Commercial Real Estate Credit —
Denver-Aurora-Centennial, CO
The state of disclosed CRE credit in this market · CO
The read
$1.8B of CMBS across 96 loans. Office is both the largest book ($494M) and the most distressed (29.2% vs 11.3% national). The heaviest maturity load lands in 2029 ($411M). Distress is flat in the filed record — 18.0% as of 2026-07. 49 on-the-ground distress events in the past year (2,323 jobs).
Overview
CMBS
Submarkets
Local Banks
Jobs & Demand
On The Ground
Loading map…
The CMBS properties our stress model flags here, plus recent store closures and layoffs. Stressed is a wider net than distressed — the distressed figure above counts only loans already in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, while these dots also include performing loans facing maturity or coverage pressure. Property dots sit at the center of their ZIP code, not the building — they show where stress concentrates, not which asset. Closures and layoffs are pinned to address where we have it. Open any dot to the building and the loan behind it →
Office Carries the Book — and the Distress — as Denver's Filed Record Holds Flat
Denver-Aurora-Centennial runs $1.8 billion of CMBS across 96 loans, and the strain sits where the money is. Office is the metro's largest book at $494 million and also its most distressed, with 29.2% in special servicing or 60-plus days delinquent — more than double the 11.3% national office rate. The rest of the stack reads calmer: hospitality at 5.7% sits just inside the 6.1% national mark, and both retail and self-storage show no distress in the filed record.
The maturity wall is spread rather than immediate, with the heaviest single load — $411 million — landing in 2029. In the filed record, the overall distress rate has been flat, sitting at 18.0% as of July 2026, and the metro's median DSCR of 1.66 gives the broader book some cushion.
On the ground, the past year brought 49 distress events — 29 store closures and 20 layoff notices tied to 2,323 jobs. Among banks, none of the 12 tracked here are flagged distressed, though three carry early-warning signals.
CMBS Distressed UPB
$280M / 15.7%
in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent
CMBS Maturing ≤ 24mo
$563M
Local Banks (stressed)
0 / 12
Bank Early-Warning
3 flagged
Store Closures (1y)
29
Layoff Notices (1y)
20 / 2,323 jobs
0.17% of metro employment
CMBS Loans / UPB
96 / $1.8B
Unemployment · Jul 2026
4.1%
+0.1pp yr
How much CRE distress is there in Denver-Aurora-Centennial, CO right now?
Denver-Aurora-Centennial, CO is showing broad-based CRE distress right now: all four of the independent feeds read elevated, and all 6 pairs of legs agree hot, with 0 pairs quiet and 0 pairs disagreeing. Store closures run at 2.02 per 100,000 jobs (28 closures, 17th of 392 metros by count but 166th by rate), while WARN layoff notices run at 0.14% of employment (22 notices, 30th of 386 by count, 146th by rate). Bank CRE over the noncurrent line sits at 9.75% of the book ($2,335.3mm allocated by branch deposits, 25th of 393 by count, 68th by rate), and securitized loans in special servicing run at 18.94% of the trust slice read here (12 rows, 14th of 335 by count, 23rd by rate) — note the bank leg's allocation caveat that only 7.3% of its dollars sit at single-metro lenders, so the rest is split by branch deposits the call report can't confirm.
