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Commercial Real Estate Credit —
Greensboro-High Point, NC
The state of disclosed CRE credit in this market · NC
The read
$429M of CMBS across 30 loans. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2030 ($133M, 31% of the book). 5 on-the-ground distress events in the past year.
Overview
CMBS
Submarkets
Local Banks
Jobs & Demand
On The Ground
Loading map…
The CMBS properties our stress model flags here, plus recent store closures and layoffs. Stressed is a wider net than distressed — the distressed figure above counts only loans already in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, while these dots also include performing loans facing maturity or coverage pressure. Property dots sit at the center of their ZIP code, not the building — they show where stress concentrates, not which asset. Closures and layoffs are pinned to address where we have it. Open any dot to the building and the loan behind it →
A Thin Book Loaded Toward 2030, and the Delinquency Column Stays Clean
Greensboro-High Point carries a modest CMBS footprint: $429M spread across 30 loans, a book small enough that single credits move the needle. The securitized ledger shows no declared distress — no loan here sits in special servicing or 60-plus days delinquent — a cleaner read than many metros its size can claim.
The weight of the book sits further out. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2030, at $133M, or 31% of the metro's outstanding balance, with only about $0.1bn of paper coming due inside the next 24 months. The 2028, 2029 and 2030 vintages each carry roughly $0.1bn, and where the servicer has marked those years, the distress rate reads at zero.
The friction, such as it is, shows up on the ground rather than in the trust reports: five store closures over the past year, against no filed layoff notices. The labor backdrop is steady — unemployment at 4.0% as of August 2026, down half a point year over year, with office-using employment of 61,313 essentially flat. For now, the distress column on the securitized side stays empty.
Written 2026-10-12
CMBS Distressed UPB
Not reported
fewer than 3 loans are distressed here, too few for the share to be a rate — the book size and loan count above are unaffected
CMBS Maturing ≤ 24mo
$86M
Banks HQ’d Here (stressed)
0 / 2
Bank Early-Warning
0 flagged
Store Closures (1y)
5
Layoff Notices (1y)
0 / 0 jobs
CMBS Loans / UPB
30 / $429M
Unemployment · Aug 2026
4.0%
-0.5pp yr
Office-Using Jobs · 2024
61,313
+0.1% yr
How much CRE distress is there in Greensboro-High Point, NC right now?
In Greensboro-High Point, NC, one leg registers as elevated out of four, with 5 closures at 1.59 per 100k jobs (a count that clears the flat threshold while sitting below the median of its own rate ranking, so it reflects metro size more than per-capita stress), 0 notices at 0%, $194.4mm of bank CRE over the noncurrent line at 3.83%, and 1 loan records in special servicing at 6.76%. Of the pairs compared, 0 are pairs with both legs elevated, 3 are pairs with both legs quiet, 3 are pairs where the legs disagree, and 0 are pairs that cannot be read because a leg is blind; note that the bank leg is allocated by branch deposits rather than confirmed at the building, so its placement carries that caveat.
The figures behind this answer
| Signal | Level | Rate | Rank by count | Rank by rate | Reading |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| store closures store closures per 100,000 jobs |
5 closures | 1.59 per 100k jobs | 92 of 392 | 246 of 392 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| layoff notices (WARN) workers on layoff notices as a share of the metro's employment |
0 notices | 0% | 314 of 382 | 308 of 382 | quiet trailing 365 days to today
|
| bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line share of the CRE lent into this metro that sits at a lender over the blended-noncurrent line |
$194.4mm | 3.83% | 116 of 393 | 171 of 393 | quiet
allocated 2026-06-30
|
| securitized loans in special servicing share of the securitized balance read here that is in special servicing |
1 loan records | 6.76% | 90 of 335 | 63 of 335 | quiet 2026-09-29
|
6 pairs compared
0 both elevated
3 both quiet
3 disagreeing
0 unreadable — a side is blind
1 of four legs elevated
one metro, four independent feeds, each on its own denominator
124 of 447 metros have at least one blind leg and 54 are blind on all four. Those 54 are the same metros the board's map cannot place and the metro resolver cannot name: one ZIP-to-CBSA crosswalk boundary, showing up three ways.
