Commercial Real Estate Credit —
Austin-Round Rock-San Marcos, TX
The state of disclosed CRE credit in this market · TX
The read
$1.6B of CMBS across 79 loans. Multifamily carries the highest distress rate (26.8%, above the 7.6% national, 3.5× national). Distress is easing in the filed record — 14.1% as of 2026-07. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2031 ($393M). 33 on-the-ground distress events in the past year (1,325 jobs).
Overview
CMBS
Submarkets
Local Banks
Jobs & Demand
On The Ground
Loading map…
The CMBS properties our stress model flags here, plus recent store closures and layoffs. Stressed is a wider net than distressed — the distressed figure above counts only loans already in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, while these dots also include performing loans facing maturity or coverage pressure. Property dots sit at the center of their ZIP code, not the building — they show where stress concentrates, not which asset. Closures and layoffs are pinned to address where we have it. Open any dot to the building and the loan behind it →
Multifamily Runs Hot in Austin as the Filed Distress Record Eases
Austin carries $1.6 billion of CMBS across 79 loans, and the standout is multifamily. Its distress rate sits at 26.8%, more than triple the 7.6% national mark for the sector — a 3.5× gap that puts Austin apartments among the strained corners of the securitized book. Office is not far behind at 20.3%, running well above its own 11.3% national rate. Even so, the filed record is easing: the metro-wide distress rate registered 14.1% as of July 2026, and the median debt-service coverage across the book stands at 1.89.
The maturity wall is back-loaded. The heaviest load lands in 2031 at $393 million, and that vintage shows no distress on the filed record today. The nearer years are lighter but more mixed, leaving the metro's refinancing pressure concentrated further out rather than in the immediate window.
On the ground, the past year brought 33 distress events — 17 store closures and 16 layoff notices — touching 1,325 jobs. Against a metro unemployment rate of 4.0% as of July 2026, up 0.4 point year over year, the picture is one of localized strain rather than a broad break, with the securitized numbers still pointing down from where they stood.
CMBS Distressed UPB
$235M / 14.3%
in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent
CMBS Maturing ≤ 24mo
$492M
Local Banks (stressed)
1 / 9
Bank Early-Warning
1 flagged
Store Closures (1y)
17
Layoff Notices (1y)
16 / 1,325 jobs
0.12% of metro employment
CMBS Loans / UPB
79 / $1.6B
Unemployment · Jul 2026
4.0%
+0.4pp yr
How much CRE distress is there in Austin-Round Rock-San Marcos, TX right now?
Austin-Round Rock-San Marcos, TX is showing distress across all four measured signals, with every leg reading elevated. Store closures sit at 13 closures (ranked 34th of 392 by count), while layoff notices hit 17 notices (ranked 42nd of 386). Bank CRE over the noncurrent line totals $1,320.9mm (ranked 36th of 393), and securitized loans in special servicing stand at 10 rows (ranked 20th of 335). All six possible pairs of signals agree that stress is elevated — none are quiet, and none disagree. One caveat: the store-closures reading is elevated on size, not on rate, ranking 250th of 392 by closures per 100,000 jobs while still clearing the flat count threshold, so that leg is on the list because the metro is large rather than stressed per unit of itself.
