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The CMBS properties our stress model flags here, plus recent store closures and layoffs. Stressed is a wider net than distressed — the distressed figure above counts only loans already in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, while these dots also include performing loans facing maturity or coverage pressure. Property dots sit at the center of their ZIP code, not the building — they show where stress concentrates, not which asset. Closures and layoffs are pinned to address where we have it. Open any dot to the building and the loan behind it →

A Clean CMBS Book, But the Ground Tells a Different Story

Augusta-Richmond County carries $306M of securitized commercial mortgage debt across 25 loans, and on the filed record it is spotless: distress stands at 0.0% as of July 2026, and it has held flat there. Median DSCR across the book sits at a comfortable 1.73, and none of the metro's tracked bank exposure is impaired, though one lender is flagged on early-warning watch. On the numbers the servicers report, there is nothing here in workout.

The concentration to watch is timing. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2029, where $118M — 39% of the entire book — comes due, and that vintage currently shows no distress. Nearer-term maturities are light. For a book this size, the read is less about what is delinquent today and more about how that 2029 wall gets refinanced when it arrives.

Away from the securitized data, the ground has been busier. The metro logged 11 on-the-ground distress events over the past year — 10 layoff notices and a single store closure — touching 1,027 jobs. That runs against an otherwise steady labor backdrop: unemployment was 4.0% in July 2026, down 0.4 point year over year. The gap between a clean filed record and real-economy churn is the tension in this market.

CMBS Distressed UPB

under $1M / 0.0% in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent

CMBS Maturing ≤ 24mo

$51M

Local Banks (stressed)

0 / 3

Bank Early-Warning

1 flagged

Store Closures (1y)

1

Layoff Notices (1y)

10 / 1,027 jobs 0.54% of metro employment

CMBS Loans / UPB

25 / $306M

Unemployment · Jul 2026

4.0% -0.4pp yr

How much CRE distress is there in Augusta-Richmond County, GA-SC right now?

For Augusta-Richmond County, GA-SC (CBSA 12260), the distress picture is mixed but not severe. Of the four stress signals, only WARN layoff notices is elevated, with 8 notices and a rate of 0.29% of employment — ranking 67th of 386 metros by count — while store closures (0 closures, rank 348 of 392), bank CRE over the noncurrent line (8.3% of allocated dollars, $264.7mm), and securitized loans in special servicing ($327.0mm) all read quiet. The securitized loans leg is blind—not measurable, so its low reading is an absence of measurement, not evidence of calm. Notably, 2 of 6 pairs disagree (closures vs. WARN reads as a large-employer event; WARN vs. bank reads as employment going before any lender books it), while 3 pairs are unadjudicated because a side is blind. The bank leg carries an allocation caveat: only 10.3% of dollars sit at single-metro lenders, so the count is a deposit-based split. Overall, this reads as one large-employer layoff event rather than systemic retail or balance-sheet distress.

The figures behind this answer

Signal	Level	Rate	Rank by count	Rank by rate	Reading
store closures store closures per 100,000 jobs	0 closures	0 per 100k jobs	348 of 392	348 of 392	quiet trailing 365 days to today
layoff notices (WARN) workers on layoff notices as a share of the metro's employment	8 notices	0.29%	67 of 386	76 of 386	elevated trailing 365 days to today
bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line share of the CRE lent into this metro that sits at a lender over the blended-noncurrent line	$264.7mm	8.3%	97 of 393	90 of 393	quiet allocated 2026-03-31
securitized loans in special servicing share of the securitized balance read here that is in special servicing	1 loan records	—	—	—	cannot be read not measurable 2026-07-29

6 pairs compared 0 both elevated 1 both quiet 2 disagreeing 3 unreadable — a side is blind 1 of four legs elevated blind: securitized loans in special servicing

one metro, four independent feeds, each on its own denominator

{'coverage': "114 of 441 metros have at least one blind leg and 48 are blind on all four. Those 48 are the same metros the board's map cannot place and the metro resolver cannot name: one ZIP-to-CBSA crosswalk boundary, showing up three ways.", 'a_count_ranks_by_size': 'Elevation is computed on the COUNT, over a flat threshold, which is a size filter. New York is 2nd of 392 by store closures and 264th of the same 392 by closures per job — both true, and which one you lead with decides what the reader believes. Every leg carries both ranks over ONE population; quote the rate beside the count.', 'disagreement_is_not_severity': 'Where two legs disagree, that is usually a fact about WHICH mechanism is running, not an error in either feed and not a worse metro. The six pairs read different populations, and each note is a STRUCTURAL prior about those populations — nothing here measures a lead or a lag between two legs, so never report one as timing.', 'a_blind_leg_is_not_a_quiet_one': "A leg with no denominator, or whose numerator cannot be measured, reads LOW and means nothing. Each leg publishes a measurement state (allocated, floor, measured, no denominator, no rate, not measurable) for that reason. Never report a blind leg as 'no distress'."}

