Commercial Real Estate Credit —
Memphis, TN-MS-AR
The state of disclosed CRE credit in this market · MS, AR, TN
The read
$791M of CMBS across 45 loans. Multifamily carries the highest distress rate (29.9%, above the 7.6% national, 4× national). Distress is rising in the filed record — 6.2% as of 2026-07. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2032 ($206M, 26% of the book). 38 on-the-ground distress events in the past year (2,914 jobs).
Overview
CMBS
Submarkets
Local Banks
Jobs & Demand
On The Ground
Loading map…
The CMBS properties our stress model flags here, plus recent store closures and layoffs. Stressed is a wider net than distressed — the distressed figure above counts only loans already in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, while these dots also include performing loans facing maturity or coverage pressure. Property dots sit at the center of their ZIP code, not the building — they show where stress concentrates, not which asset. Closures and layoffs are pinned to address where we have it. Open any dot to the building and the loan behind it →
Multifamily Runs Four Times Hot in Memphis as the Filed Record Turns
Memphis carries $791M of CMBS across 45 loans, and the standout stress sits in the one sector underwriters lean on for durability. Multifamily here runs a 29.9% distress rate — the highest of any sector in the metro, well above the 7.6% national figure and roughly four times the national mark. That is a special-servicing-or-60-days number, a status already declared, not a forecast, and it lands on a book whose overall distress rate reads 6.2% as of July 2026, a figure that has been rising in the filed record.
The maturity wall is loaded toward the back end. The heaviest single year is 2032, with $206M coming due — 26% of the entire book — though that vintage currently shows no distress. The near-term picture is more mixed: earlier maturity years already carry declared distress in the record even as median DSCR across the metro holds at 1.77.
The on-the-ground signal reinforces the read. Memphis logged 38 distress events over the past year — store closures and layoff notices combined — tied to 2,914 jobs. For desks watching this metro, multifamily is the line item that separates Memphis from the national tape.
CMBS Distressed UPB
$49M / 6.2%
in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent
CMBS Maturing ≤ 24mo
$134M
Local Banks (stressed)
1 / 13
Bank Early-Warning
4 flagged
Store Closures (1y)
18
Layoff Notices (1y)
20 / 2,914 jobs
0.55% of metro employment
CMBS Loans / UPB
45 / $791M
Unemployment · Jul 2026
4.7%
-0.2pp yr
How much CRE distress is there in Memphis, TN-MS-AR right now?
In Memphis, TN-MS-AR, three of the four distress signals are elevated, with 3 pairs both elevated and 3 pairs disagreeing out of 6 total pairs. Store closures are elevated at 14 closures, ranking 32nd of 392 by count and 108th by rate (2.62 per 100k jobs). Layoff notices are elevated at 20 notices, ranking 34th of 386 by count and 30th by rate (0.49% of employment). Bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line is elevated at $557.3 million, ranking 55th of 393 by count but only 200th by rate (3.25%)—elevated by size, not by rate, so this is a statement about how big the metro is. Securitized loans in special servicing are not elevated, at 4 rows with a rate of 6.19% and rankings of 42nd by count and 64th by rate of 335 metros. The disagreements are structural: closures are hot while the securitized book is quiet (retail failing on buildings the tape does not hold), WARN is hot while the tape is quiet (employers cutting but the securitized book has not moved), and bank CRE is hot while the tape is cold (lenders stressed on a book the tape cannot see). No reading is unavailable.
