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Commercial Real Estate Credit —
Charlotte-Concord-Gastonia, NC-SC
The state of disclosed CRE credit in this market · NC, SC
The read
$2.1B of CMBS across 94 loans. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2029 ($610M, 29% of the book). 31 on-the-ground distress events in the past year (686 jobs).
Overview
CMBS
Submarkets
Local Banks
Jobs & Demand
On The Ground
Loading map…
The CMBS properties our stress model flags here, plus recent store closures and layoffs. Stressed is a wider net than distressed — the distressed figure above counts only loans already in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, while these dots also include performing loans facing maturity or coverage pressure. Property dots sit at the center of their ZIP code, not the building — they show where stress concentrates, not which asset. Closures and layoffs are pinned to address where we have it. Open any dot to the building and the loan behind it →
A $2.1 Billion Book With a 2029 Cliff and Little Showing on the Servicer's Record
Charlotte carries $2.1 billion of CMBS across 94 loans, and the securitized record here is quiet where it counts. Retail at $0.5 billion, hospitality at $0.4 billion and mixed-use at $0.2 billion all post distress rates of 0.0%, each sitting well under the national marks of 2.6%, 6.2% and 5.4%. The region's nine banks show none distressed, with a single name on early warning. Unemployment, at 3.7% as of August 2026, is down half a point year over year.
The tension is on the calendar. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2029, where $610 million comes due — 29% of the book — followed by $0.4 billion in 2030, and $0.3 billion apiece in 2028 and 2032. Only $0.4 billion matures inside the next 24 months. Office is the sector to watch at $0.6 billion; the national office distress rate stands at 11.1%, and the clustering of refinancings a few years out concentrates where any pressure would surface.
Away from the trust-level data, the filed record is more active: 30 on-the-ground distress events over the past year — 18 store closures and 12 layoff notices accounting for 590 jobs. That is the local signal running ahead of what the servicer has declared, and it sits alongside a securitized book that, for now, reads clean across retail, hospitality and mixed-use.
Written 2026-10-27
CMBS Distressed UPB
Not reported
fewer than 3 loans are distressed here, too few for the share to be a rate — the book size and loan count above are unaffected
CMBS Maturing ≤ 24mo
$408M
Banks HQ’d Here (stressed)
0 / 9
Bank Early-Warning
1 flagged
Store Closures (1y)
18
Layoff Notices (1y)
13 / 686 jobs
0.06% of metro employment
CMBS Loans / UPB
94 / $2.1B
Unemployment · Aug 2026
3.7%
-0.5pp yr
How much CRE distress is there in Charlotte-Concord-Gastonia, NC-SC right now?
In Charlotte-Concord-Gastonia, NC-SC, 3 of the four legs read elevated, with 3 pairs with both legs elevated, 0 pairs with both legs quiet, and 3 pairs where the legs disagree across 6 pairs of legs compared; no pairs that cannot be read because a leg is blind. The elevated store closures figure is 18 closures at 1.53 per 100k jobs and the elevated layoff notices (WARN) figure is 16 notices at 0.05%; both clear a flat count threshold while sitting below the median of their own rate ranking, so any reading leaning on them is a statement about how big this metro is. The bank leg reads $2.06bn at 5.91%, allocated by branch deposits, which the call report cannot confirm, and the securitized loans in special servicing leg reads 3 loan records at 3.38% and is not elevated. Where store closures and the securitized tape disagree, the loose reading is retail is failing on buildings this tape does not hold, though the closures side of that pair is size-driven.
The figures behind this answer
| Signal | Level | Rate | Rank by count | Rank by rate | Reading |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| store closures store closures per 100,000 jobs |
18 closures | 1.53 per 100k jobs | 31 of 392 | 249 of 392 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| layoff notices (WARN) workers on layoff notices as a share of the metro's employment |
16 notices | 0.05% | 44 of 382 | 203 of 382 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line share of the CRE lent into this metro that sits at a lender over the blended-noncurrent line |
$2.06bn | 5.91% | 26 of 393 | 118 of 393 | elevated
allocated 2026-06-30
|
| securitized loans in special servicing share of the securitized balance read here that is in special servicing |
3 loan records | 3.38% | 52 of 335 | 85 of 335 | quiet 2026-09-29
|
6 pairs compared
3 both elevated
0 both quiet
3 disagreeing
0 unreadable — a side is blind
3 of four legs elevated
one metro, four independent feeds, each on its own denominator
124 of 447 metros have at least one blind leg and 54 are blind on all four. Those 54 are the same metros the board's map cannot place and the metro resolver cannot name: one ZIP-to-CBSA crosswalk boundary, showing up three ways.
