Commercial Real Estate Credit —
Kansas City, MO-KS
The state of disclosed CRE credit in this market · KS, MO
The read
$1.3B of CMBS across 67 loans. Distress is rising in the filed record — 1.5% as of 2026-07. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2029 ($330M). Office is the largest book ($576M, 0.0% distressed). 41 on-the-ground distress events in the past year (1,188 jobs).
Overview
CMBS
Submarkets
Local Banks
Jobs & Demand
On The Ground
Loading map…
The CMBS properties our stress model flags here, plus recent store closures and layoffs. Stressed is a wider net than distressed — the distressed figure above counts only loans already in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, while these dots also include performing loans facing maturity or coverage pressure. Property dots sit at the center of their ZIP code, not the building — they show where stress concentrates, not which asset. Closures and layoffs are pinned to address where we have it. Open any dot to the building and the loan behind it →
Kansas City's Book Holds, but the Filed Record Is Turning
Kansas City carries $1.3 billion of CMBS across 67 loans, and by the servicer's own ledger the metro is quiet: the distress rate stands at 1.5% as of July 2026. That is a low number by national standards, but it is rising in the filed record — the direction, not just the level, is what warrants a second look. Underwriting cushion remains, with a median debt-service coverage ratio of 1.54.
The sector story here runs against the national grain. Office is the largest book at $576 million, and none of it is distressed — a 0.0% rate against an 11.3% national office mark. Retail ($0.3 billion) and multifamily ($0.2 billion) likewise show no filed distress, versus national rates of 2.7% and 7.6% respectively. The nearest test of that calm sits in the maturity schedule: the heaviest load lands in 2029 at $330 million, with $0.3 billion more due in 2030.
Below the securitized surface, the on-the-ground record is busier. The metro logged 41 distress events over the past year — 28 store closures and 13 layoff notices — touching 1,188 jobs. That sits against a labor backdrop that has firmed, with unemployment at 3.8% in July 2026, down half a point year over year. The gap between a clean CMBS book and a filed record that is turning is the tension worth watching in Kansas City.
CMBS Distressed UPB
$20M / 1.5%
in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent
CMBS Maturing ≤ 24mo
$327M
Local Banks (stressed)
1 / 39
Bank Early-Warning
5 flagged
Store Closures (1y)
28
Layoff Notices (1y)
13 / 1,188 jobs
0.13% of metro employment
CMBS Loans / UPB
67 / $1.3B
Unemployment · Jul 2026
3.8%
-0.5pp yr
How much CRE distress is there in Kansas City, MO-KS right now?
Distress in Kansas City, MO-KS is showing up as a mixed picture across the six pairwise comparisons: 4 of 6 pairs disagree, while 1 pair is elevated on both sides and 1 is quiet on both sides. Store closures are elevated at 20 closures (rank 26th of 392 by count, 156th by rate at 2.13 closures per 100,000 jobs), and WARN layoff notices are also elevated at 13 notices (0.1% of employment). However, bank CRE over the noncurrent line is not elevated at $327.7 million (1.08% rate), and securitized loans in special servicing is also quiet at 2 rows (1.52%). The store-closures leg and WARN leg agree on hot, reflecting distress among smaller operators, but both disagree with the bank and CMBS legs – meaning tenants and employers are cutting back before any lender balance sheet reflects it. Only 1 pair (store closures vs. WARN) is elevated on both sides; 1 pair (bank vs. CMBS) is quiet on both; and the remaining 4 pairs are disagreements where the real-estate leg reads low while the operating legs read high. The overall signal points to stress at the tenant and employment level that has not yet transmitted to lender books, likely reflecting retail and small-business failures that the securitized tape and bank allocations have yet to capture.
