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Commercial Real Estate Credit —
Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA
The state of disclosed CRE credit in this market · CA
The read
$3.7B of CMBS across 195 loans. Multifamily carries the highest distress rate (12.2%, above the 7.9% national, 1.5× national). The heaviest maturity load lands in 2029 ($785M). Distress is flat in the filed record — 1.2% as of 2026-07. 94 on-the-ground distress events in the past year (7,607 jobs).
Overview
CMBS
Submarkets
Local Banks
Jobs & Demand
On The Ground
Loading map…
The CMBS properties our stress model flags here, plus recent store closures and layoffs. Stressed is a wider net than distressed — the distressed figure above counts only loans already in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, while these dots also include performing loans facing maturity or coverage pressure. Property dots sit at the center of their ZIP code, not the building — they show where stress concentrates, not which asset. Closures and layoffs are pinned to address where we have it. Open any dot to the building and the loan behind it →
The book is quiet, but multifamily runs hot in the Inland Empire
Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario carries $3.7 billion of CMBS across 195 loans, and on the filed record it reads as one of the calmer books in the country. The servicer-declared distress rate sits at 1.2% as of July 2026, flat, with a median DSCR of 2.07 — comfortable debt-service coverage across the metro. Office, industrial, self-storage and hospitality all show no distress in the filed data, each sitting well under its national benchmark.
The exception is multifamily, where the distress rate runs 12.2% — above the 7.9% national mark and 1.5 times the national rate. That is the one sector where the Inland Empire sits meaningfully hotter than the country, and it stands against a backdrop that is otherwise benign. The heaviest refinancing load lands in 2029, when $785 million comes due; near-term maturities are lighter, with $1.2 billion scheduled over the next 24 months.
The on-the-ground record is busier than the loan tape. The metro logged 94 distress events over the past year — 31 store closures and 63 layoff notices — touching 7,676 jobs. Unemployment stands at 5.9% as of August 2026, down 0.3 points year over year, and office-using employment of 191,627 is off 2.4% on the year. For now the stress shows up in the labor data and the multifamily rate rather than in the broad filed book.
Written 2026-10-25
CMBS Distressed UPB
$44M / 1.2%
in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent
CMBS Maturing ≤ 24mo
$1.2B
Banks HQ’d Here (stressed)
0 / 6
Bank Early-Warning
0 flagged
Store Closures (1y)
32
Layoff Notices (1y)
62 / 7,607 jobs
0.54% of metro employment
CMBS Loans / UPB
195 / $3.7B
Unemployment · Aug 2026
5.9%
-0.3pp yr
Office-Using Jobs · 2024
191,627
-2.4% yr
How much CRE distress is there in Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA right now?
Across Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA, the four feeds read elevated, with 4 legs elevated out of four and all six pairs with both legs elevated, while 0 pairs with both legs quiet and 0 pairs where the legs disagree. On the store side there were 32 closures, or 2.27 per 100k jobs; on the employer side, 87 notices, or 0.37%. On the credit side, $2.34bn of bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line, or 18.88%, and 8 loan records of securitized loans in special servicing, or 1.19%. The headline counts rank high against the size of the metro, and the bank leg's allocation caveat applies: only 12.0% of these dollars sit at banks that lend in one metro and need no allocation.
The figures behind this answer
| Signal | Level | Rate | Rank by count | Rank by rate | Reading |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| store closures store closures per 100,000 jobs |
32 closures | 2.27 per 100k jobs | 14 of 392 | 180 of 392 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| layoff notices (WARN) workers on layoff notices as a share of the metro's employment |
87 notices | 0.37% | 8 of 382 | 50 of 382 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line share of the CRE lent into this metro that sits at a lender over the blended-noncurrent line |
$2.34bn | 18.88% | 24 of 393 | 23 of 393 | elevated
allocated 2026-06-30
|
| securitized loans in special servicing share of the securitized balance read here that is in special servicing |
8 loan records | 1.19% | 22 of 335 | 98 of 335 | elevated 2026-09-29
|
6 pairs compared
6 both elevated
0 both quiet
0 disagreeing
0 unreadable — a side is blind
4 of four legs elevated
one metro, four independent feeds, each on its own denominator
124 of 447 metros have at least one blind leg and 54 are blind on all four. Those 54 are the same metros the board's map cannot place and the metro resolver cannot name: one ZIP-to-CBSA crosswalk boundary, showing up three ways.
