Commercial Real Estate Credit —
New Haven, CT
The state of disclosed CRE credit in this market · CT
The read
$253M of CMBS across 22 loans. Distress is rising in the filed record — 13.9% as of 2026-07. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2031 ($64M, 25% of the book). 10 on-the-ground distress events in the past year (293 jobs).
Overview
CMBS
Submarkets
Local Banks
Jobs & Demand
On The Ground
Loading map…
The CMBS properties our stress model flags here, plus recent store closures and layoffs. Stressed is a wider net than distressed — the distressed figure above counts only loans already in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, while these dots also include performing loans facing maturity or coverage pressure. Property dots sit at the center of their ZIP code, not the building — they show where stress concentrates, not which asset. Closures and layoffs are pinned to address where we have it. Open any dot to the building and the loan behind it →
CMBS Distressed UPB
$35M / 13.9%
in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent
CMBS Maturing ≤ 24mo
$32M
Local Banks (stressed)
0 / 0
Bank Early-Warning
0 flagged
Store Closures (1y)
9
Layoff Notices (1y)
1 / 293 jobs
0.12% of metro employment
CMBS Loans / UPB
22 / $253M
Unemployment · Jul 2026
5.9%
+1.4pp yr
Office-Using Jobs · 2024
42,204
-22.4% yr
How much CRE distress is there in New Haven, CT right now?
New Haven, CT is showing a split picture right now: store closures are elevated, at 8 closures with a rate of 3.2 per 100,000 jobs (ranked 49th of 392 metros by count), and securitized loans in special servicing are also elevated, at 14 rows with a 13.78% rate (ranked 11th of 335 by count) — though that CMBS reading is a floor, since it covers only 21.4% of the special-servicing rows. Bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line reads at $177.6mm, or 4.86% of the allocated balance (ranked 125th of 393), which is not elevated, and WARN layoff notices are quiet at 1 notice (0.1% of employment). Four of the six paired readings disagree — notably, closures are hot while bank CRE is quiet (suggesting tenants are leaving before any lender balance sheet shows it), and CMBS special servicing is hot while WARN is quiet (buildings in trouble while employers are not). Only one pair shows both sides elevated — closures and CMBS agree on distress — while one pair (WARN and bank CRE) is quiet on both. So the distress here is concentrated in property-level signals — storefronts closing and securitized paper in special servicing — while the employment and local-lender channels remain calm.
The figures behind this answer
| Signal | Level | Rate | Rank by count | Rank by rate | Reading |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| store closures store closures per 100,000 jobs |
8 closures | 3.2 per 100k jobs | 49 of 392 | 78 of 392 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| layoff notices (WARN) workers on layoff notices as a share of the metro's employment |
1 notices | 0.1% | 212 of 386 | 168 of 386 | quiet trailing 365 days to today
|
| bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line share of the CRE lent into this metro that sits at a lender over the blended-noncurrent line |
$177.6mm | 4.86% | 125 of 393 | 148 of 393 | quiet
allocated 2026-03-31
|
| securitized loans in special servicing share of the securitized balance read here that is in special servicing |
14 loan records | 13.78% | 11 of 335 | 37 of 335 | elevated
floor 2026-07-29
|
6 pairs compared
1 both elevated
1 both quiet
4 disagreeing
0 unreadable — a side is blind
2 of four legs elevated
one metro, four independent feeds, each on its own denominator
{'coverage': "114 of 441 metros have at least one blind leg and 48 are blind on all four. Those 48 are the same metros the board's map cannot place and the metro resolver cannot name: one ZIP-to-CBSA crosswalk boundary, showing up three ways.", 'a_count_ranks_by_size': 'Elevation is computed on the COUNT, over a flat threshold, which is a size filter. New York is 2nd of 392 by store closures and 264th of the same 392 by closures per job — both true, and which one you lead with decides what the reader believes. Every leg carries both ranks over ONE population; quote the rate beside the count.', 'disagreement_is_not_severity': 'Where two legs disagree, that is usually a fact about WHICH mechanism is running, not an error in either feed and not a worse metro. The six pairs read different populations, and each note is a STRUCTURAL prior about those populations — nothing here measures a lead or a lag between two legs, so never report one as timing.', 'a_blind_leg_is_not_a_quiet_one': "A leg with no denominator, or whose numerator cannot be measured, reads LOW and means nothing. Each leg publishes a measurement state (allocated, floor, measured, no denominator, no rate, not measurable) for that reason. Never report a blind leg as 'no distress'."}
