Commercial Real Estate Credit —
Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, PA-NJ-DE-MD
The state of disclosed CRE credit in this market · DE, MD, NJ, PA
The read
$6.7B of CMBS across 263 loans. Office is the largest book ($2.1B) but runs below its national distress rate (6.7% vs 11.3%); the elevated risk is in Multifamily (9.8%). The heaviest maturity load lands in 2028 ($1.6B). Distress is flat in the filed record — 4.7% as of 2026-07. 129 on-the-ground distress events in the past year (7,802 jobs).
Overview
CMBS
Submarkets
Local Banks
Jobs & Demand
On The Ground
Loading map…
The CMBS properties our stress model flags here, plus recent store closures and layoffs. Stressed is a wider net than distressed — the distressed figure above counts only loans already in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, while these dots also include performing loans facing maturity or coverage pressure. Property dots sit at the center of their ZIP code, not the building — they show where stress concentrates, not which asset. Closures and layoffs are pinned to address where we have it. Open any dot to the building and the loan behind it →
Office holds the line in Philadelphia; the pressure is in multifamily
Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington carries $6.7 billion of CMBS across 263 loans, and the sector shape here runs against the national script. Office is the largest book at $2.1 billion, but its distress rate of 6.7% sits well below the 11.3% national office mark — this is not where the metro's stress is concentrated. The elevated reading is in multifamily, a $1.2 billion book running at 9.8%, above the 7.6% national rate. Retail (2.1%), industrial (0.7%) and hospitality (0.0%) all print at or under their national comps.
The filed record is flat: distress stood at 4.7% as of July 2026, with a median DSCR of 1.58 across the book. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2028, when $1.6 billion comes due — a wall that currently shows a 0.9% distress rate, with the later years carrying the higher filed marks. Over the next 24 months, $1.5 billion is set to mature.
On the ground, the past year brought 87 store closures and 42 layoff notices totaling 7,802 jobs. The metro's unemployment rate was 4.2% in July 2026, down 0.9 points year over year. Among 41 banks with local exposure, two are flagged distressed and six sit on early-warning watch.
CMBS Distressed UPB
$326M / 4.9%
in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent
CMBS Maturing ≤ 24mo
$1.5B
Local Banks (stressed)
2 / 41
Bank Early-Warning
6 flagged
Store Closures (1y)
87
Layoff Notices (1y)
42 / 7,802 jobs
0.31% of metro employment
CMBS Loans / UPB
263 / $6.7B
Unemployment · Jul 2026
4.2%
-0.9pp yr
How much CRE distress is there in Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, PA-NJ-DE-MD right now?
In Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, PA-NJ-DE-MD, distress is broad and elevated across all four independent feeds, with all 6 pairs reading hot and 0 disagreeing or quiet, and 4 of 4 signals elevated. Store closures sit at 74 closures (2.92 per 100k jobs, 5th of 392 by count vs. 91st by rate), while WARN layoff notices total 44 (0.25% of employment, 21st by count, 94th by rate). Bank CRE over the noncurrent line reaches $4,864.5mm, or 6.71% of the metro's lent CRE (12th by count, 111th by rate), and securitized loans in special servicing total 93 rows, or 4.56% of the securitized balance read (2nd by count, 74th by rate; the bank figure is an allocation by branch deposits, and the CMBS value is a floor measured over 19.4% of special-servicing rows — not a precise ceiling on stress).
