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Commercial Real Estate Credit —
Raleigh-Cary, NC
The state of disclosed CRE credit in this market · NC
The read
$551M of CMBS across 36 loans. Nothing in this book is distressed today; Hospitality is the largest exposure at $123M. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2029 ($174M, 32% of the book). Distress is flat in the filed record — 0.0% as of 2026-07. 7 on-the-ground distress events in the past year (370 jobs).
Overview
CMBS
Submarkets
Local Banks
Jobs & Demand
On The Ground
Loading map…
The CMBS properties our stress model flags here, plus recent store closures and layoffs. Stressed is a wider net than distressed — the distressed figure above counts only loans already in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, while these dots also include performing loans facing maturity or coverage pressure. Property dots sit at the center of their ZIP code, not the building — they show where stress concentrates, not which asset. Closures and layoffs are pinned to address where we have it. Open any dot to the building and the loan behind it →
Raleigh's CMBS Book Stays Clean, With the Weight Pushed Out to 2029
A $551 million CMBS book spread across 36 loans, and not a dollar of it is distressed today. Nothing in Raleigh-Cary sits in special servicing or 60-plus days delinquent, and the filed record is flat at 0.0% as of July 2026. Hospitality is the largest single exposure at $123 million — a sector running a 6.2% distress rate nationally — yet the local hospitality book shows none of that strain. Median DSCR across the market sits at 1.98, comfortable coverage by any desk's measure.
The story here is timing, not stress. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2029, when $174 million — 32% of the book — comes due, with the remaining paper stacked lightly across 2027, 2028 and 2033. For now every maturity year prints a 0.0% distress rate, so the near-term runway is clear and the real test is pushed out several years.
Away from the securitized book, the on-the-ground record logged seven distress events over the past year — five store closures and two layoff notices totaling 370 jobs. That is a modest footprint against a local labor market carrying 3.1% unemployment, down half a point year over year as of August 2026. The filed CMBS distress rate has not moved off zero, and the broader signals around it remain contained.
Written 2026-10-27
CMBS Distressed UPB
under $1M / 0.0%
in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent
CMBS Maturing ≤ 24mo
$158M
Banks HQ’d Here (stressed)
0 / 4
Bank Early-Warning
0 flagged
Store Closures (1y)
5
Layoff Notices (1y)
2 / 370 jobs
0.06% of metro employment
CMBS Loans / UPB
36 / $551M
Unemployment · Aug 2026
3.1%
-0.5pp yr
How much CRE distress is there in Raleigh-Cary, NC right now?
In Raleigh-Cary, NC, two of the four legs read elevated, with the count-based readings for store closures (5 closures, 0.79 per 100k jobs) and bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line ($611.7mm, 2.31%) sitting below the median of their own rate rankings — so those elevations reflect the metro's size rather than stress per unit of itself. Layoff notices (WARN) read 2 notices at 0.04% and securitized loans in special servicing read 0 loan records at 0%, both quiet. Of the pairs of legs compared, 1 has pairs with both legs elevated, 1 has pairs with both legs quiet, and 4 are pairs where the legs disagree, with 0 pairs that cannot be read because a leg is blind; the disagreements describe which mechanism is running, not a severity ranking.
The figures behind this answer
| Signal | Level | Rate | Rank by count | Rank by rate | Reading |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| store closures store closures per 100,000 jobs |
5 closures | 0.79 per 100k jobs | 92 of 392 | 317 of 392 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| layoff notices (WARN) workers on layoff notices as a share of the metro's employment |
2 notices | 0.04% | 170 of 382 | 210 of 382 | quiet trailing 365 days to today
|
| bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line share of the CRE lent into this metro that sits at a lender over the blended-noncurrent line |
$611.7mm | 2.31% | 55 of 393 | 220 of 393 | elevated
allocated 2026-06-30
|
| securitized loans in special servicing share of the securitized balance read here that is in special servicing |
0 loan records | 0% | 220 of 335 | 220 of 335 | quiet 2026-09-29
|
6 pairs compared
1 both elevated
1 both quiet
4 disagreeing
0 unreadable — a side is blind
2 of four legs elevated
one metro, four independent feeds, each on its own denominator
124 of 447 metros have at least one blind leg and 54 are blind on all four. Those 54 are the same metros the board's map cannot place and the metro resolver cannot name: one ZIP-to-CBSA crosswalk boundary, showing up three ways.