{'fork': 'a blind leg is not a quiet one', 'note': 'securitized loans in special servicing cannot be read here. Their low numbers are an absence of MEASUREMENT.'}

{'leg': 'closures', 'unit': 'jobs', 'as_of': 'trailing 365 days to today', 'value': 189196, 'measures': 'store closures', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'window', 'what_it_is': "all metro jobs, QCEW annual average — a SIZE normaliser, not a matched population: the feed spans retail, food service and pharmacy and no single QCEW sector covers it. The MATCHED read sits beside it as this leg's second reading"}

{'leg': 'warn', 'unit': 'employed', 'as_of': 'trailing 365 days to today', 'value': 269977, 'measures': 'layoff notices (WARN)', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'window', 'what_it_is': 'employed persons, BLS LAUS, not seasonally adjusted'}

{'leg': 'bank', 'unit': '$mm', 'as_of': '2026-03-31', 'value': 3187.3, 'measures': 'bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'stamp', 'what_it_is': 'bank CRE allocated to this metro by branch deposits'}

{'leg': 'cmbs', 'unit': '$mm', 'as_of': '2026-07-29', 'value': 327.0, 'measures': 'securitized loans in special servicing', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'stamp', 'what_it_is': "current balance on the non-pari-passu rows of this tape — the trust's slice, not the whole loan, on both sides of the ratio"}

Written from the figures above · CBSA 12260 · stress_metro · last changed 28 Aug 2026 · Ask your own question →

Which distress signals are elevated in Augusta-Richmond County, GA-SC, and which cannot be read?

In Augusta-Richmond County, GA-SC, the elevated distress signal is the WARN-notice count, with 8 notices filed over the past year; the bank side shows 10.3% of CRE allocations at risk at the 90th percentile, with distressed-lender CRE at $264.7mm and no distressed bank assets. The securitized side cannot be read: CMBS special-servicing UPB shows $0.0mm and a 0.0% share of metro UPB, but this is a tape gap — all 1 loans in special servicing lack balances, so the reading is unavailable, not indicative of an absence of distress.

The figures behind this answer

CMBS in special servicing: $0.0mm
… as a share of this metro's CMBS balance: 0.0%
Bank CRE lent into this metro: $3.19bn
… at risk at the 90th percentile: 29.6%
CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line: $264.7mm
Assets at those lenders: $0.00bn
… share needing no branch-deposit allocation: 10.3%
Signals reading elevated: WARN layoff notices
Legs agreeing: 1
Phase: obscured
CMBS loans in special servicing: 1
Distressed banks: 0
Store closures (past year): 0
WARN notices (past year): 8

the ground is deteriorating, and whether CRE credit has been hit here CANNOT BE READ: not one of this metro's 1 special-servicing rows carries a balance — the securitized side is invisible here, which is not the same as quiet

little to no distressed CRE dollars behind the signals; and the securitized side is NOT MEASURED here — all 1 loans in special servicing sit on tape rows carrying no balance, so the $0 is a gap in the tape, not an absence of distress

the ground is wobbling (closures / layoffs) but little CRE-credit distress sits behind it yet — a real-economy signal, not (yet) a CRE-credit event

Written from the figures above · CBSA 12260 · geo_metro_signals · last changed 28 Aug 2026 · Ask your own question →

Jobs & Demand — the labor market under the collateralWatch it change →

Every other zone on this page reads the credit — what the loan is doing. This one reads the demand underneath it. Office jobs pay office rent; office rent services the office loan. When the jobs go, the DSCR follows — but not for another year or two. That lag is the whole point of looking here.

Unemployment · Jul 2026

4.0% -0.4pp yr

Last 24 months

3.3%4.8%

Monthly metro unemployment (BLS LAUS) — the freshest labor signal there is, about six weeks behind. Read the direction, not the level: a 4% metro that is rising and a 6% metro that is falling are not telling you the same thing.

