as_of': '2026-03-31', 'value': 19127.2, 'measures': 'bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'stamp', 'what_it_is': 'bank CRE allocated to this metro by branch deposits'}
{'leg': 'cmbs', 'unit': '$mm', 'as_of': '2026-07-29', 'value': 1964.0, 'measures': 'securitized loans in special servicing', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'stamp', 'what_it_is': "current balance on the non-pari-passu rows of this tape — the trust's slice, not the whole loan, on both sides of the ratio"}
Written from the figures above · CBSA 40900 · stress_metro · last changed 28 Aug 2026
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Which distress signals are elevated in Sacramento-Roseville-Folsom, CA, and which cannot be read?
In Sacramento-Roseville-Folsom, CA, the elevated distress signals are bank distressed CRE (with 21.7% of bank CRE allocated to at-risk assets, or $1.26bn in distressed lender CRE), closures (26 store closures over the past year), and warn (85 WARN notices over the past year). The CMBS special-servicing reading is unavailable: while 4 loans sit in special servicing, their combined UPB is listed as $0.0mm due to missing balances on the tape, so the securitized side cannot be read — the 0.0% share is a data gap, not evidence of quiet. Additionally, the metro's convergence score is 3, with 2.5 in distressed bank assets (in billions), but the credit-side phase is obscured — the ground is deteriorating (closures/layoffs), yet CRE-credit distress behind it is not yet measurable, and the securitized exposure is invisible in this reading.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS in special servicing
- $0.0mm
- … as a share of this metro's CMBS balance
- 0.0%
- Bank CRE lent into this metro
- $19.13bn
- … at risk at the 90th percentile
- 47.8%
- CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line
- $1.26bn
- Assets at those lenders
- $2.50bn
- … share needing no branch-deposit allocation
- 21.7%
- Signals reading elevated
- bank CRE over the noncurrent line, store closures, WARN layoff notices
- Legs agreeing
- 3
- Phase
- obscured
- CMBS loans in special servicing
- 4
- Distressed banks
- 1
- Store closures (past year)
- 26
- WARN notices (past year)
- 85
the ground is deteriorating, and whether CRE credit has been hit here CANNOT BE READ: not one of this metro's 4 special-servicing rows carries a balance — the securitized side is invisible here, which is not the same as quiet
tens of millions of distressed CRE exposure; and the securitized side is NOT MEASURED here — all 4 loans in special servicing sit on tape rows carrying no balance, so the $0 is a gap in the tape, not an absence of distress
the ground is wobbling (closures / layoffs) but little CRE-credit distress sits behind it yet — a real-economy signal, not (yet) a CRE-credit event
Written from the figures above · CBSA 40900 · geo_metro_signals · last changed 27 Aug 2026
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Jobs & Demand — the labor market under the collateralWatch it change →
Every other zone on this page reads the credit — what the loan is doing.
This one reads the demand underneath it. Office jobs pay office rent;
office rent services the office loan. When the jobs go, the DSCR follows — but not for another year or two.
That lag is the whole point of looking here.
Unemployment · Jul 2026
5.0%
-0.3pp yr
Last 24 months
4.2%5.4%
Monthly metro unemployment (BLS LAUS) — the freshest labor signal there is,
about six weeks behind. Read the direction, not the level: a 4% metro that is rising and a 6% metro that is
falling are not telling you the same thing.
Jobs by CRE-relevant sector · 2024
Annual employment by sector (BLS QCEW, 2024; 816,412 jobs in the metro).
QCEW lags — it is the structural read, not the current one, and we pair it with the monthly unemployment above on purpose.
Office-using sums five supersectors; where BLS withholds any one of them for
disclosure, we show nothing rather than a number we know is too low — so a missing sector here means
“suppressed at the source,” not “zero.”
Sector Heat — CMBS distress rate by property type (metro vs national)See the loans behind the bar →
This metro's CMBS runs 1.7% distressed where its own property mix predicts 6.0% — $88M less than this book would carry at the rate each property type runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted and excluding this metro. The gap is measured; the cause is not. 0 of 4 property types here run a higher distress rate than the national average for that type (the tick on each bar).
Elimination — does the gap survive a control?
