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Commercial Real Estate Credit —
Columbus, OH
The state of disclosed CRE credit in this market · OH
The read
$1.6B of CMBS across 82 loans. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2029 ($456M, 29% of the book). 55 on-the-ground distress events in the past year (3,113 jobs).
Overview
CMBS
Submarkets
Local Banks
Jobs & Demand
On The Ground
Loading map…
The CMBS properties our stress model flags here, plus recent store closures and layoffs. Stressed is a wider net than distressed — the distressed figure above counts only loans already in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, while these dots also include performing loans facing maturity or coverage pressure. Property dots sit at the center of their ZIP code, not the building — they show where stress concentrates, not which asset. Closures and layoffs are pinned to address where we have it. Open any dot to the building and the loan behind it →
The securitized book sits quiet while the ground floor empties out
Columbus carries $1.6 billion of CMBS across 82 loans, and the paper itself reads calm. Retail, hospitality and multifamily all sit at a 0.0% distress rate against national marks of 2.6%, 6.2% and 7.9%, and among the 17 banks with local exposure none is flagged distressed, though two carry early-warning signals. The heaviest maturity load does not come due soon: $456 million, 29% of the book, lands in 2029, with the nearer 2028 vintage ($0.3 billion) and the out-years in 2031 and 2032 showing no distress. Only about $0.4 billion matures inside the next 24 months.
The pressure here is on the street, not in the trust. Over the past year the metro logged 54 on-the-ground distress events — 24 store closures and 30 layoff notices totaling 3,113 jobs — a filed record that stands in contrast to the quiet securitized book. That real-economy strain has yet to register in the distress numbers, even as the labor backdrop holds firm: unemployment ran 3.3% as of August 2026, down 0.9 points year over year.
Office remains the line to watch. The metro's $0.4 billion office book sits against a national office distress rate of 11.1%, the highest of any sector nationally and the category where the ground-floor signal and the maturity wall most plausibly meet. For now the Columbus read is a split screen: a securitized book showing no declared distress across its major sectors, and a live stream of closures and layoffs that the servicer tapes have not yet caught up to.
Written 2026-10-27
CMBS Distressed UPB
Not reported
fewer than 3 loans are distressed here, too few for the share to be a rate — the book size and loan count above are unaffected
CMBS Maturing ≤ 24mo
$427M
Banks HQ’d Here (stressed)
0 / 17
Bank Early-Warning
2 flagged
Store Closures (1y)
25
Layoff Notices (1y)
30 / 3,113 jobs
0.34% of metro employment
CMBS Loans / UPB
82 / $1.6B
Unemployment · Aug 2026
3.3%
-0.9pp yr
How much CRE distress is there in Columbus, OH right now?
For Columbus, OH, the store-closure leg reads 25 closures (2.72 per 100k jobs) and the layoff leg reads 30 notices (0.28%), while the lender leg reads $11.6mm (0.05%) of bank CRE over the noncurrent line and the securitized leg reads 2 loan records (0.5%) in special servicing; that puts 2 signals elevated of four, with 1 pairs with both legs elevated, 1 pairs with both legs quiet, 4 pairs where the legs disagree, over 6 pairs of legs compared and 0 pairs that cannot be read because a leg is blind, and note the securitized figure is a floor measured over only part of the special-servicing rows while the bank dollars are largely branch-deposit allocated.
The figures behind this answer
| Signal | Level | Rate | Rank by count | Rank by rate | Reading |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| store closures store closures per 100,000 jobs |
25 closures | 2.72 per 100k jobs | 23 of 392 | 130 of 392 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| layoff notices (WARN) workers on layoff notices as a share of the metro's employment |
30 notices | 0.28% | 26 of 382 | 80 of 382 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line share of the CRE lent into this metro that sits at a lender over the blended-noncurrent line |
$11.6mm | 0.05% | 295 of 393 | 312 of 393 | quiet
allocated 2026-06-30
|
| securitized loans in special servicing share of the securitized balance read here that is in special servicing |
2 loan records | 0.5% | 66 of 335 | 103 of 335 | quiet
floor 2026-09-29
|
6 pairs compared
1 both elevated
1 both quiet
4 disagreeing
0 unreadable — a side is blind
2 of four legs elevated
one metro, four independent feeds, each on its own denominator
124 of 447 metros have at least one blind leg and 54 are blind on all four. Those 54 are the same metros the board's map cannot place and the metro resolver cannot name: one ZIP-to-CBSA crosswalk boundary, showing up three ways.
Elevation is computed on the COUNT, over a flat threshold, which is a size filter. New York is 2nd of 392 by store closures and 264th of the same 392 by closures per job — both true, and which one you lead with decides what the reader believes.