The figures behind this answer
| Signal | Level | Rate | Rank by count | Rank by rate | Reading |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| store closures store closures per 100,000 jobs |
74 closures | 2.92 per 100k jobs | 5 of 392 | 91 of 392 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| layoff notices (WARN) workers on layoff notices as a share of the metro's employment |
44 notices | 0.25% | 21 of 386 | 94 of 386 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line share of the CRE lent into this metro that sits at a lender over the blended-noncurrent line |
$4.86bn | 6.71% | 12 of 393 | 111 of 393 | elevated
allocated 2026-03-31
|
| securitized loans in special servicing share of the securitized balance read here that is in special servicing |
93 loan records | 4.56% | 2 of 335 | 74 of 335 | elevated
floor 2026-07-29
|
6 pairs compared
6 both elevated
0 both quiet
0 disagreeing
0 unreadable — a side is blind
4 of four legs elevated
one metro, four independent feeds, each on its own denominator
{'coverage': "114 of 441 metros have at least one blind leg and 48 are blind on all four. Those 48 are the same metros the board's map cannot place and the metro resolver cannot name: one ZIP-to-CBSA crosswalk boundary, showing up three ways.", 'a_count_ranks_by_size': 'Elevation is computed on the COUNT, over a flat threshold, which is a size filter. New York is 2nd of 392 by store closures and 264th of the same 392 by closures per job — both true, and which one you lead with decides what the reader believes. Every leg carries both ranks over ONE population; quote the rate beside the count.', 'disagreement_is_not_severity': 'Where two legs disagree, that is usually a fact about WHICH mechanism is running, not an error in either feed and not a worse metro. The six pairs read different populations, and each note is a STRUCTURAL prior about those populations — nothing here measures a lead or a lag between two legs, so never report one as timing.', 'a_blind_leg_is_not_a_quiet_one': "A leg with no denominator, or whose numerator cannot be measured, reads LOW and means nothing. Each leg publishes a measurement state (allocated, floor, measured, no denominator, no rate, not measurable) for that reason. Never report a blind leg as 'no distress'."}
{'leg': 'closures', 'unit': 'jobs', 'as_of': 'trailing 365 days to today', 'value': 2537841, 'measures': 'store closures', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'window', 'what_it_is': "all metro jobs, QCEW annual average — a SIZE normaliser, not a matched population: the feed spans retail, food service and pharmacy and no single QCEW sector covers it. The MATCHED read sits beside it as this leg's second reading"}
{'leg': 'warn', 'unit': 'employed', 'as_of': 'trailing 365 days to today', 'value': 3213768, 'measures': 'layoff notices (WARN)', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'window', 'what_it_is': 'employed persons, BLS LAUS, not seasonally adjusted'}
{'leg': 'bank', 'unit': '$mm', 'as_of': '2026-03-31', 'value': 72457.5, 'measures': 'bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'stamp', 'what_it_is': 'bank CRE allocated to this metro by branch deposits'}
{'leg': 'cmbs', 'unit': '$mm', 'as_of': '2026-07-29', 'value': 6838.0, 'measures': 'securitized loans in special servicing', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'stamp', 'what_it_is': "current balance on the non-pari-passu rows of this tape — the trust's slice, not the whole loan, on both sides of the ratio"}
Written from the figures above · CBSA 37980 · stress_metro · last changed 28 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Which distress signals are elevated in Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, PA-NJ-DE-MD, and which cannot be read?
In Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, PA-NJ-DE-MD, the elevated distress signals are bank distressed CRE, CMBS special servicing, closures, and WARN notices. On the credit side, bank distressed CRE exposure stands at $4.86bn (with a 90th-percentile at-risk share of 13.1% of $72.46bn bank CRE), and CMBS special servicing UPB is $312.0mm (a 4.6% share of metro UPB). Real-economy signals are also firing: 74 one-year store closures and 44 WARN notices. Notably, the CMBS dollar figure is a floor, as measured over 19.4% of the metro's 93 special-servicing rows; the rest carry no balance. The reading on distressed bank assets is 0 (with 0 distressed banks), and the bank allocation share is 4.7%. The convergence score is 4, indicating multiple signals aligning. Not readable from the provided data: any non-bank lender CRE distress detail beyond the stated figures, or a distinct measure for bank CRE at risk beyond the p90 percentile—no alternative percentiles are available.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS in special servicing
- $312.0mm
- … as a share of this metro's CMBS balance
- 4.6%
- Bank CRE lent into this metro
- $72.46bn
- … at risk at the 90th percentile
- 13.1%
- CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line
- $4.86bn
- Assets at those lenders
- $0.00bn
- … share needing no branch-deposit allocation
- 4.7%
- Signals reading elevated
- bank CRE over the noncurrent line, CMBS in special servicing, store closures, WARN layoff notices
- Legs agreeing
- 4
- Phase
- peak
- CMBS loans in special servicing
- 93
- Distressed banks
- 0
- Store closures (past year)
- 74
- WARN notices (past year)
- 44
leading (real-economy) and realized (credit) signals are firing together
hundreds of millions of distressed CRE exposure; measured over 19.4% of this metro's 93 special-servicing rows — the rest carry no balance, so the dollar figure is a FLOOR
credit distress AND ground-level distress, with real dollars behind the credit side
Written from the figures above · CBSA 37980 · geo_metro_signals · last changed 27 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Jobs & Demand — the labor market under the collateralWatch it change →
Every other zone on this page reads the credit — what the loan is doing.
This one reads the demand underneath it. Office jobs pay office rent;
office rent services the office loan. When the jobs go, the DSCR follows — but not for another year or two.
That lag is the whole point of looking here.
Unemployment · Jul 2026
4.2%
-0.9pp yr
Last 24 months
3.7%5.4%
Monthly metro unemployment (BLS LAUS) — the freshest labor signal there is,
about six weeks behind. Read the direction, not the level: a 4% metro that is rising and a 6% metro that is
falling are not telling you the same thing.
Jobs by CRE-relevant sector · 2024
Annual employment by sector (BLS QCEW, 2024; 2,537,841 jobs in the metro).
QCEW lags — it is the structural read, not the current one, and we pair it with the monthly unemployment above on purpose.
Office-using sums five supersectors; where BLS withholds any one of them for
disclosure, we show nothing rather than a number we know is too low — so a missing sector here means
“suppressed at the source,” not “zero.”
Sector Heat — CMBS distress rate by property type (metro vs national)See the loans behind the bar →
This metro's CMBS runs 4.9% distressed where its own property mix predicts 6.8% — $129M less than this book would carry at the rate each property type runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted and excluding this metro. The gap is measured; the cause is not. 2 of 7 property types here run a higher distress rate than the national average for that type (the tick on each bar).
Elimination — does the gap survive a control?
Each row re-prices this metro's book on a finer cell — its own property types, then those types split by loan size, then by vintage — always at the rate that cell runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted. A gap that shrinks toward zero is explained by the control; one that stays has ruled it out. What is measured is what survives, not a cause.
property mix alone
-1.9pp
… and loan size held fixed
-2.0pp
the gap is still there with loan size held fixed too
… and vintage held fixed
-1.3pp
the gap is still there with vintage held fixed too
The largest single contributor is Office: 74 loans, $2.1B, running 6.7% where the same type runs 11.4% elsewhere — worth 1.5pp of this metro's own rate.
Maturity Wall — CMBS coming due by year, distress within eachSee what’s maturing →
$1.5B — 22% of the metro's balance — matures within two years; the red slice of each bar is already distressed.
Distress Trend — is this market turning?Track it quarter by quarter →
Realized distress is FLAT — 4.7% now (2026-07), -0.3pp over the year.
Same definition as the cards above — distressed means in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, dollar-weighted — on a different clock. The cards are today’s tape; this is the disclosed history panel, quarter by quarter, so you can read direction rather than level. Trusts file monthly, so a quarter is usually well covered within weeks of opening and the newest one shown is normally the current one; it is withheld only when its filed book falls below 60% of recent quarters.
Share of the metro’s CMBS in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, by quarter — a firmer, backward-looking read. A loan under 1.0x DSCR that is still paying is not counted here.