The figures behind this answer
| Signal | Level | Rate | Rank by count | Rank by rate | Reading |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| store closures store closures per 100,000 jobs |
20 closures | 2.13 per 100k jobs | 26 of 392 | 156 of 392 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| layoff notices (WARN) workers on layoff notices as a share of the metro's employment |
13 notices | 0.1% | 48 of 386 | 168 of 386 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line share of the CRE lent into this metro that sits at a lender over the blended-noncurrent line |
$327.7mm | 1.08% | 86 of 393 | 288 of 393 | quiet
allocated 2026-03-31
|
| securitized loans in special servicing share of the securitized balance read here that is in special servicing |
2 loan records | 1.52% | 66 of 335 | 96 of 335 | quiet 2026-07-29
|
6 pairs compared
1 both elevated
1 both quiet
4 disagreeing
0 unreadable — a side is blind
2 of four legs elevated
one metro, four independent feeds, each on its own denominator
{'coverage': "114 of 441 metros have at least one blind leg and 48 are blind on all four. Those 48 are the same metros the board's map cannot place and the metro resolver cannot name: one ZIP-to-CBSA crosswalk boundary, showing up three ways.", 'a_count_ranks_by_size': 'Elevation is computed on the COUNT, over a flat threshold, which is a size filter. New York is 2nd of 392 by store closures and 264th of the same 392 by closures per job — both true, and which one you lead with decides what the reader believes. Every leg carries both ranks over ONE population; quote the rate beside the count.', 'disagreement_is_not_severity': 'Where two legs disagree, that is usually a fact about WHICH mechanism is running, not an error in either feed and not a worse metro. The six pairs read different populations, and each note is a STRUCTURAL prior about those populations — nothing here measures a lead or a lag between two legs, so never report one as timing.', 'a_blind_leg_is_not_a_quiet_one': "A leg with no denominator, or whose numerator cannot be measured, reads LOW and means nothing. Each leg publishes a measurement state (allocated, floor, measured, no denominator, no rate, not measurable) for that reason. Never report a blind leg as 'no distress'."}
{'leg': 'closures', 'unit': 'jobs', 'as_of': 'trailing 365 days to today', 'value': 938598, 'measures': 'store closures', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'window', 'what_it_is': "all metro jobs, QCEW annual average — a SIZE normaliser, not a matched population: the feed spans retail, food service and pharmacy and no single QCEW sector covers it. The MATCHED read sits beside it as this leg's second reading"}
{'leg': 'warn', 'unit': 'employed', 'as_of': 'trailing 365 days to today', 'value': 1183945, 'measures': 'layoff notices (WARN)', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'window', 'what_it_is': 'employed persons, BLS LAUS, not seasonally adjusted'}
{'leg': 'bank', 'unit': '$mm', 'as_of': '2026-03-31', 'value': 30240.8, 'measures': 'bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'stamp', 'what_it_is': 'bank CRE allocated to this metro by branch deposits'}
{'leg': 'cmbs', 'unit': '$mm', 'as_of': '2026-07-29', 'value': 1312.0, 'measures': 'securitized loans in special servicing', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'stamp', 'what_it_is': "current balance on the non-pari-passu rows of this tape — the trust's slice, not the whole loan, on both sides of the ratio"}
Written from the figures above · CBSA 28140 · stress_metro · last changed 28 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Which distress signals are elevated in Kansas City, MO-KS, and which cannot be read?
In Kansas City, MO-KS, the elevated distress signals are real-economy, not CRE-credit: closures and WARN notices are elevated, with 20 store closures and 13 WARN notices over one year. However, CRE-credit distress is minimal — bank CRE at risk at the 90th percentile is 7.7%, CMBS special servicing is 1.5% of metro UPB ($20.0mm), and distressed lender CRE is $327.7mm. The reading for any additional distress signals (e.g., convergence or phase details) is unavailable, as the provided figures do not include those metrics.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS in special servicing
- $20.0mm
- … as a share of this metro's CMBS balance
- 1.5%
- Bank CRE lent into this metro
- $30.24bn
- … at risk at the 90th percentile
- 7.7%
- CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line
- $327.7mm
- Assets at those lenders
- $1.10bn
- … share needing no branch-deposit allocation
- 17.9%
- Signals reading elevated
- store closures, WARN layoff notices
- Legs agreeing
- 2
- Phase
- early
- CMBS loans in special servicing
- 2
- Distressed banks
- 1
- Store closures (past year)
- 20
- WARN notices (past year)
- 13
the ground is deteriorating but CRE credit has not yet been hit — the leading edge
little to no distressed CRE dollars behind the signals
the ground is wobbling (closures / layoffs) but little CRE-credit distress sits behind it yet — a real-economy signal, not (yet) a CRE-credit event
Written from the figures above · CBSA 28140 · geo_metro_signals · last changed 27 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Jobs & Demand — the labor market under the collateralWatch it change →
Every other zone on this page reads the credit — what the loan is doing.
This one reads the demand underneath it. Office jobs pay office rent;
office rent services the office loan. When the jobs go, the DSCR follows — but not for another year or two.
That lag is the whole point of looking here.
Unemployment · Jul 2026
3.8%
-0.5pp yr
Last 24 months
3.2%4.3%
Monthly metro unemployment (BLS LAUS) — the freshest labor signal there is,
about six weeks behind. Read the direction, not the level: a 4% metro that is rising and a 6% metro that is
falling are not telling you the same thing.