Jobs by CRE-relevant sector · 2024

Retail trade

26,941 jobs · +0.4% yr

Annual employment by sector (BLS QCEW, 2024; 189,196 jobs in the metro). QCEW lags — it is the structural read, not the current one, and we pair it with the monthly unemployment above on purpose. Office-using sums five supersectors; where BLS withholds any one of them for disclosure, we show nothing rather than a number we know is too low — so a missing sector here means “suppressed at the source,” not “zero.”

Sector Heat — CMBS distress rate by property type (metro vs national)See the loans behind the bar →

This metro's CMBS runs 0.0% distressed where its own property mix predicts 4.0% — $12M less than this book would carry at the rate each property type runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted and excluding this metro. The gap is measured; the cause is not.

No CMBS sector data for this metro.

Elimination — does the gap survive a control?

Each row re-prices this metro's book on a finer cell — its own property types, then those types split by loan size, then by vintage — always at the rate that cell runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted. A gap that shrinks toward zero is explained by the control; one that stays has ruled it out. What is measured is what survives, not a cause.

property mix alone

-4.0pp

… and loan size held fixed

-3.8pp

the gap is still there with loan size held fixed too

… and vintage held fixed

-3.8pp

the gap is still there with vintage held fixed too

The largest single contributor is Multifamily: 3 loans, $67M, running 0.0% where the same type runs 7.7% elsewhere — worth 1.7pp of this metro's own rate.

Maturity Wall — CMBS coming due by year, distress within eachSee what’s maturing →

$51M — 17% of the metro's balance — matures within two years; the red slice of each bar is already distressed.

2027

$16M · 3 loans · 0.0%

2028

$40M · 4 loans · 0.0%

2029

$118M · 9 loans · 0.0%

2030

$41M · 2 loans · 0.0%

2031

$30M · 2 loans · 0.0%

2032

$44M · 3 loans · 0.0%

2034

$13M · 1 loan · 0.0%

2038

$4M · 1 loan · 0.0%

Distress Trend — is this market turning?Track it quarter by quarter →

Realized distress is FLAT — 0.0% now (2026-07), +0.0pp over the year.

Same definition as the cards above — distressed means in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, dollar-weighted — on a different clock. The cards are today’s tape; this is the disclosed history panel, quarter by quarter, so you can read direction rather than level. Trusts file monthly, so a quarter is usually well covered within weeks of opening and the newest one shown is normally the current one; it is withheld only when its filed book falls below 60% of recent quarters.

Share of the metro’s CMBS in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, by quarter — a firmer, backward-looking read. A loan under 1.0x DSCR that is still paying is not counted here.

Submarket Heat — where in the metro the distress sitsOpen the submarket →

The top three submarkets hold $306M of the metro's $306M; each bar's colored share is its distress rate.

Augusta — Core

$231M · 0.0%

Augusta — Northeast

$48M · 0.0%

Augusta — South

$27M · 0.0%

Bank Door — what the local bank sector could absorbSee it on every loan’s exit read →

$51M of CMBS matures here within two years. The 10 regional and local banks that gather deposits here could write roughly $492M more CRE before the 300% supervisory line, so the maturing balance is 0.10× that room. The median metro sits at 0.12×.

Regional Bank Room

$492M

After Committed Draws

$283M / −42%

Maturing ÷ Room

0.10×

Banks In Footprint

10 / 2 at the line

The room above is already part-sold. Construction lending is a promise drawn down over two or three years, and the undrawn part is an obligation the bank cannot decline while the borrower performs — every one of those dollars lands in the same CRE book the 300% line governs. These banks have $237M of construction committed and not yet advanced, of which $208M comes out of the room above, leaving $283M, with 5 banks whose entire remaining room is spoken for. A bank with no room contributes zero here, never a negative one — capacity does not net across balance sheets — so $28M of what has been promised is not deducted at all, because there is nothing left to deduct it from. On today’s capital that is funding already contracted which would cross the line as it draws. SR 06-26 draws a second line at 100% of capital for construction and land: 2 of 10 are past it on drawn balances alone, and 6 more cross it once their own commitments fund.