Submarket Heat — where in the metro the distress sitsOpen the submarket →
The top three submarkets hold $3.8B of the metro's $6.7B; each bar's colored share is its distress rate.
Bank Door — what the local bank sector could absorbSee it on every loan’s exit read →
$1.5B of CMBS matures here within two years.
The 37 regional and local banks that gather deposits here could write roughly
$4.7B more CRE before the 300% supervisory line, so the maturing balance is
0.31× that room.
The median metro sits at 0.12×.
Regional Bank Room
$4.7B
After Committed Draws
$2.4B / −49%
Maturing ÷ Room
0.31×
Banks In Footprint
37 / 16 at the line
The room above is already part-sold. Construction lending is a promise drawn
down over two or three years, and the undrawn part is an obligation the bank cannot decline while the borrower performs
— every one of those dollars lands in the same CRE book the 300% line governs. These banks
have $3.7B of construction committed and not yet
advanced, of which $2.3B
comes out of the room above, leaving $2.4B,
with 19 banks
whose entire remaining room is spoken for.
A bank with no room contributes zero here, never a negative one — capacity does not net
across balance sheets — so $1.4B of what has
been promised is not deducted at all, because there is nothing left to deduct it from. On today’s
capital that is funding already contracted which would cross the line as it draws.
SR 06-26 draws a second line at 100% of capital for construction and land:
3 of 37
are past it on drawn balances alone, and
11 more cross it
once their own commitments fund.
Counted — 37 regional & local CRE lenders
| Bank | Deposit share | CRE / Capital* | Room contributed | Noncurrent CRE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Wilmington Savings Fund Society, Fsb DE | 89.8% | 225% total 301%
|
🔒 | 0.68% |
| Fulton Bank, National Association PA | 32.0% | 184% total 283%
|
🔒 | 0.79% |
| Firstrust Savings Bank PA | 94.7% | 245% total 306%
|
🔒 | 0.74% |
| Penn Community Bank PA | 97.3% | 229% total 278%
|
🔒 | 0.82% |
| Univest Bank And Trust Co. PA | 88.3% | 264% total 373%
|
🔒 | 0.22% |
| Parke Bank NJ | 76.2% | 254% total 306%
|
🔒 | 0.19% |
| Ambler Savings Bank PA | 83.1% | 113% total 174%
|
🔒 | 0.04% |
| Phoenixville Federal Bank And Trust PA | 100.0% | 176% total 237%
|
🔒 | 0.38% |
| Customers Bank PA | 2.6% | 179% total 253%
|
🔒 | 0.30% |
| Newfield National Bank NJ | 58.3% | 174% total 300%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Asian Bank PA | 100.0% | 251% total 337%
|
🔒 | 1.22% |
| Franklin Bank NJ | 91.6% | 136% total 211%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Century Savings Bank NJ | 32.5% | 131% total 225%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Quaint Oak Bank PA | 77.8% | 232% total 503%
|
🔒 | 1.10% |
| Haddon Savings Bank NJ | 100.0% | 192% total 225%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Iron Workers Savings Bank PA | 100.0% | 145% total 265%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Citizens & Northern Bank PA | 20.8% | 262% total 366%
|
🔒 | 2.56% |
| The First National Bank Of Elmer NJ | 85.6% | 237% total 440%
|
🔒 | 1.30% |
| Harleysville Bank PA | 88.8% | 284% total 291%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Harford Bank MD | 9.6% | 235% total 419%
|
🔒 | 1.52% |
| Peoples Security Bank And Trust Company PA | 3.2% | 290% total 389%
|
🔒 | 0.33% |
| Sharon Bank PA | 100.0% | 361% total 435%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Meridian Bank PA | 100.0% | 306% total 448%
|
🔒 | 4.33% |