The figures behind this answer
| Signal | Level | Rate | Rank by count | Rank by rate | Reading |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| store closures store closures per 100,000 jobs |
13 closures | 1.21 per 100k jobs | 34 of 392 | 250 of 392 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| layoff notices (WARN) workers on layoff notices as a share of the metro's employment |
17 notices | 0.09% | 42 of 386 | 174 of 386 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line share of the CRE lent into this metro that sits at a lender over the blended-noncurrent line |
$1.32bn | 8.65% | 36 of 393 | 85 of 393 | elevated
allocated 2026-03-31
|
| securitized loans in special servicing share of the securitized balance read here that is in special servicing |
10 loan records | 14.09% | 20 of 335 | 36 of 335 | elevated 2026-07-29
|
6 pairs compared
6 both elevated
0 both quiet
0 disagreeing
0 unreadable — a side is blind
4 of four legs elevated
one metro, four independent feeds, each on its own denominator
{'coverage': "114 of 441 metros have at least one blind leg and 48 are blind on all four. Those 48 are the same metros the board's map cannot place and the metro resolver cannot name: one ZIP-to-CBSA crosswalk boundary, showing up three ways.", 'a_count_ranks_by_size': 'Elevation is computed on the COUNT, over a flat threshold, which is a size filter. New York is 2nd of 392 by store closures and 264th of the same 392 by closures per job — both true, and which one you lead with decides what the reader believes. Every leg carries both ranks over ONE population; quote the rate beside the count.', 'disagreement_is_not_severity': 'Where two legs disagree, that is usually a fact about WHICH mechanism is running, not an error in either feed and not a worse metro. The six pairs read different populations, and each note is a STRUCTURAL prior about those populations — nothing here measures a lead or a lag between two legs, so never report one as timing.', 'a_blind_leg_is_not_a_quiet_one': "A leg with no denominator, or whose numerator cannot be measured, reads LOW and means nothing. Each leg publishes a measurement state (allocated, floor, measured, no denominator, no rate, not measurable) for that reason. Never report a blind leg as 'no distress'."}
{'fork': 'elevated by size, not by rate', 'note': 'store closures clear a flat count threshold while sitting below the median of their own rate ranking. Any reading that leans on them is a statement about how big this metro is.'}
{'leg': 'closures', 'unit': 'jobs', 'as_of': 'trailing 365 days to today', 'value': 1074287, 'measures': 'store closures', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'window', 'what_it_is': "all metro jobs, QCEW annual average — a SIZE normaliser, not a matched population: the feed spans retail, food service and pharmacy and no single QCEW sector covers it. The MATCHED read sits beside it as this leg's second reading"}
{'leg': 'warn', 'unit': 'employed', 'as_of': 'trailing 365 days to today', 'value': 1505300, 'measures': 'layoff notices (WARN)', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'window', 'what_it_is': 'employed persons, BLS LAUS, not seasonally adjusted'}
{'leg': 'bank', 'unit': '$mm', 'as_of': '2026-03-31', 'value': 15262.5, 'measures': 'bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'stamp', 'what_it_is': 'bank CRE allocated to this metro by branch deposits'}
{'leg': 'cmbs', 'unit': '$mm', 'as_of': '2026-07-29', 'value': 1675.0, 'measures': 'securitized loans in special servicing', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'stamp', 'what_it_is': "current balance on the non-pari-passu rows of this tape — the trust's slice, not the whole loan, on both sides of the ratio"}
Written from the figures above · CBSA 12420 · stress_metro · last changed 28 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Which distress signals are elevated in Austin-Round Rock-San Marcos, TX, and which cannot be read?
In Austin-Round Rock-San Marcos, TX, elevated distress signals include bank distressed CRE (9.0% of bank CRE at risk at the 90th percentile, $15.26bn bank CRE with $1.32bn distressed), CMBS special servicing ($236.0mm, 14.1% of metro UPB), store closures (13 in the past year), and WARN notices (17). The reading on the bank allocation exact share is unavailable, as no figure is provided for that metric.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS in special servicing
- $236.0mm
- … as a share of this metro's CMBS balance
- 14.1%
- Bank CRE lent into this metro
- $15.26bn
- … at risk at the 90th percentile
- 16.7%
- CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line
- $1.32bn
- Assets at those lenders
- $0.40bn
- … share needing no branch-deposit allocation
- 9.0%
- Signals reading elevated
- bank CRE over the noncurrent line, CMBS in special servicing, store closures, WARN layoff notices
- Legs agreeing
- 4
- Phase
- peak
- CMBS loans in special servicing
- 10
- Distressed banks
- 1
- Store closures (past year)
- 13
- WARN notices (past year)
- 17
leading (real-economy) and realized (credit) signals are firing together
hundreds of millions of distressed CRE exposure
credit distress AND ground-level distress, with real dollars behind the credit side
Written from the figures above · CBSA 12420 · geo_metro_signals · last changed 28 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Jobs & Demand — the labor market under the collateralWatch it change →
Every other zone on this page reads the credit — what the loan is doing.
This one reads the demand underneath it. Office jobs pay office rent;
office rent services the office loan. When the jobs go, the DSCR follows — but not for another year or two.
That lag is the whole point of looking here.
Unemployment · Jul 2026
4.0%
+0.4pp yr
Last 24 months
3.1%4.1%
Monthly metro unemployment (BLS LAUS) — the freshest labor signal there is,
about six weeks behind. Read the direction, not the level: a 4% metro that is rising and a 6% metro that is
falling are not telling you the same thing.
Jobs by CRE-relevant sector · 2024
Annual employment by sector (BLS QCEW, 2024; 1,074,287 jobs in the metro).
QCEW lags — it is the structural read, not the current one, and we pair it with the monthly unemployment above on purpose.
