Commercial Real Estate Credit —
Columbus, OH
The state of disclosed CRE credit in this market · OH
The read
$1.6B of CMBS across 83 loans. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2029 ($456M, 29% of the book). Office is the largest book ($449M, 1.8% distressed). Distress is flat in the filed record — 0.5% as of 2026-07. 41 on-the-ground distress events in the past year (1,627 jobs).
Overview
CMBS
Submarkets
Local Banks
Jobs & Demand
On The Ground
Loading map…
The CMBS properties our stress model flags here, plus recent store closures and layoffs. Stressed is a wider net than distressed — the distressed figure above counts only loans already in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, while these dots also include performing loans facing maturity or coverage pressure. Property dots sit at the center of their ZIP code, not the building — they show where stress concentrates, not which asset. Closures and layoffs are pinned to address where we have it. Open any dot to the building and the loan behind it →
In Columbus, the filed record holds flat while Main Street does the talking
Columbus carries $1.6 billion of CMBS across 83 loans, and the filed record reads quiet: distress sits at 0.5% as of July 2026, flat in the data and a fraction of what the national tape shows. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2029, when $456 million — 29% of the book — comes due. That is the concentration to watch on the desk, even as the near-term picture stays calm.
Office is the largest single book at $449 million, and here the contrast with the national read is stark: distress runs 1.8% locally against 11.3% nationwide. Retail, hospitality and multifamily each show no distress in the filed record. Median DSCR across the metro stands at 1.75, and the direction of the distress rate is flat, not rising.
The pressure that does exist shows up on the ground rather than in the servicer files. Columbus logged 41 distress events over the past year — a mix of store closures and layoff notices — touching 1,627 jobs. That is the softer signal beneath a hard number that has not moved.
CMBS Distressed UPB
$8M / 0.5%
in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent
CMBS Maturing ≤ 24mo
$391M
Local Banks (stressed)
0 / 17
Bank Early-Warning
2 flagged
Store Closures (1y)
25
Layoff Notices (1y)
16 / 1,627 jobs
0.18% of metro employment
CMBS Loans / UPB
83 / $1.6B
Unemployment · Jul 2026
3.2%
-1.3pp yr
Which distress signals are elevated in Columbus, OH, and which cannot be read?
The elevated distress signals in Columbus, OH are closures and WARN notices, reflecting a real-economy wobble (21 store closures and 16 WARN notices over the past year) rather than a CRE-credit event. However, the CRE-credit side cannot be read: the securitized dollar figure is measured over 50.0% of this metro's 2 special-servicing rows, so the true extent is unavailable — the $8.0mm CMBS special-servicing balance is a FLOOR, not a complete reading, and distressed lender CRE sits at $11.4mm with zero $0 in distressed bank assets. Distressed-bank-asset readings are unavailable (0 distressed banks), and the broader bank CRE at risk is $26.55bn with a 3.8% p90 share, but these do not clarify the credit side given the obscuration.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS in special servicing
- $8.0mm
- … as a share of this metro's CMBS balance
- 0.5%
- Bank CRE lent into this metro
- $26.55bn
- … at risk at the 90th percentile
- 3.8%
- CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line
- $11.4mm
- Assets at those lenders
- $0.00bn
- … share needing no branch-deposit allocation
- 7.3%
- Signals reading elevated
- store closures, WARN layoff notices
- Legs agreeing
- 2
- Phase
- obscured
- CMBS loans in special servicing
- 2
- Distressed banks
- 0
- Store closures (past year)
- 21
- WARN notices (past year)
- 16
the ground is deteriorating, and whether CRE credit has been hit here CANNOT BE READ: the securitized dollars are measured over 50.0% of its 2 special-servicing rows — the securitized side is invisible here, which is not the same as quiet
little to no distressed CRE dollars behind the signals; measured over 50.0% of this metro's 2 special-servicing rows — the rest carry no balance, so the dollar figure is a FLOOR
the ground is wobbling (closures / layoffs) but little CRE-credit distress sits behind it yet — a real-economy signal, not (yet) a CRE-credit event
Written from the figures above · CBSA 18140 · geo_metro_signals · last changed 27 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Jobs & Demand — the labor market under the collateralWatch it change →
Every other zone on this page reads the credit — what the loan is doing.
This one reads the demand underneath it. Office jobs pay office rent;
office rent services the office loan. When the jobs go, the DSCR follows — but not for another year or two.
That lag is the whole point of looking here.