Elevation is computed on the COUNT, over a flat threshold, which is a size filter. New York is 2nd of 392 by store closures and 264th of the same 392 by closures per job — both true, and which one you lead with decides what the reader believes.
Where two legs disagree, that is usually a fact about WHICH mechanism is running, not an error in either feed and not a worse metro.
A leg with no denominator, or whose numerator cannot be measured, reads LOW and means nothing. Each leg publishes a measurement state (allocated, floor, measured, no denominator, no rate, not measurable) for that reason.
elevated by size, not by rate — store closures, layoff notices (WARN) clear a flat count threshold while sitting below the median of their own rate ranking. Any reading that leans on them is a statement about how big this metro is.
Store closures: divided by 1,178,258 jobs
— all metro jobs, QCEW annual average — a SIZE normaliser, not a matched population: the feed spans retail, food service and pharmacy and no single QCEW sector covers it. The MATCHED read sits beside it as this leg's second reading (trailing 365 days to today).
Layoff notices (WARN): divided by 1,428,409 employed
— employed persons, BLS LAUS, not seasonally adjusted (trailing 365 days to today).
Bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line: divided by $34,914.6 mm
— bank CRE allocated to this metro by branch deposits (2026-06-30).
Securitized loans in special servicing: divided by $2,069.0 mm
— current balance on the non-pari-passu rows of this tape — the trust's slice, not the whole loan, on both sides of the ratio (2026-09-29).
Written from the figures above · CBSA 16740 · stress_metro · last changed 01 Nov 2026
· Ask your own question →
Jobs & Demand — the labor market under the collateralWatch it change →
Every other zone on this page reads the credit — what the loan is doing.
This one reads the demand underneath it. Office jobs pay office rent;
office rent services the office loan. When the jobs go, the DSCR follows — but not for another year or two.
That lag is the whole point of looking here.
Unemployment · Aug 2026
3.7%
-0.5pp yr
Last 24 months
3.4%4.3%
Monthly metro unemployment (BLS LAUS) — the freshest labor signal there is,
about six weeks behind. Read the direction, not the level: a 4% metro that is rising and a 6% metro that is
falling are not telling you the same thing.
Jobs by CRE-relevant sector · 2024
Annual employment by sector (BLS QCEW, 2024; 1,178,258 jobs in the metro).
QCEW lags — it is the structural read, not the current one, and we pair it with the monthly unemployment above on purpose.
Office-using sums five supersectors; where BLS withholds any one of them for
disclosure, we show nothing rather than a number we know is too low — so a missing sector here means
“suppressed at the source,” not “zero.”
Sector Heat — CMBS distress rate by property type (metro vs national)See the loans behind the bar →
Fewer than 3 loans here are distressed, too few for a distress rate to mean anything — so there is no rate to test against this metro's property mix. 0 of 3 property types here run a higher distress rate than the national average for that type (the tick on each bar).
Maturity Wall — CMBS coming due by year, distress within eachSee what’s maturing →
$408M — 20% of the metro's balance — matures within two years; the red slice of each bar is already distressed.
Distress Trend — is this market turning?Track it quarter by quarter →
Too few loans here are distressed for a quarterly rate to be a rate, so no direction is stated. The quarters that can be read are shown below.
Same definition as the cards above — distressed means in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, dollar-weighted — on a different clock. The cards are today’s tape; this is the disclosed history panel, quarter by quarter, so you can read direction rather than level. Trusts file monthly, so a quarter is usually well covered within weeks of opening and the newest one shown is normally the current one; it is withheld only when its filed book falls below 60% of recent quarters.
Share of the metro’s CMBS in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, by quarter — a firmer, backward-looking read. A loan under 1.0x DSCR that is still paying is not counted here.
Submarket Heat — where in the metro the distress sitsOpen the submarket →
The top three submarkets hold $1.2B of the metro's $2.1B; each bar's colored share is its distress rate.
Bank Door — what the local bank sector could absorbSee it on every loan’s exit read →
$408M of CMBS matures here within two years.
The 19 regional and local banks that gather deposits here could write roughly
$524M more CRE before the 300% supervisory line, so the maturing balance is
0.78× that room.
The median metro sits at 0.13×.
Regional Bank Room
$524M
After Committed Draws
$162M / −69%
Maturing ÷ Room
0.78×
Banks In Footprint
19 / 3 at the line
The room above is already part-sold. Construction lending is a promise drawn
down over two or three years, and the undrawn part is an obligation the bank cannot decline while the borrower performs
— every one of those dollars lands in the same CRE book the 300% line governs. These banks
have $530M of construction committed and not yet
advanced, of which $363M
comes out of the room above, leaving $162M,
with 8 banks
whose entire remaining room is spoken for.