Where two legs disagree, that is usually a fact about WHICH mechanism is running, not an error in either feed and not a worse metro.
A leg with no denominator, or whose numerator cannot be measured, reads LOW and means nothing. Each leg publishes a measurement state (allocated, floor, measured, no denominator, no rate, not measurable) for that reason.
Store closures: divided by 918,564 jobs
— all metro jobs, QCEW annual average — a SIZE normaliser, not a matched population: the feed spans retail, food service and pharmacy and no single QCEW sector covers it. The MATCHED read sits beside it as this leg's second reading (trailing 365 days to today).
Layoff notices (WARN): divided by 1,129,504 employed
— employed persons, BLS LAUS, not seasonally adjusted (trailing 365 days to today).
Bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line: divided by $22,911.8 mm
— bank CRE allocated to this metro by branch deposits (2026-06-30).
Securitized loans in special servicing: divided by $1,597.0 mm
— current balance on the non-pari-passu rows of this tape — the trust's slice, not the whole loan, on both sides of the ratio (2026-09-29).
Written from the figures above · CBSA 18140 · stress_metro · last changed 01 Nov 2026
· Ask your own question →
Jobs & Demand — the labor market under the collateralWatch it change →
Every other zone on this page reads the credit — what the loan is doing.
This one reads the demand underneath it. Office jobs pay office rent;
office rent services the office loan. When the jobs go, the DSCR follows — but not for another year or two.
That lag is the whole point of looking here.
Unemployment · Aug 2026
3.3%
-0.9pp yr
Last 24 months
2.7%4.9%
Monthly metro unemployment (BLS LAUS) — the freshest labor signal there is,
about six weeks behind. Read the direction, not the level: a 4% metro that is rising and a 6% metro that is
falling are not telling you the same thing.
Jobs by CRE-relevant sector · 2024
Annual employment by sector (BLS QCEW, 2024; 918,564 jobs in the metro).
QCEW lags — it is the structural read, not the current one, and we pair it with the monthly unemployment above on purpose.
Office-using sums five supersectors; where BLS withholds any one of them for
disclosure, we show nothing rather than a number we know is too low — so a missing sector here means
“suppressed at the source,” not “zero.”
Sector Heat — CMBS distress rate by property type (metro vs national)See the loans behind the bar →
Fewer than 3 loans here are distressed, too few for a distress rate to mean anything — so there is no rate to test against this metro's property mix. 0 of 3 property types here run a higher distress rate than the national average for that type (the tick on each bar).
Maturity Wall — CMBS coming due by year, distress within eachSee what’s maturing →
$427M — 27% of the metro's balance — matures within two years; the red slice of each bar is already distressed.
Distress Trend — is this market turning?Track it quarter by quarter →
Too few loans here are distressed for a quarterly rate to be a rate, so no direction is stated. The quarters that can be read are shown below.
Same definition as the cards above — distressed means in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, dollar-weighted — on a different clock. The cards are today’s tape; this is the disclosed history panel, quarter by quarter, so you can read direction rather than level. Trusts file monthly, so a quarter is usually well covered within weeks of opening and the newest one shown is normally the current one; it is withheld only when its filed book falls below 60% of recent quarters.
Share of the metro’s CMBS in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, by quarter — a firmer, backward-looking read. A loan under 1.0x DSCR that is still paying is not counted here.
Submarket Heat — where in the metro the distress sitsOpen the submarket →
The top three submarkets hold $1.1B of the metro's $1.6B; each bar's colored share is its distress rate.
Bank Door — what the local bank sector could absorbSee it on every loan’s exit read →
$427M of CMBS matures here within two years.
The 29 regional and local banks that gather deposits here could write roughly
$1.6B more CRE before the 300% supervisory line, so the maturing balance is
0.27× that room.
The median metro sits at 0.13×.
Regional Bank Room
$1.6B
After Committed Draws
$984M / −38%
Maturing ÷ Room
0.27×
Banks In Footprint
29 / 5 at the line
The room above is already part-sold. Construction lending is a promise drawn
down over two or three years, and the undrawn part is an obligation the bank cannot decline while the borrower performs
— every one of those dollars lands in the same CRE book the 300% line governs. These banks
have $776M of construction committed and not yet
advanced, of which $595M
comes out of the room above, leaving $984M,
with 8 banks
whose entire remaining room is spoken for.
A bank with no room contributes zero here, never a negative one — capacity does not net
across balance sheets — so $181M of what has
been promised is not deducted at all, because there is nothing left to deduct it from. On today’s
capital that is funding already contracted which would cross the line as it draws.
SR 07-1 draws a second line at 100% of capital for construction and land:
1 of 29
is past it on drawn balances alone, and
6 more cross it
once their own commitments fund.