Unemployment · Jul 2026
3.2%
-1.3pp yr
Last 24 months
2.7%4.9%
Monthly metro unemployment (BLS LAUS) — the freshest labor signal there is,
about six weeks behind. Read the direction, not the level: a 4% metro that is rising and a 6% metro that is
falling are not telling you the same thing.
Jobs by CRE-relevant sector · 2024
Annual employment by sector (BLS QCEW, 2024; 918,564 jobs in the metro).
QCEW lags — it is the structural read, not the current one, and we pair it with the monthly unemployment above on purpose.
Office-using sums five supersectors; where BLS withholds any one of them for
disclosure, we show nothing rather than a number we know is too low — so a missing sector here means
“suppressed at the source,” not “zero.”
Sector Heat — CMBS distress rate by property type (metro vs national)See the loans behind the bar →
This metro's CMBS runs 0.5% distressed where its own property mix predicts 5.9% — $85M less than this book would carry at the rate each property type runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted and excluding this metro. The gap is measured; the cause is not. 0 of 4 property types here run a higher distress rate than the national average for that type (the tick on each bar).
Elimination — does the gap survive a control?
Each row re-prices this metro's book on a finer cell — its own property types, then those types split by loan size, then by vintage — always at the rate that cell runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted. A gap that shrinks toward zero is explained by the control; one that stays has ruled it out. What is measured is what survives, not a cause.
property mix alone
-5.4pp
… and loan size held fixed
-5.0pp
the gap is still there with loan size held fixed too
… and vintage held fixed
-5.2pp
the gap is still there with vintage held fixed too
The largest single contributor is Office: 17 loans, $449M, running 1.8% where the same type runs 11.3% elsewhere — worth 2.7pp of this metro's own rate.
Maturity Wall — CMBS coming due by year, distress within eachSee what’s maturing →
$391M — 25% of the metro's balance — matures within two years; the red slice of each bar is already distressed.
Distress Trend — is this market turning?Track it quarter by quarter →
Realized distress is FLAT — 0.5% now (2026-07), +0.5pp over the year.
Same definition as the cards above — distressed means in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, dollar-weighted — on a different clock. The cards are today’s tape; this is the disclosed history panel, quarter by quarter, so you can read direction rather than level. Trusts file monthly, so a quarter is usually well covered within weeks of opening and the newest one shown is normally the current one; it is withheld only when its filed book falls below 60% of recent quarters.
Share of the metro’s CMBS in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, by quarter — a firmer, backward-looking read. A loan under 1.0x DSCR that is still paying is not counted here.
Submarket Heat — where in the metro the distress sitsOpen the submarket →
The top three submarkets hold $1.1B of the metro's $1.6B; each bar's colored share is its distress rate.
Bank Door — what the local bank sector could absorbSee it on every loan’s exit read →
$391M of CMBS matures here within two years.
The 27 regional and local banks that gather deposits here could write roughly
$1.7B more CRE before the 300% supervisory line, so the maturing balance is
0.23× that room.
The median metro sits at 0.12×.
Regional Bank Room
$1.7B
After Committed Draws
$1.1B / −38%
Maturing ÷ Room
0.23×
Banks In Footprint
27 / 4 at the line
The room above is already part-sold. Construction lending is a promise drawn
down over two or three years, and the undrawn part is an obligation the bank cannot decline while the borrower performs
— every one of those dollars lands in the same CRE book the 300% line governs. These banks
have $845M of construction committed and not yet
advanced, of which $659M
comes out of the room above, leaving $1.1B,
with 7 banks
whose entire remaining room is spoken for.
A bank with no room contributes zero here, never a negative one — capacity does not net
across balance sheets — so $186M of what has
been promised is not deducted at all, because there is nothing left to deduct it from. On today’s
capital that is funding already contracted which would cross the line as it draws.
SR 06-26 draws a second line at 100% of capital for construction and land:
1 of 27
is past it on drawn balances alone, and
6 more cross it
once their own commitments fund.