A bank with no room contributes zero here, never a negative one — capacity does not net
across balance sheets — so $167M of what has
been promised is not deducted at all, because there is nothing left to deduct it from. On today’s
capital that is funding already contracted which would cross the line as it draws.
SR 07-1 draws a second line at 100% of capital for construction and land:
1 of 19
is past it on drawn balances alone, and
13 more cross it
once their own commitments fund.
Counted — 19 regional & local CRE lenders
| Bank | Deposit share | CRE / Capital* | Room contributed | Noncurrent CRE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Farmers & Merchants Bank NC | 96.0% | 210% total 249%
|
🔒 | 0.79% |
| Townebank VA | 6.8% | 249% total 345%
|
🔒 | 0.19% |
| Uwharrie Bank NC | 36.6% | 172% total 260%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Peoples Bank NC | 29.8% | 215% total 338%
|
🔒 | 0.16% |
| The Fidelity Bank NC | 7.7% | 206% total 373%
|
🔒 | 0.47% |
| The Park National Bank OH | 1.9% | 197% total 270%
|
🔒 | 0.81% |
| American Bank Of The Carolinas NC | 100.0% | 216% total 307%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Blueharbor Bank NC | 95.6% | 274% total 378%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| First Bank NC | 5.0% | 280% total 366%
|
🔒 | 0.40% |
| Hometrust Bank NC | 3.8% | 235% total 324%
|
🔒 | 0.68% |
| Oakworth Capital Bank AL | 4.3% | 190% total 305%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Movement Bank VA | 53.6% | 203% total 353%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Southern First Bank SC | 2.4% | 236% total 397%
|
🔒 | 0.23% |
| Ameris Bank GA | 0.4% | 263% total 319%
|
🔒 | 0.12% |
| First Palmetto Bank SC | 7.3% | 266% total 409%
|
🔒 | 0.01% |
| Arthur State Bank SC | 2.4% | 175% total 303%
|
🔒 | 0.04% |
| Commercial Bank TN | 5.2% | 307% total 480%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Carter Bank & Trust VA | 2.7% | 395% total 423%
|
🔒 | 0.84% |
| First Community Bank SC | 2.5% | 316% total 473%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
Not counted — 27 banks with deposits here
These hold deposits in this metro but are left out of the capacity above, because for them deposit location stops indicating where they lend — or they do not lend CRE at all. Real money that could refinance here is deliberately not counted.
no CRE book — CRE under 100% of capital — not a CRE lender
Bank Of America, National Association NC · Truist Bank NC · Wells Fargo Bank, National Association SD · Fifth Third Bank, National Association OH · First-Citizens Bank & Trust Company NC · Pnc Bank, National Association DE · Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Association OH · Regions Bank AL · First Federal Savings Bank Of Lincolnton NC · U.s. Bank National Association OH · Td Bank, National Association DE · Bank Of York SC · Spratt Savings Bank SC · The Huntington National Bank OH · Belmont Savings Bank, Ssb NC · Mechanics & Farmers Bank NC
national — operates in more than 5 states, so deposits stop indicating where it lends
First National Bank Of Pennsylvania PA · First Horizon Bank TN · Pinnacle Bank TN · Bank Ozk AR · Southstate Bank, National Association FL · United Community Bank SC · Woodforest National Bank TX · United Bank VA · Encore Bank AR · Servisfirst Bank AL · Flagstar Bank, National Association NY
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 07-1 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
How to read this. It is not whether any particular loan can refinance — a borrower also reaches
national banks, life companies, agencies and debt funds. It is how much of this metro’s maturing volume the local
bank sector could absorb if it were the only door.
Banks are placed by deposit share (FDIC Summary of Deposits, June 2026) — a proxy for
where they lend, not a measurement; call reports carry no collateral geography. Room = 3× total risk-based capital less CRE held
(SR 07-1, the capital base the rule names — not book equity), from Q2 2026 call reports, apportioned by that share.
Committed construction comes from FFIEC Schedule RC-L as filed at 2026-06-30 —
the undrawn half of loans already written, which the balance sheet above does not show.
Banks in more than 5 states, single-branch bookers and banks that do not lend CRE are excluded —
315 banks holding $263.8B of national capacity not counted here.
Local Lenders — banks headquartered here, worst CRE noncurrent firstUnlock each bank’s early-warning flag →
| Bank | Total CRE | CRE / Capital* | Noncurrent CRE | Early Warning |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Farmers & Merchants Bank | $395M | 210% total 249%
|
0.79% | 🔒 |
| Bank Of America, National Association | $79.9B | 27% total 39%
|
1.57% | 🔒 |
| Truist Bank | $51.0B | 57% total 87%
|
0.45% | 🔒 |
| Blueharbor Bank | $296M | 274% total 378%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
| American Bank Of The Carolinas | $86M | 216% total 307%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 07-1 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
Banks are matched to their HQ metro (a proxy for footprint). Noncurrent CRE = CRE-balance-weighted blend of multifamily / nonresidential / construction noncurrent (distress already arrived). Early Warning is a validated leading signal — the bank’s 30-89 early-delinquency rank among all CRE lenders this quarter, which has predicted ~2.3× forward CRE distress. Per-bank flags are on a plan.