| First Resource Bank PA | 100.0% | 454% total 620%
|
🔒 | 0.06% |
| Qnb Bank PA | 81.2% | 332% total 436%
|
🔒 | 0.68% |
| Artisans' Bank DE | 68.7% | 302% total 400%
|
🔒 | 0.40% |
| Hyperion Bank PA | 56.8% | 348% total 363%
|
🔒 | 0.91% |
| The Bank Of Princeton NJ | 39.6% | 382% total 509%
|
🔒 | 1.09% |
| First Bank NJ | 30.9% | 339% total 486%
|
🔒 | 0.84% |
| First Citizens Community Bank PA | 25.7% | 320% total 401%
|
🔒 | 1.98% |
| Mid Penn Bank PA | 19.9% | 328% total 438%
|
🔒 | 0.25% |
| Columbia Bank NJ | 12.6% | 350% total 405%
|
🔒 | 0.32% |
| S&t Bank PA | 10.9% | 309% total 339%
|
🔒 | 0.24% |
| Tompkins Community Bank NY | 6.3% | 323% total 392%
|
🔒 | 0.68% |
| Oceanfirst Bank, National Association NJ | 5.4% | 384% total 456%
|
🔒 | 0.95% |
| First Commerce Bank NJ | 5.3% | 459% total 634%
|
🔒 | 0.41% |
| Provident Bank NJ | 0.8% | 422% total 526%
|
🔒 | 0.59% |
Not counted — 36 banks with deposits here
These hold deposits in this metro but are left out of the capacity above, because for them deposit location stops indicating where they lend — or they do not lend CRE at all. Real money that could refinance here is deliberately not counted.
no CRE book — CRE under 100% of capital — not a CRE lender
Capital One, National Association VA · Td Bank, National Association DE · Barclays Bank Delaware DE · Td Bank Usa, National Association DE · Pnc Bank, National Association DE · Wells Fargo Bank, National Association SD · Bank Of America, National Association NC · Citizens Bank, National Association RI · Comenity Bank DE · Truist Bank NC · Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Association OH · Keybank National Association OH · Sei Private Trust Company PA · Hatboro Federal Savings, Fa PA · Deutsche Bank Trust Company Delaware DE · First National Bank And Trust Company Of Newtown PA · United Savings Bank PA · Bny Mellon Trust Of Delaware DE · The Haverford Trust Company PA · Stifel Trust Company Delaware, National Association DE · The Northern Trust Company IL · Applied Bank DE · The National Bank Of Malvern PA · The Pennsville National Bank NJ · Monroe Savings Bank NJ · Beal Bank Usa NV · Abacus Federal Savings Bank NY · Wilmington Trust, National Association DE · Bny Mellon, National Association PA · The Bank Of New York Mellon Trust Company, National Association CA · Cibc National Trust Company GA
national — operates in more than 5 states, so deposits stop indicating where it lends
Manufacturers And Traders Trust Company NY · Santander Bank, N.a. DE · First National Bank Of Pennsylvania PA · Woori America Bank NY · Woodforest National Bank TX
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
How to read this. It is not whether any particular loan can refinance — a borrower also reaches
national banks, life companies, agencies and debt funds. It is how much of this metro’s maturing volume the local
bank sector could absorb if it were the only door.
Banks are placed by deposit share (FDIC Summary of Deposits, June 2025) — a proxy for
where they lend, not a measurement; call reports carry no collateral geography. Room = 3× total risk-based capital less CRE held
(SR 06-26, the capital base the rule names — not book equity), from Q2 2026 call reports, apportioned by that share.
Committed construction comes from FFIEC Schedule RC-L as filed at 2026-06-30 —
the undrawn half of loans already written, which the balance sheet above does not show.
Banks in more than 5 states, single-branch bookers and banks that do not lend CRE are excluded —
313 banks holding $268.2B of national capacity not counted here.