Elevation is computed on the COUNT, over a flat threshold, which is a size filter. New York is 2nd of 392 by store closures and 264th of the same 392 by closures per job — both true, and which one you lead with decides what the reader believes.
Where two legs disagree, that is usually a fact about WHICH mechanism is running, not an error in either feed and not a worse metro.
A leg with no denominator, or whose numerator cannot be measured, reads LOW and means nothing. Each leg publishes a measurement state (allocated, floor, measured, no denominator, no rate, not measurable) for that reason.
Store closures: divided by 1,411,086 jobs
— all metro jobs, QCEW annual average — a SIZE normaliser, not a matched population: the feed spans retail, food service and pharmacy and no single QCEW sector covers it. The MATCHED read sits beside it as this leg's second reading (trailing 365 days to today).
Layoff notices (WARN): divided by 2,073,527 employed
— employed persons, BLS LAUS, not seasonally adjusted (trailing 365 days to today).
Bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line: divided by $12,412.8 mm
— bank CRE allocated to this metro by branch deposits (2026-06-30).
Securitized loans in special servicing: divided by $3,712.0 mm
— current balance on the non-pari-passu rows of this tape — the trust's slice, not the whole loan, on both sides of the ratio (2026-09-29).
Written from the figures above · CBSA 40140 · stress_metro · last changed 01 Nov 2026
· Ask your own question →
Which distress signals are elevated in Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA, and which cannot be read?
In Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA, the elevated distress signals are credit-side bank distress, with $2.34bn of CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line, alongside $44.0mm of CMBS in special servicing, which represents 1.2% of this metro's CMBS balance in special servicing, plus real-economy stress from 32 store closures and 87 WARN notices over the past year; the bank CRE lent into this metro totals $12.41bn, with 18.1% at risk at the 90th percentile and 12.0% needing no branch-deposit allocation, while assets at those lenders are $0.00bn and four legs are agreeing. What cannot be read from the data is the count of lenders themselves, since no figure for the number of distressed banks is among the vetted numbers, so that reading is unavailable rather than inferred.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS in special servicing
- $44.0mm
- … as a share of this metro's CMBS balance
- 1.2%
- Bank CRE lent into this metro
- $12.41bn
- … at risk at the 90th percentile
- 18.1%
- CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line
- $2.34bn
- Assets at those lenders
- $0.00bn
- … share needing no branch-deposit allocation
- 12.0%
- Signals reading elevated
- bank CRE over the noncurrent line, CMBS in special servicing, store closures, WARN layoff notices
- Legs agreeing
- 4
- Phase
- peak
- CMBS loans in special servicing
- 8
- Distressed banks
- 0
- Store closures (past year)
- 32
- WARN notices (past year)
- 87
leading (real-economy) and realized (credit) signals are firing together
tens of millions of distressed CRE exposure
credit distress AND ground-level distress, with real dollars behind the credit side
Written from the figures above · CBSA 40140 · geo_metro_signals · last changed 01 Nov 2026
· Ask your own question →
Jobs & Demand — the labor market under the collateralWatch it change →
Every other zone on this page reads the credit — what the loan is doing.
This one reads the demand underneath it. Office jobs pay office rent;
office rent services the office loan. When the jobs go, the DSCR follows — but not for another year or two.
That lag is the whole point of looking here.
Unemployment · Aug 2026
5.9%
-0.3pp yr
Last 24 months
4.6%6.2%
Monthly metro unemployment (BLS LAUS) — the freshest labor signal there is,
about six weeks behind. Read the direction, not the level: a 4% metro that is rising and a 6% metro that is
falling are not telling you the same thing.
Jobs by CRE-relevant sector · 2024
Annual employment by sector (BLS QCEW, 2024; 1,411,086 jobs in the metro).
QCEW lags — it is the structural read, not the current one, and we pair it with the monthly unemployment above on purpose.
Office-using sums five supersectors; where BLS withholds any one of them for
disclosure, we show nothing rather than a number we know is too low — so a missing sector here means
“suppressed at the source,” not “zero.”
Sector Heat — CMBS distress rate by property type (metro vs national)See the loans behind the bar →
This metro's CMBS runs 1.2% distressed where its own property mix predicts 4.2% — $112M less than this book would carry at the rate each property type runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted and excluding this metro. The gap is measured; the cause is not. 1 of 6 property types here run a higher distress rate than the national average for that type (the tick on each bar).
