Commercial Real Estate Credit —
Oxnard-Thousand Oaks-Ventura, CA
The state of disclosed CRE credit in this market · CA
The read
$786M of CMBS across 45 loans. Nothing in this book is distressed today; Retail is the largest exposure at $236M. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2029 ($251M, 32% of the book). Distress is flat in the filed record — 0.0% as of 2026-07. 27 on-the-ground distress events in the past year (1,863 jobs).
Overview
CMBS
Submarkets
Local Banks
Jobs & Demand
On The Ground
Loading map…
The CMBS properties our stress model flags here, plus recent store closures and layoffs. Stressed is a wider net than distressed — the distressed figure above counts only loans already in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, while these dots also include performing loans facing maturity or coverage pressure. Property dots sit at the center of their ZIP code, not the building — they show where stress concentrates, not which asset. Closures and layoffs are pinned to address where we have it. Open any dot to the building and the loan behind it →
A clean book on the coast, with the reckoning penciled in for 2029
Oxnard-Thousand Oaks-Ventura carries $786M of CMBS across 45 loans, and as of July 2026 not a dollar of it is distressed — a flat 0.0% in the filed record, with none of the drift that has turned other coastal books. Retail is the largest single exposure at $236M and sits at 0.0%, against a 2.7% national retail rate; office, the sector doing the damage elsewhere, is likewise clean here versus an 11.3% national mark. Median DSCR across the book is a comfortable 2.32.
The concentration to watch is temporal, not sectoral. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2029, when $251M — 32% of the book — comes due, well ahead of the smaller walls in 2027, 2031 and 2032. Only about $0.1B matures inside the next 24 months, so the near-term refinancing calendar is light and the pressure, such as it is, is a 2029 story.
The softer signal is on the ground: 27 distress events over the past year — 6 store closures and 21 layoff notices — touching 1,863 jobs. That sits against a metro unemployment rate of 4.7%, down 0.4 points year over year, and office-using employment of 56,305, up 0.5%. For now the servicer record and the local job filings tell the same quiet story.
CMBS Distressed UPB
under $1M / 0.0%
in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent
CMBS Maturing ≤ 24mo
$148M
Local Banks (stressed)
0 / 0
Bank Early-Warning
0 flagged
Store Closures (1y)
6
Layoff Notices (1y)
21 / 1,863 jobs
0.64% of metro employment
CMBS Loans / UPB
45 / $786M
Unemployment · Jul 2026
4.7%
-0.4pp yr
Office-Using Jobs · 2024
56,305
+0.5% yr
How much CRE distress is there in Oxnard-Thousand Oaks-Ventura, CA right now?
In the Oxnard-Thousand Oaks-Ventura, CA metro, the data for the trailing 365 days to today shows a mixed but notably elevated distress picture. Store closures are elevated, with 6 closures at a rate of 2.07 per 100,000 jobs (rank 70 of 392 by count, 160 by rate). Layoff notices are also elevated, with 23 notices at a 0.42% share of the metro's employment (rank 28 of 386 by count, 42 by rate). Bank CRE over the noncurrent line is elevated, with $460.4mm in noncurrent loans, a 14.32% share of allocated CRE (rank 68 of 393 by count, 35 by rate). However, securitized loans in special servicing show 0 rows, a 0.0% rate, and are not elevated (rank 220 of 335). Of the six pairs, 3 show both legs elevated, 0 show both quiet, and 3 show disagreement; none are unadjudicated because a side is blind. The three disagreements read as: retail is failing on buildings this tape does not hold (store closures hot / securitized cold), employers are cutting and the securitized book has not moved (WARN hot / securitized cold), and the lenders here are stressed on a book the tape cannot see (bank hot / securitized cold).