Elevation is computed on the COUNT, over a flat threshold, which is a size filter. New York is 2nd of 392 by store closures and 264th of the same 392 by closures per job — both true, and which one you lead with decides what the reader believes.
Where two legs disagree, that is usually a fact about WHICH mechanism is running, not an error in either feed and not a worse metro.
A leg with no denominator, or whose numerator cannot be measured, reads LOW and means nothing. Each leg publishes a measurement state (allocated, floor, measured, no denominator, no rate, not measurable) for that reason.
elevated by size, not by rate — store closures clear a flat count threshold while sitting below the median of their own rate ranking. Any reading that leans on them is a statement about how big this metro is.
Store closures: divided by 315,438 jobs
— all metro jobs, QCEW annual average — a SIZE normaliser, not a matched population: the feed spans retail, food service and pharmacy and no single QCEW sector covers it. The MATCHED read sits beside it as this leg's second reading (trailing 365 days to today).
Layoff notices (WARN): divided by 354,307 employed
— employed persons, BLS LAUS, not seasonally adjusted (trailing 365 days to today).
Bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line: divided by $5,079.0 mm
— bank CRE allocated to this metro by branch deposits (2026-06-30).
Securitized loans in special servicing: divided by $429.0 mm
— current balance on the non-pari-passu rows of this tape — the trust's slice, not the whole loan, on both sides of the ratio (2026-09-29).
Written from the figures above · CBSA 24660 · stress_metro · last changed 01 Nov 2026
· Ask your own question →
Jobs & Demand — the labor market under the collateralWatch it change →
Every other zone on this page reads the credit — what the loan is doing.
This one reads the demand underneath it. Office jobs pay office rent;
office rent services the office loan. When the jobs go, the DSCR follows — but not for another year or two.
That lag is the whole point of looking here.
Unemployment · Aug 2026
4.0%
-0.5pp yr
Last 24 months
3.5%4.6%
Monthly metro unemployment (BLS LAUS) — the freshest labor signal there is,
about six weeks behind. Read the direction, not the level: a 4% metro that is rising and a 6% metro that is
falling are not telling you the same thing.
Jobs by CRE-relevant sector · 2024
Annual employment by sector (BLS QCEW, 2024; 315,438 jobs in the metro).
QCEW lags — it is the structural read, not the current one, and we pair it with the monthly unemployment above on purpose.
Office-using sums five supersectors; where BLS withholds any one of them for
disclosure, we show nothing rather than a number we know is too low — so a missing sector here means
“suppressed at the source,” not “zero.”
Sector Heat — CMBS distress rate by property type (metro vs national)See the loans behind the bar →
Fewer than 3 loans here are distressed, too few for a distress rate to mean anything — so there is no rate to test against this metro's property mix.
No CMBS sector data for this metro.
Maturity Wall — CMBS coming due by year, distress within eachSee what’s maturing →
$86M — 20% of the metro's balance — matures within two years; the red slice of each bar is already distressed.
Distress Trend — is this market turning?Track it quarter by quarter →
Too few loans here are distressed for a quarterly rate to be a rate, so no direction is stated. The quarters that can be read are shown below.
Same definition as the cards above — distressed means in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, dollar-weighted — on a different clock. The cards are today’s tape; this is the disclosed history panel, quarter by quarter, so you can read direction rather than level. Trusts file monthly, so a quarter is usually well covered within weeks of opening and the newest one shown is normally the current one; it is withheld only when its filed book falls below 60% of recent quarters.
Share of the metro’s CMBS in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, by quarter — a firmer, backward-looking read. A loan under 1.0x DSCR that is still paying is not counted here.
Submarket Heat — where in the metro the distress sitsOpen the submarket →
The top three submarkets hold $311M of the metro's $429M; each bar's colored share is its distress rate.
Bank Door — what the local bank sector could absorbSee it on every loan’s exit read →
$86M of CMBS matures here within two years.