Office-using sums five supersectors; where BLS withholds any one of them for
disclosure, we show nothing rather than a number we know is too low — so a missing sector here means
“suppressed at the source,” not “zero.”
Sector Heat — CMBS distress rate by property type (metro vs national)See the loans behind the bar →
This metro's CMBS runs 14.3% distressed where its own property mix predicts 6.1% — $136M more than this book would carry at the rate each property type runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted and excluding this metro. The gap is measured; the cause is not. 4 of 4 property types here run a higher distress rate than the national average for that type (the tick on each bar).
Elimination — does the gap survive a control?
Each row re-prices this metro's book on a finer cell — its own property types, then those types split by loan size, then by vintage — always at the rate that cell runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted. A gap that shrinks toward zero is explained by the control; one that stays has ruled it out. What is measured is what survives, not a cause.
property mix alone
+8.2pp
… and loan size held fixed
+7.8pp
the gap is still there with loan size held fixed too
… and vintage held fixed
+8.4pp
the gap is still there with vintage held fixed too
The largest single contributor is Multifamily: 10 loans, $411M, running 26.8% where the same type runs 7.4% elsewhere — worth 4.8pp of this metro's own rate.
Maturity Wall — CMBS coming due by year, distress within eachSee what’s maturing →
$492M — 30% of the metro's balance — matures within two years; the red slice of each bar is already distressed.
Distress Trend — is this market turning?Track it quarter by quarter →
Realized distress is FALLING — 14.1% now (2026-07), -1.7pp over the year.
Same definition as the cards above — distressed means in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, dollar-weighted — on a different clock. The cards are today’s tape; this is the disclosed history panel, quarter by quarter, so you can read direction rather than level. Trusts file monthly, so a quarter is usually well covered within weeks of opening and the newest one shown is normally the current one; it is withheld only when its filed book falls below 60% of recent quarters.
Share of the metro’s CMBS in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, by quarter — a firmer, backward-looking read. A loan under 1.0x DSCR that is still paying is not counted here.
Submarket Heat — where in the metro the distress sitsOpen the submarket →
The top three submarkets hold $1.2B of the metro's $1.6B; each bar's colored share is its distress rate.
Bank Door — what the local bank sector could absorbSee it on every loan’s exit read →
$492M of CMBS matures here within two years.
The 44 regional and local banks that gather deposits here could write roughly
$5.6B more CRE before the 300% supervisory line, so the maturing balance is
0.09× that room.
The median metro sits at 0.12×.
Regional Bank Room
$5.6B
After Committed Draws
$3.9B / −30%
Maturing ÷ Room
0.09×
Banks In Footprint
44 / 7 at the line
The room above is already part-sold. Construction lending is a promise drawn
down over two or three years, and the undrawn part is an obligation the bank cannot decline while the borrower performs
— every one of those dollars lands in the same CRE book the 300% line governs. These banks
have $2.1B of construction committed and not yet
advanced, of which $1.7B
comes out of the room above, leaving $3.9B,
with 23 banks
whose entire remaining room is spoken for.
A bank with no room contributes zero here, never a negative one — capacity does not net
across balance sheets — so $389M of what has
been promised is not deducted at all, because there is nothing left to deduct it from. On today’s
capital that is funding already contracted which would cross the line as it draws.
SR 06-26 draws a second line at 100% of capital for construction and land:
13 of 44
are past it on drawn balances alone, and
17 more cross it
once their own commitments fund.
