Commercial Real Estate Credit —
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA
The state of disclosed CRE credit in this market · GA
The read
$4.6B of CMBS across 266 loans. Retail is the largest book ($1.2B) but runs below its national distress rate (0.3% vs 2.7%); the elevated risk is in Office (14.6%). Distress is rising in the filed record — 3.6% as of 2026-07. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2029 ($1.3B, 27% of the book). 110 on-the-ground distress events in the past year (9,964 jobs).
Overview
CMBS
Submarkets
Local Banks
Jobs & Demand
On The Ground
Loading map…
The CMBS properties our stress model flags here, plus recent store closures and layoffs. Stressed is a wider net than distressed — the distressed figure above counts only loans already in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, while these dots also include performing loans facing maturity or coverage pressure. Property dots sit at the center of their ZIP code, not the building — they show where stress concentrates, not which asset. Closures and layoffs are pinned to address where we have it. Open any dot to the building and the loan behind it →
Office Carries the Risk in Atlanta as the Filed Record Turns Higher
Atlanta's CMBS book runs to $4.6B across 266 loans, and the distress reported by servicers stands at 3.6% as of July 2026 — a rate that has been rising in the filed record. The largest single sector is Retail at $1.2B, but it is not where the trouble sits: Atlanta retail carries a 0.3% distress rate against a 2.7% national mark. The elevated risk is concentrated in Office, a $0.6B book running at 14.6% distress — above the 11.3% national office rate and well clear of anything else in the metro.
Across the rest of the stack, Atlanta reads calmer than the country. Hospitality ($0.9B) sits at 3.7% versus 6.1% nationally, Multifamily ($0.7B) at 5.0% against 7.6%, and Industrial ($0.6B) at 0.8% against 2.7%. Median DSCR across the book is 1.74. The maturity wall is the number to watch: the heaviest load lands in 2029, with $1.3B — 27% of the book — coming due at a 3.8% distress rate, followed by $1.0B in 2028 and $0.9B in 2031.
On the ground, the past year brought 110 distress events — 48 store closures and 62 layoff notices totaling 9,964 jobs — even as metro unemployment held at 3.2%, down 0.2 points from a year earlier. Among 21 banks tracked, one is distressed and five carry early-warning flags.
CMBS Distressed UPB
$168M / 3.6%
in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent
CMBS Maturing ≤ 24mo
$757M
Local Banks (stressed)
1 / 21
Bank Early-Warning
5 flagged
Store Closures (1y)
48
Layoff Notices (1y)
62 / 9,964 jobs
0.39% of metro employment
CMBS Loans / UPB
266 / $4.6B
Unemployment · Jul 2026
3.2%
-0.2pp yr
How much CRE distress is there in Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA right now?
For Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA, commercial real estate distress is elevated across all four independent feeds, with all 6 of 6 possible pairings agreeing on heightened stress. Store closures number 44 over the trailing year, ranking 9th of 392 metros by count but only 197th by rate at 1.74 closures per 100,000 jobs—a reading that is elevated by the metro's size rather than by per-unit stress. Layoff notices (WARN) total 70, ranking 12th of 386 by count and 68th by rate at 0.31% of metro employment. Bank CRE over the noncurrent line sits at $3,477.3 million, ranking 16th of 393 by count and 95th by rate at 7.83%, though this figure is allocated by branch deposits and cannot be fully confirmed. Securitized loans in special servicing number 11 rows, ranking 16th of 335 by count and 76th by rate at 4.2% of the securitized balance read here. The single size-driven caveat applies only to the closures leg; all three other legs show genuine rate-based elevation alongside strong count rankings. No pairs disagree, and none are unadjudicated due to blindness—so the distress signal is broad-based and mutually reinforcing across tenant operations, employer headcount, bank balance sheets, and securitized trust paper.
