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Commercial Real Estate Credit —
Bloomington, IN
The state of disclosed CRE credit in this market · IN
The read
$191M of CMBS across 11 loans. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2030 ($82M, 43% of the book). Distress is flat in the filed record — 0.0% as of 2026-07. 2 on-the-ground distress events in the past year.
Overview
CMBS
Submarkets
Local Banks
Jobs & Demand
On The Ground
Loading map…
The CMBS properties our stress model flags here, plus recent store closures and layoffs. Stressed is a wider net than distressed — the distressed figure above counts only loans already in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, while these dots also include performing loans facing maturity or coverage pressure. Property dots sit at the center of their ZIP code, not the building — they show where stress concentrates, not which asset. Closures and layoffs are pinned to address where we have it. Open any dot to the building and the loan behind it →
CMBS Distressed UPB
under $1M / 0.0%
in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent
CMBS Maturing ≤ 24mo
under $1M
Banks HQ’d Here (stressed)
0 / 2
Bank Early-Warning
1 flagged
Store Closures (1y)
2
Layoff Notices (1y)
0 / 0 jobs
CMBS Loans / UPB
11 / $191M
Unemployment · Aug 2026
3.8%
-0.1pp yr
How much CRE distress is there in Bloomington, IN right now?
In Bloomington, IN, store closures read 2 closures at 3.66 per 100k jobs, layoff notices (WARN) read 0 notices at 0%, and bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line reads $0 at 0%. The fourth leg, securitized loans in special servicing, is not measurable here: the reading is unavailable because the share of the special-servicing rows here that carry a balance at all is 0%. Of the four legs, 0 are elevated, and of 6 pairs compared, 3 are pairs with both legs quiet while 3 are pairs that cannot be read because a leg is blind — a blind leg is not a quiet one, so the tape cannot be reported as no distress.
The figures behind this answer
| Signal | Level | Rate | Rank by count | Rank by rate | Reading |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| store closures store closures per 100,000 jobs |
2 closures | 3.66 per 100k jobs | 202 of 392 | 79 of 392 | quiet trailing 365 days to today
|
| layoff notices (WARN) workers on layoff notices as a share of the metro's employment |
0 notices | 0% | 314 of 382 | 308 of 382 | quiet trailing 365 days to today
|
| bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line share of the CRE lent into this metro that sits at a lender over the blended-noncurrent line |
$0 | 0% | 354 of 393 | 354 of 393 | quiet
allocated 2026-06-30
|
| securitized loans in special servicing share of the securitized balance read here that is in special servicing |
2 loan records | — | — | — | cannot be read
not measurable 2026-09-29
|
6 pairs compared
0 both elevated
3 both quiet
0 disagreeing
3 unreadable — a side is blind
0 of four legs elevated
blind: securitized loans in special servicing
one metro, four independent feeds, each on its own denominator
124 of 447 metros have at least one blind leg and 54 are blind on all four. Those 54 are the same metros the board's map cannot place and the metro resolver cannot name: one ZIP-to-CBSA crosswalk boundary, showing up three ways.
Elevation is computed on the COUNT, over a flat threshold, which is a size filter. New York is 2nd of 392 by store closures and 264th of the same 392 by closures per job — both true, and which one you lead with decides what the reader believes.
Where two legs disagree, that is usually a fact about WHICH mechanism is running, not an error in either feed and not a worse metro.
A leg with no denominator, or whose numerator cannot be measured, reads LOW and means nothing. Each leg publishes a measurement state (allocated, floor, measured, no denominator, no rate, not measurable) for that reason.
a blind leg is not a quiet one — securitized loans in special servicing cannot be read here. Their low numbers are an absence of MEASUREMENT.
Store closures: divided by 54,648 jobs
— all metro jobs, QCEW annual average — a SIZE normaliser, not a matched population: the feed spans retail, food service and pharmacy and no single QCEW sector covers it. The MATCHED read sits beside it as this leg's second reading (trailing 365 days to today).
Layoff notices (WARN): divided by 78,295 employed
— employed persons, BLS LAUS, not seasonally adjusted (trailing 365 days to today).
Bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line: divided by $1,276.7 mm
— bank CRE allocated to this metro by branch deposits (2026-06-30).