Counted — 44 regional & local CRE lenders
| Bank | Deposit share | CRE / Capital* | Room contributed | Noncurrent CRE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Texas Capital Bank TX | 38.5% | 105% total 130%
|
🔒 | 0.77% |
| Frost Bank TX | 12.0% | 123% total 208%
|
🔒 | 0.74% |
| Prosperity Bank TX | 4.5% | 171% total 228%
|
🔒 | 0.18% |
| The First National Bank Of Bastrop TX | 100.0% | 182% total 239%
|
🔒 | 0.19% |
| First Texas Bank TX | 68.8% | 162% total 270%
|
🔒 | 0.67% |
| Verabank, National Association TX | 16.3% | 166% total 253%
|
🔒 | 0.96% |
| Broadway National Bank TX | 14.3% | 176% total 244%
|
🔒 | 0.03% |
| International Bank Of Commerce TX | 6.4% | 215% total 236%
|
🔒 | 0.90% |
| Horizon Bank, Ssb TX | 89.5% | 254% total 420%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Plainscapital Bank TX | 15.3% | 255% total 369%
|
🔒 | 0.54% |
| Southstar Bank, S.s.b. TX | 29.5% | 155% total 214%
|
🔒 | 1.19% |
| Frontier Bank Of Texas TX | 100.0% | 231% total 444%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Round Top State Bank TX | 32.2% | 148% total 215%
|
🔒 | 0.25% |
| R Bank TX | 77.8% | 256% total 418%
|
🔒 | 2.76% |
| Ozona Bank TX | 60.6% | 174% total 237%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Susser Bank TX | 17.1% | 243% total 309%
|
🔒 | 0.44% |
| Citizens National Bank TX | 47.8% | 237% total 302%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Classic Bank, National Association TX | 14.9% | 125% total 228%
|
🔒 | 2.29% |
| Cornerstone Capital Bank, Ssb TX | 3.4% | 147% total 176%
|
🔒 | 0.15% |
| Third Coast Bank TX | 3.6% | 236% total 309%
|
🔒 | 0.43% |
| First United Bank And Trust Company OK | 4.4% | 280% total 344%
|
🔒 | 1.37% |
| Benchmark Bank TX | 17.3% | 254% total 308%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Security State Bank & Trust TX | 11.7% | 266% total 346%
|
🔒 | 3.45% |
| Primebank Of Texas TX | 45.8% | 236% total 366%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| First National Bank Texas TX | 1.9% | 206% total 240%
|
🔒 | 0.07% |
| Central National Bank TX | 18.5% | 274% total 351%
|
🔒 | 0.09% |
| Centennial Bank AR | 0.5% | 257% total 315%
|
🔒 | 0.46% |
| Extraco Banks, National Association TX | 1.7% | 149% total 201%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Rio Bank TX | 4.3% | 242% total 329%
|
🔒 | 0.06% |
| The Moody National Bank TX | 4.0% | 278% total 364%
|
🔒 | 1.18% |
| Southside Bank TX | 1.8% | 289% total 324%
|
🔒 | 0.09% |
| Jefferson Bank TX | 1.3% | 251% total 352%
|
🔒 | 1.04% |
| Texas Regional Bank TX | 10.2% | 295% total 391%
|
🔒 | 0.02% |
| Citizens State Bank TX | 3.9% | 268% total 326%
|
🔒 | 4.98% |
| Security Bank Of Texas TX | 3.4% | 231% total 283%
|
🔒 | 2.88% |
| Hancock Whitney Bank MS | 0.0% | 146% total 229%
|
🔒 | 0.26% |
| Falcon International Bank TX | 0.7% | 285% total 352%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| First Lockhart Bank TX | 100.0% | 365% total 510%
|
🔒 | 0.16% |
| American Bank Of Commerce TX | 53.6% | 365% total 507%
|
🔒 | 0.06% |
| Sage Capital Bank, TX | 36.6% | 329% total 391%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| The First National Bank Of Sonora TX | 7.0% | 327% total 439%
|
🔒 | 2.28% |
| Schertz Bank & Trust TX | 6.1% | 345% total 467%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Alliance Bank Central Texas TX | 5.4% | 302% total 391%
|
🔒 | 0.02% |
| Southwestern National Bank TX | 3.2% | 321% total 540%
|
🔒 | 0.34% |
Not counted — 23 banks with deposits here
These hold deposits in this metro but are left out of the capacity above, because for them deposit location stops indicating where they lend — or they do not lend CRE at all. Real money that could refinance here is deliberately not counted.
no CRE book — CRE under 100% of capital — not a CRE lender
Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Association OH · Wells Fargo Bank, National Association SD · Bank Of America, National Association NC · Pnc Bank, National Association DE · Regions Bank AL · Truist Bank NC · Austin Capital Bank Ssb TX · First-Citizens Bank & Trust Company NC · First American Trust, Fsb CA · The City National Bank Of Taylor TX · Anthem Bank & Trust LA · Amarillo National Bank TX · The Northern Trust Company IL · Trusttexas Bank, Ssb TX · Cibc National Trust Company GA
national — operates in more than 5 states, so deposits stop indicating where it lends
Sunflower Bank, National Association TX · Bank Ozk AR · Southstate Bank, National Association FL · Zions Bancorporation, N.a. UT · Woodforest National Bank TX · Nbh Bank CO · Encore Bank AR · Wafd Bank WA
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
How to read this. It is not whether any particular loan can refinance — a borrower also reaches
national banks, life companies, agencies and debt funds. It is how much of this metro’s maturing volume the local
bank sector could absorb if it were the only door.