The figures behind this answer
| Signal | Level | Rate | Rank by count | Rank by rate | Reading |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| store closures store closures per 100,000 jobs |
44 closures | 1.74 per 100k jobs | 9 of 392 | 197 of 392 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| layoff notices (WARN) workers on layoff notices as a share of the metro's employment |
70 notices | 0.31% | 12 of 386 | 68 of 386 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line share of the CRE lent into this metro that sits at a lender over the blended-noncurrent line |
$3.48bn | 7.83% | 16 of 393 | 95 of 393 | elevated
allocated 2026-03-31
|
| securitized loans in special servicing share of the securitized balance read here that is in special servicing |
11 loan records | 4.2% | 16 of 335 | 76 of 335 | elevated 2026-07-29
|
6 pairs compared
6 both elevated
0 both quiet
0 disagreeing
0 unreadable — a side is blind
4 of four legs elevated
one metro, four independent feeds, each on its own denominator
{'coverage': "114 of 441 metros have at least one blind leg and 48 are blind on all four. Those 48 are the same metros the board's map cannot place and the metro resolver cannot name: one ZIP-to-CBSA crosswalk boundary, showing up three ways.", 'a_count_ranks_by_size': 'Elevation is computed on the COUNT, over a flat threshold, which is a size filter. New York is 2nd of 392 by store closures and 264th of the same 392 by closures per job — both true, and which one you lead with decides what the reader believes. Every leg carries both ranks over ONE population; quote the rate beside the count.', 'disagreement_is_not_severity': 'Where two legs disagree, that is usually a fact about WHICH mechanism is running, not an error in either feed and not a worse metro. The six pairs read different populations, and each note is a STRUCTURAL prior about those populations — nothing here measures a lead or a lag between two legs, so never report one as timing.', 'a_blind_leg_is_not_a_quiet_one': "A leg with no denominator, or whose numerator cannot be measured, reads LOW and means nothing. Each leg publishes a measurement state (allocated, floor, measured, no denominator, no rate, not measurable) for that reason. Never report a blind leg as 'no distress'."}
{'fork': 'elevated by size, not by rate', 'note': 'store closures clear a flat count threshold while sitting below the median of their own rate ranking. Any reading that leans on them is a statement about how big this metro is.'}
{'leg': 'closures', 'unit': 'jobs', 'as_of': 'trailing 365 days to today', 'value': 2530649, 'measures': 'store closures', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'window', 'what_it_is': "all metro jobs, QCEW annual average — a SIZE normaliser, not a matched population: the feed spans retail, food service and pharmacy and no single QCEW sector covers it. The MATCHED read sits beside it as this leg's second reading"}
{'leg': 'warn', 'unit': 'employed', 'as_of': 'trailing 365 days to today', 'value': 3252603, 'measures': 'layoff notices (WARN)', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'window', 'what_it_is': 'employed persons, BLS LAUS, not seasonally adjusted'}
{'leg': 'bank', 'unit': '$mm', 'as_of': '2026-03-31', 'value': 44436.6, 'measures': 'bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'stamp', 'what_it_is': 'bank CRE allocated to this metro by branch deposits'}
{'leg': 'cmbs', 'unit': '$mm', 'as_of': '2026-07-29', 'value': 4551.0, 'measures': 'securitized loans in special servicing', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'stamp', 'what_it_is': "current balance on the non-pari-passu rows of this tape — the trust's slice, not the whole loan, on both sides of the ratio"}
Written from the figures above · CBSA 12060 · stress_metro · last changed 28 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Which distress signals are elevated in Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA, and which cannot be read?
In Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA, the elevated distress signals are bank distressed CRE exposure, CMBS special servicing, store closures, and WARN notices. Specifically, bank CRE at the 90th percentile is 27.1%, with bank CRE 7.7% allocated to distressed lender exposure totaling $3.48bn, while CMBS special servicing UPB is $191.0mm (a 4.2% share of metro UPB). Additionally, there are 44 store closures and 70 WARN notices over the past year. The reading for distressed banks (count: 0 and assets $0.00bn) is unavailable as a distress signal since none are present, and the analyst should note that no elevated bank-level default figure is cited here beyond the at-risk percentage.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS in special servicing
- $191.0mm
- … as a share of this metro's CMBS balance
- 4.2%
- Bank CRE lent into this metro
- $44.44bn
- … at risk at the 90th percentile
- 27.1%
- CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line
- $3.48bn
- Assets at those lenders
- $0.00bn
- … share needing no branch-deposit allocation
- 7.7%
- Signals reading elevated
- bank CRE over the noncurrent line, CMBS in special servicing, store closures, WARN layoff notices
- Legs agreeing
- 4
- Phase
- peak
- CMBS loans in special servicing
- 11
- Distressed banks
- 0
- Store closures (past year)
- 44
- WARN notices (past year)
- 70
leading (real-economy) and realized (credit) signals are firing together
tens of millions of distressed CRE exposure
credit distress AND ground-level distress, with real dollars behind the credit side
Written from the figures above · CBSA 12060 · geo_metro_signals · last changed 27 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Jobs & Demand — the labor market under the collateralWatch it change →
Every other zone on this page reads the credit — what the loan is doing.
This one reads the demand underneath it. Office jobs pay office rent;
office rent services the office loan. When the jobs go, the DSCR follows — but not for another year or two.
That lag is the whole point of looking here.
Unemployment · Jul 2026
3.2%
-0.2pp yr
Last 24 months
2.8%3.8%
Monthly metro unemployment (BLS LAUS) — the freshest labor signal there is,
about six weeks behind. Read the direction, not the level: a 4% metro that is rising and a 6% metro that is
falling are not telling you the same thing.