Each row re-prices this metro's book on a finer cell — its own property types, then those types split by loan size, then by vintage — always at the rate that cell runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted. A gap that shrinks toward zero is explained by the control; one that stays has ruled it out. What is measured is what survives, not a cause.
property mix alone
-4.3pp
… and loan size held fixed
-4.2pp
the gap is still there with loan size held fixed too
… and vintage held fixed
-4.4pp
the gap is still there with vintage held fixed too
The largest single contributor is Office: 25 loans, $684M, running 5.0% where the same type runs 11.3% elsewhere — worth 2.1pp of this metro's own rate.
Maturity Wall — CMBS coming due by year, distress within eachSee what’s maturing →
$520M — 25% of the metro's balance — matures within two years; the red slice of each bar is already distressed.
Distress Trend — is this market turning?Track it quarter by quarter →
Realized distress is FLAT — 1.6% now (2026-07), -0.1pp over the year.
Same definition as the cards above — distressed means in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, dollar-weighted — on a different clock. The cards are today’s tape; this is the disclosed history panel, quarter by quarter, so you can read direction rather than level. Trusts file monthly, so a quarter is usually well covered within weeks of opening and the newest one shown is normally the current one; it is withheld only when its filed book falls below 60% of recent quarters.
Share of the metro’s CMBS in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, by quarter — a firmer, backward-looking read. A loan under 1.0x DSCR that is still paying is not counted here.
Submarket Heat — where in the metro the distress sitsOpen the submarket →
The top three submarkets hold $1.3B of the metro's $2.0B; each bar's colored share is its distress rate.
Bank Door — what the local bank sector could absorbSee it on every loan’s exit read →
$520M of CMBS matures here within two years.
The 18 regional and local banks that gather deposits here could write roughly
$389M more CRE before the 300% supervisory line, so the maturing balance is
1.34× that room.
The median metro sits at 0.12×.
Regional Bank Room
$389M
After Committed Draws
$278M / −28%
Maturing ÷ Room
1.34×
Banks In Footprint
18 / 6 at the line
The room above is already part-sold. Construction lending is a promise drawn
down over two or three years, and the undrawn part is an obligation the bank cannot decline while the borrower performs
— every one of those dollars lands in the same CRE book the 300% line governs. These banks
have $431M of construction committed and not yet
advanced, of which $110M
comes out of the room above, leaving $278M,
with 11 banks
whose entire remaining room is spoken for.
A bank with no room contributes zero here, never a negative one — capacity does not net
across balance sheets — so $321M of what has
been promised is not deducted at all, because there is nothing left to deduct it from. On today’s
capital that is funding already contracted which would cross the line as it draws.
SR 06-26 draws a second line at 100% of capital for construction and land:
2 more cross it
once their own commitments fund.
Counted — 18 regional & local CRE lenders
| Bank | Deposit share | CRE / Capital* | Room contributed | Noncurrent CRE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Farmers & Merchants Bank Of Central California CA | 14.9% | 164% total 224%
|
🔒 | 0.04% |
| First Northern Bank Of Dixon CA | 67.3% | 221% total 279%
|
🔒 | 0.13% |
| Banner Bank WA | 4.5% | 253% total 379%
|
🔒 | 0.22% |
| First Bank MO | 3.1% | 184% total 273%
|
🔒 | 0.09% |
| Plumas Bank CA | 8.5% | 235% total 408%
|
🔒 | 0.79% |
| Everbank, National Association FL | 0.2% | 169% total 175%
|
🔒 | 1.03% |
| Exchange Bank CA | 1.5% | 225% total 255%
|
🔒 | 0.59% |
| Citizens National Bank Of Texas TX | 1.9% | 215% total 416%
|
🔒 | 2.19% |
| River Valley Community Bank CA | 13.8% | 274% total 451%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Citizens Business Bank, National Association CA | 0.5% | 281% total 406%
|
🔒 | 0.06% |
| Community West Bank CA | 11.4% | 298% total 391%
|
🔒 | 0.56% |
| Oak Valley Community Bank CA | 1.6% | 289% total 379%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Five Star Bank CA | 78.2% | 536% total 640%
|
🔒 | 0.35% |
| Bank Of Marin CA | 10.8% | 366% total 440%
|
🔒 | 0.50% |
| Tri Counties Bank CA | 8.9% | 315% total 396%
|
🔒 | 0.54% |
| Poppy Bank CA | 4.2% | 360% total 557%
|
🔒 | 2.15% |
| United Business Bank CA | 3.5% | 402% total 555%
|
🔒 | 0.48% |
| Mechanics Bank CA | 3.1% | 340% total 362%
|
🔒 | 0.30% |
Not counted — 19 banks with deposits here
These hold deposits in this metro but are left out of the capacity above, because for them deposit location stops indicating where they lend — or they do not lend CRE at all. Real money that could refinance here is deliberately not counted.