The 12 regional and local banks that gather deposits here could write roughly
$228M more CRE before the 300% supervisory line, so the maturing balance is
0.38× that room.
The median metro sits at 0.13×.
Regional Bank Room
$228M
After Committed Draws
$76M / −67%
Maturing ÷ Room
0.38×
Banks In Footprint
12 / 2 at the line
The room above is already part-sold. Construction lending is a promise drawn
down over two or three years, and the undrawn part is an obligation the bank cannot decline while the borrower performs
— every one of those dollars lands in the same CRE book the 300% line governs. These banks
have $330M of construction committed and not yet
advanced, of which $152M
comes out of the room above, leaving $76M,
with 6 banks
whose entire remaining room is spoken for.
A bank with no room contributes zero here, never a negative one — capacity does not net
across balance sheets — so $178M of what has
been promised is not deducted at all, because there is nothing left to deduct it from. On today’s
capital that is funding already contracted which would cross the line as it draws.
SR 07-1 draws a second line at 100% of capital for construction and land:
8 more cross it
once their own commitments fund.
Counted — 12 regional & local CRE lenders
| Bank | Deposit share | CRE / Capital* | Room contributed | Noncurrent CRE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| The Fidelity Bank NC | 11.0% | 206% total 373%
|
🔒 | 0.47% |
| Bank Of Oak Ridge NC | 100.0% | 241% total 428%
|
🔒 | 0.70% |
| First Bank NC | 9.4% | 280% total 366%
|
🔒 | 0.40% |
| Hometrust Bank NC | 6.7% | 235% total 324%
|
🔒 | 0.68% |
| Triad Business Bank NC | 90.3% | 259% total 434%
|
🔒 | 0.58% |
| Townebank VA | 1.2% | 249% total 345%
|
🔒 | 0.19% |
| Southern First Bank SC | 3.7% | 236% total 397%
|
🔒 | 0.23% |
| Atlantic Union Bank VA | 0.5% | 264% total 363%
|
🔒 | 0.42% |
| Movement Bank VA | 25.4% | 203% total 353%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Blue Ridge Bank, National Association VA | 1.0% | 255% total 315%
|
🔒 | 0.14% |
| Carter Bank & Trust VA | 9.1% | 395% total 423%
|
🔒 | 0.84% |
| First Carolina Bank NC | 2.5% | 448% total 515%
|
🔒 | 1.07% |
Not counted — 14 banks with deposits here
These hold deposits in this metro but are left out of the capacity above, because for them deposit location stops indicating where they lend — or they do not lend CRE at all. Real money that could refinance here is deliberately not counted.
no CRE book — CRE under 100% of capital — not a CRE lender
Truist Bank NC · Wells Fargo Bank, National Association SD · Bank Of America, National Association NC · First-Citizens Bank & Trust Company NC · Pnc Bank, National Association DE · Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Association OH · Piedmont Federal Savings Bank NC · Mechanics & Farmers Bank NC · The Huntington National Bank OH
national — operates in more than 5 states, so deposits stop indicating where it lends
Pinnacle Bank TN · First National Bank Of Pennsylvania PA · First Horizon Bank TN · Bank Ozk AR · Woodforest National Bank TX
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 07-1 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
How to read this. It is not whether any particular loan can refinance — a borrower also reaches
national banks, life companies, agencies and debt funds. It is how much of this metro’s maturing volume the local
bank sector could absorb if it were the only door.
Banks are placed by deposit share (FDIC Summary of Deposits, June 2026) — a proxy for
where they lend, not a measurement; call reports carry no collateral geography. Room = 3× total risk-based capital less CRE held
(SR 07-1, the capital base the rule names — not book equity), from Q2 2026 call reports, apportioned by that share.
Committed construction comes from FFIEC Schedule RC-L as filed at 2026-06-30 —
the undrawn half of loans already written, which the balance sheet above does not show.
Banks in more than 5 states, single-branch bookers and banks that do not lend CRE are excluded —
315 banks holding $263.8B of national capacity not counted here.