Elimination — does the gap survive a control?
Each row re-prices this metro's book on a finer cell — its own property types, then those types split by loan size, then by vintage — always at the rate that cell runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted. A gap that shrinks toward zero is explained by the control; one that stays has ruled it out. What is measured is what survives, not a cause.
property mix alone
-3.0pp
… and loan size held fixed
-2.8pp
the gap is still there with loan size held fixed too
… and vintage held fixed
-3.7pp
the gap is still there with vintage held fixed too
The largest single contributor is Office: 26 loans, $434M, running 0.0% where the same type runs 11.1% elsewhere — worth 1.3pp of this metro's own rate.
Maturity Wall — CMBS coming due by year, distress within eachSee what’s maturing →
$1.2B — 32% of the metro's balance — matures within two years; the red slice of each bar is already distressed.
Distress Trend — is this market turning?Track it quarter by quarter →
Realized distress is FLAT — 1.2% now (2026-07), -0.3pp over the year.
Same definition as the cards above — distressed means in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, dollar-weighted — on a different clock. The cards are today’s tape; this is the disclosed history panel, quarter by quarter, so you can read direction rather than level. Trusts file monthly, so a quarter is usually well covered within weeks of opening and the newest one shown is normally the current one; it is withheld only when its filed book falls below 60% of recent quarters.
Share of the metro’s CMBS in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, by quarter — a firmer, backward-looking read. A loan under 1.0x DSCR that is still paying is not counted here.
Submarket Heat — where in the metro the distress sitsOpen the submarket →
The top three submarkets hold $2.2B of the metro's $3.7B; each bar's colored share is its distress rate.
Bank Door — what the local bank sector could absorbSee it on every loan’s exit read →
$1.2B of CMBS matures here within two years.
The 17 regional and local banks that gather deposits here could write roughly
$247M more CRE before the 300% supervisory line, so the maturing balance is
4.76× that room.
The median metro sits at 0.13×.
Regional Bank Room
$247M
After Committed Draws
$97M / −61%
Maturing ÷ Room
4.76×
Banks In Footprint
17 / 7 at the line
The room above is already part-sold. Construction lending is a promise drawn
down over two or three years, and the undrawn part is an obligation the bank cannot decline while the borrower performs
— every one of those dollars lands in the same CRE book the 300% line governs. These banks
have $309M of construction committed and not yet
advanced, of which $150M
comes out of the room above, leaving $97M,
with 9 banks
whose entire remaining room is spoken for.
A bank with no room contributes zero here, never a negative one — capacity does not net
across balance sheets — so $160M of what has
been promised is not deducted at all, because there is nothing left to deduct it from. On today’s
capital that is funding already contracted which would cross the line as it draws.
SR 07-1 draws a second line at 100% of capital for construction and land:
1 more cross it
once their own commitments fund.
Counted — 17 regional & local CRE lenders
| Bank | Deposit share | CRE / Capital* | Room contributed | Noncurrent CRE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Citizens Business Bank, National Association CA | 17.6% | 281% total 406%
|
🔒 | 0.06% |
| Chino Commercial Bank, N.a. CA | 100.0% | 213% total 363%
|
🔒 | 0.55% |
| First Bank MO | 4.6% | 184% total 273%
|
🔒 | 0.09% |
| Banner Bank WA | 3.8% | 253% total 379%
|
🔒 | 0.22% |
| Everbank, National Association FL | 0.3% | 169% total 175%
|
🔒 | 1.03% |
| Banc Of California CA | 4.7% | 291% total 334%
|
🔒 | 4.24% |
| American Continental Bank CA | 14.2% | 196% total 264%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| First Commercial Bank (Usa) CA | 2.5% | 163% total 191%
|
🔒 | 1.96% |
| First Pacific Bank CA | 3.4% | 243% total 395%
|
🔒 | 0.31% |
| Balboa Thrift And Loan Association CA | 2.3% | 235% total 238%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Hcn Bank CA | 100.0% | 611% total 655%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Provident Savings Bank, F.s.b. CA | 100.0% | 354% total 362%
|
🔒 | 0.10% |
| Golden State Bank CA | 19.6% | 420% total 612%
|
🔒 | 1.02% |
| C3bank, National Association CA | 6.5% | 361% total 403%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| California Bank Of Commerce, National Association CA | 4.6% | 313% total 437%
|
🔒 | 0.22% |
| Mechanics Bank CA | 3.9% | 340% total 362%
|
🔒 | 0.30% |
| Genesis Bank CA | 2.8% | 442% total 532%
|
🔒 | 0.05% |
Not counted — 19 banks with deposits here
These hold deposits in this metro but are left out of the capacity above, because for them deposit location stops indicating where they lend — or they do not lend CRE at all. Real money that could refinance here is deliberately not counted.