{'leg': 'closures', 'unit': 'jobs', 'as_of': 'trailing 365 days to today', 'value': 250140, 'measures': 'store closures', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'window', 'what_it_is': "all metro jobs, QCEW annual average — a SIZE normaliser, not a matched population: the feed spans retail, food service and pharmacy and no single QCEW sector covers it. The MATCHED read sits beside it as this leg's second reading"}
{'leg': 'warn', 'unit': 'employed', 'as_of': 'trailing 365 days to today', 'value': 283663, 'measures': 'layoff notices (WARN)', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'window', 'what_it_is': 'employed persons, BLS LAUS, not seasonally adjusted'}
{'leg': 'bank', 'unit': '$mm', 'as_of': '2026-03-31', 'value': 3655.1, 'measures': 'bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'stamp', 'what_it_is': 'bank CRE allocated to this metro by branch deposits'}
{'leg': 'cmbs', 'unit': '$mm', 'as_of': '2026-07-29', 'value': 254.0, 'measures': 'securitized loans in special servicing', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'stamp', 'what_it_is': "current balance on the non-pari-passu rows of this tape — the trust's slice, not the whole loan, on both sides of the ratio"}
Written from the figures above · CBSA 35300 · stress_metro · last changed 28 Aug 2026
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Which distress signals are elevated in New Haven, CT, and which cannot be read?
In New Haven, CT, the elevated distress signals are the CMBS special-servicing reading and store closures: the CMBS special-servicing UPB is $35.0mm, representing a 13.8% share of metro UPB, while the metro recorded 8 store closures over one year.
The credit-side reading is obscured: the distressed-bank assets figure is 0, the distressed-lender CRE is $177.6mm, and the bank CRE at-risk 90th percentile is 8.2% with a bank CRE allocation of 2.2% (bank CRE total $3.66bn). However, the securitized-dollar figure is a floor — measured over 21.4% of the metro’s 14 special-servicing rows, the rest carrying no balance — so whether CRE credit has been hit here cannot be read. The phase is "obscured" with convergence 2: the ground is deteriorating (warn notices: 1), but the credit-side signal is not the same as quiet — it is unreadable.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS in special servicing
- $35.0mm
- … as a share of this metro's CMBS balance
- 13.8%
- Bank CRE lent into this metro
- $3.66bn
- … at risk at the 90th percentile
- 8.2%
- CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line
- $177.6mm
- Assets at those lenders
- $0.00bn
- … share needing no branch-deposit allocation
- 2.2%
- Signals reading elevated
- CMBS in special servicing, store closures
- Legs agreeing
- 2
- Phase
- obscured
- CMBS loans in special servicing
- 14
- Distressed banks
- 0
- Store closures (past year)
- 8
- WARN notices (past year)
- 1
the ground is deteriorating, and whether CRE credit has been hit here CANNOT BE READ: the securitized dollars are measured over 21.4% of its 14 special-servicing rows — the securitized side is invisible here, which is not the same as quiet
tens of millions of distressed CRE exposure; measured over 21.4% of this metro's 14 special-servicing rows — the rest carry no balance, so the dollar figure is a FLOOR
the ground is wobbling (closures / layoffs) but little CRE-credit distress sits behind it yet — a real-economy signal, not (yet) a CRE-credit event
Written from the figures above · CBSA 35300 · geo_metro_signals · last changed 27 Aug 2026
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Jobs & Demand — the labor market under the collateralWatch it change →
Every other zone on this page reads the credit — what the loan is doing.