Jobs by CRE-relevant sector · 2024
Annual employment by sector (BLS QCEW, 2024; 2,530,649 jobs in the metro).
QCEW lags — it is the structural read, not the current one, and we pair it with the monthly unemployment above on purpose.
Office-using sums five supersectors; where BLS withholds any one of them for
disclosure, we show nothing rather than a number we know is too low — so a missing sector here means
“suppressed at the source,” not “zero.”
Sector Heat — CMBS distress rate by property type (metro vs national)See the loans behind the bar →
This metro's CMBS runs 3.6% distressed where its own property mix predicts 5.4% — $80M less than this book would carry at the rate each property type runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted and excluding this metro. The gap is measured; the cause is not. 1 of 7 property types here run a higher distress rate than the national average for that type (the tick on each bar).
Elimination — does the gap survive a control?
Each row re-prices this metro's book on a finer cell — its own property types, then those types split by loan size, then by vintage — always at the rate that cell runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted. A gap that shrinks toward zero is explained by the control; one that stays has ruled it out. What is measured is what survives, not a cause.
property mix alone
-1.8pp
… and loan size held fixed
-1.4pp
the gap is still there with loan size held fixed too
… and vintage held fixed
-2.0pp
the gap is still there with vintage held fixed too
The largest single contributor is Retail: 87 loans, $1.2B, running 0.3% where the same type runs 2.7% elsewhere — worth 0.7pp of this metro's own rate.
Maturity Wall — CMBS coming due by year, distress within eachSee what’s maturing →
$757M — 16% of the metro's balance — matures within two years; the red slice of each bar is already distressed.
Distress Trend — is this market turning?Track it quarter by quarter →
Realized distress is RISING — 3.6% now (2026-07), +2.5pp over the year.
Same definition as the cards above — distressed means in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, dollar-weighted — on a different clock. The cards are today’s tape; this is the disclosed history panel, quarter by quarter, so you can read direction rather than level. Trusts file monthly, so a quarter is usually well covered within weeks of opening and the newest one shown is normally the current one; it is withheld only when its filed book falls below 60% of recent quarters.
Share of the metro’s CMBS in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, by quarter — a firmer, backward-looking read. A loan under 1.0x DSCR that is still paying is not counted here.
Submarket Heat — where in the metro the distress sitsOpen the submarket →
The top three submarkets hold $1.9B of the metro's $4.6B; each bar's colored share is its distress rate.
Bank Door — what the local bank sector could absorbSee it on every loan’s exit read →
$757M of CMBS matures here within two years.
The 33 regional and local banks that gather deposits here could write roughly
$1.7B more CRE before the 300% supervisory line, so the maturing balance is
0.44× that room.
The median metro sits at 0.12×.
Regional Bank Room
$1.7B
After Committed Draws
$654M / −61%
Maturing ÷ Room
0.44×
Banks In Footprint
33 / 7 at the line
The room above is already part-sold. Construction lending is a promise drawn
down over two or three years, and the undrawn part is an obligation the bank cannot decline while the borrower performs
— every one of those dollars lands in the same CRE book the 300% line governs. These banks
have $1.7B of construction committed and not yet
advanced, of which $1.0B
comes out of the room above, leaving $654M,
with 15 banks
whose entire remaining room is spoken for.
A bank with no room contributes zero here, never a negative one — capacity does not net
across balance sheets — so $644M of what has
been promised is not deducted at all, because there is nothing left to deduct it from. On today’s
capital that is funding already contracted which would cross the line as it draws.
SR 06-26 draws a second line at 100% of capital for construction and land:
7 of 33
are past it on drawn balances alone, and
12 more cross it
once their own commitments fund.
2% of the room above sits at banks we could not
match to a commitment filing; they are left out of this deduction rather than assumed to have promised nothing.