The figures behind this answer
| Signal | Level | Rate | Rank by count | Rank by rate | Reading |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| store closures store closures per 100,000 jobs |
14 closures | 2.62 per 100k jobs | 32 of 392 | 108 of 392 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| layoff notices (WARN) workers on layoff notices as a share of the metro's employment |
20 notices | 0.49% | 34 of 386 | 30 of 386 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line share of the CRE lent into this metro that sits at a lender over the blended-noncurrent line |
$557.3mm | 3.25% | 55 of 393 | 200 of 393 | elevated
allocated 2026-03-31
|
| securitized loans in special servicing share of the securitized balance read here that is in special servicing |
4 loan records | 6.19% | 42 of 335 | 64 of 335 | quiet 2026-07-29
|
6 pairs compared
3 both elevated
0 both quiet
3 disagreeing
0 unreadable — a side is blind
3 of four legs elevated
one metro, four independent feeds, each on its own denominator
{'coverage': "114 of 441 metros have at least one blind leg and 48 are blind on all four. Those 48 are the same metros the board's map cannot place and the metro resolver cannot name: one ZIP-to-CBSA crosswalk boundary, showing up three ways.", 'a_count_ranks_by_size': 'Elevation is computed on the COUNT, over a flat threshold, which is a size filter. New York is 2nd of 392 by store closures and 264th of the same 392 by closures per job — both true, and which one you lead with decides what the reader believes. Every leg carries both ranks over ONE population; quote the rate beside the count.', 'disagreement_is_not_severity': 'Where two legs disagree, that is usually a fact about WHICH mechanism is running, not an error in either feed and not a worse metro. The six pairs read different populations, and each note is a STRUCTURAL prior about those populations — nothing here measures a lead or a lag between two legs, so never report one as timing.', 'a_blind_leg_is_not_a_quiet_one': "A leg with no denominator, or whose numerator cannot be measured, reads LOW and means nothing. Each leg publishes a measurement state (allocated, floor, measured, no denominator, no rate, not measurable) for that reason. Never report a blind leg as 'no distress'."}
{'fork': 'elevated by size, not by rate', 'note': 'bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line clear a flat count threshold while sitting below the median of their own rate ranking. Any reading that leans on them is a statement about how big this metro is.'}
{'leg': 'closures', 'unit': 'jobs', 'as_of': 'trailing 365 days to today', 'value': 535002, 'measures': 'store closures', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'window', 'what_it_is': "all metro jobs, QCEW annual average — a SIZE normaliser, not a matched population: the feed spans retail, food service and pharmacy and no single QCEW sector covers it. The MATCHED read sits beside it as this leg's second reading"}
{'leg': 'warn', 'unit': 'employed', 'as_of': 'trailing 365 days to today', 'value': 596036, 'measures': 'layoff notices (WARN)', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'window', 'what_it_is': 'employed persons, BLS LAUS, not seasonally adjusted'}
{'leg': 'bank', 'unit': '$mm', 'as_of': '2026-03-31', 'value': 17123.8, 'measures': 'bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'stamp', 'what_it_is': 'bank CRE allocated to this metro by branch deposits'}
{'leg': 'cmbs', 'unit': '$mm', 'as_of': '2026-07-29', 'value': 791.0, 'measures': 'securitized loans in special servicing', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'stamp', 'what_it_is': "current balance on the non-pari-passu rows of this tape — the trust's slice, not the whole loan, on both sides of the ratio"}
Written from the figures above · CBSA 32820 · stress_metro · last changed 28 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Which distress signals are elevated in Memphis, TN-MS-AR, and which cannot be read?
In Memphis, TN-MS-AR, the elevated distress signals are bank-distressed CRE, closures, and WARN notices: bank CRE at risk at the 90th percentile is 25.8%, with distressed lender CRE of $557.3mm. Additionally, the metro has seen 14 store closures and 20 WARN notices over the past year. The reading for CMBS special-servicing activity is unavailable — while the special-servicing UPB is $49.0mm, the share of metro UPB is not provided.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS in special servicing
- $49.0mm
- … as a share of this metro's CMBS balance
- 6.2%
- Bank CRE lent into this metro
- $17.12bn
- … at risk at the 90th percentile
- 25.8%
- CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line
- $557.3mm
- Assets at those lenders
- $0.30bn
- … share needing no branch-deposit allocation
- 11.0%
- Signals reading elevated
- bank CRE over the noncurrent line, store closures, WARN layoff notices
- Legs agreeing
- 3
- Phase
- early
- CMBS loans in special servicing
- 4
- Distressed banks
- 1
- Store closures (past year)
- 14
- WARN notices (past year)
- 20
the ground is deteriorating but CRE credit has not yet been hit — the leading edge
tens of millions of distressed CRE exposure
the ground is wobbling (closures / layoffs) but little CRE-credit distress sits behind it yet — a real-economy signal, not (yet) a CRE-credit event
Written from the figures above · CBSA 32820 · geo_metro_signals · last changed 28 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Jobs & Demand — the labor market under the collateralWatch it change →
Every other zone on this page reads the credit — what the loan is doing.