Banks are placed by deposit share (FDIC Summary of Deposits, June 2025) — a proxy for
where they lend, not a measurement; call reports carry no collateral geography. Room = 3× total risk-based capital less CRE held
(SR 06-26, the capital base the rule names — not book equity), from Q2 2026 call reports, apportioned by that share.
Committed construction comes from FFIEC Schedule RC-L as filed at 2026-06-30 —
the undrawn half of loans already written, which the balance sheet above does not show.
Banks in more than 5 states, single-branch bookers and banks that do not lend CRE are excluded —
313 banks holding $268.2B of national capacity not counted here.
Local Lenders — banks headquartered here, worst CRE noncurrent firstUnlock each bank’s early-warning flag →
| Bank | Total CRE | CRE / Capital* | Noncurrent CRE | Early Warning |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| First Lockhart Bank | $196M | 365% total 510%
|
0.16% | 🔒 |
| R Bank | $422M | 256% total 418%
|
2.76% | 🔒 |
| First Texas Bank | $401M | 162% total 270%
|
0.67% | 🔒 |
| The First National Bank Of Bastrop | $318M | 182% total 239%
|
0.19% | 🔒 |
| Primebank Of Texas | $116M | 236% total 366%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
| Frontier Bank Of Texas | $482M | 231% total 444%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
| Horizon Bank, Ssb | $1.0B | 254% total 420%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
Banks are matched to their HQ metro (a proxy for footprint). Noncurrent CRE = CRE-balance-weighted blend of multifamily / nonresidential / construction noncurrent (distress already arrived). Early Warning is a validated leading signal — the bank’s 30-89 early-delinquency rank among all CRE lenders this quarter, which has predicted ~2.3× forward CRE distress. Per-bank flags are on a plan.
Do the banks lending in Austin-Round Rock-San Marcos, TX have the capacity to refinance its maturing CRE?
In Austin-Round Rock-San Marcos, TX, the refinancing picture looks manageable on this reading: 23 maturing loans totalling $491.8mm against room of $3.88bn after committed draws leaves a wall_to_room of 0.13, which is BELOW the median of 0.20, so this metro is LESS strained than the typical ranked metro, and it sits at 177 of 270, counting from the MOST strained — a LOWER rank number means MORE strain. Before deducting committed construction draws, room of $5.56bn gives a wall_to_room before committed draws of 0.09, while the $1.64bn of CMBS UPB and $2.07bn of committed draws bracket the scale of the visible load; note the wall is the CMBS balance maturing within 24 months — the maturing debt this platform can see, not the metro's whole maturity load — and that room is what regional and community banks could still write before the SR 06-26 concentration line. The caveat on coverage applies here in the other direction: of the 44 banks qualifying, 8 are excluded here, and a high ratio is as often an exclusion artifact as a credit event, so capacity reads as slack rather than thin, though the reading is unavailable for what share of the wall those excluded banks might absorb.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS maturing in the window
- $491.8mm
- … across this many loans
- 23
- Local bank room, before committed draws
- $5.56bn
- Committed construction draws
- $2.07bn
- Local bank room, after those draws
- $3.88bn
- Wall-to-room ratio
- 0.13
- Rank, most strained
- 177
- … out of this many metros ranked
- 270
- … before committed draws
- 0.09
- Population ranked against
- CMBS maturing within 24 months against regional/community bank room in this metro
- Qualifying local banks
- 44
- … excluded from the calculation
- 8
- Distressed share of this metro's CMBS
- 14.3%
- Total CMBS balance here
- $1.64bn
- Capacity band
- slack
Compared against a median wall-to-room ratio of
0.20 across the ranked metros.