Securitized loans in special servicing: divided by $191.0 mm
— current balance on the non-pari-passu rows of this tape — the trust's slice, not the whole loan, on both sides of the ratio (2026-09-29).
Written from the figures above · CBSA 14020 · stress_metro · last changed 01 Nov 2026
· Ask your own question →
Which distress signals are elevated in Bloomington, IN, and which cannot be read?
In Bloomington, IN, the share of bank CRE needing no branch-deposit allocation sits at 9.8% while bank CRE at risk at the 90th percentile reads 35.2%, against bank CRE lent into this metro of $1.28bn; CMBS in special servicing is $0.0mm and share of this metro's CMBS balance in special servicing is 0.0%, with CMBS in special servicing recorded as $0.0mm even though two loans sit in special servicing on tape rows carrying no balance, so that zero is a gap in the tape rather than an absence of distress. Assets at those lenders are $0.00bn, CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line is $0.0mm, and legs agreeing is 0; the count of signals reading elevated is empty, and the phase is watch.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS in special servicing
- $0.0mm
- … as a share of this metro's CMBS balance
- 0.0%
- Bank CRE lent into this metro
- $1.28bn
- … at risk at the 90th percentile
- 35.2%
- CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line
- $0.0mm
- Assets at those lenders
- $0.00bn
- … share needing no branch-deposit allocation
- 9.8%
- Legs agreeing
- 0
- Phase
- watch
- CMBS loans in special servicing
- 2
- Distressed banks
- 0
- Store closures (past year)
- 2
- WARN notices (past year)
- 0
an isolated signal, not a convergence
little to no distressed CRE dollars behind the signals; and the securitized side is NOT MEASURED here — all 2 loans in special servicing sit on tape rows carrying no balance, so the $0 is a gap in the tape, not an absence of distress
signals are present but neither credit-material nor ground-heavy
Written from the figures above · CBSA 14020 · geo_metro_signals · last changed 01 Nov 2026
· Ask your own question →
Jobs & Demand — the labor market under the collateralWatch it change →
Every other zone on this page reads the credit — what the loan is doing.
This one reads the demand underneath it. Office jobs pay office rent;
office rent services the office loan. When the jobs go, the DSCR follows — but not for another year or two.
That lag is the whole point of looking here.
Unemployment · Aug 2026
3.8%
-0.1pp yr
Last 24 months
2.3%4.4%
Monthly metro unemployment (BLS LAUS) — the freshest labor signal there is,
about six weeks behind. Read the direction, not the level: a 4% metro that is rising and a 6% metro that is
falling are not telling you the same thing.
Jobs by CRE-relevant sector · 2024
Annual employment by sector (BLS QCEW, 2024; 54,648 jobs in the metro).
QCEW lags — it is the structural read, not the current one, and we pair it with the monthly unemployment above on purpose.
Office-using sums five supersectors; where BLS withholds any one of them for
disclosure, we show nothing rather than a number we know is too low — so a missing sector here means
“suppressed at the source,” not “zero.”
Sector Heat — CMBS distress rate by property type (metro vs national)See the loans behind the bar →
Too few CMBS loans here (11) to say whether this metro's rate is explained by its property mix — that comparison needs 25.
No CMBS sector data for this metro.
Maturity Wall — CMBS coming due by year, distress within eachSee what’s maturing →
under $1M — 0% of the metro's balance — matures within two years; the red slice of each bar is already distressed.
Distress Trend — is this market turning?Track it quarter by quarter →
Realized distress is FLAT — 0.0% now (2026-07), +0.0pp over the year.
Same definition as the cards above — distressed means in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, dollar-weighted — on a different clock. The cards are today’s tape; this is the disclosed history panel, quarter by quarter, so you can read direction rather than level. Trusts file monthly, so a quarter is usually well covered within weeks of opening and the newest one shown is normally the current one; it is withheld only when its filed book falls below 60% of recent quarters.
Share of the metro’s CMBS in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, by quarter — a firmer, backward-looking read. A loan under 1.0x DSCR that is still paying is not counted here.
Submarket Heat — where in the metro the distress sitsOpen the submarket →
The top three submarkets hold $191M of the metro's $191M; each bar's colored share is its distress rate.