This one reads the demand underneath it. Office jobs pay office rent;
office rent services the office loan. When the jobs go, the DSCR follows — but not for another year or two.
That lag is the whole point of looking here.
Unemployment · Jul 2026
4.7%
-0.2pp yr
Last 24 months
3.8%4.9%
Monthly metro unemployment (BLS LAUS) — the freshest labor signal there is,
about six weeks behind. Read the direction, not the level: a 4% metro that is rising and a 6% metro that is
falling are not telling you the same thing.
Sector Heat — CMBS distress rate by property type (metro vs national)See the loans behind the bar →
This metro's CMBS runs 6.2% distressed where its own property mix predicts 5.3% — $7M more than this book would carry at the rate each property type runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted and excluding this metro. The gap is measured; the cause is not. 1 of 2 property types here run a higher distress rate than the national average for that type (the tick on each bar).
Elimination — does the gap survive a control?
Each row re-prices this metro's book on a finer cell — its own property types, then those types split by loan size, then by vintage — always at the rate that cell runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted. A gap that shrinks toward zero is explained by the control; one that stays has ruled it out. What is measured is what survives, not a cause.
property mix alone
+0.9pp
… and loan size held fixed
+1.1pp
there is no gap here to explain
… and vintage held fixed
-0.3pp
there is no gap here to explain
The largest single contributor is Multifamily: 13 loans, $152M, running 29.9% where the same type runs 7.6% elsewhere — worth 4.3pp of this metro's own rate.
Maturity Wall — CMBS coming due by year, distress within eachSee what’s maturing →
$134M — 17% of the metro's balance — matures within two years; the red slice of each bar is already distressed.
Distress Trend — is this market turning?Track it quarter by quarter →
Realized distress is RISING — 6.2% now (2026-07), +5.3pp over the year.
Same definition as the cards above — distressed means in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, dollar-weighted — on a different clock. The cards are today’s tape; this is the disclosed history panel, quarter by quarter, so you can read direction rather than level. Trusts file monthly, so a quarter is usually well covered within weeks of opening and the newest one shown is normally the current one; it is withheld only when its filed book falls below 60% of recent quarters.
Share of the metro’s CMBS in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, by quarter — a firmer, backward-looking read. A loan under 1.0x DSCR that is still paying is not counted here.
Submarket Heat — where in the metro the distress sitsOpen the submarket →
The top three submarkets hold $539M of the metro's $791M; each bar's colored share is its distress rate.
Bank Door — what the local bank sector could absorbSee it on every loan’s exit read →
$134M of CMBS matures here within two years.
The 24 regional and local banks that gather deposits here could write roughly
$835M more CRE before the 300% supervisory line, so the maturing balance is
0.16× that room.
The median metro sits at 0.12×.
Regional Bank Room
$835M
After Committed Draws
$451M / −46%
Maturing ÷ Room
0.16×
Banks In Footprint
24 / 1 at the line
The room above is already part-sold. Construction lending is a promise drawn
down over two or three years, and the undrawn part is an obligation the bank cannot decline while the borrower performs
— every one of those dollars lands in the same CRE book the 300% line governs. These banks
have $522M of construction committed and not yet
advanced, of which $384M
comes out of the room above, leaving $451M,
with 7 banks
whose entire remaining room is spoken for.
A bank with no room contributes zero here, never a negative one — capacity does not net
across balance sheets — so $138M of what has
been promised is not deducted at all, because there is nothing left to deduct it from. On today’s
capital that is funding already contracted which would cross the line as it draws.
SR 06-26 draws a second line at 100% of capital for construction and land:
1 of 24
is past it on drawn balances alone, and
17 more cross it
once their own commitments fund.