The figures behind this answer
| Signal | Level | Rate | Rank by count | Rank by rate | Reading |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| store closures store closures per 100,000 jobs |
6 closures | 2.07 per 100k jobs | 70 of 392 | 160 of 392 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| layoff notices (WARN) workers on layoff notices as a share of the metro's employment |
23 notices | 0.42% | 28 of 386 | 42 of 386 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line share of the CRE lent into this metro that sits at a lender over the blended-noncurrent line |
$460.4mm | 14.32% | 68 of 393 | 35 of 393 | elevated
allocated 2026-03-31
|
| securitized loans in special servicing share of the securitized balance read here that is in special servicing |
0 loan records | 0% | 220 of 335 | 220 of 335 | quiet 2026-07-29
|
6 pairs compared
3 both elevated
0 both quiet
3 disagreeing
0 unreadable — a side is blind
3 of four legs elevated
one metro, four independent feeds, each on its own denominator
{'coverage': "114 of 441 metros have at least one blind leg and 48 are blind on all four. Those 48 are the same metros the board's map cannot place and the metro resolver cannot name: one ZIP-to-CBSA crosswalk boundary, showing up three ways.", 'a_count_ranks_by_size': 'Elevation is computed on the COUNT, over a flat threshold, which is a size filter. New York is 2nd of 392 by store closures and 264th of the same 392 by closures per job — both true, and which one you lead with decides what the reader believes. Every leg carries both ranks over ONE population; quote the rate beside the count.', 'disagreement_is_not_severity': 'Where two legs disagree, that is usually a fact about WHICH mechanism is running, not an error in either feed and not a worse metro. The six pairs read different populations, and each note is a STRUCTURAL prior about those populations — nothing here measures a lead or a lag between two legs, so never report one as timing.', 'a_blind_leg_is_not_a_quiet_one': "A leg with no denominator, or whose numerator cannot be measured, reads LOW and means nothing. Each leg publishes a measurement state (allocated, floor, measured, no denominator, no rate, not measurable) for that reason. Never report a blind leg as 'no distress'."}
{'leg': 'closures', 'unit': 'jobs', 'as_of': 'trailing 365 days to today', 'value': 289266, 'measures': 'store closures', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'window', 'what_it_is': "all metro jobs, QCEW annual average — a SIZE normaliser, not a matched population: the feed spans retail, food service and pharmacy and no single QCEW sector covers it. The MATCHED read sits beside it as this leg's second reading"}
{'leg': 'warn', 'unit': 'employed', 'as_of': 'trailing 365 days to today', 'value': 397886, 'measures': 'layoff notices (WARN)', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'window', 'what_it_is': 'employed persons, BLS LAUS, not seasonally adjusted'}
{'leg': 'bank', 'unit': '$mm', 'as_of': '2026-03-31', 'value': 3214.7, 'measures': 'bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'stamp', 'what_it_is': 'bank CRE allocated to this metro by branch deposits'}
{'leg': 'cmbs', 'unit': '$mm', 'as_of': '2026-07-29', 'value': 787.0, 'measures': 'securitized loans in special servicing', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'stamp', 'what_it_is': "current balance on the non-pari-passu rows of this tape — the trust's slice, not the whole loan, on both sides of the ratio"}
Written from the figures above · CBSA 37100 · stress_metro · last changed 28 Aug 2026
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Which distress signals are elevated in Oxnard-Thousand Oaks-Ventura, CA, and which cannot be read?
In Oxnard-Thousand Oaks-Ventura, CA, the elevated distress signals are all real-economy indicators rather than CRE-credit ones: bank-distressed CRE exposure sits at $460.4mm (a non-zero reading), alongside 6 store closures and 23 WARN notices over the past year. Notably, the CRE-credit side shows no distress — bank CRE at risk is only 2.2% (90th percentile), bank CRE allocation is 0.0%, and CMBS special servicing is $0.0mm (0.0% of metro UPB), with zero distressed banks. The "convergence" score is 3, placing this in an early phase where the ground is wobbling via closures/layoffs but little CRE-credit distress sits behind it yet. The reading on stressed lender CRE dollar volume is unavailable — the only distressed-lender figure given is the bank-specific $460.4mm; no aggregate stressed-lender CRE total is provided.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS in special servicing
- $0.0mm
- … as a share of this metro's CMBS balance
- 0.0%
- Bank CRE lent into this metro
- $3.21bn
- … at risk at the 90th percentile
- 2.2%
- CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line
- $460.4mm
- Assets at those lenders
- $0.00bn
- … share needing no branch-deposit allocation
- 0.0%
- Signals reading elevated
- bank CRE over the noncurrent line, store closures, WARN layoff notices
- Legs agreeing
- 3
- Phase
- early
- CMBS loans in special servicing
- 0
- Distressed banks
- 0
- Store closures (past year)
- 6
- WARN notices (past year)
- 23
the ground is deteriorating but CRE credit has not yet been hit — the leading edge
little to no distressed CRE dollars behind the signals
the ground is wobbling (closures / layoffs) but little CRE-credit distress sits behind it yet — a real-economy signal, not (yet) a CRE-credit event
Written from the figures above · CBSA 37100 · geo_metro_signals · last changed 27 Aug 2026
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Jobs & Demand — the labor market under the collateralWatch it change →
Every other zone on this page reads the credit — what the loan is doing.