Elevation is computed on the COUNT, over a flat threshold, which is a size filter. New York is 2nd of 392 by store closures and 264th of the same 392 by closures per job — both true, and which one you lead with decides what the reader believes.
Where two legs disagree, that is usually a fact about WHICH mechanism is running, not an error in either feed and not a worse metro.
A leg with no denominator, or whose numerator cannot be measured, reads LOW and means nothing. Each leg publishes a measurement state (allocated, floor, measured, no denominator, no rate, not measurable) for that reason.
elevated by size, not by rate — store closures, bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line clear a flat count threshold while sitting below the median of their own rate ranking. Any reading that leans on them is a statement about how big this metro is.
Store closures: divided by 629,871 jobs
— all metro jobs, QCEW annual average — a SIZE normaliser, not a matched population: the feed spans retail, food service and pharmacy and no single QCEW sector covers it. The MATCHED read sits beside it as this leg's second reading (trailing 365 days to today).
Layoff notices (WARN): divided by 836,490 employed
— employed persons, BLS LAUS, not seasonally adjusted (trailing 365 days to today).
Bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line: divided by $26,441.5 mm
— bank CRE allocated to this metro by branch deposits (2026-06-30).
Securitized loans in special servicing: divided by $551.0 mm
— current balance on the non-pari-passu rows of this tape — the trust's slice, not the whole loan, on both sides of the ratio (2026-09-29).
Written from the figures above · CBSA 39580 · stress_metro · last changed 01 Nov 2026
· Ask your own question →
Jobs & Demand — the labor market under the collateralWatch it change →
Every other zone on this page reads the credit — what the loan is doing.
This one reads the demand underneath it. Office jobs pay office rent;
office rent services the office loan. When the jobs go, the DSCR follows — but not for another year or two.
That lag is the whole point of looking here.
Unemployment · Aug 2026
3.1%
-0.5pp yr
Last 24 months
2.9%3.6%
Monthly metro unemployment (BLS LAUS) — the freshest labor signal there is,
about six weeks behind. Read the direction, not the level: a 4% metro that is rising and a 6% metro that is
falling are not telling you the same thing.
Jobs by CRE-relevant sector · 2024
Annual employment by sector (BLS QCEW, 2024; 629,871 jobs in the metro).
QCEW lags — it is the structural read, not the current one, and we pair it with the monthly unemployment above on purpose.
Office-using sums five supersectors; where BLS withholds any one of them for
disclosure, we show nothing rather than a number we know is too low — so a missing sector here means
“suppressed at the source,” not “zero.”
Sector Heat — CMBS distress rate by property type (metro vs national)See the loans behind the bar →
This metro's CMBS runs 0.0% distressed where its own property mix predicts 5.6% — $31M less than this book would carry at the rate each property type runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted and excluding this metro. The gap is measured; the cause is not. 0 of 1 property types here run a higher distress rate than the national average for that type (the tick on each bar).
Elimination — does the gap survive a control?
Each row re-prices this metro's book on a finer cell — its own property types, then those types split by loan size, then by vintage — always at the rate that cell runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted. A gap that shrinks toward zero is explained by the control; one that stays has ruled it out. What is measured is what survives, not a cause.
property mix alone
-5.6pp
… and loan size held fixed
-5.5pp
the gap is still there with loan size held fixed too
… and vintage held fixed
-6.8pp
the gap is still there with vintage held fixed too
The largest single contributor is Office: 6 loans, $150M, running 0.0% where the same type runs 11.1% elsewhere — worth 3.0pp of this metro's own rate.
Maturity Wall — CMBS coming due by year, distress within eachSee what’s maturing →
$158M — 29% of the metro's balance — matures within two years; the red slice of each bar is already distressed.
Distress Trend — is this market turning?Track it quarter by quarter →
Realized distress is FLAT — 0.0% now (2026-07), +0.0pp over the year.
Same definition as the cards above — distressed means in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, dollar-weighted — on a different clock. The cards are today’s tape; this is the disclosed history panel, quarter by quarter, so you can read direction rather than level. Trusts file monthly, so a quarter is usually well covered within weeks of opening and the newest one shown is normally the current one; it is withheld only when its filed book falls below 60% of recent quarters.