Counted — 24 regional & local CRE lenders
| Bank | Deposit share | CRE / Capital* | Room contributed | Noncurrent CRE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| The Bank Of Fayette County TN | 78.1% | 145% total 279%
|
🔒 | 1.16% |
| Independent Bank TN | 30.5% | 114% total 138%
|
🔒 | 2.84% |
| Fidelity Bank AR | 98.1% | 167% total 214%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Trustmark Bank MS | 6.5% | 237% total 298%
|
🔒 | 0.17% |
| Patriot Bank TN | 100.0% | 182% total 279%
|
🔒 | 0.71% |
| First Security Bank MS | 37.7% | 189% total 298%
|
🔒 | 0.20% |
| Bank3 TN | 75.5% | 209% total 328%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Bankfirst Financial Services MS | 14.0% | 219% total 317%
|
🔒 | 0.32% |
| Planters Bank & Trust Company MS | 17.4% | 236% total 301%
|
🔒 | 0.61% |
| Southern Bancorp Bank AR | 8.0% | 174% total 246%
|
🔒 | 1.17% |
| Banktennessee TN | 64.6% | 236% total 286%
|
🔒 | 1.24% |
| Bankplus MS | 4.6% | 235% total 371%
|
🔒 | 0.63% |
| First Financial Bank AR | 6.6% | 132% total 201%
|
🔒 | 4.49% |
| Community Bank Of Mississippi MS | 4.9% | 202% total 310%
|
🔒 | 0.06% |
| Guaranty Bank And Trust Company MS | 20.8% | 272% total 368%
|
🔒 | 1.05% |
| Firstbank TN | 2.6% | 269% total 386%
|
🔒 | 0.97% |
| Story Bank Dba Story Financial Partners MS | 17.1% | 244% total 366%
|
🔒 | 0.79% |
| First National Bank Of Eastern Arkansas AR | 15.9% | 220% total 252%
|
🔒 | 0.15% |
| The Citizens National Bank Of Meridian MS | 6.5% | 248% total 334%
|
🔒 | 0.68% |
| Security Bank And Trust Company TN | 3.0% | 237% total 277%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Decatur County Bank TN | 5.9% | 202% total 274%
|
🔒 | 0.97% |
| Insouth Bank TN | 55.3% | 295% total 400%
|
🔒 | 3.53% |
| Partners Bank AR | 11.3% | 288% total 361%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Paragon Bank TN | 82.2% | 321% total 423%
|
🔒 | 0.23% |
Not counted — 19 banks with deposits here
These hold deposits in this metro but are left out of the capacity above, because for them deposit location stops indicating where they lend — or they do not lend CRE at all. Real money that could refinance here is deliberately not counted.
no CRE book — CRE under 100% of capital — not a CRE lender
Regions Bank AL · Truist Bank NC · Bank Of America, National Association NC · Wells Fargo Bank, National Association SD · Bank Of Holly Springs MS · Bank Of Bartlett TN · Commercial Bank & Trust Co. TN · Unity Bank Of Mississippi MS · Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Association OH · Fsnb, National Association OK
national — operates in more than 5 states, so deposits stop indicating where it lends
First Horizon Bank TN · Pinnacle Bank TN · Renasant Bank MS · Liberty Bank And Trust Company LA · Woodforest National Bank TX · Simmons Bank AR · Servisfirst Bank AL
booked here — books nearly all deposits to one branch — a charter address, not a footprint
Evolve Bank & Trust AR · Financial Federal Bank TN
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
How to read this. It is not whether any particular loan can refinance — a borrower also reaches
national banks, life companies, agencies and debt funds. It is how much of this metro’s maturing volume the local
bank sector could absorb if it were the only door.
Banks are placed by deposit share (FDIC Summary of Deposits, June 2025) — a proxy for
where they lend, not a measurement; call reports carry no collateral geography. Room = 3× total risk-based capital less CRE held
(SR 06-26, the capital base the rule names — not book equity), from Q2 2026 call reports, apportioned by that share.
Committed construction comes from FFIEC Schedule RC-L as filed at 2026-06-30 —
the undrawn half of loans already written, which the balance sheet above does not show.
Banks in more than 5 states, single-branch bookers and banks that do not lend CRE are excluded —
313 banks holding $268.2B of national capacity not counted here.