This one reads the demand underneath it. Office jobs pay office rent;
office rent services the office loan. When the jobs go, the DSCR follows — but not for another year or two.
That lag is the whole point of looking here.
Unemployment · Jul 2026
4.7%
-0.4pp yr
Last 24 months
3.9%5.3%
Monthly metro unemployment (BLS LAUS) — the freshest labor signal there is,
about six weeks behind. Read the direction, not the level: a 4% metro that is rising and a 6% metro that is
falling are not telling you the same thing.
Jobs by CRE-relevant sector · 2024
Annual employment by sector (BLS QCEW, 2024; 289,266 jobs in the metro).
QCEW lags — it is the structural read, not the current one, and we pair it with the monthly unemployment above on purpose.
Office-using sums five supersectors; where BLS withholds any one of them for
disclosure, we show nothing rather than a number we know is too low — so a missing sector here means
“suppressed at the source,” not “zero.”
Sector Heat — CMBS distress rate by property type (metro vs national)See the loans behind the bar →
This metro's CMBS runs 0.0% distressed where its own property mix predicts 5.3% — $42M less than this book would carry at the rate each property type runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted and excluding this metro. The gap is measured; the cause is not. 0 of 3 property types here run a higher distress rate than the national average for that type (the tick on each bar).
Elimination — does the gap survive a control?
Each row re-prices this metro's book on a finer cell — its own property types, then those types split by loan size, then by vintage — always at the rate that cell runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted. A gap that shrinks toward zero is explained by the control; one that stays has ruled it out. What is measured is what survives, not a cause.
property mix alone
-5.3pp
… and loan size held fixed
-5.1pp
the gap is still there with loan size held fixed too
… and vintage held fixed
-4.2pp
the gap is still there with vintage held fixed too
The largest single contributor is Office: 13 loans, $221M, running 0.0% where the same type runs 11.3% elsewhere — worth 3.2pp of this metro's own rate.
Maturity Wall — CMBS coming due by year, distress within eachSee what’s maturing →
$148M — 19% of the metro's balance — matures within two years; the red slice of each bar is already distressed.
Distress Trend — is this market turning?Track it quarter by quarter →
Realized distress is FLAT — 0.0% now (2026-07), +0.0pp over the year.
Same definition as the cards above — distressed means in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, dollar-weighted — on a different clock. The cards are today’s tape; this is the disclosed history panel, quarter by quarter, so you can read direction rather than level. Trusts file monthly, so a quarter is usually well covered within weeks of opening and the newest one shown is normally the current one; it is withheld only when its filed book falls below 60% of recent quarters.
Share of the metro’s CMBS in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, by quarter — a firmer, backward-looking read. A loan under 1.0x DSCR that is still paying is not counted here.
Submarket Heat — where in the metro the distress sitsOpen the submarket →
The top three submarkets hold $674M of the metro's $786M; each bar's colored share is its distress rate.
Bank Door — what the local bank sector could absorbSee it on every loan’s exit read →
$148M of CMBS matures here within two years.
The 9 regional and local banks that gather deposits here could write roughly
$97M more CRE before the 300% supervisory line, so the maturing balance is
1.52× that room.
The median metro sits at 0.12×.
Regional Bank Room
$97M
After Committed Draws
$56M / −42%
Maturing ÷ Room
1.52×
Banks In Footprint
9 / 2 at the line
The room above is already part-sold. Construction lending is a promise drawn
down over two or three years, and the undrawn part is an obligation the bank cannot decline while the borrower performs
— every one of those dollars lands in the same CRE book the 300% line governs. These banks
have $104M of construction committed and not yet
advanced, of which $41M
comes out of the room above, leaving $56M,
with 6 banks
whose entire remaining room is spoken for.
A bank with no room contributes zero here, never a negative one — capacity does not net
across balance sheets — so $63M of what has
been promised is not deducted at all, because there is nothing left to deduct it from. On today’s
capital that is funding already contracted which would cross the line as it draws.
