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Commercial Real Estate Credit —
Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL
The state of disclosed CRE credit in this market · FL
The read
$1.8B of CMBS across 95 loans. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2028 ($480M, 27% of the book). 50 on-the-ground distress events in the past year (3,958 jobs).
Overview
CMBS
Submarkets
Local Banks
Jobs & Demand
On The Ground
Loading map…
The CMBS properties our stress model flags here, plus recent store closures and layoffs. Stressed is a wider net than distressed — the distressed figure above counts only loans already in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, while these dots also include performing loans facing maturity or coverage pressure. Property dots sit at the center of their ZIP code, not the building — they show where stress concentrates, not which asset. Closures and layoffs are pinned to address where we have it. Open any dot to the building and the loan behind it →
The 2028 wall looms over Orlando as the filed record stacks up
Orlando's securitized book runs to $1.8 billion across 95 CMBS loans, and the maturity calendar is front-loaded on a single year: $480 million, or 27% of the book, comes due in 2028 — the heaviest concentration on the page, with another $0.5 billion stacked behind it in 2029. For now the declared distress rate sits at 5.5%, roughly $0.1 billion of the book carrying a special-servicing or 60-plus-day tag. Hospitality is the largest exposure at $0.5 billion, ahead of office at $0.4 billion, retail at $0.3 billion, and multifamily and industrial at $0.2 billion apiece.
The contrast with the national sector reads is worth holding onto. Office nationally carries an 11.1% distress rate and multifamily 7.9%, both well above where Orlando's overall book prints; retail runs lighter nationally at 2.6%, and the metro's $0.2 billion industrial slice shows a 0.0% distress rate against a 2.7% national mark. Hospitality's national rate of 6.2% hangs over the metro's single largest line.
The on-the-ground record is where the strain shows most plainly. Fifty distress events landed in the past year — 26 store closures and 24 layoff notices — touching 3,958 jobs. That sits against a labor backdrop of 4.6% unemployment, up 0.4 point year over year, and an office-using employment base of 318,144 that was essentially flat, at 0.1%, over the same stretch.
Written 2026-10-27
CMBS Distressed UPB
$98M / 5.5%
in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent
CMBS Maturing ≤ 24mo
$513M
Banks HQ’d Here (stressed)
1 / 7
Bank Early-Warning
1 flagged
Store Closures (1y)
26
Layoff Notices (1y)
24 / 3,958 jobs
0.31% of metro employment
CMBS Loans / UPB
95 / $1.8B
Unemployment · Aug 2026
4.6%
+0.4pp yr
Office-Using Jobs · 2024
318,144
+0.1% yr
How much CRE distress is there in Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL right now?
In Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL, the four feeds read as follows: store closures stand at 26 closures, or 2.05 per 100k jobs — a count-driven reading, since this leg clears the flat count threshold while sitting below the median of its own rate ranking; layoff notices (WARN) at 43 notices, or 0.27%; bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line at $864.7mm, or 7.32%; and securitized loans in special servicing at 6 loan records, or 5.46%. All legs elevated out of four is 4, with pairs with both legs elevated at 6 of 6 pairs of legs compared, pairs with both legs quiet at 0, pairs where the legs disagree at 0, and pairs that cannot be read because a leg is blind at 0 — so the reading is complete, with no legs that cannot be read. Worth weighting alongside the bank figure: its dollars are largely placed by branch deposits rather than confirmed at the lending bank, so the 7.32% carries that allocation caveat, and the closures leg is a statement about metro size rather than stress per unit of itself.
The figures behind this answer
| Signal | Level | Rate | Rank by count | Rank by rate | Reading |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| store closures store closures per 100,000 jobs |
26 closures | 2.05 per 100k jobs | 21 of 392 | 200 of 392 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| layoff notices (WARN) workers on layoff notices as a share of the metro's employment |
43 notices | 0.27% | 20 of 382 | 85 of 382 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line share of the CRE lent into this metro that sits at a lender over the blended-noncurrent line |
$864.7mm | 7.32% | 43 of 393 | 92 of 393 | elevated
allocated 2026-06-30
|
| securitized loans in special servicing share of the securitized balance read here that is in special servicing |
6 loan records | 5.46% | 29 of 335 | 70 of 335 | elevated 2026-09-29
|
6 pairs compared
6 both elevated
0 both quiet
0 disagreeing
0 unreadable — a side is blind
4 of four legs elevated
one metro, four independent feeds, each on its own denominator
124 of 447 metros have at least one blind leg and 54 are blind on all four. Those 54 are the same metros the board's map cannot place and the metro resolver cannot name: one ZIP-to-CBSA crosswalk boundary, showing up three ways.