The figures behind this answer
| Signal | Level | Rate | Rank by count | Rank by rate | Reading |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| store closures store closures per 100,000 jobs |
28 closures | 2.02 per 100k jobs | 17 of 392 | 166 of 392 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| layoff notices (WARN) workers on layoff notices as a share of the metro's employment |
22 notices | 0.14% | 30 of 386 | 146 of 386 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line share of the CRE lent into this metro that sits at a lender over the blended-noncurrent line |
$2.34bn | 9.75% | 25 of 393 | 68 of 393 | elevated
allocated 2026-03-31
|
| securitized loans in special servicing share of the securitized balance read here that is in special servicing |
12 loan records | 18.94% | 14 of 335 | 23 of 335 | elevated 2026-07-29
|
6 pairs compared
6 both elevated
0 both quiet
0 disagreeing
0 unreadable — a side is blind
4 of four legs elevated
one metro, four independent feeds, each on its own denominator
{'coverage': "114 of 441 metros have at least one blind leg and 48 are blind on all four. Those 48 are the same metros the board's map cannot place and the metro resolver cannot name: one ZIP-to-CBSA crosswalk boundary, showing up three ways.", 'a_count_ranks_by_size': 'Elevation is computed on the COUNT, over a flat threshold, which is a size filter. New York is 2nd of 392 by store closures and 264th of the same 392 by closures per job — both true, and which one you lead with decides what the reader believes. Every leg carries both ranks over ONE population; quote the rate beside the count.', 'disagreement_is_not_severity': 'Where two legs disagree, that is usually a fact about WHICH mechanism is running, not an error in either feed and not a worse metro. The six pairs read different populations, and each note is a STRUCTURAL prior about those populations — nothing here measures a lead or a lag between two legs, so never report one as timing.', 'a_blind_leg_is_not_a_quiet_one': "A leg with no denominator, or whose numerator cannot be measured, reads LOW and means nothing. Each leg publishes a measurement state (allocated, floor, measured, no denominator, no rate, not measurable) for that reason. Never report a blind leg as 'no distress'."}
{'leg': 'closures', 'unit': 'jobs', 'as_of': 'trailing 365 days to today', 'value': 1387005, 'measures': 'store closures', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'window', 'what_it_is': "all metro jobs, QCEW annual average — a SIZE normaliser, not a matched population: the feed spans retail, food service and pharmacy and no single QCEW sector covers it. The MATCHED read sits beside it as this leg's second reading"}
{'leg': 'warn', 'unit': 'employed', 'as_of': 'trailing 365 days to today', 'value': 1668733, 'measures': 'layoff notices (WARN)', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'window', 'what_it_is': 'employed persons, BLS LAUS, not seasonally adjusted'}
{'leg': 'bank', 'unit': '$mm', 'as_of': '2026-03-31', 'value': 23959.9, 'measures': 'bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'stamp', 'what_it_is': 'bank CRE allocated to this metro by branch deposits'}
{'leg': 'cmbs', 'unit': '$mm', 'as_of': '2026-07-29', 'value': 1827.0, 'measures': 'securitized loans in special servicing', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'stamp', 'what_it_is': "current balance on the non-pari-passu rows of this tape — the trust's slice, not the whole loan, on both sides of the ratio"}
Written from the figures above · CBSA 19740 · stress_metro · last changed 28 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Which distress signals are elevated in Denver-Aurora-Centennial, CO, and which cannot be read?
In Denver-Aurora-Centennial, CO, the elevated distress signals are bank-distressed CRE, CMBS special servicing, store closures, and WARN notices. Specifically, bank-distressed CRE is at “$2.34bn” (with a 90th-percentile at-risk share of “31.6%”), CMBS special-servicing UPB is “$346.0mm” (18.9% of metro UPB), and there are 12 CMBS loans in special servicing, 28 store closures, and 22 WARN notices over the past year. However, the bank-level distress signal cannot be read: the reading on distressed bank assets is “0”, and the count of distressed banks is likewise unavailable beyond that zero figure, with the bank CRE allocation share at “7.3%” but no explicit elevated bank-failure metric provided.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS in special servicing
- $346.0mm
- … as a share of this metro's CMBS balance
- 18.9%
- Bank CRE lent into this metro
- $23.96bn
- … at risk at the 90th percentile
- 31.6%
- CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line
- $2.34bn
- Assets at those lenders
- $0.00bn
- … share needing no branch-deposit allocation
- 7.3%
- Signals reading elevated
- bank CRE over the noncurrent line, CMBS in special servicing, store closures, WARN layoff notices
- Legs agreeing
- 4
- Phase
- peak
- CMBS loans in special servicing
- 12
- Distressed banks
- 0
- Store closures (past year)
- 28
- WARN notices (past year)
- 22
leading (real-economy) and realized (credit) signals are firing together
hundreds of millions of distressed CRE exposure
credit distress AND ground-level distress, with real dollars behind the credit side
Written from the figures above · CBSA 19740 · geo_metro_signals · last changed 27 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Jobs & Demand — the labor market under the collateralWatch it change →
Every other zone on this page reads the credit — what the loan is doing.