Counted — 9 regional & local CRE lenders
| Bank | Deposit share | CRE / Capital* | Room contributed | Noncurrent CRE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bank Of The Sierra CA | 10.9% | 246% total 317%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Montecito Bank & Trust CA | 14.6% | 240% total 345%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| First Bank MO | 2.1% | 184% total 273%
|
🔒 | 0.09% |
| Mission Bank CA | 16.2% | 263% total 424%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Citizens Business Bank, National Association CA | 2.9% | 281% total 406%
|
🔒 | 0.06% |
| Banc Of California CA | 1.9% | 291% total 334%
|
🔒 | 4.24% |
| Community West Bank CA | 5.0% | 298% total 391%
|
🔒 | 0.56% |
| Mechanics Bank CA | 5.9% | 340% total 362%
|
🔒 | 0.30% |
| California Bank Of Commerce, National Association CA | 3.1% | 313% total 437%
|
🔒 | 0.22% |
Not counted — 10 banks with deposits here
These hold deposits in this metro but are left out of the capacity above, because for them deposit location stops indicating where they lend — or they do not lend CRE at all. Real money that could refinance here is deliberately not counted.
no CRE book — CRE under 100% of capital — not a CRE lender
Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Association OH · Wells Fargo Bank, National Association SD · Bank Of America, National Association NC · Citibank, National Association SD · U.s. Bank National Association OH · First-Citizens Bank & Trust Company NC · Bmo Bank National Association IL
national — operates in more than 5 states, so deposits stop indicating where it lends
City National Bank CA · Zions Bancorporation, N.a. UT · Royal Business Bank CA
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
How to read this. It is not whether any particular loan can refinance — a borrower also reaches
national banks, life companies, agencies and debt funds. It is how much of this metro’s maturing volume the local
bank sector could absorb if it were the only door.
Banks are placed by deposit share (FDIC Summary of Deposits, June 2025) — a proxy for
where they lend, not a measurement; call reports carry no collateral geography. Room = 3× total risk-based capital less CRE held
(SR 06-26, the capital base the rule names — not book equity), from Q2 2026 call reports, apportioned by that share.
Committed construction comes from FFIEC Schedule RC-L as filed at 2026-06-30 —
the undrawn half of loans already written, which the balance sheet above does not show.
Banks in more than 5 states, single-branch bookers and banks that do not lend CRE are excluded —
313 banks holding $268.2B of national capacity not counted here.
Local Lenders — banks headquartered here, worst CRE noncurrent firstUnlock each bank’s early-warning flag →
No locally-headquartered banks in our FDIC data for this metro.
Do the banks lending in Oxnard-Thousand Oaks-Ventura, CA have the capacity to refinance its maturing CRE?
In Oxnard-Thousand Oaks-Ventura, CA, the CMBS wall maturing within 24 months is $147.6mm across 11 maturing loans, while the 9 banks qualifying here show room_after_committed of $56.2mm — giving a wall_to_room of 2.62, which is ABOVE the median of 0.20, so this metro is MORE strained than the typical ranked metro, ranking 23 of 270 counting from the most strained. Before committed draws, the picture is less acute: room_before_committed stands at $97.2mm against the same wall, a wall_to_room_before_committed_draws of 1.52. Two caveats matter for the read: 3 banks_excluded_here sit outside the room calculation, so the qualifying count should be checked against the excluded count, and explained_by_exclusion is false — meaning the strain is not simply an exclusion artifact, though the tighter after-committed figure is the binding one. Distressed share reads 0.0%, so none of this is currently distressed; the question is capacity, not loss, and on these figures capacity is thin relative to the wall.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS maturing in the window
- $147.6mm
- … across this many loans
- 11
- Local bank room, before committed draws
- $97.2mm
- Committed construction draws
- $103.9mm
- Local bank room, after those draws
- $56.2mm
- Wall-to-room ratio
- 2.62
- Rank, most strained
- 23
- … out of this many metros ranked
- 270
- … before committed draws
- 1.52
- Population ranked against
- CMBS maturing within 24 months against regional/community bank room in this metro
- Qualifying local banks
- 9
- … excluded from the calculation
- 3
- Distressed share of this metro's CMBS
- 0.0%
- Total CMBS balance here
- $785.7mm
- Capacity band
- tight
Compared against a median wall-to-room ratio of
0.20 across the ranked metros.