Jobs by CRE-relevant sector · 2024
Annual employment by sector (BLS QCEW, 2024; 938,598 jobs in the metro).
QCEW lags — it is the structural read, not the current one, and we pair it with the monthly unemployment above on purpose.
Office-using sums five supersectors; where BLS withholds any one of them for
disclosure, we show nothing rather than a number we know is too low — so a missing sector here means
“suppressed at the source,” not “zero.”
Sector Heat — CMBS distress rate by property type (metro vs national)See the loans behind the bar →
This metro's CMBS runs 1.5% distressed where its own property mix predicts 7.5% — $80M less than this book would carry at the rate each property type runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted and excluding this metro. The gap is measured; the cause is not. 0 of 3 property types here run a higher distress rate than the national average for that type (the tick on each bar).
Elimination — does the gap survive a control?
Each row re-prices this metro's book on a finer cell — its own property types, then those types split by loan size, then by vintage — always at the rate that cell runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted. A gap that shrinks toward zero is explained by the control; one that stays has ruled it out. What is measured is what survives, not a cause.
property mix alone
-6.0pp
… and loan size held fixed
-5.6pp
the gap is still there with loan size held fixed too
… and vintage held fixed
-5.8pp
the gap is still there with vintage held fixed too
The largest single contributor is Office: 14 loans, $576M, running 0.0% where the same type runs 11.4% elsewhere — worth 4.9pp of this metro's own rate.
Maturity Wall — CMBS coming due by year, distress within eachSee what’s maturing →
$327M — 25% of the metro's balance — matures within two years; the red slice of each bar is already distressed.
Distress Trend — is this market turning?Track it quarter by quarter →
Realized distress is RISING — 1.5% now (2026-07), +1.5pp over the year.
Same definition as the cards above — distressed means in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, dollar-weighted — on a different clock. The cards are today’s tape; this is the disclosed history panel, quarter by quarter, so you can read direction rather than level. Trusts file monthly, so a quarter is usually well covered within weeks of opening and the newest one shown is normally the current one; it is withheld only when its filed book falls below 60% of recent quarters.
Share of the metro’s CMBS in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, by quarter — a firmer, backward-looking read. A loan under 1.0x DSCR that is still paying is not counted here.
Submarket Heat — where in the metro the distress sitsOpen the submarket →
The top three submarkets hold $955M of the metro's $1.3B; each bar's colored share is its distress rate.
Bank Door — what the local bank sector could absorbSee it on every loan’s exit read →
$327M of CMBS matures here within two years.
The 52 regional and local banks that gather deposits here could write roughly
$2.9B more CRE before the 300% supervisory line, so the maturing balance is
0.11× that room.
The median metro sits at 0.12×.
Regional Bank Room
$2.9B
After Committed Draws
$1.6B / −45%
Maturing ÷ Room
0.11×
Banks In Footprint
52 / 14 at the line
The room above is already part-sold. Construction lending is a promise drawn
down over two or three years, and the undrawn part is an obligation the bank cannot decline while the borrower performs
— every one of those dollars lands in the same CRE book the 300% line governs. These banks
have $1.8B of construction committed and not yet
advanced, of which $1.3B
comes out of the room above, leaving $1.6B,
with 22 banks
whose entire remaining room is spoken for.
A bank with no room contributes zero here, never a negative one — capacity does not net
across balance sheets — so $556M of what has
been promised is not deducted at all, because there is nothing left to deduct it from. On today’s
capital that is funding already contracted which would cross the line as it draws.
SR 06-26 draws a second line at 100% of capital for construction and land:
8 of 52
are past it on drawn balances alone, and
19 more cross it
once their own commitments fund.