This one reads the demand underneath it. Office jobs pay office rent;
office rent services the office loan. When the jobs go, the DSCR follows — but not for another year or two.
That lag is the whole point of looking here.
Unemployment · Jul 2026
4.1%
+0.1pp yr
Last 24 months
3.5%4.5%
Monthly metro unemployment (BLS LAUS) — the freshest labor signal there is,
about six weeks behind. Read the direction, not the level: a 4% metro that is rising and a 6% metro that is
falling are not telling you the same thing.
Sector Heat — CMBS distress rate by property type (metro vs national)See the loans behind the bar →
This metro's CMBS runs 15.7% distressed where its own property mix predicts 6.4% — $165M more than this book would carry at the rate each property type runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted and excluding this metro. The gap is measured; the cause is not. 1 of 4 property types here run a higher distress rate than the national average for that type (the tick on each bar).
Elimination — does the gap survive a control?
Each row re-prices this metro's book on a finer cell — its own property types, then those types split by loan size, then by vintage — always at the rate that cell runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted. A gap that shrinks toward zero is explained by the control; one that stays has ruled it out. What is measured is what survives, not a cause.
property mix alone
+9.3pp
… and loan size held fixed
+9.3pp
the gap is still there with loan size held fixed too
… and vintage held fixed
+7.5pp
the gap is still there with vintage held fixed too
The largest single contributor is Mixed-Use: 8 loans, $200M, running 58.7% where the same type runs 4.6% elsewhere — worth 6.1pp of this metro's own rate.
Maturity Wall — CMBS coming due by year, distress within eachSee what’s maturing →
$563M — 32% of the metro's balance — matures within two years; the red slice of each bar is already distressed.
Distress Trend — is this market turning?Track it quarter by quarter →
Realized distress is FLAT — 18.0% now (2026-07), +0.6pp over the year.
Same definition as the cards above — distressed means in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, dollar-weighted — on a different clock. The cards are today’s tape; this is the disclosed history panel, quarter by quarter, so you can read direction rather than level. Trusts file monthly, so a quarter is usually well covered within weeks of opening and the newest one shown is normally the current one; it is withheld only when its filed book falls below 60% of recent quarters.
Share of the metro’s CMBS in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, by quarter — a firmer, backward-looking read. A loan under 1.0x DSCR that is still paying is not counted here.
Submarket Heat — where in the metro the distress sitsOpen the submarket →
The top three submarkets hold $866M of the metro's $1.8B; each bar's colored share is its distress rate.
Bank Door — what the local bank sector could absorbSee it on every loan’s exit read →
$563M of CMBS matures here within two years.
The 20 regional and local banks that gather deposits here could write roughly
$470M more CRE before the 300% supervisory line, so the maturing balance is
1.20× that room.
The median metro sits at 0.12×.
Regional Bank Room
$470M
After Committed Draws
$295M / −37%
Maturing ÷ Room
1.20×
Banks In Footprint
20 / 7 at the line
The room above is already part-sold. Construction lending is a promise drawn
down over two or three years, and the undrawn part is an obligation the bank cannot decline while the borrower performs
— every one of those dollars lands in the same CRE book the 300% line governs. These banks
have $273M of construction committed and not yet
advanced, of which $175M
comes out of the room above, leaving $295M,
with 11 banks
whose entire remaining room is spoken for.
A bank with no room contributes zero here, never a negative one — capacity does not net
across balance sheets — so $97M of what has
been promised is not deducted at all, because there is nothing left to deduct it from. On today’s
capital that is funding already contracted which would cross the line as it draws.
SR 06-26 draws a second line at 100% of capital for construction and land:
3 of 20
are past it on drawn balances alone, and
5 more cross it
once their own commitments fund.