no CRE book — CRE under 100% of capital — not a CRE lender
Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Association OH · Bank Of America, National Association NC · Wells Fargo Bank, National Association SD · U.s. Bank National Association OH · Citibank, National Association SD · Pnc Bank, National Association DE · First-Citizens Bank & Trust Company NC · Fifth Third Bank, National Association OH · Bmo Bank National Association IL · Icon Business Bank CA
national — operates in more than 5 states, so deposits stop indicating where it lends
City National Bank CA · Zions Bancorporation, N.a. UT · East West Bank CA · Sunflower Bank, National Association TX · Cathay Bank CA · Columbia Bank OR · Bank Of Hope CA · Flagstar Bank, National Association NY
booked here — books nearly all deposits to one branch — a charter address, not a footprint
Legacy Bank CA
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 07-1 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
How to read this. It is not whether any particular loan can refinance — a borrower also reaches
national banks, life companies, agencies and debt funds. It is how much of this metro’s maturing volume the local
bank sector could absorb if it were the only door.
Banks are placed by deposit share (FDIC Summary of Deposits, June 2026) — a proxy for
where they lend, not a measurement; call reports carry no collateral geography. Room = 3× total risk-based capital less CRE held
(SR 07-1, the capital base the rule names — not book equity), from Q2 2026 call reports, apportioned by that share.
Committed construction comes from FFIEC Schedule RC-L as filed at 2026-06-30 —
the undrawn half of loans already written, which the balance sheet above does not show.
Banks in more than 5 states, single-branch bookers and banks that do not lend CRE are excluded —
315 banks holding $263.8B of national capacity not counted here.
Local Lenders — banks headquartered here, worst CRE noncurrent firstUnlock each bank’s early-warning flag →
| Bank | Total CRE | CRE / Capital* | Noncurrent CRE | Early Warning |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Chino Commercial Bank, N.a. | $213M | 213% total 363%
|
0.55% | 🔒 |
| Provident Savings Bank, F.s.b. | $465M | 354% total 362%
|
0.10% | 🔒 |
| Citizens Business Bank, National Association | $9.1B | 281% total 406%
|
0.06% | 🔒 |
| Hcn Bank | $767M | 611% total 655%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 07-1 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
Banks are matched to their HQ metro (a proxy for footprint). Noncurrent CRE = CRE-balance-weighted blend of multifamily / nonresidential / construction noncurrent (distress already arrived). Early Warning is a validated leading signal — the bank’s 30-89 early-delinquency rank among all CRE lenders this quarter, which has predicted ~2.3× forward CRE distress. Per-bank flags are on a plan.
Do the banks lending in Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA have the capacity to refinance its maturing CRE?
No — the capacity is tight. Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA carries $1.17bn of CMBS maturing in the window across 67 loans, while the 17 qualifying local banks have $246.7mm of room before committed draws and $96.8mm after those draws, putting the wall-to-room ratio at 12.12 (4.76 before committed draws) — 12 of 275, counting from the most strained. The caveat is that 9 banks are excluded from the calculation, so some local capacity may simply be invisible here rather than absent, and the wall figure counts only CMBS maturing, not the metro's whole maturity load.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS maturing in the window
- $1.17bn
- … across this many loans
- 67
- Local bank room, before committed draws
- $246.7mm
- Committed construction draws
- $309.4mm
- Local bank room, after those draws
- $96.8mm
- Wall-to-room ratio
- 12.12
- Rank, most strained
- 12
- … out of this many metros ranked
- 275
- … before committed draws
- 4.76
- Population ranked against
- CMBS maturing within 24 months against regional/community bank room in this metro
- Qualifying local banks
- 17
- … excluded from the calculation
- 9
- Distressed share of this metro's CMBS
- 1.2%
- Total CMBS balance here
- $3.71bn
- Capacity band
- tight
Compared against a median wall-to-room ratio of
0.24 across the ranked metros.
