Commercial Real Estate Credit —
Nashville-Davidson--Murfreesboro--Franklin, TN

Nashville-Davidson--Murfreesboro--Franklin, TN shows 3 of the 4 monitored signals elevated, with 3 of 6 total pairings in disagreement. Store closures are elevated primarily by size (rank 38th of 392 by count but 246th by rate, at 1.24 closures per 100k jobs) rather than per-unit stress, while WARN layoff notices are elevated on a more modest 0.27% rate (rank 86th of 386 by rate). The CMBS leg is elevated but only as a floor reading: 3.96% of the securitized balance read is in special servicing, measured over just 50.0% of the special-servicing rows. Bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line is notably quiet at 0.46% ($190.6MM), ranking 314th of 393 by rate. The three disagreements all follow the same pattern: the real-economy legs (closures, WARN) are hot while the lender legs (bank, CMBS) are quiet, suggesting tenant stress is showing up at the front door before any lender balance sheet or trust tape reflects it. No legs are blind here, so all readings are meaningful, but the size-driven closure elevation should not be read as per-capita distress.

The elevated distress signals in Nashville-Davidson--Murfreesboro--Franklin, TN are the CMBS special-servicing rate, store closures, and WARN notices. The CMBS special-servicing reading shows $62.0mm in UPB, or 4.0% of metro UPB; the reading is elevated but only partial, as the dollar figure is a "FLOOR" because balances are measured over 50.0% of the metro’s 6 special-servicing rows, with the rest carrying no balance. Store closures (12 in one year) and WARN notices (22 in one year) are also elevated, though these reflect real-economy stress rather than confirmed CRE credit pain. The bank side shows elevated risk metrics: 62.8% of bank CRE is at risk at the 90th percentile, and 14.9% of banks’ total allocation is to CRE, with distressed bank assets at 0.2 billion and distressed lender CRE at $190.6mm. However, the overall credit phase is "obscured": the securitized side is "invisible here, which is not the same as quiet," so a definitive read on CRE credit distress cannot be obtained from the CMBS data. No other distress signals are unavailable—the bank-side figures are fully readable.

In Nashville-Davidson--Murfreesboro--Franklin, TN, the CMBS wall maturing within 24 months of 22 maturing_loans stands at $523.9mm against room_after_committed of $812.2mm across 36 banks_qualifying, a wall_to_room of 0.65 — above the median of 0.20 but still within the slack band, with room_before_committed of $1.83bn falling to 0.29 on wall_to_room_before_committed_draws once $1.89bn in committed_draws is netted out. The metro ranks 65 of 270 counting from the MOST strained, and with explained_by_exclusion false, the exclusion of 11 banks_excluded_here does not appear to be driving the reading; the supporting CMBS balance is $1.57bn with a distressed_share of 4.0%, though whether local banks can fully absorb the wall depends on their actual lending footprint rather than the deposit proxy.

Over the trailing 365 days in the Nashville-Davidson--Murfreesboro--Franklin, TN metro, the on-the-ground activity reads as 22 WARN notices, 14 store closures, and 2,921 jobs affected — the latter a floor, since notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs. On the commercial-real-estate side, the count of CRE-likely bankruptcy filings is 0, though this is a STATE PROXY — bankruptcy filings carry the filer's state, not the property's location, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in, not a metro-native count.