Counted — 29 regional & local CRE lenders
| Bank | Deposit share | CRE / Capital* | Room contributed | Noncurrent CRE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| The Park National Bank OH | 28.1% | 197% total 270%
|
🔒 | 0.81% |
| The Vinton County National Bank OH | 65.5% | 122% total 181%
|
🔒 | 0.25% |
| German American Bank IN | 18.0% | 222% total 306%
|
🔒 | 0.21% |
| Union Savings Bank OH | 18.0% | 128% total 128%
|
🔒 | 0.21% |
| First Commonwealth Bank PA | 8.8% | 205% total 260%
|
🔒 | 0.71% |
| The Richwood Banking Company OH | 80.9% | 209% total 302%
|
🔒 | 2.14% |
| First Merchants Bank IN | 3.9% | 183% total 243%
|
🔒 | 0.59% |
| First Financial Bank OH | 2.6% | 169% total 215%
|
🔒 | 0.91% |
| The Savings Bank OH | 100.0% | 200% total 237%
|
🔒 | 0.20% |
| Peoples State Bank OH | 94.9% | 101% total 206%
|
🔒 | 1.03% |
| The Merchants National Bank OH | 24.5% | 149% total 240%
|
🔒 | 0.59% |
| Cfbank, National Association OH | 58.8% | 279% total 362%
|
🔒 | 0.53% |
| North Valley Bank OH | 53.9% | 184% total 349%
|
🔒 | 1.09% |
| The Farmers National Bank Of Canfield OH | 2.6% | 198% total 285%
|
🔒 | 1.02% |
| The Union Bank Company OH | 11.0% | 228% total 281%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Cnb Bank PA | 4.3% | 269% total 341%
|
🔒 | 0.61% |
| The State Bank And Trust Company OH | 8.3% | 225% total 307%
|
🔒 | 0.04% |
| Civista Bank OH | 3.6% | 261% total 329%
|
🔒 | 0.63% |
| Unified Bank OH | 6.9% | 183% total 309%
|
🔒 | 2.26% |
| Buckeye State Bank OH | 68.8% | 280% total 401%
|
🔒 | 0.07% |
| The First Citizens National Bank Of Upper Sandusky OH | 10.8% | 198% total 261%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| First Federal Savings And Loan Association Of Lakewood OH | 0.8% | 138% total 185%
|
🔒 | 0.83% |
| First Federal Community Bank Of Bucyrus OH | 6.5% | 174% total 290%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| The Home Loan Savings Bank OH | 2.0% | 105% total 233%
|
🔒 | 1.23% |
| Ohio State Bank OH | 100.0% | 461% total 535%
|
🔒 | 1.50% |
| First Bank Of Central Ohio OH | 100.0% | 363% total 421%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| First Bank Richmond IN | 4.4% | 304% total 374%
|
🔒 | 2.72% |
| Lcnb National Bank OH | 2.7% | 386% total 492%
|
🔒 | 0.23% |
| S&t Bank PA | 2.0% | 309% total 339%
|
🔒 | 0.24% |
Not counted — 23 banks with deposits here
These hold deposits in this metro but are left out of the capacity above, because for them deposit location stops indicating where they lend — or they do not lend CRE at all. Real money that could refinance here is deliberately not counted.
no CRE book — CRE under 100% of capital — not a CRE lender
The Huntington National Bank OH · Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Association OH · Pnc Bank, National Association DE · Bank Of America, National Association NC · Fifth Third Bank, National Association OH · Erebor Bank, N.a. OH · U.s. Bank National Association OH · Keybank National Association OH · Nationwide Trust Company, Fsb OH · United Midwest Savings Bank, National Association OH · First Federal Savings And Loan Association OH · Fairfield Federal Savings And Loan Association Of Lancaster OH · First Federal Bank Of Ohio OH · Fidelity Federal Savings And Loan Association Of Delaware OH · Kingston National Bank OH · The Community Bank OH · The Farmers Bank And Savings Company OH · The First National Bank Of Mcconnelsville OH
national — operates in more than 5 states, so deposits stop indicating where it lends
booked here — books nearly all deposits to one branch — a charter address, not a footprint
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 07-1 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
How to read this. It is not whether any particular loan can refinance — a borrower also reaches
national banks, life companies, agencies and debt funds. It is how much of this metro’s maturing volume the local
bank sector could absorb if it were the only door.
Banks are placed by deposit share (FDIC Summary of Deposits, June 2026) — a proxy for
where they lend, not a measurement; call reports carry no collateral geography. Room = 3× total risk-based capital less CRE held
(SR 07-1, the capital base the rule names — not book equity), from Q2 2026 call reports, apportioned by that share.
Committed construction comes from FFIEC Schedule RC-L as filed at 2026-06-30 —
the undrawn half of loans already written, which the balance sheet above does not show.