0.13 is BELOW the median of 0.20, so this metro is LESS strained than the typical ranked metro
177 of 270, counting from the MOST strained — a LOWER rank number means MORE strain
{'room_is_a_proxy': 'Room is what regional and community banks could still write before the SR 06-26 concentration line, after deducting construction draws already committed. Deposit footprint is a proxy for lending footprint, not a measurement of it.', 'ratio_is_not_size': 'The most extreme ratios belong to the smallest metros. Read maturing_bal_mm beside the ratio — the map sizes bubbles by the wall, not the strain, for exactly this reason.', 'wall_is_cmbs_only': "The wall is the CMBS balance maturing within 24 months — the maturing debt this platform can see, not the metro's whole maturity load. Every ratio is an upper bound on how much of it local banks would have to absorb.", 'exclusion_artifact': 'A high ratio is as often an exclusion artifact as a credit event. Banks whose deposits do not indicate where they lend (nationals, card and charter banks) are excluded from the room, so a metro served mainly by those reads strained while its credit is simply invisible here. Check banks_qualifying against banks_excluded_here, and explained_by_exclusion.'}
Written from the figures above · CBSA 12420 · capacity_metro · last changed 13 Sep 2026
· Ask your own question →
Apartment-REIT Operating Read — same-store disclosures for this metro · as of 2026-07-30Set against the loan book →
Same-Store NOI
-5.3%
Same-Store Revenue
-3.6%
Occupancy
96.0%
Rent Growth
-4.5%
| REIT | SS NOI | SS Revenue | Occupancy | Rent | As Of |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CPT | -3.8% | -2.0% | 95.9% | -4.1% | 2026-07-30 |
| MAA | -6.7% | -3.1% | 95.0% | -3.9% | 2026-07-29 |
| UDR | -5.4% | -5.8% | 97.0% | -5.5% | 2026-07-27 |
Same-store operating results disclosed by public apartment REITs (AVB · EQR · ESS · MAA · CPT · UDR) for this market in their quarterly supplements. Directional market context — an operating trend, not a Verstavo score.
On The Ground — recent closures, layoffs & CRE bankruptciesTie these events to loans →
33 local distress events in the past year (1,325 jobs) — store closures, layoffs, and commercial real estate bankruptcies near this metro's collateral.
2026-11-01
CLOSURE
San Marcos
2026-08-30
CLOSURE
Austin
2026-08-30
CLOSURE
Austin
2026-08-30
CLOSURE
Austin
2026-08-17
CLOSURE
Austin
2026-08-06
LAYOFF
Austin
2026-08-03
CLOSURE
Austin
2026-07-31
CLOSURE
Austin
2026-07-27
CLOSURE
Austin
2026-07-24
CLOSURE
Austin
2026-07-20
CLOSURE
Austin
2026-07-09
CLOSURE
Austin
2026-07-09
BANKRUPTCY
CRE-linked bankruptcy
2026-07-08
LAYOFF
Austin
2026-07-06
LAYOFF
22 jobs · Austin
What has actually happened on the ground in Austin-Round Rock-San Marcos, TX recently?
Over the trailing 365 days in the Austin-Round Rock-San Marcos, TX metro, the vetted on-the-ground activity comprises 17 approved store closures matched by ZIP to the CBSA, 16 WARN notices, and 1,325 jobs affected — a floor, since notices stating no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs — alongside 4 CRE-likely bankruptcies, which are a STATE PROXY — bankruptcy filings carry the filer's state, not the property's location, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count.
The figures behind this answer
- Store closures
- 17
- WARN layoff notices
- 16
- Jobs on those notices
- 1,325
- CRE-related bankruptcies
- 4
- Window, in days
- 365
STATE PROXY — bankruptcy filings carry the filer's state, not the property's location, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count.
affected_employees is nullable — notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, so this is a floor.
Closures are matched ZIP -> CBSA and only APPROVED rows count (a pending, machine-extracted row is not yet a closure). This mirrors the Metro Pulse page, not the convergence board — the board applies neither filter and counts higher. Layoffs take the same ZIP -> CBSA and review treatment, and a WARN notice counts if it affects >= 10 people or does not state a headcount (a NULL is not 'fewer than 10').
Written from the figures above · CBSA 12420 · geo_events · last changed 13 Sep 2026
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What this page can’t do
Everything above is a snapshot — one market, as it stands today, and
it’s yours to read. What a snapshot can’t tell you is when it moves: which loan slipped a DSCR band
this month, which bank’s early-warning rank crossed into the top quartile, which submarket started turning
while the headline number still looked fine. Distress doesn’t announce itself on the day you happen to check.
This page
One metro · one moment · you come looking.
Verstavo
Every metro · every month · it comes looking for you.
CMBS covers the securitized slice of CRE; bank, closure and layoff signals widen the view.
“No data” in a zone means we don’t observe it here, not that there is no stress.
Employment is BLS (QCEW annual, LAUS monthly) — public data, and the demand leg under all of it.
See the whole picture, not just the pulse.
Metro Pulse is the free, public read. The Verstavo platform goes loan‑by‑loan — stress
scores, maturity walls, special‑servicing transfers, bank CRE, and your own portfolio benchmarked
against the market.