Counted — 10 regional & local CRE lenders

Bank	Deposit share	CRE / Capital*	Room contributed	Noncurrent CRE
Security Federal Bank SC	85.3%	142% total 224%	🔒	0.95%
Queensborough National Bank & Trust Company GA	60.7%	162% total 327%	🔒	0.37%
F&m Bank GA	27.2%	146% total 210%	🔒	0.59%
First State Bank GA	36.2%	182% total 290%	🔒	0.22%
Ameris Bank GA	0.7%	263% total 319%	🔒	0.12%
Coastal Carolina National Bank SC	8.4%	266% total 364%	🔒	0.00%
Vallant Bank GA	2.5%	264% total 397%	🔒	0.71%
South Georgia Bank GA	0.4%	159% total 213%	🔒	0.24%
Southern Bank SC	35.4%	339% total 508%	🔒	0.02%
First Community Bank SC	9.2%	316% total 473%	🔒	0.00%

Not counted — 12 banks with deposits here

These hold deposits in this metro but are left out of the capacity above, because for them deposit location stops indicating where they lend — or they do not lend CRE at all. Real money that could refinance here is deliberately not counted.

no CRE book — CRE under 100% of capital — not a CRE lender

Wells Fargo Bank, National Association SD · Bank Of America, National Association NC · Regions Bank AL · First-Citizens Bank & Trust Company NC · Truist Bank NC · The First National Bank Of Waynesboro GA · Fifth Third Bank, National Association OH · Farmers State Bank GA · Td Bank, National Association DE · Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Association OH

national — operates in more than 5 states, so deposits stop indicating where it lends

Southstate Bank, National Association FL · Woodforest National Bank TX

* Two ratios, two perimeters. The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital — construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its 300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on. Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.

How to read this. It is not whether any particular loan can refinance — a borrower also reaches national banks, life companies, agencies and debt funds. It is how much of this metro’s maturing volume the local bank sector could absorb if it were the only door. Banks are placed by deposit share (FDIC Summary of Deposits, June 2025) — a proxy for where they lend, not a measurement; call reports carry no collateral geography. Room = 3× total risk-based capital less CRE held (SR 06-26, the capital base the rule names — not book equity), from Q2 2026 call reports, apportioned by that share. Committed construction comes from FFIEC Schedule RC-L as filed at 2026-06-30 — the undrawn half of loans already written, which the balance sheet above does not show. Banks in more than 5 states, single-branch bookers and banks that do not lend CRE are excluded — 313 banks holding $268.2B of national capacity not counted here.

Local Lenders — banks headquartered here, worst CRE noncurrent firstUnlock each bank’s early-warning flag →

Bank	Total CRE	CRE / Capital*	Noncurrent CRE	Early Warning
Security Federal Bank	$405M	142% total 224%	0.95%	🔒

* Two ratios, two perimeters. The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital — construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its 300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on. Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.

Banks are matched to their HQ metro (a proxy for footprint). Noncurrent CRE = CRE-balance-weighted blend of multifamily / nonresidential / construction noncurrent (distress already arrived). Early Warning is a validated leading signal — the bank’s 30-89 early-delinquency rank among all CRE lenders this quarter, which has predicted ~2.3× forward CRE distress. Per-bank flags are on a plan.

Do the banks lending in Augusta-Richmond County, GA-SC have the capacity to refinance its maturing CRE?

In Augusta-Richmond County, GA-SC, banks appear to have ample capacity to absorb the maturing CMBS wall: with 10 banks qualifying against 2 banks excluded here, the metro's wall_to_room of 0.18 sits against room_after_committed of $283.2mm and room_before_committed of $491.7mm, covering a maturing_bal of $50.6mm across 6 maturing_loans and a cmbs_upb of $305.6mm, with committed_draws of $236.9mm and a distressed_share of 0.0%. The wall_to_room_before_committed_draws of 0.10 and the band reading of slack reinforce this, and at 145 of 270 counting from the most strained, the metro ranks less strained than the median. The standard caveats apply: room is a proxy built on deposit footprint, the wall is CMBS-only and thus an upper bound, and the ratios here remain well inside the pool's extremes.

The figures behind this answer

CMBS maturing in the window: $50.6mm
… across this many loans: 6
Local bank room, before committed draws: $491.7mm
Committed construction draws: $236.9mm
Local bank room, after those draws: $283.2mm
Wall-to-room ratio: 0.18
Rank, most strained: 145
… out of this many metros ranked: 270
… before committed draws: 0.10
Population ranked against: CMBS maturing within 24 months against regional/community bank room in this metro
Qualifying local banks: 10
… excluded from the calculation: 2
Distressed share of this metro's CMBS: 0.0%
Total CMBS balance here: $305.6mm
Capacity band: slack

Compared against a median wall-to-room ratio of 0.20 across the ranked metros.