Share of the metro’s CMBS in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, by quarter — a firmer, backward-looking read. A loan under 1.0x DSCR that is still paying is not counted here.
Submarket Heat — where in the metro the distress sitsOpen the submarket →
The top three submarkets hold $437M of the metro's $551M; each bar's colored share is its distress rate.
Bank Door — what the local bank sector could absorbSee it on every loan’s exit read →
$158M of CMBS matures here within two years.
The 16 regional and local banks that gather deposits here could write roughly
$398M more CRE before the 300% supervisory line, so the maturing balance is
0.40× that room.
The median metro sits at 0.13×.
Regional Bank Room
$398M
After Committed Draws
$98M / −75%
Maturing ÷ Room
0.40×
Banks In Footprint
16 / 5 at the line
The room above is already part-sold. Construction lending is a promise drawn
down over two or three years, and the undrawn part is an obligation the bank cannot decline while the borrower performs
— every one of those dollars lands in the same CRE book the 300% line governs. These banks
have $646M of construction committed and not yet
advanced, of which $300M
comes out of the room above, leaving $98M,
with 10 banks
whose entire remaining room is spoken for.
A bank with no room contributes zero here, never a negative one — capacity does not net
across balance sheets — so $347M of what has
been promised is not deducted at all, because there is nothing left to deduct it from. On today’s
capital that is funding already contracted which would cross the line as it draws.
SR 07-1 draws a second line at 100% of capital for construction and land:
4 of 16
are past it on drawn balances alone, and
10 more cross it
once their own commitments fund.
Counted — 16 regional & local CRE lenders
| Bank | Deposit share | CRE / Capital* | Room contributed | Noncurrent CRE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Townebank VA | 11.0% | 249% total 345%
|
🔒 | 0.19% |
| The Fidelity Bank NC | 24.8% | 206% total 373%
|
🔒 | 0.47% |
| Southern Bank And Trust Company NC | 3.5% | 158% total 320%
|
🔒 | 0.12% |
| North State Bank NC | 92.4% | 277% total 498%
|
🔒 | 0.19% |
| Southern First Bank SC | 6.9% | 236% total 397%
|
🔒 | 0.23% |
| Hometrust Bank NC | 5.0% | 235% total 324%
|
🔒 | 0.68% |
| First Bank NC | 2.6% | 280% total 366%
|
🔒 | 0.40% |
| First Federal Bank NC | 16.8% | 166% total 240%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Farmers & Merchants Bank NC | 4.0% | 210% total 249%
|
🔒 | 0.79% |
| Atlantic Union Bank VA | 0.2% | 264% total 363%
|
🔒 | 0.42% |
| First Bank VA | 0.9% | 283% total 391%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Ks Bank, Inc. NC | 72.7% | 425% total 606%
|
🔒 | 0.06% |
| First Carolina Bank NC | 48.4% | 448% total 515%
|
🔒 | 1.07% |
| Benchmark Community Bank VA | 5.8% | 321% total 403%
|
🔒 | 0.17% |
| Providence Bank NC | 3.2% | 419% total 551%
|
🔒 | 0.13% |
| Carter Bank & Trust VA | 1.4% | 395% total 423%
|
🔒 | 0.84% |
Not counted — 21 banks with deposits here
These hold deposits in this metro but are left out of the capacity above, because for them deposit location stops indicating where they lend — or they do not lend CRE at all. Real money that could refinance here is deliberately not counted.
no CRE book — CRE under 100% of capital — not a CRE lender
First-Citizens Bank & Trust Company NC · Truist Bank NC · Wells Fargo Bank, National Association SD · Pnc Bank, National Association DE · Bank Of America, National Association NC · Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Association OH · Fifth Third Bank, National Association OH · Piedmont Federal Savings Bank NC · Regions Bank AL · The Huntington National Bank OH · Mechanics & Farmers Bank NC · Td Bank, National Association DE · Fsnb, National Association OK
national — operates in more than 5 states, so deposits stop indicating where it lends
First Horizon Bank TN · First National Bank Of Pennsylvania PA · Pinnacle Bank TN · United Community Bank SC · Woodforest National Bank TX · Southstate Bank, National Association FL · United Bank VA · Capital Bank, National Association MD
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 07-1 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
How to read this. It is not whether any particular loan can refinance — a borrower also reaches
national banks, life companies, agencies and debt funds. It is how much of this metro’s maturing volume the local
bank sector could absorb if it were the only door.