Local Lenders — banks headquartered here, worst CRE noncurrent firstUnlock each bank’s early-warning flag →
| Bank | Total CRE | CRE / Capital* | Noncurrent CRE | Early Warning |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Owen County State Bank | $118M | 188% total 315%
|
0.23% | 🔒 |
| The Peoples State Bank | $144M | 207% total 268%
|
0.29% | 🔒 |
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 07-1 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
Banks are matched to their HQ metro (a proxy for footprint). Noncurrent CRE = CRE-balance-weighted blend of multifamily / nonresidential / construction noncurrent (distress already arrived). Early Warning is a validated leading signal — the bank’s 30-89 early-delinquency rank among all CRE lenders this quarter, which has predicted ~2.3× forward CRE distress. Per-bank flags are on a plan.
On The Ground — recent closures, layoffs & CRE bankruptciesTie these events to loans →
2 local distress events in the past year — store closures, layoffs, and commercial real estate bankruptcies near this metro's collateral.
2026-07-02
CLOSURE
Bloomington
2026-03-26
BANKRUPTCY
CRE-linked bankruptcy
2026-03-26
BANKRUPTCY
CRE-linked bankruptcy
2025-12-31
CLOSURE
Bloomington
2025-09-30
CLOSURE
Bloomington
2020-03-23
LAYOFF
53 jobs · Bloomington
2015-09-25
LAYOFF
169 jobs · Bloomington
2015-02-23
LAYOFF
49 jobs · Bloomington
2015-02-20
LAYOFF
320 jobs · Bloomington
2014-08-22
LAYOFF
120 jobs · Bloomington
2013-05-15
LAYOFF
72 jobs · Bloomington
2012-05-15
LAYOFF
93 jobs · Bloomington
2012-05-04
LAYOFF
16 jobs · Bloomington
2011-02-15
LAYOFF
59 jobs · Bloomington
2009-06-23
LAYOFF
400 jobs · Bloomington
What has actually happened on the ground in Bloomington, IN recently?
Over the past 365 days, the concrete activity on the ground in Bloomington, IN amounts to 2 store closures, with 0 WARN layoff notices and 0 jobs on those notices, alongside 2 CRE-related bankruptcies. Note that the CRE-related bankruptcies figure is a state-level proxy rather than a metro-native count, so it should not be read as filings located in the metro itself; and because notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute no jobs, the jobs figure is a floor.
The figures behind this answer
- Store closures
- 2
- WARN layoff notices
- 0
- Jobs on those notices
- 0
- CRE-related bankruptcies
- 2
- Window, in days
- 365
STATE PROXY — a court case counts in its filing district and an SEC 8-K in the filer's state, not where the property is, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count. Each court case is counted once even when both PACER and CourtListener carry it. A court case's state is its filing district; an SEC 8-K or news item carries the filer's state. Coverage widened to both court feeds on 2026-09-16, so counts before and after that date are not comparable.
affected_employees is nullable — notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, so this is a floor.
Closures are matched ZIP -> CBSA and only APPROVED rows count (a pending, machine-extracted row is not yet a closure). This mirrors the Metro Pulse page, not the convergence board — the board applies neither filter and counts higher. Layoffs take the same ZIP -> CBSA and review treatment, and a WARN notice counts if it affects >= 10 people or does not state a headcount (a NULL is not 'fewer than 10').
Written from the figures above · CBSA 14020 · geo_events · last changed 30 Oct 2026
· Ask your own question →
What this page can’t do
Everything above is a snapshot — one market, as it stands today, and
it’s yours to read. What a snapshot can’t tell you is when it moves: which loan slipped a DSCR band
this month, which bank’s early-warning rank crossed into the top quartile, which submarket started turning
while the headline number still looked fine. Distress doesn’t announce itself on the day you happen to check.
This page
One metro · one moment · you come looking.
Verstavo
Every metro · every month · it comes looking for you.
CMBS covers the securitized slice of CRE; bank, closure and layoff signals widen the view.
“No data” in a zone means we don’t observe it here, not that there is no stress.
Employment is BLS (QCEW annual, LAUS monthly) — public data, and the demand leg under all of it.
See the whole picture, not just the pulse.
Metro Pulse is the free, public read — one page for every market we cover. The platform goes loan‑by‑loan inside it: which buildings carry the stress, when their debt comes due, and your own portfolio benchmarked against the market you are standing in.