Counted — 27 regional & local CRE lenders
| Bank | Deposit share | CRE / Capital* | Room contributed | Noncurrent CRE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| The Park National Bank OH | 35.3% | 197% total 270%
|
🔒 | 0.81% |
| The Vinton County National Bank OH | 65.0% | 122% total 181%
|
🔒 | 0.25% |
| German American Bank IN | 20.2% | 222% total 306%
|
🔒 | 0.21% |
| Union Savings Bank OH | 18.8% | 128% total 128%
|
🔒 | 0.21% |
| First Merchants Bank IN | 4.4% | 183% total 243%
|
🔒 | 0.59% |
| First Commonwealth Bank PA | 8.5% | 205% total 260%
|
🔒 | 0.71% |
| The Richwood Banking Company OH | 81.5% | 209% total 302%
|
🔒 | 2.14% |
| First Financial Bank OH | 3.0% | 169% total 215%
|
🔒 | 0.91% |
| The Savings Bank OH | 100.0% | 200% total 237%
|
🔒 | 0.20% |
| Peoples State Bank OH | 94.7% | 101% total 206%
|
🔒 | 1.03% |
| The Merchants National Bank OH | 25.1% | 149% total 240%
|
🔒 | 0.59% |
| Cfbank, National Association OH | 61.9% | 279% total 362%
|
🔒 | 0.53% |
| North Valley Bank OH | 56.6% | 184% total 349%
|
🔒 | 1.09% |
| Cnb Bank PA | 5.3% | 269% total 341%
|
🔒 | 0.61% |
| The State Bank And Trust Company OH | 8.1% | 225% total 307%
|
🔒 | 0.04% |
| The Union Bank Company OH | 9.1% | 228% total 281%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Civista Bank OH | 3.7% | 261% total 329%
|
🔒 | 0.63% |
| Unified Bank OH | 7.0% | 183% total 309%
|
🔒 | 2.26% |
| Buckeye State Bank OH | 65.2% | 280% total 401%
|
🔒 | 0.07% |
| The First Citizens National Bank Of Upper Sandusky OH | 10.3% | 198% total 261%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| First Federal Community Bank Of Bucyrus OH | 9.7% | 174% total 290%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| First Federal Savings And Loan Association Of Lakewood OH | 0.9% | 138% total 185%
|
🔒 | 0.83% |
| The Home Loan Savings Bank OH | 1.6% | 105% total 233%
|
🔒 | 1.23% |
| Ohio State Bank OH | 100.0% | 461% total 535%
|
🔒 | 1.50% |
| First Bank Of Central Ohio OH | 100.0% | 363% total 421%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Lcnb National Bank OH | 3.2% | 386% total 492%
|
🔒 | 0.23% |
| S&t Bank PA | 1.6% | 309% total 339%
|
🔒 | 0.24% |
Not counted — 22 banks with deposits here
These hold deposits in this metro but are left out of the capacity above, because for them deposit location stops indicating where they lend — or they do not lend CRE at all. Real money that could refinance here is deliberately not counted.
no CRE book — CRE under 100% of capital — not a CRE lender
The Huntington National Bank OH · Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Association OH · Fifth Third Bank, National Association OH · Pnc Bank, National Association DE · Bank Of America, National Association NC · U.s. Bank National Association OH · Keybank National Association OH · Nationwide Trust Company, Fsb OH · United Midwest Savings Bank, National Association OH · First Federal Savings And Loan Association OH · Fairfield Federal Savings And Loan Association Of Lancaster OH · First Federal Bank Of Ohio OH · Fidelity Federal Savings And Loan Association Of Delaware OH · Kingston National Bank OH · The Community Bank OH · The Farmers Bank And Savings Company OH · The First National Bank Of Mcconnelsville OH
national — operates in more than 5 states, so deposits stop indicating where it lends
Wesbanco Bank, Inc. WV · Peoples Bank OH · Woodforest National Bank TX
booked here — books nearly all deposits to one branch — a charter address, not a footprint
Adelphi Bank OH · Riverside Bank Of Dublin OH
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
How to read this. It is not whether any particular loan can refinance — a borrower also reaches
national banks, life companies, agencies and debt funds. It is how much of this metro’s maturing volume the local
bank sector could absorb if it were the only door.
Banks are placed by deposit share (FDIC Summary of Deposits, June 2025) — a proxy for
where they lend, not a measurement; call reports carry no collateral geography. Room = 3× total risk-based capital less CRE held
(SR 06-26, the capital base the rule names — not book equity), from Q2 2026 call reports, apportioned by that share.
Committed construction comes from FFIEC Schedule RC-L as filed at 2026-06-30 —
the undrawn half of loans already written, which the balance sheet above does not show.
Banks in more than 5 states, single-branch bookers and banks that do not lend CRE are excluded —
313 banks holding $268.2B of national capacity not counted here.