Banks are placed by deposit share (FDIC Summary of Deposits, June 2026) — a proxy for
where they lend, not a measurement; call reports carry no collateral geography. Room = 3× total risk-based capital less CRE held
(SR 07-1, the capital base the rule names — not book equity), from Q2 2026 call reports, apportioned by that share.
Committed construction comes from FFIEC Schedule RC-L as filed at 2026-06-30 —
the undrawn half of loans already written, which the balance sheet above does not show.
Banks in more than 5 states, single-branch bookers and banks that do not lend CRE are excluded —
315 banks holding $263.8B of national capacity not counted here.
Local Lenders — banks headquartered here, worst CRE noncurrent firstUnlock each bank’s early-warning flag →
| Bank | Total CRE | CRE / Capital* | Noncurrent CRE | Early Warning |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| First-Citizens Bank & Trust Company | $38.8B | 89% total 158%
|
2.09% | 🔒 |
| The Fidelity Bank | $2.1B | 206% total 373%
|
0.47% | 🔒 |
| North State Bank | $649M | 277% total 498%
|
0.19% | 🔒 |
| Ks Bank, Inc. | $484M | 425% total 606%
|
0.06% | 🔒 |
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 07-1 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
Banks are matched to their HQ metro (a proxy for footprint). Noncurrent CRE = CRE-balance-weighted blend of multifamily / nonresidential / construction noncurrent (distress already arrived). Early Warning is a validated leading signal — the bank’s 30-89 early-delinquency rank among all CRE lenders this quarter, which has predicted ~2.3× forward CRE distress. Per-bank flags are on a plan.
Do the banks lending in Raleigh-Cary, NC have the capacity to refinance its maturing CRE?
Raleigh-Cary’s capacity reading is strained but should be qualified: the Wall-to-room ratio is 1.61, against $157.8mm of CMBS maturing in the window across 12 loans and $97.9mm of Local bank room, after those draws. That places the metro at 46 out of 275 metros ranked, counting from the most strained, with local lending capacity concentrated in 16 Qualifying local banks while 8 are excluded from the calculation — so some of the apparent strain may reflect an exclusion artifact rather than a credit judgment.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS maturing in the window
- $157.8mm
- … across this many loans
- 12
- Local bank room, before committed draws
- $397.7mm
- Committed construction draws
- $646.5mm
- Local bank room, after those draws
- $97.9mm
- Wall-to-room ratio
- 1.61
- Rank, most strained
- 46
- … out of this many metros ranked
- 275
- … before committed draws
- 0.40
- Population ranked against
- CMBS maturing within 24 months against regional/community bank room in this metro
- Qualifying local banks
- 16
- … excluded from the calculation
- 8
- Distressed share of this metro's CMBS
- 0.0%
- Total CMBS balance here
- $550.6mm
- Capacity band
- over
Compared against a median wall-to-room ratio of
0.24 across the ranked metros.
1.61 is ABOVE the median of 0.24, so this metro is MORE strained than the typical ranked metro
46 of 275, counting from the MOST strained — a LOWER rank number means MORE strain
Room is what regional and community banks could still write before the SR 06-26 concentration line, after deducting construction draws already committed. Deposit footprint is a proxy for lending footprint, not a measurement of it.
The most extreme ratios belong to the smallest metros.
The wall is the CMBS balance maturing within 24 months — the maturing debt this platform can see, not the metro's whole maturity load. Every ratio is an upper bound on how much of it local banks would have to absorb.
A high ratio is as often an exclusion artifact as a credit event. Banks whose deposits do not indicate where they lend (nationals, card and charter banks) are excluded from the room, so a metro served mainly by those reads strained while its credit is simply invisible here.