2.62 is ABOVE the median of 0.20, so this metro is MORE strained than the typical ranked metro
23 of 270, counting from the MOST strained — a LOWER rank number means MORE strain
{'room_is_a_proxy': 'Room is what regional and community banks could still write before the SR 06-26 concentration line, after deducting construction draws already committed. Deposit footprint is a proxy for lending footprint, not a measurement of it.', 'ratio_is_not_size': 'The most extreme ratios belong to the smallest metros. Read maturing_bal_mm beside the ratio — the map sizes bubbles by the wall, not the strain, for exactly this reason.', 'wall_is_cmbs_only': "The wall is the CMBS balance maturing within 24 months — the maturing debt this platform can see, not the metro's whole maturity load. Every ratio is an upper bound on how much of it local banks would have to absorb.", 'exclusion_artifact': 'A high ratio is as often an exclusion artifact as a credit event. Banks whose deposits do not indicate where they lend (nationals, card and charter banks) are excluded from the room, so a metro served mainly by those reads strained while its credit is simply invisible here. Check banks_qualifying against banks_excluded_here, and explained_by_exclusion.'}
Written from the figures above · CBSA 37100 · capacity_metro · last changed 13 Sep 2026
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On The Ground — recent closures, layoffs & CRE bankruptciesTie these events to loans →
27 local distress events in the past year (1,863 jobs) — store closures, layoffs, and commercial real estate bankruptcies near this metro's collateral.
2026-09-03
LAYOFF
128 jobs · Ventura
2026-08-28
LAYOFF
23 jobs · Camarillo
2026-08-28
LAYOFF
16 jobs · Camarillo
2026-08-28
LAYOFF
16 jobs · Camarillo
2026-08-28
LAYOFF
13 jobs · Camarillo
2026-08-19
LAYOFF
73 jobs · Oxnard
2026-08-17
LAYOFF
93 jobs · Simi Valley
2026-08-14
BANKRUPTCY
CRE-linked bankruptcy
2026-07-12
CLOSURE
Oak Park
2026-06-17
LAYOFF
69 jobs · Oxnard
2026-06-01
LAYOFF
80 jobs · Oxnard
2026-06-01
BANKRUPTCY
CRE-linked bankruptcy
2026-05-18
LAYOFF
25 jobs · Camarillo
2026-05-18
LAYOFF
15 jobs · Camarillo
2026-05-18
LAYOFF
18 jobs · Camarillo
What has actually happened on the ground in Oxnard-Thousand Oaks-Ventura, CA recently?
Over the trailing 365 days in Oxnard-Thousand Oaks-Ventura, CA, the reviewed ground-level record shows 6 store closures and 21 WARN notices affecting 1,863 jobs — the latter a floor, since notices stating no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs. On the CRE side, the reading of 3 cre_bankruptcies is a STATE PROXY — bankruptcy filings carry the filer's state, not the property's location, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in, and it is not a metro-native count.
The figures behind this answer
- Store closures
- 6
- WARN layoff notices
- 21
- Jobs on those notices
- 1,863
- CRE-related bankruptcies
- 3
- Window, in days
- 365
STATE PROXY — bankruptcy filings carry the filer's state, not the property's location, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count.
affected_employees is nullable — notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, so this is a floor.
Closures are matched ZIP -> CBSA and only APPROVED rows count (a pending, machine-extracted row is not yet a closure). This mirrors the Metro Pulse page, not the convergence board — the board applies neither filter and counts higher. Layoffs take the same ZIP -> CBSA and review treatment, and a WARN notice counts if it affects >= 10 people or does not state a headcount (a NULL is not 'fewer than 10').
Written from the figures above · CBSA 37100 · geo_events · last changed 13 Sep 2026
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What this page can’t do
Everything above is a snapshot — one market, as it stands today, and
it’s yours to read. What a snapshot can’t tell you is when it moves: which loan slipped a DSCR band
this month, which bank’s early-warning rank crossed into the top quartile, which submarket started turning
while the headline number still looked fine. Distress doesn’t announce itself on the day you happen to check.
This page
One metro · one moment · you come looking.
Verstavo
Every metro · every month · it comes looking for you.
CMBS covers the securitized slice of CRE; bank, closure and layoff signals widen the view.
“No data” in a zone means we don’t observe it here, not that there is no stress.
Employment is BLS (QCEW annual, LAUS monthly) — public data, and the demand leg under all of it.
See the whole picture, not just the pulse.
Metro Pulse is the free, public read. The Verstavo platform goes loan‑by‑loan — stress
scores, maturity walls, special‑servicing transfers, bank CRE, and your own portfolio benchmarked
against the market.