This one reads the demand underneath it. Office jobs pay office rent;
office rent services the office loan. When the jobs go, the DSCR follows — but not for another year or two.
That lag is the whole point of looking here.
Unemployment · Jul 2026
5.9%
+1.4pp yr
Last 24 months
3.0%5.9%
Monthly metro unemployment (BLS LAUS) — the freshest labor signal there is,
about six weeks behind. Read the direction, not the level: a 4% metro that is rising and a 6% metro that is
falling are not telling you the same thing.
Jobs by CRE-relevant sector · 2024
Annual employment by sector (BLS QCEW, 2024; 250,140 jobs in the metro).
QCEW lags — it is the structural read, not the current one, and we pair it with the monthly unemployment above on purpose.
Office-using sums five supersectors; where BLS withholds any one of them for
disclosure, we show nothing rather than a number we know is too low — so a missing sector here means
“suppressed at the source,” not “zero.”
Sector Heat — CMBS distress rate by property type (metro vs national)See the loans behind the bar →
Too few CMBS loans here (22) to say whether this metro's rate is explained by its property mix — that comparison needs 25.
No CMBS sector data for this metro.
Maturity Wall — CMBS coming due by year, distress within eachSee what’s maturing →
$32M — 13% of the metro's balance — matures within two years; the red slice of each bar is already distressed.
Distress Trend — is this market turning?Track it quarter by quarter →
Realized distress is RISING — 13.9% now (2026-07), +9.9pp over the year.
Same definition as the cards above — distressed means in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, dollar-weighted — on a different clock. The cards are today’s tape; this is the disclosed history panel, quarter by quarter, so you can read direction rather than level. Trusts file monthly, so a quarter is usually well covered within weeks of opening and the newest one shown is normally the current one; it is withheld only when its filed book falls below 60% of recent quarters.
Share of the metro’s CMBS in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, by quarter — a firmer, backward-looking read. A loan under 1.0x DSCR that is still paying is not counted here.
Submarket Heat — where in the metro the distress sitsOpen the submarket →
The top three submarkets hold $248M of the metro's $253M; each bar's colored share is its distress rate.
Bank Door — what the local bank sector could absorbSee it on every loan’s exit read →
$32M of CMBS matures here within two years.
The 9 regional and local banks that gather deposits here could write roughly
$375M more CRE before the 300% supervisory line, so the maturing balance is
0.09× that room.
The median metro sits at 0.12×.
Regional Bank Room
$375M
After Committed Draws
$159M / −56%
Maturing ÷ Room
0.09×
Banks In Footprint
9 / 1 at the line
The room above is already part-sold. Construction lending is a promise drawn
down over two or three years, and the undrawn part is an obligation the bank cannot decline while the borrower performs
— every one of those dollars lands in the same CRE book the 300% line governs. These banks
have $246M of construction committed and not yet
advanced, of which $202M
comes out of the room above, leaving $159M,
with 4 banks
whose entire remaining room is spoken for.
A bank with no room contributes zero here, never a negative one — capacity does not net
across balance sheets — so $43M of what has
been promised is not deducted at all, because there is nothing left to deduct it from. On today’s
capital that is funding already contracted which would cross the line as it draws.
SR 06-26 draws a second line at 100% of capital for construction and land:
1 more cross it
once their own commitments fund.
4% of the room above sits at banks we could not
match to a commitment filing; they are left out of this deduction rather than assumed to have promised nothing.