Elevation is computed on the COUNT, over a flat threshold, which is a size filter. New York is 2nd of 392 by store closures and 264th of the same 392 by closures per job — both true, and which one you lead with decides what the reader believes.
Where two legs disagree, that is usually a fact about WHICH mechanism is running, not an error in either feed and not a worse metro.
A leg with no denominator, or whose numerator cannot be measured, reads LOW and means nothing. Each leg publishes a measurement state (allocated, floor, measured, no denominator, no rate, not measurable) for that reason.
elevated by size, not by rate — store closures clear a flat count threshold while sitting below the median of their own rate ranking. Any reading that leans on them is a statement about how big this metro is.
Store closures: divided by 1,269,572 jobs
— all metro jobs, QCEW annual average — a SIZE normaliser, not a matched population: the feed spans retail, food service and pharmacy and no single QCEW sector covers it. The MATCHED read sits beside it as this leg's second reading (trailing 365 days to today).
Layoff notices (WARN): divided by 1,462,367 employed
— employed persons, BLS LAUS, not seasonally adjusted (trailing 365 days to today).
Bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line: divided by $11,819.9 mm
— bank CRE allocated to this metro by branch deposits (2026-06-30).
Securitized loans in special servicing: divided by $1,796.0 mm
— current balance on the non-pari-passu rows of this tape — the trust's slice, not the whole loan, on both sides of the ratio (2026-09-29).
Written from the figures above · CBSA 36740 · stress_metro · last changed 01 Nov 2026
· Ask your own question →
Jobs & Demand — the labor market under the collateralWatch it change →
Every other zone on this page reads the credit — what the loan is doing.
This one reads the demand underneath it. Office jobs pay office rent;
office rent services the office loan. When the jobs go, the DSCR follows — but not for another year or two.
That lag is the whole point of looking here.
Unemployment · Aug 2026
4.6%
+0.4pp yr
Last 24 months
3.1%4.9%
Monthly metro unemployment (BLS LAUS) — the freshest labor signal there is,
about six weeks behind. Read the direction, not the level: a 4% metro that is rising and a 6% metro that is
falling are not telling you the same thing.
Jobs by CRE-relevant sector · 2024
Annual employment by sector (BLS QCEW, 2024; 1,269,572 jobs in the metro).
QCEW lags — it is the structural read, not the current one, and we pair it with the monthly unemployment above on purpose.
Office-using sums five supersectors; where BLS withholds any one of them for
disclosure, we show nothing rather than a number we know is too low — so a missing sector here means
“suppressed at the source,” not “zero.”
Sector Heat — CMBS distress rate by property type (metro vs national)See the loans behind the bar →
This metro's CMBS runs 5.5% distressed where its own property mix predicts 6.2% — $12M less than this book would carry at the rate each property type runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted and excluding this metro. The gap is measured; the cause is not. 0 of 1 property types here run a higher distress rate than the national average for that type (the tick on each bar).
Elimination — does the gap survive a control?
Each row re-prices this metro's book on a finer cell — its own property types, then those types split by loan size, then by vintage — always at the rate that cell runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted. A gap that shrinks toward zero is explained by the control; one that stays has ruled it out. What is measured is what survives, not a cause.
property mix alone
-0.7pp
… and loan size held fixed
-0.6pp
there is no gap here to explain
… and vintage held fixed
-0.7pp
there is no gap here to explain
The largest single contributor is Office: 11 loans, $370M, where the same type runs 11.1% elsewhere. Its own rate and its part of the gap are not shown: fewer than 3 loans are distressed here, too few for the share to be a rate.
Maturity Wall — CMBS coming due by year, distress within eachSee what’s maturing →
$513M — 29% of the metro's balance — matures within two years; the red slice of each bar is already distressed.
Distress Trend — is this market turning?Track it quarter by quarter →
Too few loans here are distressed for a quarterly rate to be a rate, so no direction is stated. The quarters that can be read are shown below.
Same definition as the cards above — distressed means in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, dollar-weighted — on a different clock. The cards are today’s tape; this is the disclosed history panel, quarter by quarter, so you can read direction rather than level. Trusts file monthly, so a quarter is usually well covered within weeks of opening and the newest one shown is normally the current one; it is withheld only when its filed book falls below 60% of recent quarters.