Local Lenders — banks headquartered here, worst CRE noncurrent firstUnlock each bank’s early-warning flag →
| Bank | Total CRE | CRE / Capital* | Noncurrent CRE | Early Warning |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bank Of Holly Springs | $168M | 95% total 219%
|
3.10% | 🔒 |
| Independent Bank | $270M | 114% total 138%
|
2.84% | 🔒 |
| Evolve Bank & Trust | $258M | 101% total 154%
|
1.52% | 🔒 |
| The Bank Of Fayette County | $300M | 145% total 279%
|
1.16% | 🔒 |
| Banktennessee | $190M | 236% total 286%
|
1.24% | 🔒 |
| First Horizon Bank | $22.5B | 143% total 235%
|
1.12% | 🔒 |
| Patriot Bank | $128M | 182% total 279%
|
0.71% | 🔒 |
| Unity Bank Of Mississippi | $88M | 69% total 282%
|
0.28% | 🔒 |
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
Banks are matched to their HQ metro (a proxy for footprint). Noncurrent CRE = CRE-balance-weighted blend of multifamily / nonresidential / construction noncurrent (distress already arrived). Early Warning is a validated leading signal — the bank’s 30-89 early-delinquency rank among all CRE lenders this quarter, which has predicted ~2.3× forward CRE distress. Per-bank flags are on a plan.
Do the banks lending in Memphis, TN-MS-AR have the capacity to refinance its maturing CRE?
On the evidence here, Memphis, TN-MS-AR looks adequately served rather than strained: banks_qualifying of 24 against banks_excluded_here of 9, with explained_by_exclusion false, means the local-bank reading is not simply an exclusion artifact, and the maturing wall it must absorb is small — maturing_bal_mm of $134.0mm across maturing_loans of 5. Against that, room_before_committed is $834.7mm and room_after_committed is $450.7mm once committed_draws of $521.8mm are deducted, leaving wall_to_room of 0.30 and wall_to_room_before_committed_draws of 0.16. At 0.30 the ratio is ABOVE the median of 0.20, so this metro is MORE strained than the typical ranked metro, ranking 116 of 270, but the 6.2% distressed_share applies to a cmbs_upb of $790.9mm rather than to the maturing balance. The caveat still binds: room is a proxy built on deposit footprint, and the wall is the CMBS balance maturing within 24 months — the maturing debt this platform can see, not the metro's whole maturity load — so every ratio is an upper bound on how much of it local banks would have to absorb.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS maturing in the window
- $134.0mm
- … across this many loans
- 5
- Local bank room, before committed draws
- $834.7mm
- Committed construction draws
- $521.8mm
- Local bank room, after those draws
- $450.7mm
- Wall-to-room ratio
- 0.30
- Rank, most strained
- 116
- … out of this many metros ranked
- 270
- … before committed draws
- 0.16
- Population ranked against
- CMBS maturing within 24 months against regional/community bank room in this metro
- Qualifying local banks
- 24
- … excluded from the calculation
- 9
- Distressed share of this metro's CMBS
- 6.2%
- Total CMBS balance here
- $790.9mm
- Capacity band
- slack
Compared against a median wall-to-room ratio of
0.20 across the ranked metros.
0.30 is ABOVE the median of 0.20, so this metro is MORE strained than the typical ranked metro
116 of 270, counting from the MOST strained — a LOWER rank number means MORE strain
{'room_is_a_proxy': 'Room is what regional and community banks could still write before the SR 06-26 concentration line, after deducting construction draws already committed. Deposit footprint is a proxy for lending footprint, not a measurement of it.', 'ratio_is_not_size': 'The most extreme ratios belong to the smallest metros. Read maturing_bal_mm beside the ratio — the map sizes bubbles by the wall, not the strain, for exactly this reason.', 'wall_is_cmbs_only': "The wall is the CMBS balance maturing within 24 months — the maturing debt this platform can see, not the metro's whole maturity load. Every ratio is an upper bound on how much of it local banks would have to absorb.", 'exclusion_artifact': 'A high ratio is as often an exclusion artifact as a credit event. Banks whose deposits do not indicate where they lend (nationals, card and charter banks) are excluded from the room, so a metro served mainly by those reads strained while its credit is simply invisible here. Check banks_qualifying against banks_excluded_here, and explained_by_exclusion.'}
Written from the figures above · CBSA 32820 · capacity_metro · last changed 13 Sep 2026
· Ask your own question →
Apartment-REIT Operating Read — same-store disclosures for this metro · as of 2026-07-29Set against the loan book →
Same-Store NOI
-12.1%
Same-Store Revenue
-1.1%
Occupancy
94.6%
Rent Growth
-0.7%
| REIT | SS NOI | SS Revenue | Occupancy | Rent | As Of |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| MAA | -12.1% | -1.1% | 94.6% | -0.7% | 2026-07-29 |
Same-store operating results disclosed by public apartment REITs (AVB · EQR · ESS · MAA · CPT · UDR) for this market in their quarterly supplements. Directional market context — an operating trend, not a Verstavo score.