Counted — 52 regional & local CRE lenders
| Bank | Deposit share | CRE / Capital* | Room contributed | Noncurrent CRE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| North American Savings Bank, F.s.b. MO | 87.7% | 117% total 117%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Capitol Federal Savings Bank KS | 44.9% | 204% total 223%
|
🔒 | 2.03% |
| Nbkc Bank KS | 100.0% | 149% total 164%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Academy Bank, National Association MO | 53.0% | 228% total 294%
|
🔒 | 1.11% |
| Bank Of Odessa MO | 90.5% | 107% total 126%
|
🔒 | 2.28% |
| Mutual Savings Association KS | 82.1% | 102% total 117%
|
🔒 | 2.65% |
| Bank Of Labor KS | 100.0% | 131% total 243%
|
🔒 | 4.98% |
| Arvest Bank AR | 3.9% | 213% total 265%
|
🔒 | 0.47% |
| Landmark National Bank KS | 28.2% | 126% total 249%
|
🔒 | 0.58% |
| Intrust Bank, National Association KS | 7.7% | 189% total 251%
|
🔒 | 0.54% |
| Equity Bank KS | 10.6% | 237% total 305%
|
🔒 | 0.48% |
| First Option Bank KS | 85.2% | 215% total 258%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| The First National Bank Of Louisburg KS | 100.0% | 123% total 143%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Community National Bank KS | 21.9% | 113% total 193%
|
🔒 | 1.43% |
| Union Bank And Trust Company NE | 4.5% | 235% total 321%
|
🔒 | 0.38% |
| Fusion Bank KS | 50.4% | 143% total 150%
|
🔒 | 1.16% |
| Hawthorn Bank MO | 26.7% | 260% total 340%
|
🔒 | 0.19% |
| Wood & Huston Bank MO | 7.4% | 105% total 250%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| State Bank Of Missouri MO | 100.0% | 148% total 167%
|
🔒 | 0.39% |
| The Nodaway Valley Bank MO | 8.1% | 190% total 246%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Citizens Bank MO | 68.2% | 154% total 285%
|
🔒 | 0.12% |
| F & C Bank MO | 22.9% | 173% total 221%
|
🔒 | 0.77% |
| Verimore Bank MO | 49.7% | 260% total 309%
|
🔒 | 0.50% |
| Concordia Bank Of Concordia, Missouri MO | 79.4% | 184% total 253%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Mid-America Bank KS | 21.5% | 205% total 228%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| The First Security Bank KS | 35.1% | 157% total 235%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Sterling Bank MO | 3.6% | 195% total 227%
|
🔒 | 0.83% |
| Patriots Bank KS | 29.3% | 205% total 514%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Outdoor Bank KS | 28.9% | 266% total 363%
|
🔒 | 0.70% |
| First Heritage Bank KS | 10.1% | 136% total 205%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Southern Bank MO | 6.3% | 288% total 367%
|
🔒 | 0.49% |
| Pinnacle Bank NE | 2.2% | 282% total 346%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Corefirst Bank & Trust KS | 6.6% | 274% total 401%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Central National Bank KS | 0.9% | 154% total 250%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Farmers State Bank MO | 1.4% | 120% total 166%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Silver Lake Bank KS | 1.3% | 187% total 289%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Bank Of Weston MO | 100.0% | 298% total 425%
|
🔒 | 0.13% |
| Omb Bank MO | 1.3% | 298% total 404%
|
🔒 | 1.10% |
| Security Bank Of Kansas City KS | 100.0% | 310% total 351%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Blue Ridge Bank And Trust Co. MO | 100.0% | 316% total 435%
|
🔒 | 0.10% |
| Bison State Bank KS | 88.7% | 391% total 398%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Tricentury Bank KS | 82.4% | 352% total 460%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| First State Bank And Trust KS | 76.3% | 321% total 376%
|
🔒 | 0.54% |
| Kendall Bank KS | 72.6% | 304% total 564%
|
🔒 | 1.69% |
| Connections Bank MO | 52.8% | 320% total 431%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Bank 21 MO | 37.8% | 335% total 376%
|
🔒 | 0.06% |
| Great American Bank KS | 36.5% | 308% total 377%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Oakstar Bank MO | 11.8% | 315% total 471%
|
🔒 | 0.16% |
| First Business Bank WI | 3.7% | 340% total 423%
|
🔒 | 0.76% |
| Core Bank NE | 3.3% | 375% total 446%
|
🔒 | 0.02% |
| Fidelity Bank, National Association KS | 2.2% | 323% total 412%
|
🔒 | 0.62% |
| Emprise Bank KS | 0.9% | 380% total 462%
|
🔒 | 0.04% |
Not counted — 50 banks with deposits here
These hold deposits in this metro but are left out of the capacity above, because for them deposit location stops indicating where they lend — or they do not lend CRE at all. Real money that could refinance here is deliberately not counted.