Local Lenders — banks headquartered here, worst CRE noncurrent firstUnlock each bank’s early-warning flag →
| Bank | Total CRE | CRE / Capital* | Noncurrent CRE | Early Warning |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| The Huntington National Bank | $37.9B | 83% total 129%
|
0.97% | 🔒 |
| Adelphi Bank | $71M | 283% total 380%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
| The Richwood Banking Company | $449M | 209% total 302%
|
2.14% | 🔒 |
| Ohio State Bank | $293M | 461% total 535%
|
1.50% | 🔒 |
| Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Association | $179.8B | 51% total 55%
|
1.12% | 🔒 |
| Peoples State Bank | $52M | 101% total 206%
|
1.03% | 🔒 |
| The Park National Bank | $3.8B | 197% total 270%
|
0.81% | 🔒 |
| Cfbank, National Association | $976M | 279% total 362%
|
0.53% | 🔒 |
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
Banks are matched to their HQ metro (a proxy for footprint). Noncurrent CRE = CRE-balance-weighted blend of multifamily / nonresidential / construction noncurrent (distress already arrived). Early Warning is a validated leading signal — the bank’s 30-89 early-delinquency rank among all CRE lenders this quarter, which has predicted ~2.3× forward CRE distress. Per-bank flags are on a plan.
On The Ground — recent closures, layoffs & CRE bankruptciesTie these events to loans →
41 local distress events in the past year (1,627 jobs) — store closures, layoffs, and commercial real estate bankruptcies near this metro's collateral.
2026-12-31
CLOSURE
Columbus
2026-09-10
CLOSURE
Columbus
2026-08-16
CLOSURE
Grove City
2026-07-31
CLOSURE
Columbus
2026-07-17
CLOSURE
Columbus
2026-07-16
CLOSURE
Columbus
2026-07-11
CLOSURE
Lancaster
2026-07-02
LAYOFF
100 jobs · Groveport
2026-06-23
LAYOFF
92 jobs · Groveport/Franklin
2026-06-17
LAYOFF
110 jobs · Hebron/Licking
2026-05-29
LAYOFF
92 jobs · Hebron/Licking
2026-04-30
CLOSURE
Columbus
2026-04-30
CLOSURE
Columbus
2026-04-30
CLOSURE
Columbus
2026-04-30
CLOSURE
Columbus
What has actually happened on the ground in Columbus, OH recently?
Over the trailing 365 days, Columbus, OH has recorded 25 store closures and 16 warn notices, with 1,627 jobs affected, alongside 0 cre bankruptcies. Note that the closures and layoffs figures are filtered to approved rows and ZIP-to-CBSA matched records, and the jobs figure is a floor because notices stating no headcount contribute 0 jobs; the cre bankruptcies reading is a STATE PROXY — bankruptcy filings carry the filer's state, not the property's location, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in, and it is not a metro-native count.
The figures behind this answer
- Store closures
- 25
- WARN layoff notices
- 16
- Jobs on those notices
- 1,627
- CRE-related bankruptcies
- 0
- Window, in days
- 365
STATE PROXY — bankruptcy filings carry the filer's state, not the property's location, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count.
affected_employees is nullable — notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, so this is a floor.
Closures are matched ZIP -> CBSA and only APPROVED rows count (a pending, machine-extracted row is not yet a closure). This mirrors the Metro Pulse page, not the convergence board — the board applies neither filter and counts higher. Layoffs take the same ZIP -> CBSA and review treatment, and a WARN notice counts if it affects >= 10 people or does not state a headcount (a NULL is not 'fewer than 10').
Written from the figures above · CBSA 18140 · geo_events · last changed 13 Sep 2026
· Ask your own question →
What this page can’t do
Everything above is a snapshot — one market, as it stands today, and
it’s yours to read. What a snapshot can’t tell you is when it moves: which loan slipped a DSCR band
this month, which bank’s early-warning rank crossed into the top quartile, which submarket started turning
while the headline number still looked fine. Distress doesn’t announce itself on the day you happen to check.
This page
One metro · one moment · you come looking.
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Every metro · every month · it comes looking for you.
CMBS covers the securitized slice of CRE; bank, closure and layoff signals widen the view.
“No data” in a zone means we don’t observe it here, not that there is no stress.
Employment is BLS (QCEW annual, LAUS monthly) — public data, and the demand leg under all of it.
See the whole picture, not just the pulse.
Metro Pulse is the free, public read. The Verstavo platform goes loan‑by‑loan — stress
scores, maturity walls, special‑servicing transfers, bank CRE, and your own portfolio benchmarked
against the market.