no CRE book — CRE under 100% of capital — not a CRE lender
U.s. Bank National Association OH · Wells Fargo Bank, National Association SD · Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Association OH · Bank Of America, National Association NC · Bmo Bank National Association IL · El Dorado Savings Bank, F.s.b. CA · Citibank, National Association SD · First-Citizens Bank & Trust Company NC · Pnc Bank, National Association DE · Beal Bank Usa NV · Westamerica Bank CA · Bank Of Stockton CA · Sofi Bank, National Association UT
national — operates in more than 5 states, so deposits stop indicating where it lends
Zions Bancorporation, N.a. UT · East West Bank CA · Columbia Bank OR · Cathay Bank CA · Flagstar Bank, National Association NY
booked here — books nearly all deposits to one branch — a charter address, not a footprint
River City Bank CA
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
How to read this. It is not whether any particular loan can refinance — a borrower also reaches
national banks, life companies, agencies and debt funds. It is how much of this metro’s maturing volume the local
bank sector could absorb if it were the only door.
Banks are placed by deposit share (FDIC Summary of Deposits, June 2025) — a proxy for
where they lend, not a measurement; call reports carry no collateral geography. Room = 3× total risk-based capital less CRE held
(SR 06-26, the capital base the rule names — not book equity), from Q2 2026 call reports, apportioned by that share.
Committed construction comes from FFIEC Schedule RC-L as filed at 2026-06-30 —
the undrawn half of loans already written, which the balance sheet above does not show.
Banks in more than 5 states, single-branch bookers and banks that do not lend CRE are excluded —
313 banks holding $268.2B of national capacity not counted here.
Local Lenders — banks headquartered here, worst CRE noncurrent firstUnlock each bank’s early-warning flag →
| Bank | Total CRE | CRE / Capital* | Noncurrent CRE | Early Warning |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Five Star Bank | $3.7B | 536% total 640%
|
0.35% | 🔒 |
| River City Bank | $4.2B | 649% total 675%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
Banks are matched to their HQ metro (a proxy for footprint). Noncurrent CRE = CRE-balance-weighted blend of multifamily / nonresidential / construction noncurrent (distress already arrived). Early Warning is a validated leading signal — the bank’s 30-89 early-delinquency rank among all CRE lenders this quarter, which has predicted ~2.3× forward CRE distress. Per-bank flags are on a plan.
Do the banks lending in Sacramento-Roseville-Folsom, CA have the capacity to refinance its maturing CRE?
Sacramento-Roseville-Folsom, CA screens as more strained than the typical metro on this measure: 18 banks qualifying against 6 banks excluded here, with a maturing wall of 37 maturing loans totaling $519.9mm against $388.6mm of room before committed draws and $278.5mm after — a wall-to-room of 1.87 and a wall-to-room before committed draws of 1.34, ranking 37 of 270 counting from the most strained. The ratio is an upper bound, since the wall is CMBS maturing within 24 months and room is a deposit-footprint proxy for what regional and community banks could still write; at $2.05bn CMBS UPB and a distressed share of 1.7%, capacity here is thin rather than clearly adequate, and the caveat that a high ratio is as often an exclusion artifact as a credit event applies — explained_by_exclusion is false, so the strain is not attributed to bank exclusion in this case.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS maturing in the window
- $519.9mm
- … across this many loans
- 37
- Local bank room, before committed draws
- $388.6mm
- Committed construction draws
- $431.3mm
- Local bank room, after those draws
- $278.5mm
- Wall-to-room ratio
- 1.87
- Rank, most strained
- 37
- … out of this many metros ranked
- 270
- … before committed draws
- 1.34
- Population ranked against
- CMBS maturing within 24 months against regional/community bank room in this metro
- Qualifying local banks
- 18
- … excluded from the calculation
- 6
- Distressed share of this metro's CMBS
- 1.7%
- Total CMBS balance here
- $2.05bn
- Capacity band
- over
Compared against a median wall-to-room ratio of
0.20 across the ranked metros.