Apartment-REIT Operating Read — same-store disclosures for this metro · as of 2026-07-30Set against the loan book →
Same-Store NOI
-1.7%
Same-Store Revenue
-1.0%
Occupancy
95.3%
Rent Growth
-1.0%
| REIT | SS NOI | SS Revenue | Occupancy | Rent | As Of |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CPT | -1.3% | -0.8% | 95.0% | -1.1% | 2026-07-30 |
| MAA | -2.1% | -1.1% | 95.7% | -0.9% | 2026-07-29 |
Same-store operating results disclosed by public apartment REITs (AVB · EQR · ESS · MAA · CPT · UDR) for this market in their quarterly supplements. Directional market context — an operating trend, not a Verstavo score.
On The Ground — recent closures, layoffs & CRE bankruptciesTie these events to loans →
31 local distress events in the past year (686 jobs) — store closures, layoffs, and commercial real estate bankruptcies near this metro's collateral.
2026-10-30
LAYOFF
96 jobs · Statesville
2026-10-16
CLOSURE
Charlotte
2026-10-14
CLOSURE
Charlotte
2026-10-05
CLOSURE
Anson County
2026-10-05
LAYOFF
150 jobs · Anson County
2026-09-28
CLOSURE
Concord
2026-09-21
BANKRUPTCY
CRE-linked bankruptcy
2026-09-18
LAYOFF
250 jobs · Charlotte
2026-09-12
CLOSURE
Charlotte
2026-09-10
LAYOFF
Charlotte
2026-09-05
LAYOFF
Charlotte
2026-09-04
CLOSURE
Gastonia
2026-09-03
CLOSURE
Mint Hill
2026-08-30
CLOSURE
Charlotte
2026-08-26
CLOSURE
Charlotte
What has actually happened on the ground in Charlotte-Concord-Gastonia, NC-SC recently?
In Charlotte-Concord-Gastonia, NC-SC, the record shows 13 WARN layoff notices over 365 days, with 686 jobs on those notices — a floor, since notices without a stated headcount count but add no jobs — alongside 18 store closures among approved rows; cRE-related bankruptcies come in at 4, though that reading is a state proxy rather than a metro-native count, since a court case counts in its filing district and an SEC 8-K in the filer's state.
The figures behind this answer
- Store closures
- 18
- WARN layoff notices
- 13
- Jobs on those notices
- 686
- CRE-related bankruptcies
- 4
- Window, in days
- 365
STATE PROXY — a court case counts in its filing district and an SEC 8-K in the filer's state, not where the property is, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count. Each court case is counted once even when both PACER and CourtListener carry it. A court case's state is its filing district; an SEC 8-K or news item carries the filer's state. Coverage widened to both court feeds on 2026-09-16, so counts before and after that date are not comparable.
affected_employees is nullable — notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, so this is a floor.
Closures are matched ZIP -> CBSA and only APPROVED rows count (a pending, machine-extracted row is not yet a closure). This mirrors the Metro Pulse page, not the convergence board — the board applies neither filter and counts higher. Layoffs take the same ZIP -> CBSA and review treatment, and a WARN notice counts if it affects >= 10 people or does not state a headcount (a NULL is not 'fewer than 10').
Written from the figures above · CBSA 16740 · geo_events · last changed 01 Nov 2026
· Ask your own question →
What this page can’t do
Everything above is a snapshot — one market, as it stands today, and
it’s yours to read. What a snapshot can’t tell you is when it moves: which loan slipped a DSCR band
this month, which bank’s early-warning rank crossed into the top quartile, which submarket started turning
while the headline number still looked fine. Distress doesn’t announce itself on the day you happen to check.
This page
One metro · one moment · you come looking.
Verstavo
Every metro · every month · it comes looking for you.
CMBS covers the securitized slice of CRE; bank, closure and layoff signals widen the view.
“No data” in a zone means we don’t observe it here, not that there is no stress.
Employment is BLS (QCEW annual, LAUS monthly) — public data, and the demand leg under all of it.
See the whole picture, not just the pulse.
Metro Pulse is the free, public read — one page for every market we cover. The platform goes loan‑by‑loan inside it: which buildings carry the stress, when their debt comes due, and your own portfolio benchmarked against the market you are standing in.