Local Lenders — banks headquartered here, worst CRE noncurrent firstUnlock each bank’s early-warning flag →
| Bank | Total CRE | CRE / Capital* | Noncurrent CRE | Early Warning |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bank Of Oak Ridge | $352M | 241% total 428%
|
0.70% | 🔒 |
| Triad Business Bank | $274M | 259% total 434%
|
0.58% | 🔒 |
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 07-1 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
Banks are matched to their HQ metro (a proxy for footprint). Noncurrent CRE = CRE-balance-weighted blend of multifamily / nonresidential / construction noncurrent (distress already arrived). Early Warning is a validated leading signal — the bank’s 30-89 early-delinquency rank among all CRE lenders this quarter, which has predicted ~2.3× forward CRE distress. Per-bank flags are on a plan.
On The Ground — recent closures, layoffs & CRE bankruptciesTie these events to loans →
5 local distress events in the past year — store closures, layoffs, and commercial real estate bankruptcies near this metro's collateral.
2026-09-22
CLOSURE
Greensboro
2026-09-21
BANKRUPTCY
CRE-linked bankruptcy
2026-08-28
CLOSURE
Asheboro
2026-08-03
CLOSURE
Greensboro
2026-07-23
CLOSURE
Asheboro
2026-07-16
BANKRUPTCY
CRE-linked bankruptcy
2026-05-31
CLOSURE
High Point
2026-05-29
BANKRUPTCY
CRE-linked bankruptcy
2025-09-25
CLOSURE
Greensboro
2025-09-07
CLOSURE
Asheboro
2025-06-30
CLOSURE
Greensboro
2025-05-21
CLOSURE
Greensboro
2024-12-05
CLOSURE
High Point
What has actually happened on the ground in Greensboro-High Point, NC recently?
Over the trailing 365 days in Greensboro-High Point, NC, the on-the-ground record shows 5 store closures and 0 WARN layoff notices, with 0 jobs on those notices. CRE-related bankruptcies registered 3, though that reading is a state proxy rather than a metro-native count, so it should not be read as activity specific to this metro.
The figures behind this answer
- Store closures
- 5
- WARN layoff notices
- 0
- Jobs on those notices
- 0
- CRE-related bankruptcies
- 3
- Window, in days
- 365
STATE PROXY — a court case counts in its filing district and an SEC 8-K in the filer's state, not where the property is, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count. Each court case is counted once even when both PACER and CourtListener carry it. A court case's state is its filing district; an SEC 8-K or news item carries the filer's state. Coverage widened to both court feeds on 2026-09-16, so counts before and after that date are not comparable.
affected_employees is nullable — notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, so this is a floor.
Closures are matched ZIP -> CBSA and only APPROVED rows count (a pending, machine-extracted row is not yet a closure). This mirrors the Metro Pulse page, not the convergence board — the board applies neither filter and counts higher. Layoffs take the same ZIP -> CBSA and review treatment, and a WARN notice counts if it affects >= 10 people or does not state a headcount (a NULL is not 'fewer than 10').
Written from the figures above · CBSA 24660 · geo_events · last changed 30 Oct 2026
· Ask your own question →
What this page can’t do
Everything above is a snapshot — one market, as it stands today, and
it’s yours to read. What a snapshot can’t tell you is when it moves: which loan slipped a DSCR band
this month, which bank’s early-warning rank crossed into the top quartile, which submarket started turning
while the headline number still looked fine. Distress doesn’t announce itself on the day you happen to check.
This page
One metro · one moment · you come looking.
Verstavo
Every metro · every month · it comes looking for you.
CMBS covers the securitized slice of CRE; bank, closure and layoff signals widen the view.
“No data” in a zone means we don’t observe it here, not that there is no stress.
Employment is BLS (QCEW annual, LAUS monthly) — public data, and the demand leg under all of it.
See the whole picture, not just the pulse.
Metro Pulse is the free, public read — one page for every market we cover. The platform goes loan‑by‑loan inside it: which buildings carry the stress, when their debt comes due, and your own portfolio benchmarked against the market you are standing in.