no CRE book — CRE under 100% of capital — not a CRE lender
Commerce Bank MO · U.s. Bank National Association OH · Bank Of America, National Association NC · Bmo Bank National Association IL · First Federal Bank Of Kansas City MO · Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Association OH · Wells Fargo Bank, National Association SD · Citizens Federal Savings Bank KS · Community Bank Of Raymore MO · Pnc Bank, National Association DE · Farmers Bank & Trust KS · Exchange Bank & Trust KS · The Bank Of Grain Valley MO · Adrian Bank MO · Goppert Financial Bank MO · First-Citizens Bank & Trust Company NC · Community First Bank MO · First Federal Savings And Loan Bank KS · Community Bank Of Pleasant Hill MO · The Hamilton Bank MO · Bank Northwest MO · Labette Bank KS · The Union State Bank Of Everest KS · Preferred Bank MO · The Citizens National Bank KS · Community Bank Of Marshall MO · Independent Farmers Bank MO · First State Bank Of St. Charles, Missouri MO · Btc Bank MO · State Street Bank And Trust Company MA · Midwest Heritage Bank, Fsb IA
national — operates in more than 5 states, so deposits stop indicating where it lends
Umb Bank, National Association MO · Bokf, National Association OK · First National Bank Of Omaha NE · Busey Bank IL · Nbh Bank CO · The Central Trust Bank MO · Armed Forces Bank, National Association KS · Enterprise Bank & Trust MO · Sunflower Bank, National Association TX · Liberty Bank And Trust Company LA · First Interstate Bank MT · Great Southern Bank MO · Simmons Bank AR
booked here — books nearly all deposits to one branch — a charter address, not a footprint
Lead Bank MO · Pony Express Bank MO · Central Bank Of Kansas City MO · Tbo Bank MO · Bank Of Prairie Village KS · Cornerstone Bank KS
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
How to read this. It is not whether any particular loan can refinance — a borrower also reaches
national banks, life companies, agencies and debt funds. It is how much of this metro’s maturing volume the local
bank sector could absorb if it were the only door.
Banks are placed by deposit share (FDIC Summary of Deposits, June 2025) — a proxy for
where they lend, not a measurement; call reports carry no collateral geography. Room = 3× total risk-based capital less CRE held
(SR 06-26, the capital base the rule names — not book equity), from Q2 2026 call reports, apportioned by that share.
Committed construction comes from FFIEC Schedule RC-L as filed at 2026-06-30 —
the undrawn half of loans already written, which the balance sheet above does not show.
Banks in more than 5 states, single-branch bookers and banks that do not lend CRE are excluded —
313 banks holding $268.2B of national capacity not counted here.
Local Lenders — banks headquartered here, worst CRE noncurrent firstUnlock each bank’s early-warning flag →
| Bank | Total CRE | CRE / Capital* | Noncurrent CRE | Early Warning |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bank Of Labor | $225M | 131% total 243%
|
4.98% | 🔒 |
| Bank Of Odessa | $121M | 107% total 126%
|
2.28% | 🔒 |
| Kendall Bank | $115M | 304% total 564%
|
1.69% | 🔒 |
| First State Bank And Trust | $185M | 321% total 376%
|
0.54% | 🔒 |
| Bank Of Weston | $100M | 298% total 425%
|
0.13% | 🔒 |
| Mutual Savings Association | $116M | 102% total 117%
|
2.65% | 🔒 |
| Lead Bank | $318M | 136% total 150%
|
2.49% | 🔒 |
| Academy Bank, National Association | $1.5B | 228% total 294%
|
1.11% | 🔒 |
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
Banks are matched to their HQ metro (a proxy for footprint). Noncurrent CRE = CRE-balance-weighted blend of multifamily / nonresidential / construction noncurrent (distress already arrived). Early Warning is a validated leading signal — the bank’s 30-89 early-delinquency rank among all CRE lenders this quarter, which has predicted ~2.3× forward CRE distress. Per-bank flags are on a plan.
Do the banks lending in Kansas City, MO-KS have the capacity to refinance its maturing CRE?
Kansas City's banks appear to have ample capacity to absorb its visible maturity load: the metro's wall_to_room is 0.20 against $327.1mm of maturing_bal across 10 maturing_loans, with room_before_committed of $2.89bn and room_after_committed of $1.60bn after $1.85bn in committed_draws, though that ratio sits LEVEL WITH the median and reflects room from only the 52 banks_qualifying here while 19 banks_excluded_here go unmeasured, and the $1.33bn cmbs_upb wall is not the metro's whole maturity load, so this is an upper bound on local-bank absorption rather than a clean bill of health.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS maturing in the window
- $327.1mm
- … across this many loans
- 10
- Local bank room, before committed draws
- $2.89bn
- Committed construction draws
- $1.85bn
- Local bank room, after those draws
- $1.60bn
- Wall-to-room ratio
- 0.20
- Rank, most strained
- 136
- … out of this many metros ranked
- 270
- … before committed draws
- 0.11
- Population ranked against
- CMBS maturing within 24 months against regional/community bank room in this metro
- Qualifying local banks
- 52
- … excluded from the calculation
- 19
- Distressed share of this metro's CMBS
- 1.5%
- Total CMBS balance here
- $1.33bn
- Capacity band
- slack
Compared against a median wall-to-room ratio of
0.20 across the ranked metros.