Counted — 20 regional & local CRE lenders
| Bank | Deposit share | CRE / Capital* | Room contributed | Noncurrent CRE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| First National Bank SD | 17.0% | 148% total 188%
|
🔒 | 0.01% |
| Anb Bank CO | 25.8% | 166% total 242%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Academy Bank, National Association MO | 19.0% | 228% total 294%
|
🔒 | 1.11% |
| Alpine Bank CO | 7.7% | 190% total 259%
|
🔒 | 0.20% |
| Inbank NM | 34.0% | 224% total 355%
|
🔒 | 0.92% |
| Redstone Bank CO | 100.0% | 232% total 340%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Evergreen National Bank CO | 100.0% | 208% total 322%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Bank Of Colorado CO | 11.4% | 292% total 356%
|
🔒 | 0.07% |
| High Plains Bank CO | 13.1% | 197% total 377%
|
🔒 | 0.37% |
| 5star Bank CO | 16.0% | 228% total 299%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Farmers State Bank Of Calhan CO | 14.2% | 184% total 204%
|
🔒 | 0.71% |
| Banc Of California CA | 0.5% | 291% total 334%
|
🔒 | 4.24% |
| Corefirst Bank & Trust KS | 1.7% | 274% total 401%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| First Western Trust Bank CO | 56.4% | 312% total 384%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Firstier Bank NE | 15.7% | 323% total 401%
|
🔒 | 3.81% |
| Pb&t Bank CO | 10.4% | 317% total 480%
|
🔒 | 0.68% |
| Kirkpatrick Bank OK | 4.4% | 384% total 449%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| United Fidelity Bank, Fsb IN | 1.7% | 430% total 434%
|
🔒 | 0.06% |
| First Fidelity Bank OK | 1.3% | 308% total 462%
|
🔒 | 0.49% |
| United Business Bank CA | 0.2% | 402% total 555%
|
🔒 | 0.48% |
Not counted — 41 banks with deposits here
These hold deposits in this metro but are left out of the capacity above, because for them deposit location stops indicating where they lend — or they do not lend CRE at all. Real money that could refinance here is deliberately not counted.
no CRE book — CRE under 100% of capital — not a CRE lender
Wells Fargo Bank, National Association SD · Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Association OH · U.s. Bank National Association OH · Keybank National Association OH · Bank Of America, National Association NC · Bmo Bank National Association IL · Pnc Bank, National Association DE · The Huntington National Bank OH · Native American Bank, National Association CO · The Northern Trust Company IL · First-Citizens Bank & Trust Company NC · Tbk Bank, Ssb TX · Beal Bank Usa NV · Commerce Bank MO · State Bank Of Downs KS · Fnb Bank KS · Farmers & Merchants Bank Of Colby KS · Bny Mellon, National Association PA · Cibc National Trust Company GA
national — operates in more than 5 states, so deposits stop indicating where it lends
Bokf, National Association OK · Umb Bank, National Association MO · Zions Bancorporation, N.a. UT · Nbh Bank CO · Midfirst Bank OK · Sunflower Bank, National Association TX · First National Bank Of Omaha NE · Southstate Bank, National Association FL · Western Alliance Bank AZ · Busey Bank IL · First Interstate Bank MT · Glacier Bank MT · The Central Trust Bank MO · Amg National Trust Bank CO · Columbia Bank OR · Encore Bank AR
booked here — books nearly all deposits to one branch — a charter address, not a footprint
Colorado Federal Savings Bank CO · Solera National Bank CO · Fortis Bank CO · North Valley Bank CO · Bankers' Bank Of The West CO · First American State Bank CO
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
How to read this. It is not whether any particular loan can refinance — a borrower also reaches
national banks, life companies, agencies and debt funds. It is how much of this metro’s maturing volume the local
bank sector could absorb if it were the only door.
Banks are placed by deposit share (FDIC Summary of Deposits, June 2025) — a proxy for
where they lend, not a measurement; call reports carry no collateral geography. Room = 3× total risk-based capital less CRE held
(SR 06-26, the capital base the rule names — not book equity), from Q2 2026 call reports, apportioned by that share.
Committed construction comes from FFIEC Schedule RC-L as filed at 2026-06-30 —
the undrawn half of loans already written, which the balance sheet above does not show.
Banks in more than 5 states, single-branch bookers and banks that do not lend CRE are excluded —
313 banks holding $268.2B of national capacity not counted here.