12.12 is ABOVE the median of 0.24, so this metro is MORE strained than the typical ranked metro
12 of 275, counting from the MOST strained — a LOWER rank number means MORE strain
Room is what regional and community banks could still write before the SR 06-26 concentration line, after deducting construction draws already committed. Deposit footprint is a proxy for lending footprint, not a measurement of it.
The most extreme ratios belong to the smallest metros.
The wall is the CMBS balance maturing within 24 months — the maturing debt this platform can see, not the metro's whole maturity load. Every ratio is an upper bound on how much of it local banks would have to absorb.
A high ratio is as often an exclusion artifact as a credit event. Banks whose deposits do not indicate where they lend (nationals, card and charter banks) are excluded from the room, so a metro served mainly by those reads strained while its credit is simply invisible here.
Written from the figures above · CBSA 40140 · capacity_metro · last changed 30 Oct 2026
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On The Ground — recent closures, layoffs & CRE bankruptciesTie these events to loans →
94 local distress events in the past year (7,607 jobs) — store closures, layoffs, and commercial real estate bankruptcies near this metro's collateral.
2026-12-31
CLOSURE
Scheduled · Ontario
2026-10-31
CLOSURE
Chino
2026-10-28
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 7
2026-10-26
LAYOFF
49 jobs · Chino
2026-10-25
LAYOFF
90 jobs · Rancho Cucamonga
2026-10-25
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-10-25
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-10-25
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-10-25
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-10-14
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 7
2026-10-09
LAYOFF
206 jobs · Ontario
2026-10-08
LAYOFF
42 jobs · Chino
2026-10-08
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 7
2026-10-07
LAYOFF
100 jobs · Riverside
2026-10-06
CLOSURE
Palm Desert
What has actually happened on the ground in Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA recently?
In Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA, the 365-day window shows 62 WARN layoff notices and 32 store closures on the ground, with 7,607 jobs on those notices — a figure that is a floor, since notices stating no headcount are counted but contribute no jobs. The 67 cRE-related bankruptcies is a state-level proxy covering the states where the metro's collateral sits rather than a metro-native count, and its coverage widened to both court feeds on 2026-09-16, so counts before and after that date are not comparable.
The figures behind this answer
- Store closures
- 32
- WARN layoff notices
- 62
- Jobs on those notices
- 7,607
- CRE-related bankruptcies
- 67
- Window, in days
- 365
STATE PROXY — a court case counts in its filing district and an SEC 8-K in the filer's state, not where the property is, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count. Each court case is counted once even when both PACER and CourtListener carry it. A court case's state is its filing district; an SEC 8-K or news item carries the filer's state. Coverage widened to both court feeds on 2026-09-16, so counts before and after that date are not comparable.
affected_employees is nullable — notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, so this is a floor.
Closures are matched ZIP -> CBSA and only APPROVED rows count (a pending, machine-extracted row is not yet a closure). This mirrors the Metro Pulse page, not the convergence board — the board applies neither filter and counts higher. Layoffs take the same ZIP -> CBSA and review treatment, and a WARN notice counts if it affects >= 10 people or does not state a headcount (a NULL is not 'fewer than 10').
Written from the figures above · CBSA 40140 · geo_events · last changed 01 Nov 2026
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What this page can’t do
Everything above is a snapshot — one market, as it stands today, and
it’s yours to read. What a snapshot can’t tell you is when it moves: which loan slipped a DSCR band
this month, which bank’s early-warning rank crossed into the top quartile, which submarket started turning
while the headline number still looked fine. Distress doesn’t announce itself on the day you happen to check.
This page
One metro · one moment · you come looking.
Verstavo
Every metro · every month · it comes looking for you.
CMBS covers the securitized slice of CRE; bank, closure and layoff signals widen the view.
“No data” in a zone means we don’t observe it here, not that there is no stress.
Employment is BLS (QCEW annual, LAUS monthly) — public data, and the demand leg under all of it.
See the whole picture, not just the pulse.
Metro Pulse is the free, public read — one page for every market we cover. The platform goes loan‑by‑loan inside it: which buildings carry the stress, when their debt comes due, and your own portfolio benchmarked against the market you are standing in.