Share of the metro’s CMBS in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, by quarter — a firmer, backward-looking read. A loan under 1.0x DSCR that is still paying is not counted here.
Submarket Heat — where in the metro the distress sitsOpen the submarket →
The top three submarkets hold $1.2B of the metro's $1.8B; each bar's colored share is its distress rate.
Bank Door — what the local bank sector could absorbSee it on every loan’s exit read →
$513M of CMBS matures here within two years.
The 21 regional and local banks that gather deposits here could write roughly
$729M more CRE before the 300% supervisory line, so the maturing balance is
0.70× that room.
The median metro sits at 0.13×.
Regional Bank Room
$729M
After Committed Draws
$364M / −50%
Maturing ÷ Room
0.70×
Banks In Footprint
21 / 4 at the line
The room above is already part-sold. Construction lending is a promise drawn
down over two or three years, and the undrawn part is an obligation the bank cannot decline while the borrower performs
— every one of those dollars lands in the same CRE book the 300% line governs. These banks
have $609M of construction committed and not yet
advanced, of which $365M
comes out of the room above, leaving $364M,
with 9 banks
whose entire remaining room is spoken for.
A bank with no room contributes zero here, never a negative one — capacity does not net
across balance sheets — so $244M of what has
been promised is not deducted at all, because there is nothing left to deduct it from. On today’s
capital that is funding already contracted which would cross the line as it draws.
SR 07-1 draws a second line at 100% of capital for construction and land:
9 more cross it
once their own commitments fund.
Counted — 21 regional & local CRE lenders
| Bank | Deposit share | CRE / Capital* | Room contributed | Noncurrent CRE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Seacoast National Bank FL | 14.6% | 230% total 325%
|
🔒 | 0.57% |
| Cogent Bank FL | 41.7% | 162% total 276%
|
🔒 | 0.32% |
| Axiom Bank, National Association FL | 76.3% | 171% total 188%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| United Southern Bank FL | 79.9% | 224% total 279%
|
🔒 | 0.18% |
| Banco Do Brasil Americas FL | 6.5% | 108% total 119%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| City National Bank Of Florida FL | 3.3% | 258% total 307%
|
🔒 | 0.37% |
| Bankunited, National Association FL | 0.7% | 194% total 243%
|
🔒 | 0.62% |
| First National Banker's Bank LA | 10.2% | 189% total 233%
|
🔒 | 1.00% |
| Ameris Bank GA | 1.3% | 263% total 319%
|
🔒 | 0.12% |
| Climate First Bank FL | 20.8% | 261% total 347%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| American Momentum Bank TX | 1.9% | 173% total 214%
|
🔒 | 4.40% |
| Florida Capital Bank, National Association FL | 19.1% | 228% total 318%
|
🔒 | 0.24% |
| One Florida Bank FL | 96.8% | 298% total 433%
|
🔒 | 0.12% |
| Bankflorida FL | 30.3% | 281% total 437%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Mainstreet Community Bank Of Florida FL | 27.8% | 292% total 529%
|
🔒 | 1.94% |
| First Southern Bank AL | 2.0% | 171% total 243%
|
🔒 | 2.46% |
| Cypress Bank & Trust FL | 9.4% | 252% total 418%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Sunrise Bank FL | 47.4% | 387% total 582%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Central Bank FL | 24.4% | 398% total 588%
|
🔒 | 0.06% |
| Amerasia Bank NY | 9.7% | 354% total 406%
|
🔒 | 1.90% |
| Ocean Bank FL | 0.3% | 528% total 621%
|
🔒 | 0.36% |
Not counted — 27 banks with deposits here
These hold deposits in this metro but are left out of the capacity above, because for them deposit location stops indicating where they lend — or they do not lend CRE at all. Real money that could refinance here is deliberately not counted.