Local Lenders — banks headquartered here, worst CRE noncurrent firstUnlock each bank’s early-warning flag →
| Bank | Total CRE | CRE / Capital* | Noncurrent CRE | Early Warning |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Solera National Bank | $342M | 218% total 231%
|
1.63% | 🔒 |
| Native American Bank, National Association | $50M | 34% total 92%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
| Evergreen National Bank | $58M | 208% total 322%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
| Colorado Federal Savings Bank | $483M | 176% total 176%
|
1.26% | 🔒 |
| North Valley Bank | $143M | 248% total 406%
|
0.87% | 🔒 |
| First American State Bank | $110M | 286% total 377%
|
0.43% | 🔒 |
| Nbh Bank | $4.1B | 215% total 306%
|
0.22% | 🔒 |
| Fortis Bank | $589M | 267% total 447%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
Banks are matched to their HQ metro (a proxy for footprint). Noncurrent CRE = CRE-balance-weighted blend of multifamily / nonresidential / construction noncurrent (distress already arrived). Early Warning is a validated leading signal — the bank’s 30-89 early-delinquency rank among all CRE lenders this quarter, which has predicted ~2.3× forward CRE distress. Per-bank flags are on a plan.
Do the banks lending in Denver-Aurora-Centennial, CO have the capacity to refinance its maturing CRE?
Denver-Aurora-Centennial, CO shows a wall_to_room of 1.91 against $562.8mm of maturing_bal across 35 maturing_loans, ranking 36 of 270 from the most strained, but this reading is best explained by exclusion rather than scarcity: more banks are excluded here (22) than qualify (20), since banks whose deposits do not indicate where they lend are absent from the room, so the metro reads strained while its credit is simply invisible here; with room_before_committed of $470.5mm, committed_draws of $272.7mm, and room_after_committed of $295.0mm, the ratio of 1.20 before committed draws versus 1.91 after shows how thin the residual capacity is, and against a CMBS balance of $1.78bn and a distressed_share of 15.7% the true refinancing capacity of local banks cannot be confirmed from this read.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS maturing in the window
- $562.8mm
- … across this many loans
- 35
- Local bank room, before committed draws
- $470.5mm
- Committed construction draws
- $272.7mm
- Local bank room, after those draws
- $295.0mm
- Wall-to-room ratio
- 1.91
- Rank, most strained
- 36
- … out of this many metros ranked
- 270
- … before committed draws
- 1.20
- Population ranked against
- CMBS maturing within 24 months against regional/community bank room in this metro
- Qualifying local banks
- 20
- … excluded from the calculation
- 22
- Distressed share of this metro's CMBS
- 15.7%
- Total CMBS balance here
- $1.78bn
- Capacity band
- over
Compared against a median wall-to-room ratio of
0.20 across the ranked metros.
1.91 is ABOVE the median of 0.20, so this metro is MORE strained than the typical ranked metro
36 of 270, counting from the MOST strained — a LOWER rank number means MORE strain
{'room_is_a_proxy': 'Room is what regional and community banks could still write before the SR 06-26 concentration line, after deducting construction draws already committed. Deposit footprint is a proxy for lending footprint, not a measurement of it.', 'ratio_is_not_size': 'The most extreme ratios belong to the smallest metros. Read maturing_bal_mm beside the ratio — the map sizes bubbles by the wall, not the strain, for exactly this reason.', 'wall_is_cmbs_only': "The wall is the CMBS balance maturing within 24 months — the maturing debt this platform can see, not the metro's whole maturity load. Every ratio is an upper bound on how much of it local banks would have to absorb.", 'exclusion_artifact': 'A high ratio is as often an exclusion artifact as a credit event. Banks whose deposits do not indicate where they lend (nationals, card and charter banks) are excluded from the room, so a metro served mainly by those reads strained while its credit is simply invisible here. Check banks_qualifying against banks_excluded_here, and explained_by_exclusion.'}
{'fork': 'exclusion, not scarcity', 'note': "More banks are excluded here (22) than qualify (20). This metro's ratio is an artifact of who this read can see, not evidence that credit is scarce."}
True
Written from the figures above · CBSA 19740 · capacity_metro · last changed 13 Sep 2026
· Ask your own question →
Apartment-REIT Operating Read — same-store disclosures for this metro · as of 2026-07-30Set against the loan book →
Same-Store NOI
-8.1%
Same-Store Revenue
-4.4%
Occupancy
96.1%
Rent Growth
-4.5%
| REIT | SS NOI | SS Revenue | Occupancy | Rent | As Of |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AVB | — | -3.5% | 95.6% | -5.7% | 2026-07-30 |
| CPT | -7.5% | -4.1% | 96.2% | -1.7% | 2026-07-30 |
| EQR | -9.8% | -5.9% | 96.8% | -7.7% | 2026-04-28 |
| MAA | -7.1% | -4.0% | 95.8% | -2.8% | 2026-07-29 |
Same-store operating results disclosed by public apartment REITs (AVB · EQR · ESS · MAA · CPT · UDR) for this market in their quarterly supplements. Directional market context — an operating trend, not a Verstavo score.