Local Lenders — banks headquartered here, worst CRE noncurrent firstUnlock each bank’s early-warning flag →
| Bank | Total CRE | CRE / Capital* | Noncurrent CRE | Early Warning |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Meridian Bank | $1.1B | 306% total 448%
|
4.33% | 🔒 |
| Santander Bank, N.a. | $17.1B | 117% total 124%
|
3.20% | 🔒 |
| The First National Bank Of Elmer | $196M | 237% total 440%
|
1.30% | 🔒 |
| Quaint Oak Bank | $370M | 232% total 503%
|
1.10% | 🔒 |
| Artisans' Bank | $326M | 302% total 400%
|
0.40% | 🔒 |
| Sharon Bank | $72M | 361% total 435%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
| Franklin Bank | $77M | 136% total 211%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
| The National Bank Of Malvern | $51M | 97% total 138%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
Banks are matched to their HQ metro (a proxy for footprint). Noncurrent CRE = CRE-balance-weighted blend of multifamily / nonresidential / construction noncurrent (distress already arrived). Early Warning is a validated leading signal — the bank’s 30-89 early-delinquency rank among all CRE lenders this quarter, which has predicted ~2.3× forward CRE distress. Per-bank flags are on a plan.
Do the banks lending in Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, PA-NJ-DE-MD have the capacity to refinance its maturing CRE?
Banks lending in Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, PA-NJ-DE-MD appear to have ample capacity to refinance the CMBS debt maturing over the next 24 months: the wall of $1.47bn against $2.44bn of room after committed draws gives a wall_to_room of 0.60, and before those committed draws are deducted the ratio is 0.31. The reading sits in the slack band, though at 71 of 270 counting from the most strained, this metro is more strained than the typical ranked metro (0.60 is ABOVE the median of 0.20). The $1.47bn wall covers 58 maturing loans, and the capacity rests on 37 qualifying banks, with 5 banks excluded here — so this is a metro whose credit is visible rather than an exclusion artifact, since explained_by_exclusion is false. Note that room is a proxy for lending footprint, and the wall is CMBS-only, making every ratio an upper bound on how much of it local banks would have to absorb.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS maturing in the window
- $1.47bn
- … across this many loans
- 58
- Local bank room, before committed draws
- $4.74bn
- Committed construction draws
- $3.70bn
- Local bank room, after those draws
- $2.44bn
- Wall-to-room ratio
- 0.60
- Rank, most strained
- 71
- … out of this many metros ranked
- 270
- … before committed draws
- 0.31
- Population ranked against
- CMBS maturing within 24 months against regional/community bank room in this metro
- Qualifying local banks
- 37
- … excluded from the calculation
- 5
- Distressed share of this metro's CMBS
- 4.9%
- Total CMBS balance here
- $6.65bn
- Capacity band
- slack
Compared against a median wall-to-room ratio of
0.20 across the ranked metros.
0.60 is ABOVE the median of 0.20, so this metro is MORE strained than the typical ranked metro
71 of 270, counting from the MOST strained — a LOWER rank number means MORE strain
{'room_is_a_proxy': 'Room is what regional and community banks could still write before the SR 06-26 concentration line, after deducting construction draws already committed. Deposit footprint is a proxy for lending footprint, not a measurement of it.', 'ratio_is_not_size': 'The most extreme ratios belong to the smallest metros. Read maturing_bal_mm beside the ratio — the map sizes bubbles by the wall, not the strain, for exactly this reason.', 'wall_is_cmbs_only': "The wall is the CMBS balance maturing within 24 months — the maturing debt this platform can see, not the metro's whole maturity load. Every ratio is an upper bound on how much of it local banks would have to absorb.", 'exclusion_artifact': 'A high ratio is as often an exclusion artifact as a credit event. Banks whose deposits do not indicate where they lend (nationals, card and charter banks) are excluded from the room, so a metro served mainly by those reads strained while its credit is simply invisible here. Check banks_qualifying against banks_excluded_here, and explained_by_exclusion.'}
Written from the figures above · CBSA 37980 · capacity_metro · last changed 13 Sep 2026
· Ask your own question →
Apartment-REIT Operating Read — same-store disclosures for this metro · as of 2026-07-27Set against the loan book →
Same-Store NOI
+4.5%
Same-Store Revenue
+4.4%
Occupancy
97.0%
Rent Growth
+4.4%
| REIT | SS NOI | SS Revenue | Occupancy | Rent | As Of |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| UDR | +4.5% | +4.4% | 97.0% | +4.4% | 2026-07-27 |
Same-store operating results disclosed by public apartment REITs (AVB · EQR · ESS · MAA · CPT · UDR) for this market in their quarterly supplements. Directional market context — an operating trend, not a Verstavo score.