no CRE book — CRE under 100% of capital — not a CRE lender
Truist Bank NC · Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Association OH · Bank Of America, National Association NC · Wells Fargo Bank, National Association SD · Regions Bank AL · Fifth Third Bank, National Association OH · Td Bank, National Association DE · Pnc Bank, National Association DE · Trustco Bank NY · The First National Bank Of Mount Dora FL · First-Citizens Bank & Trust Company NC · Helm Bank Usa FL · Bny Mellon, National Association PA · The Bank Of New York Mellon Trust Company, National Association CA · Synchrony Bank UT
national — operates in more than 5 states, so deposits stop indicating where it lends
First Horizon Bank TN · Pinnacle Bank TN · United Community Bank SC · Southstate Bank, National Association FL · Enterprise Bank & Trust MO · Centennial Bank AR · Bank Ozk AR · Woodforest National Bank TX · Valley National Bank NJ · Servisfirst Bank AL
booked here — books nearly all deposits to one branch — a charter address, not a footprint
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 07-1 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
How to read this. It is not whether any particular loan can refinance — a borrower also reaches
national banks, life companies, agencies and debt funds. It is how much of this metro’s maturing volume the local
bank sector could absorb if it were the only door.
Banks are placed by deposit share (FDIC Summary of Deposits, June 2026) — a proxy for
where they lend, not a measurement; call reports carry no collateral geography. Room = 3× total risk-based capital less CRE held
(SR 07-1, the capital base the rule names — not book equity), from Q2 2026 call reports, apportioned by that share.
Committed construction comes from FFIEC Schedule RC-L as filed at 2026-06-30 —
the undrawn half of loans already written, which the balance sheet above does not show.
Banks in more than 5 states, single-branch bookers and banks that do not lend CRE are excluded —
315 banks holding $263.8B of national capacity not counted here.
Local Lenders — banks headquartered here, worst CRE noncurrent firstUnlock each bank’s early-warning flag →
| Bank | Total CRE | CRE / Capital* | Noncurrent CRE | Early Warning |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Commerce Bank & Trust | $76M | 163% total 368%
|
5.39% | 🔒 |
| United Southern Bank | $262M | 224% total 279%
|
0.18% | 🔒 |
| Cogent Bank | $724M | 162% total 276%
|
0.32% | 🔒 |
| Sunrise Bank | $343M | 387% total 582%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
| Axiom Bank, National Association | $166M | 171% total 188%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
| First Colony Bank Of Florida | $156M | 239% total 485%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
| The First National Bank Of Mount Dora | $54M | 74% total 124%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 07-1 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
Banks are matched to their HQ metro (a proxy for footprint). Noncurrent CRE = CRE-balance-weighted blend of multifamily / nonresidential / construction noncurrent (distress already arrived). Early Warning is a validated leading signal — the bank’s 30-89 early-delinquency rank among all CRE lenders this quarter, which has predicted ~2.3× forward CRE distress. Per-bank flags are on a plan.
Do the banks lending in Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL have the capacity to refinance its maturing CRE?
Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL sits in the over band: the wall-to-room ratio of 1.41 (against $512.7mm of CMBS maturing in the window across this many loans: 27) is above the median, ranking 49 of 275 counting from the most strained. Local bank room, after those draws, is $364.2mm from 21 qualifying local banks, versus $728.8mm before committed draws of $608.5mm — a before-draws ratio of 0.70. That suggests limited spare capacity to absorb the maturing CMBS, though the ratio is an upper bound, since the wall covers only CMBS maturing within 24 months and room is a deposit-footprint proxy; note also that 12 banks are excluded from the calculation, so the true picture may be less strained than the exclusion implies.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS maturing in the window
- $512.7mm
- … across this many loans
- 27
- Local bank room, before committed draws
- $728.8mm
- Committed construction draws
- $608.5mm
- Local bank room, after those draws
- $364.2mm
- Wall-to-room ratio
- 1.41
- Rank, most strained
- 49
- … out of this many metros ranked
- 275
- … before committed draws
- 0.70
- Population ranked against
- CMBS maturing within 24 months against regional/community bank room in this metro
- Qualifying local banks
- 21
- … excluded from the calculation
- 12
- Distressed share of this metro's CMBS
- 5.5%
- Total CMBS balance here
- $1.80bn
- Capacity band
- over
Compared against a median wall-to-room ratio of
0.24 across the ranked metros.
1.41 is ABOVE the median of 0.24, so this metro is MORE strained than the typical ranked metro
49 of 275, counting from the MOST strained — a LOWER rank number means MORE strain
Room is what regional and community banks could still write before the SR 06-26 concentration line, after deducting construction draws already committed. Deposit footprint is a proxy for lending footprint, not a measurement of it.
The most extreme ratios belong to the smallest metros.
The wall is the CMBS balance maturing within 24 months — the maturing debt this platform can see, not the metro's whole maturity load. Every ratio is an upper bound on how much of it local banks would have to absorb.