Written from the figures above · CBSA 39580 · capacity_metro · last changed 30 Oct 2026
· Ask your own question →
Apartment-REIT Operating Read — same-store disclosures for this metro · as of 2026-07-30Set against the loan book →
Same-Store NOI
-5.0%
Same-Store Revenue
-0.9%
Occupancy
95.6%
Rent Growth
-0.9%
| REIT | SS NOI | SS Revenue | Occupancy | Rent | As Of |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CPT | -8.0% | -0.1% | 95.9% | -0.4% | 2026-07-30 |
| MAA | -2.0% | -1.6% | 95.3% | -1.5% | 2026-07-29 |
Same-store operating results disclosed by public apartment REITs (AVB · EQR · ESS · MAA · CPT · UDR) for this market in their quarterly supplements. Directional market context — an operating trend, not a Verstavo score.
On The Ground — recent closures, layoffs & CRE bankruptciesTie these events to loans →
7 local distress events in the past year (370 jobs) — store closures, layoffs, and commercial real estate bankruptcies near this metro's collateral.
2026-09-21
BANKRUPTCY
CRE-linked bankruptcy
2026-09-14
CLOSURE
Raleigh
2026-08-13
CLOSURE
Raleigh
2026-07-16
BANKRUPTCY
CRE-linked bankruptcy
2026-07-14
LAYOFF
70 jobs · Raleigh
2026-06-27
LAYOFF
300 jobs · Cary
2026-05-31
CLOSURE
Smithfield
2026-05-31
CLOSURE
Raleigh
2026-05-29
BANKRUPTCY
CRE-linked bankruptcy
2026-03-31
CLOSURE
Raleigh
2025-10-01
CLOSURE
Cary
2025-10-01
CLOSURE
Holly Springs
2025-09-07
CLOSURE
Cary
2025-09-07
CLOSURE
Morrisville
2025-06-26
CLOSURE
Raleigh
What has actually happened on the ground in Raleigh-Cary, NC recently?
Over the trailing 365 window, Raleigh-Cary, NC shows 5 store closures, 2 WARN notices, and 370 jobs affected — the latter a floor, since notices stating no headcount count but contribute 0 jobs — alongside 3 CRE bankruptcies, though that figure is a STATE PROXY rather than a metro-native count and is not comparable across the 2026-09-16 coverage change. Any metro-native reading of CRE distress on the ground is unavailable from these figures.
The figures behind this answer
- Store closures
- 5
- WARN layoff notices
- 2
- Jobs on those notices
- 370
- CRE-related bankruptcies
- 3
- Window, in days
- 365
STATE PROXY — a court case counts in its filing district and an SEC 8-K in the filer's state, not where the property is, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count. Each court case is counted once even when both PACER and CourtListener carry it. A court case's state is its filing district; an SEC 8-K or news item carries the filer's state. Coverage widened to both court feeds on 2026-09-16, so counts before and after that date are not comparable.
affected_employees is nullable — notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, so this is a floor.
Closures are matched ZIP -> CBSA and only APPROVED rows count (a pending, machine-extracted row is not yet a closure). This mirrors the Metro Pulse page, not the convergence board — the board applies neither filter and counts higher. Layoffs take the same ZIP -> CBSA and review treatment, and a WARN notice counts if it affects >= 10 people or does not state a headcount (a NULL is not 'fewer than 10').
Written from the figures above · CBSA 39580 · geo_events · last changed 25 Oct 2026
· Ask your own question →
What this page can’t do
Everything above is a snapshot — one market, as it stands today, and
it’s yours to read. What a snapshot can’t tell you is when it moves: which loan slipped a DSCR band
this month, which bank’s early-warning rank crossed into the top quartile, which submarket started turning
while the headline number still looked fine. Distress doesn’t announce itself on the day you happen to check.
This page
One metro · one moment · you come looking.
Verstavo
Every metro · every month · it comes looking for you.
CMBS covers the securitized slice of CRE; bank, closure and layoff signals widen the view.
“No data” in a zone means we don’t observe it here, not that there is no stress.
Employment is BLS (QCEW annual, LAUS monthly) — public data, and the demand leg under all of it.
See the whole picture, not just the pulse.
Metro Pulse is the free, public read — one page for every market we cover. The platform goes loan‑by‑loan inside it: which buildings carry the stress, when their debt comes due, and your own portfolio benchmarked against the market you are standing in.