0.18 is BELOW the median of 0.20, so this metro is LESS strained than the typical ranked metro

145 of 270, counting from the MOST strained — a LOWER rank number means MORE strain

{'room_is_a_proxy': 'Room is what regional and community banks could still write before the SR 06-26 concentration line, after deducting construction draws already committed. Deposit footprint is a proxy for lending footprint, not a measurement of it.', 'ratio_is_not_size': 'The most extreme ratios belong to the smallest metros. Read maturing_bal_mm beside the ratio — the map sizes bubbles by the wall, not the strain, for exactly this reason.', 'wall_is_cmbs_only': "The wall is the CMBS balance maturing within 24 months — the maturing debt this platform can see, not the metro's whole maturity load. Every ratio is an upper bound on how much of it local banks would have to absorb.", 'exclusion_artifact': 'A high ratio is as often an exclusion artifact as a credit event. Banks whose deposits do not indicate where they lend (nationals, card and charter banks) are excluded from the room, so a metro served mainly by those reads strained while its credit is simply invisible here. Check banks_qualifying against banks_excluded_here, and explained_by_exclusion.'}

Written from the figures above · CBSA 12260 · capacity_metro · last changed 13 Sep 2026 · Ask your own question →

On The Ground — recent closures, layoffs & CRE bankruptciesTie these events to loans →

11 local distress events in the past year (1,027 jobs) — store closures, layoffs, and commercial real estate bankruptcies near this metro's collateral.

2026-10-31

LAYOFF

FPL Food, LLC

179 jobs · Augusta

2026-10-31

LAYOFF

Amentum

77 jobs · Augusta

2026-10-06

LAYOFF

Pactiv LLC

133 jobs · Aiken

2026-08-25

CLOSURE

YMCA

Augusta

2026-08-05

LAYOFF

Novolex

Jackson

2026-05-15

LAYOFF

KPR US LLC

213 jobs · Augusta

2026-05-11

BANKRUPTCY

Weeping Willows Developer

CRE-linked bankruptcy

2026-02-27

LAYOFF

Railcrew Xpress, LLC

55 jobs · Augusta

2026-01-31

LAYOFF

SDH Service East,LLC

67 jobs · Augusta

2026-01-05

LAYOFF

West Fraser, Inc.

130 jobs · Augusta

2025-12-31

LAYOFF

RATP Dev USA Inc

80 jobs · Augusta

2025-12-19

LAYOFF

Augusta Sportswear, Inc

93 jobs · Grovetown

2025-07-11

CLOSURE

BrandsMart

Augusta

2025-03-31

CLOSURE

Big Lots

North Augusta

2024-10-31

CLOSURE

Conn's

Augusta

What has actually happened on the ground in Augusta-Richmond County, GA-SC recently?

Over the trailing 365 days, Augusta-Richmond County, GA-SC has recorded 10 WARN notices affecting 1,027 jobs (a floor, since notices stating no headcount contribute none) and 1 store closure; the CRE bankruptcy reading is a STATE PROXY — bankruptcy filings carry the filer's state, not the property's location, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in, and it is not a metro-native count, standing at 1.

The figures behind this answer

Store closures: 1
WARN layoff notices: 10
Jobs on those notices: 1,027
CRE-related bankruptcies: 1
Window, in days: 365

STATE PROXY — bankruptcy filings carry the filer's state, not the property's location, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count.

affected_employees is nullable — notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, so this is a floor.

Closures are matched ZIP -> CBSA and only APPROVED rows count (a pending, machine-extracted row is not yet a closure). This mirrors the Metro Pulse page, not the convergence board — the board applies neither filter and counts higher. Layoffs take the same ZIP -> CBSA and review treatment, and a WARN notice counts if it affects >= 10 people or does not state a headcount (a NULL is not 'fewer than 10').

Written from the figures above · CBSA 12260 · geo_events · last changed 13 Sep 2026 · Ask your own question →

Commercial Real Estate Credit —Augusta-Richmond County, GA-SC

How much CRE distress is there in Augusta-Richmond County, GA-SC right now?

Which distress signals are elevated in Augusta-Richmond County, GA-SC, and which cannot be read?

Do the banks lending in Augusta-Richmond County, GA-SC have the capacity to refinance its maturing CRE?

What has actually happened on the ground in Augusta-Richmond County, GA-SC recently?

Commercial Real Estate Credit —
Augusta-Richmond County, GA-SC