A high ratio is as often an exclusion artifact as a credit event. Banks whose deposits do not indicate where they lend (nationals, card and charter banks) are excluded from the room, so a metro served mainly by those reads strained while its credit is simply invisible here.
Written from the figures above · CBSA 36740 · capacity_metro · last changed 30 Oct 2026
· Ask your own question →
Apartment-REIT Operating Read — same-store disclosures for this metro · as of 2026-07-30Set against the loan book →
Same-Store NOI
+1.5%
Same-Store Revenue
-0.4%
Occupancy
96.1%
Rent Growth
-0.7%
| REIT | SS NOI | SS Revenue | Occupancy | Rent | As Of |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CPT | +3.1% | -0.4% | 96.2% | -0.8% | 2026-07-30 |
| MAA | +1.3% | -0.1% | 95.5% | -0.1% | 2026-07-29 |
| UDR | +0.1% | -0.7% | 96.7% | -1.1% | 2026-07-27 |
Same-store operating results disclosed by public apartment REITs (AVB · EQR · ESS · MAA · CPT · UDR) for this market in their quarterly supplements. Directional market context — an operating trend, not a Verstavo score.
On The Ground — recent closures, layoffs & CRE bankruptciesTie these events to loans →
50 local distress events in the past year (3,958 jobs) — store closures, layoffs, and commercial real estate bankruptcies near this metro's collateral.
2026-12-31
CLOSURE
Scheduled · Altamonte Springs
2026-10-28
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-10-26
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-10-20
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-10-19
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 7
2026-10-15
BANKRUPTCY
CRE-linked bankruptcy
2026-10-12
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-10-08
BANKRUPTCY
Chapter 11
2026-10-07
BANKRUPTCY
CRE-linked bankruptcy
2026-10-01
LAYOFF
52 jobs · Orlando
2026-09-28
CLOSURE
Orlando
2026-09-01
LAYOFF
180 jobs · Winter Park
2026-08-30
CLOSURE
Orlando
2026-08-02
CLOSURE
Orlando
2026-06-18
LAYOFF
21 jobs · ORLANDO
What has actually happened on the ground in Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL recently?
Over the past 365 days, Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL has seen 26 store closures and 24 WARN layoff notices affecting 3,958 jobs on those notices (a floor, since notices stating no headcount contribute none). The CRE-related bankruptcies reading of 55 is a state-level proxy rather than a metro-native count, so it should not be read as activity on the ground in Orlando itself.
The figures behind this answer
- Store closures
- 26
- WARN layoff notices
- 24
- Jobs on those notices
- 3,958
- CRE-related bankruptcies
- 55
- Window, in days
- 365
STATE PROXY — a court case counts in its filing district and an SEC 8-K in the filer's state, not where the property is, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count. Each court case is counted once even when both PACER and CourtListener carry it. A court case's state is its filing district; an SEC 8-K or news item carries the filer's state. Coverage widened to both court feeds on 2026-09-16, so counts before and after that date are not comparable.
affected_employees is nullable — notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, so this is a floor.
Closures are matched ZIP -> CBSA and only APPROVED rows count (a pending, machine-extracted row is not yet a closure). This mirrors the Metro Pulse page, not the convergence board — the board applies neither filter and counts higher. Layoffs take the same ZIP -> CBSA and review treatment, and a WARN notice counts if it affects >= 10 people or does not state a headcount (a NULL is not 'fewer than 10').
Written from the figures above · CBSA 36740 · geo_events · last changed 30 Oct 2026
· Ask your own question →
What this page can’t do
Everything above is a snapshot — one market, as it stands today, and
it’s yours to read. What a snapshot can’t tell you is when it moves: which loan slipped a DSCR band
this month, which bank’s early-warning rank crossed into the top quartile, which submarket started turning
while the headline number still looked fine. Distress doesn’t announce itself on the day you happen to check.
This page
One metro · one moment · you come looking.
Verstavo
Every metro · every month · it comes looking for you.
CMBS covers the securitized slice of CRE; bank, closure and layoff signals widen the view.
“No data” in a zone means we don’t observe it here, not that there is no stress.
Employment is BLS (QCEW annual, LAUS monthly) — public data, and the demand leg under all of it.
See the whole picture, not just the pulse.
Metro Pulse is the free, public read — one page for every market we cover. The platform goes loan‑by‑loan inside it: which buildings carry the stress, when their debt comes due, and your own portfolio benchmarked against the market you are standing in.