0.20 is LEVEL WITH the median of 0.20, so this metro is as strained as the typical ranked metro
136 of 270, counting from the MOST strained — a LOWER rank number means MORE strain
{'room_is_a_proxy': 'Room is what regional and community banks could still write before the SR 06-26 concentration line, after deducting construction draws already committed. Deposit footprint is a proxy for lending footprint, not a measurement of it.', 'ratio_is_not_size': 'The most extreme ratios belong to the smallest metros. Read maturing_bal_mm beside the ratio — the map sizes bubbles by the wall, not the strain, for exactly this reason.', 'wall_is_cmbs_only': "The wall is the CMBS balance maturing within 24 months — the maturing debt this platform can see, not the metro's whole maturity load. Every ratio is an upper bound on how much of it local banks would have to absorb.", 'exclusion_artifact': 'A high ratio is as often an exclusion artifact as a credit event. Banks whose deposits do not indicate where they lend (nationals, card and charter banks) are excluded from the room, so a metro served mainly by those reads strained while its credit is simply invisible here. Check banks_qualifying against banks_excluded_here, and explained_by_exclusion.'}
Written from the figures above · CBSA 28140 · capacity_metro · last changed 13 Sep 2026
· Ask your own question →
On The Ground — recent closures, layoffs & CRE bankruptciesTie these events to loans →
41 local distress events in the past year (1,188 jobs) — store closures, layoffs, and commercial real estate bankruptcies near this metro's collateral.
2026-08-21
LAYOFF
Kearney
2026-08-20
LAYOFF
61 jobs · Kearney
2026-08-18
CLOSURE
Kansas City
2026-08-10
CLOSURE
Kansas City
2026-08-10
LAYOFF
Overland Park
2026-08-02
CLOSURE
Kansas City
2026-07-31
CLOSURE
Belton
2026-07-31
CLOSURE
Belton
2026-07-26
CLOSURE
Overland Park
2026-07-10
CLOSURE
Kansas City
2026-07-07
LAYOFF
Kansas City
2026-06-30
CLOSURE
Kansas City
2026-06-03
BANKRUPTCY
CRE-linked bankruptcy
2026-05-02
CLOSURE
Kansas City
2026-04-04
CLOSURE
Olathe
What has actually happened on the ground in Kansas City, MO-KS recently?
Over the trailing 365 days, the on-the-ground picture for Kansas City, MO-KS shows 28 store closures, 13 WARN notices affecting 1,188 jobs — and this jobs figure is a floor, since affected_employees is nullable and notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs — alongside 1 CRE-likely bankruptcy, though that 1 is a STATE PROXY — bankruptcy filings carry the filer's state, not the property's location, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count.
The figures behind this answer
- Store closures
- 28
- WARN layoff notices
- 13
- Jobs on those notices
- 1,188
- CRE-related bankruptcies
- 1
- Window, in days
- 365
STATE PROXY — bankruptcy filings carry the filer's state, not the property's location, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count.
affected_employees is nullable — notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, so this is a floor.
Closures are matched ZIP -> CBSA and only APPROVED rows count (a pending, machine-extracted row is not yet a closure). This mirrors the Metro Pulse page, not the convergence board — the board applies neither filter and counts higher. Layoffs take the same ZIP -> CBSA and review treatment, and a WARN notice counts if it affects >= 10 people or does not state a headcount (a NULL is not 'fewer than 10').
Written from the figures above · CBSA 28140 · geo_events · last changed 13 Sep 2026
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Everything above is a snapshot — one market, as it stands today, and
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this month, which bank’s early-warning rank crossed into the top quartile, which submarket started turning
while the headline number still looked fine. Distress doesn’t announce itself on the day you happen to check.
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CMBS covers the securitized slice of CRE; bank, closure and layoff signals widen the view.
“No data” in a zone means we don’t observe it here, not that there is no stress.
Employment is BLS (QCEW annual, LAUS monthly) — public data, and the demand leg under all of it.
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