1.87 is ABOVE the median of 0.20, so this metro is MORE strained than the typical ranked metro
37 of 270, counting from the MOST strained — a LOWER rank number means MORE strain
{'room_is_a_proxy': 'Room is what regional and community banks could still write before the SR 06-26 concentration line, after deducting construction draws already committed. Deposit footprint is a proxy for lending footprint, not a measurement of it.', 'ratio_is_not_size': 'The most extreme ratios belong to the smallest metros. Read maturing_bal_mm beside the ratio — the map sizes bubbles by the wall, not the strain, for exactly this reason.', 'wall_is_cmbs_only': "The wall is the CMBS balance maturing within 24 months — the maturing debt this platform can see, not the metro's whole maturity load. Every ratio is an upper bound on how much of it local banks would have to absorb.", 'exclusion_artifact': 'A high ratio is as often an exclusion artifact as a credit event. Banks whose deposits do not indicate where they lend (nationals, card and charter banks) are excluded from the room, so a metro served mainly by those reads strained while its credit is simply invisible here. Check banks_qualifying against banks_excluded_here, and explained_by_exclusion.'}
Written from the figures above · CBSA 40900 · capacity_metro · last changed 13 Sep 2026
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On The Ground — recent closures, layoffs & CRE bankruptciesTie these events to loans →
75 local distress events in the past year (4,175 jobs) — store closures, layoffs, and commercial real estate bankruptcies near this metro's collateral.
2026-09-02
LAYOFF
178 jobs · Sacramento
2026-08-28
LAYOFF
53 jobs · Sacramento
2026-08-21
LAYOFF
12 jobs · El Dorado Hills
2026-08-14
BANKRUPTCY
CRE-linked bankruptcy
2026-08-09
CLOSURE
Sacramento
2026-08-05
LAYOFF
Sacramento
2026-08-03
LAYOFF
99 jobs · Sacramento
2026-07-28
LAYOFF
41 jobs · Sacramento
2026-07-28
LAYOFF
47 jobs · Tahoe City
2026-07-23
CLOSURE
Sacramento
2026-07-13
LAYOFF
158 jobs · Woodland
2026-07-02
LAYOFF
31 jobs · Sacramento
2026-07-01
LAYOFF
100 jobs · Roseville
2026-06-26
LAYOFF
130 jobs · Elk Grove
2026-06-26
LAYOFF
93 jobs · Sacramento
What has actually happened on the ground in Sacramento-Roseville-Folsom, CA recently?
Over the past 365 days, the Sacramento-Roseville-Folsom, CA metro has recorded 49 WARN notices affecting 4,175 jobs, alongside 26 store closures and 3 CRE-likely bankruptcy filings. The bankruptcy figure is a state-level proxy, as filings are attributed by the filer's state rather than the property's exact location, so it is not metro-native; layoff and closure counts are ZIP-matched and review-approved.
The figures behind this answer
- Store closures
- 26
- WARN layoff notices
- 49
- Jobs on those notices
- 4,175
- CRE-related bankruptcies
- 3
- Window, in days
- 365
STATE PROXY — bankruptcy filings carry the filer's state, not the property's location, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count.
affected_employees is nullable — notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, so this is a floor.
Closures are matched ZIP -> CBSA and only APPROVED rows count (a pending, machine-extracted row is not yet a closure). This mirrors the Metro Pulse page, not the convergence board — the board applies neither filter and counts higher. Layoffs take the same ZIP -> CBSA and review treatment, and a WARN notice counts if it affects >= 10 people or does not state a headcount (a NULL is not 'fewer than 10').
Written from the figures above · CBSA 40900 · geo_events · last changed 06 Sep 2026
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What this page can’t do
Everything above is a snapshot — one market, as it stands today, and
it’s yours to read. What a snapshot can’t tell you is when it moves: which loan slipped a DSCR band
this month, which bank’s early-warning rank crossed into the top quartile, which submarket started turning
while the headline number still looked fine. Distress doesn’t announce itself on the day you happen to check.
This page
One metro · one moment · you come looking.
Verstavo
Every metro · every month · it comes looking for you.
CMBS covers the securitized slice of CRE; bank, closure and layoff signals widen the view.
“No data” in a zone means we don’t observe it here, not that there is no stress.
Employment is BLS (QCEW annual, LAUS monthly) — public data, and the demand leg under all of it.
See the whole picture, not just the pulse.
Metro Pulse is the free, public read. The Verstavo platform goes loan‑by‑loan — stress
scores, maturity walls, special‑servicing transfers, bank CRE, and your own portfolio benchmarked
against the market.