Counted — 9 regional & local CRE lenders
| Bank | Deposit share | CRE / Capital* | Room contributed | Noncurrent CRE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| The Milford Bank CT | 90.7% | 137% total 238%
|
🔒 | 0.36% |
| Webster Bank, National Association CT | 2.6% | 256% total 287%
|
🔒 | 0.84% |
| Liberty Bank CT | 11.0% | 256% total 271%
|
🔒 | 0.38% |
| Ascend Bank CT | 90.4% | 256% total 334%
|
🔒 | 0.07% |
| Ion Bank CT | 14.2% | 243% total 294%
|
🔒 | 1.30% |
| Essex Bank CT | 14.7% | 125% total 206%
|
🔒 | 1.41% |
| New Haven Bank CT | 100.0% | 227% total 427%
|
🔒 | 0.58% |
| Patriot Bank, National Association CT | 6.8% | 289% total 374%
|
🔒 | 2.34% |
| Bankwell Bank CT | 10.9% | 331% total 549%
|
🔒 | 0.66% |
Not counted — 8 banks with deposits here
These hold deposits in this metro but are left out of the capacity above, because for them deposit location stops indicating where they lend — or they do not lend CRE at all. Real money that could refinance here is deliberately not counted.
no CRE book — CRE under 100% of capital — not a CRE lender
Bank Of America, National Association NC · Keybank National Association OH · Wells Fargo Bank, National Association SD · Td Bank, National Association DE · Citizens Bank, National Association RI · Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Association OH · Wilmington Trust, National Association DE
national — operates in more than 5 states, so deposits stop indicating where it lends
Manufacturers And Traders Trust Company NY
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
How to read this. It is not whether any particular loan can refinance — a borrower also reaches
national banks, life companies, agencies and debt funds. It is how much of this metro’s maturing volume the local
bank sector could absorb if it were the only door.
Banks are placed by deposit share (FDIC Summary of Deposits, June 2025) — a proxy for
where they lend, not a measurement; call reports carry no collateral geography. Room = 3× total risk-based capital less CRE held
(SR 06-26, the capital base the rule names — not book equity), from Q2 2026 call reports, apportioned by that share.
Committed construction comes from FFIEC Schedule RC-L as filed at 2026-06-30 —
the undrawn half of loans already written, which the balance sheet above does not show.
Banks in more than 5 states, single-branch bookers and banks that do not lend CRE are excluded —
313 banks holding $268.2B of national capacity not counted here.
Local Lenders — banks headquartered here, worst CRE noncurrent firstUnlock each bank’s early-warning flag →
No locally-headquartered banks in our FDIC data for this metro.
Do the banks lending in New Haven, CT have the capacity to refinance its maturing CRE?
For New Haven, CT, the banks lending here appear to have the capacity to refinance its maturing CMBS: the wall is $32.3mm across maturing_loans of 2, against room_after_committed of $159.2mm (room_before_committed $375.2mm), giving a wall_to_room of 0.20 and wall_to_room_before_committed_draws of 0.09, which is LEVEL WITH the median of 0.20, so this metro is as strained as the typical ranked metro — though with banks_qualifying at 9 against banks_excluded_here of 1 and explained_by_exclusion false, and given that the wall is the CMBS balance maturing within 24 months, not the metro's whole maturity load, every ratio here is an upper bound on how much of it local banks would have to absorb; the reading on the broader maturing CRE load beyond CMBS is unavailable.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS maturing in the window
- $32.3mm
- … across this many loans
- 2
- Local bank room, before committed draws
- $375.2mm
- Committed construction draws
- $245.8mm
- Local bank room, after those draws
- $159.2mm
- Wall-to-room ratio
- 0.20
- Rank, most strained
- 137
- … out of this many metros ranked
- 270
- … before committed draws
- 0.09
- Population ranked against
- CMBS maturing within 24 months against regional/community bank room in this metro
- Qualifying local banks
- 9
- … excluded from the calculation
- 1
- Distressed share of this metro's CMBS
- 13.9%
- Total CMBS balance here
- $253.3mm
- Capacity band
- slack
Compared against a median wall-to-room ratio of
0.20 across the ranked metros.