On The Ground — recent closures, layoffs & CRE bankruptciesTie these events to loans →
49 local distress events in the past year (2,323 jobs) — store closures, layoffs, and commercial real estate bankruptcies near this metro's collateral.
2026-09-08
LAYOFF
73 jobs · Adams
2026-08-28
CLOSURE
Lakewood
2026-08-13
LAYOFF
Denver
2026-08-11
CLOSURE
Denver
2026-08-06
CLOSURE
Denver
2026-08-03
LAYOFF
141 jobs · Denver
2026-08-03
LAYOFF
60 jobs · Denver/Adams
2026-07-31
LAYOFF
20 jobs · Denver
2026-07-21
LAYOFF
57 jobs · Denver
2026-07-14
LAYOFF
50 jobs · Denver
2026-06-20
CLOSURE
Denver
2026-05-27
LAYOFF
173 jobs · Denver
2026-05-27
LAYOFF
173 jobs · Denver
2026-04-30
CLOSURE
Littleton
2026-04-30
CLOSURE
Lone Tree
What has actually happened on the ground in Denver-Aurora-Centennial, CO recently?
Over the last 365 days, the Denver-Aurora-Centennial, CO metro has recorded 29 store closures and 20 warn notices, with 2,323 jobs affected — a figure that is a floor, since notices stating no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs. CRE bankruptcies read 0, but that is a STATE PROXY — bankruptcy filings carry the filer's state, not the property's location, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in, and it is not a metro-native count.
The figures behind this answer
- Store closures
- 29
- WARN layoff notices
- 20
- Jobs on those notices
- 2,323
- CRE-related bankruptcies
- 0
- Window, in days
- 365
STATE PROXY — bankruptcy filings carry the filer's state, not the property's location, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count.
affected_employees is nullable — notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, so this is a floor.
Closures are matched ZIP -> CBSA and only APPROVED rows count (a pending, machine-extracted row is not yet a closure). This mirrors the Metro Pulse page, not the convergence board — the board applies neither filter and counts higher. Layoffs take the same ZIP -> CBSA and review treatment, and a WARN notice counts if it affects >= 10 people or does not state a headcount (a NULL is not 'fewer than 10').
Written from the figures above · CBSA 19740 · geo_events · last changed 13 Sep 2026
· Ask your own question →
What this page can’t do
Everything above is a snapshot — one market, as it stands today, and
it’s yours to read. What a snapshot can’t tell you is when it moves: which loan slipped a DSCR band
this month, which bank’s early-warning rank crossed into the top quartile, which submarket started turning
while the headline number still looked fine. Distress doesn’t announce itself on the day you happen to check.
This page
One metro · one moment · you come looking.
Verstavo
Every metro · every month · it comes looking for you.
CMBS covers the securitized slice of CRE; bank, closure and layoff signals widen the view.
“No data” in a zone means we don’t observe it here, not that there is no stress.
Employment is BLS (QCEW annual, LAUS monthly) — public data, and the demand leg under all of it.
See the whole picture, not just the pulse.
Metro Pulse is the free, public read. The Verstavo platform goes loan‑by‑loan — stress
scores, maturity walls, special‑servicing transfers, bank CRE, and your own portfolio benchmarked
against the market.