On The Ground — recent closures, layoffs & CRE bankruptciesTie these events to loans →
129 local distress events in the past year (7,802 jobs) — store closures, layoffs, and commercial real estate bankruptcies near this metro's collateral.
2026-12-31
CLOSURE
Philadelphia
2026-12-31
CLOSURE
Philadelphia
2026-12-31
CLOSURE
Kennett Square
2026-12-31
CLOSURE
Kennett Square
2026-12-31
CLOSURE
Sicklerville
2026-12-31
CLOSURE
Delran
2026-12-31
CLOSURE
Gibbstown
2026-12-31
CLOSURE
Kennett Square
2026-11-17
LAYOFF
374 jobs · Swedesboro
2026-11-15
LAYOFF
61 jobs · Philadelphia
2026-10-16
LAYOFF
48 jobs · Philadelphia
2026-10-03
LAYOFF
150 jobs · Chester
2026-10-01
LAYOFF
80 jobs · Philadelphia
2026-09-24
LAYOFF
126 jobs · Barrington
2026-09-16
LAYOFF
147 jobs · Bucks
What has actually happened on the ground in Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, PA-NJ-DE-MD recently?
Over the past 365 days, the Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, PA-NJ-DE-MD metro has recorded 87 store closures and 42 WARN notices, affecting 7,802 jobs; the jobs figure is a floor, since notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs. On the bankruptcy side, the reading is a state proxy rather than a metro-native count — 1 CRE-likely filing in the states this metro's collateral sits in, since bankruptcy filings carry the filer's state, not the property's location.
The figures behind this answer
- Store closures
- 87
- WARN layoff notices
- 42
- Jobs on those notices
- 7,802
- CRE-related bankruptcies
- 1
- Window, in days
- 365
STATE PROXY — bankruptcy filings carry the filer's state, not the property's location, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count.
affected_employees is nullable — notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, so this is a floor.
Closures are matched ZIP -> CBSA and only APPROVED rows count (a pending, machine-extracted row is not yet a closure). This mirrors the Metro Pulse page, not the convergence board — the board applies neither filter and counts higher. Layoffs take the same ZIP -> CBSA and review treatment, and a WARN notice counts if it affects >= 10 people or does not state a headcount (a NULL is not 'fewer than 10').
Written from the figures above · CBSA 37980 · geo_events · last changed 13 Sep 2026
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What this page can’t do
Everything above is a snapshot — one market, as it stands today, and
it’s yours to read. What a snapshot can’t tell you is when it moves: which loan slipped a DSCR band
this month, which bank’s early-warning rank crossed into the top quartile, which submarket started turning
while the headline number still looked fine. Distress doesn’t announce itself on the day you happen to check.
This page
One metro · one moment · you come looking.
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Every metro · every month · it comes looking for you.
CMBS covers the securitized slice of CRE; bank, closure and layoff signals widen the view.
“No data” in a zone means we don’t observe it here, not that there is no stress.
Employment is BLS (QCEW annual, LAUS monthly) — public data, and the demand leg under all of it.
See the whole picture, not just the pulse.
Metro Pulse is the free, public read. The Verstavo platform goes loan‑by‑loan — stress
scores, maturity walls, special‑servicing transfers, bank CRE, and your own portfolio benchmarked
against the market.