Banks in more than 5 states, single-branch bookers and banks that do not lend CRE are excluded —
315 banks holding $263.8B of national capacity not counted here.
Local Lenders — banks headquartered here, worst CRE noncurrent firstUnlock each bank’s early-warning flag →
| Bank | Total CRE | CRE / Capital* | Noncurrent CRE | Early Warning |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| The Huntington National Bank | $37.9B | 83% total 129%
|
0.97% | 🔒 |
| Adelphi Bank | $71M | 283% total 380%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
| The Richwood Banking Company | $449M | 209% total 302%
|
2.14% | 🔒 |
| Ohio State Bank | $293M | 461% total 535%
|
1.50% | 🔒 |
| Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Association | $179.8B | 51% total 55%
|
1.12% | 🔒 |
| Peoples State Bank | $52M | 101% total 206%
|
1.03% | 🔒 |
| The Park National Bank | $3.8B | 197% total 270%
|
0.81% | 🔒 |
| Cfbank, National Association | $976M | 279% total 362%
|
0.53% | 🔒 |
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 07-1 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
Banks are matched to their HQ metro (a proxy for footprint). Noncurrent CRE = CRE-balance-weighted blend of multifamily / nonresidential / construction noncurrent (distress already arrived). Early Warning is a validated leading signal — the bank’s 30-89 early-delinquency rank among all CRE lenders this quarter, which has predicted ~2.3× forward CRE distress. Per-bank flags are on a plan.
On The Ground — recent closures, layoffs & CRE bankruptciesTie these events to loans →
55 local distress events in the past year (3,113 jobs) — store closures, layoffs, and commercial real estate bankruptcies near this metro's collateral.
2026-12-31
CLOSURE
Scheduled · Columbus
2026-10-27
CLOSURE
Columbus
2026-09-23
CLOSURE
Columbus
2026-09-22
CLOSURE
Columbus
2026-09-10
CLOSURE
Columbus
2026-09-03
CLOSURE
Columbus
2026-08-16
CLOSURE
Grove City
2026-07-31
CLOSURE
Columbus
2026-07-17
CLOSURE
Columbus
2026-07-16
CLOSURE
Columbus
2026-07-02
LAYOFF
100 jobs · Groveport
2026-06-23
LAYOFF
92 jobs · Groveport/Franklin
2026-06-23
LAYOFF
92 jobs · Groveport/Franklin
2026-06-17
LAYOFF
110 jobs · Hebron/Licking
2026-06-17
LAYOFF
110 jobs · Hebron/Licking
What has actually happened on the ground in Columbus, OH recently?
In Columbus, OH over the past 365 days, the reviewed WARN layoff notices total 30, affecting 3,113 jobs on those notices — a floor, since notices stating no headcount still count but add no jobs — alongside 25 store closures. CRE-related bankruptcies read 0, but that figure is a state proxy rather than a metro-native count and is not comparable across the coverage change, so it should not be read as an absence of local distress.
The figures behind this answer
- Store closures
- 25
- WARN layoff notices
- 30
- Jobs on those notices
- 3,113
- CRE-related bankruptcies
- 0
- Window, in days
- 365
STATE PROXY — a court case counts in its filing district and an SEC 8-K in the filer's state, not where the property is, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count. Each court case is counted once even when both PACER and CourtListener carry it. A court case's state is its filing district; an SEC 8-K or news item carries the filer's state. Coverage widened to both court feeds on 2026-09-16, so counts before and after that date are not comparable.
affected_employees is nullable — notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, so this is a floor.
Closures are matched ZIP -> CBSA and only APPROVED rows count (a pending, machine-extracted row is not yet a closure). This mirrors the Metro Pulse page, not the convergence board — the board applies neither filter and counts higher. Layoffs take the same ZIP -> CBSA and review treatment, and a WARN notice counts if it affects >= 10 people or does not state a headcount (a NULL is not 'fewer than 10').
Written from the figures above · CBSA 18140 · geo_events · last changed 30 Oct 2026
· Ask your own question →
What this page can’t do
Everything above is a snapshot — one market, as it stands today, and
it’s yours to read. What a snapshot can’t tell you is when it moves: which loan slipped a DSCR band
this month, which bank’s early-warning rank crossed into the top quartile, which submarket started turning
while the headline number still looked fine. Distress doesn’t announce itself on the day you happen to check.
This page
One metro · one moment · you come looking.
Verstavo
Every metro · every month · it comes looking for you.
CMBS covers the securitized slice of CRE; bank, closure and layoff signals widen the view.
“No data” in a zone means we don’t observe it here, not that there is no stress.
Employment is BLS (QCEW annual, LAUS monthly) — public data, and the demand leg under all of it.
See the whole picture, not just the pulse.
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