0.20 is LEVEL WITH the median of 0.20, so this metro is as strained as the typical ranked metro
137 of 270, counting from the MOST strained — a LOWER rank number means MORE strain
{'room_is_a_proxy': 'Room is what regional and community banks could still write before the SR 06-26 concentration line, after deducting construction draws already committed. Deposit footprint is a proxy for lending footprint, not a measurement of it.', 'ratio_is_not_size': 'The most extreme ratios belong to the smallest metros. Read maturing_bal_mm beside the ratio — the map sizes bubbles by the wall, not the strain, for exactly this reason.', 'wall_is_cmbs_only': "The wall is the CMBS balance maturing within 24 months — the maturing debt this platform can see, not the metro's whole maturity load. Every ratio is an upper bound on how much of it local banks would have to absorb.", 'exclusion_artifact': 'A high ratio is as often an exclusion artifact as a credit event. Banks whose deposits do not indicate where they lend (nationals, card and charter banks) are excluded from the room, so a metro served mainly by those reads strained while its credit is simply invisible here. Check banks_qualifying against banks_excluded_here, and explained_by_exclusion.'}
Written from the figures above · CBSA 35300 · capacity_metro · last changed 13 Sep 2026
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On The Ground — recent closures, layoffs & CRE bankruptciesTie these events to loans →
10 local distress events in the past year (293 jobs) — store closures, layoffs, and commercial real estate bankruptcies near this metro's collateral.
2026-08-18
CLOSURE
New Haven
2026-08-18
CLOSURE
New Haven
2026-06-24
CLOSURE
Milford
2026-04-28
CLOSURE
North Haven
2025-12-31
CLOSURE
East Haven
2025-12-31
CLOSURE
Hamden
2025-12-31
CLOSURE
Milford
2025-11-21
CLOSURE
Orange
2025-11-13
LAYOFF
293 jobs · Milford
2025-10-01
CLOSURE
Meriden
2025-09-09
CLOSURE
Hamden
2025-05-22
CLOSURE
East Haven
2025-05-22
CLOSURE
East Haven
What has actually happened on the ground in New Haven, CT recently?
Over the trailing 365 days, New Haven, CT has recorded 9 store closures, 1 WARN notice, and 293 jobs affected, with 0 CRE bankruptcies — though that bankruptcy figure is a state proxy rather than a metro-native count, and the jobs total is a floor since notices stating no headcount contribute 0 to it.
The figures behind this answer
- Store closures
- 9
- WARN layoff notices
- 1
- Jobs on those notices
- 293
- CRE-related bankruptcies
- 0
- Window, in days
- 365
STATE PROXY — bankruptcy filings carry the filer's state, not the property's location, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count.
affected_employees is nullable — notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, so this is a floor.
Closures are matched ZIP -> CBSA and only APPROVED rows count (a pending, machine-extracted row is not yet a closure). This mirrors the Metro Pulse page, not the convergence board — the board applies neither filter and counts higher. Layoffs take the same ZIP -> CBSA and review treatment, and a WARN notice counts if it affects >= 10 people or does not state a headcount (a NULL is not 'fewer than 10').
Written from the figures above · CBSA 35300 · geo_events · last changed 13 Sep 2026
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What this page can’t do
Everything above is a snapshot — one market, as it stands today, and
it’s yours to read. What a snapshot can’t tell you is when it moves: which loan slipped a DSCR band
this month, which bank’s early-warning rank crossed into the top quartile, which submarket started turning
while the headline number still looked fine. Distress doesn’t announce itself on the day you happen to check.
This page
One metro · one moment · you come looking.
Verstavo
Every metro · every month · it comes looking for you.
CMBS covers the securitized slice of CRE; bank, closure and layoff signals widen the view.
“No data” in a zone means we don’t observe it here, not that there is no stress.
Employment is BLS (QCEW annual, LAUS monthly) — public data, and the demand leg under all of it.
See the whole picture, not just the pulse.
Metro Pulse is the free, public read. The Verstavo platform goes loan‑by‑loan — stress
scores, maturity walls, special‑servicing transfers, bank CRE, and your own portfolio benchmarked
against the market.