On The Ground — recent closures, layoffs & CRE bankruptciesTie these events to loans →
38 local distress events in the past year (2,914 jobs) — store closures, layoffs, and commercial real estate bankruptcies near this metro's collateral.
2028-07-01
CLOSURE
Memphis
2026-09-26
CLOSURE
Memphis
2026-08-18
CLOSURE
Memphis
2026-08-14
CLOSURE
Memphis
2026-08-04
LAYOFF
119 jobs · Shelby County
2026-07-07
LAYOFF
103 jobs · Shelby County
2026-06-30
CLOSURE
Memphis
2026-06-17
LAYOFF
208 jobs · Shelby County
2026-06-15
LAYOFF
75 jobs · Shelby County
2026-06-08
LAYOFF
117 jobs · Shelby County
2026-05-31
CLOSURE
Memphis
2026-05-04
LAYOFF
75 jobs · Fayette County
2026-05-03
CLOSURE
Memphis
2026-05-03
CLOSURE
Cordova
2026-05-03
CLOSURE
Cordova
What has actually happened on the ground in Memphis, TN-MS-AR recently?
Over the last 365, the Memphis, TN-MS-AR metro recorded 18 store closures and 20 WARN notices, with 2,914 jobs affected — noting that affected_employees is nullable, so notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, making this a floor. CRE-likely bankruptcies in the states this metro's collateral sits in came to 0, though that figure is a STATE PROXY — bankruptcy filings carry the filer's state, not the property's location, so it counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in and is not a metro-native count.
The figures behind this answer
- Store closures
- 18
- WARN layoff notices
- 20
- Jobs on those notices
- 2,914
- CRE-related bankruptcies
- 0
- Window, in days
- 365
STATE PROXY — bankruptcy filings carry the filer's state, not the property's location, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count.
affected_employees is nullable — notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, so this is a floor.
Closures are matched ZIP -> CBSA and only APPROVED rows count (a pending, machine-extracted row is not yet a closure). This mirrors the Metro Pulse page, not the convergence board — the board applies neither filter and counts higher. Layoffs take the same ZIP -> CBSA and review treatment, and a WARN notice counts if it affects >= 10 people or does not state a headcount (a NULL is not 'fewer than 10').
Written from the figures above · CBSA 32820 · geo_events · last changed 13 Sep 2026
· Ask your own question →
What this page can’t do
Everything above is a snapshot — one market, as it stands today, and
it’s yours to read. What a snapshot can’t tell you is when it moves: which loan slipped a DSCR band
this month, which bank’s early-warning rank crossed into the top quartile, which submarket started turning
while the headline number still looked fine. Distress doesn’t announce itself on the day you happen to check.
This page
One metro · one moment · you come looking.
Verstavo
Every metro · every month · it comes looking for you.
CMBS covers the securitized slice of CRE; bank, closure and layoff signals widen the view.
“No data” in a zone means we don’t observe it here, not that there is no stress.
Employment is BLS (QCEW annual, LAUS monthly) — public data, and the demand leg under all of it.
See the whole picture, not just the pulse.
Metro Pulse is the free, public read. The Verstavo platform goes loan‑by‑loan — stress
scores, maturity walls, special‑servicing transfers, bank CRE, and your own portfolio benchmarked
against the market.