Counted — 33 regional & local CRE lenders
| Bank | Deposit share | CRE / Capital* | Room contributed | Noncurrent CRE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ameris Bank GA | 38.6% | 263% total 319%
|
🔒 | 0.12% |
| United Bank GA | 66.5% | 124% total 172%
|
🔒 | 0.10% |
| Citizens Trust Bank GA | 85.9% | 110% total 177%
|
🔒 | 1.62% |
| Affinity Bank, National Association GA | 100.0% | 220% total 360%
|
🔒 | 0.46% |
| Community Bank Of Pickens County GA | 100.0% | 211% total 399%
|
🔒 | 2.42% |
| The Citizens Bank Of Georgia GA | 100.0% | 200% total 292%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Coastal States Bank SC | 36.8% | 238% total 331%
|
🔒 | 1.53% |
| Bank Of Madison GA | 100.0% | 207% total 277%
|
🔒 | 0.03% |
| First National Bank Of Griffin GA | 100.0% | 196% total 258%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Southern First Bank SC | 12.8% | 236% total 397%
|
🔒 | 0.23% |
| Vallant Bank GA | 24.3% | 264% total 397%
|
🔒 | 0.71% |
| Shinhan Bank America NY | 31.0% | 257% total 382%
|
🔒 | 0.88% |
| American Commerce Bank, National Association GA | 89.3% | 257% total 369%
|
🔒 | 3.03% |
| Georgia Banking Company GA | 100.0% | 290% total 370%
|
🔒 | 0.04% |
| Hometrust Bank NC | 7.8% | 235% total 324%
|
🔒 | 0.68% |
| New Millennium Bank NJ | 9.8% | 168% total 294%
|
🔒 | 0.08% |
| First National Community Bank GA | 20.9% | 225% total 384%
|
🔒 | 0.51% |
| Banksouth GA | 15.2% | 247% total 303%
|
🔒 | 0.54% |
| Promiseone Bank GA | 75.9% | 284% total 364%
|
🔒 | 1.01% |
| Capital City Bank FL | 1.0% | 122% total 193%
|
🔒 | 0.40% |
| First Peoples Bank GA | 14.9% | 205% total 321%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Colony Bank GA | 8.1% | 278% total 392%
|
🔒 | 0.49% |
| Oconee State Bank GA | 12.8% | 248% total 482%
|
🔒 | 3.83% |
| First American Bank And Trust Company GA | 23.6% | 293% total 391%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Farmers And Merchants Bank GA | 9.5% | 285% total 389%
|
🔒 | 1.54% |
| Fieldpoint Private Bank & Trust CT | 0.7% | 257% total 330%
|
🔒 | 1.66% |
| Hyperion Bank PA | 43.2% | 348% total 363%
|
🔒 | 0.91% |
| American Pride Bank GA | 11.8% | 431% total 502%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Wallis Bank TX | 9.9% | 419% total 676%
|
🔒 | 1.67% |
| Central Bank FL | 8.5% | 398% total 588%
|
🔒 | 0.06% |
| First Carolina Bank NC | 3.7% | 448% total 515%
|
🔒 | 1.07% |
| Paragon Bank TN | 1.8% | 321% total 423%
|
🔒 | 0.23% |
| Pcb Bank CA | 0.2% | 304% total 471%
|
🔒 | 0.13% |
Not counted — 38 banks with deposits here
These hold deposits in this metro but are left out of the capacity above, because for them deposit location stops indicating where they lend — or they do not lend CRE at all. Real money that could refinance here is deliberately not counted.
no CRE book — CRE under 100% of capital — not a CRE lender
Truist Bank NC · Bank Of America, National Association NC · Wells Fargo Bank, National Association SD · Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Association OH · Rbc Bank, (Georgia) National Association GA · Regions Bank AL · Pnc Bank, National Association DE · Fifth Third Bank, National Association OH · Cibc National Trust Company GA · First-Citizens Bank & Trust Company NC · The Northern Trust Company IL · Tib National Association TX · Beal Bank Usa NV · Fsnb, National Association OK · Bny Mellon, National Association PA · Wilmington Trust, National Association DE
national — operates in more than 5 states, so deposits stop indicating where it lends
Metro City Bank GA · United Community Bank SC · Bank Ozk AR · First Horizon Bank TN · Pinnacle Bank TN · East West Bank CA · Renasant Bank MS · City National Bank CA · Southstate Bank, National Association FL · Woori America Bank NY · Bank Of Hope CA · Woodforest National Bank TX · United Bank VA · Servisfirst Bank AL · Hanmi Bank CA
booked here — books nearly all deposits to one branch — a charter address, not a footprint
Peoples Bank & Trust GA · Craft Bank GA · Bank Of Monticello GA · Loyal Trust Bank GA · Legacy State Bank GA · Embassy National Bank GA · Touchmark National Bank GA
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
How to read this. It is not whether any particular loan can refinance — a borrower also reaches
national banks, life companies, agencies and debt funds. It is how much of this metro’s maturing volume the local
bank sector could absorb if it were the only door.
Banks are placed by deposit share (FDIC Summary of Deposits, June 2025) — a proxy for
where they lend, not a measurement; call reports carry no collateral geography. Room = 3× total risk-based capital less CRE held
(SR 06-26, the capital base the rule names — not book equity), from Q2 2026 call reports, apportioned by that share.
Committed construction comes from FFIEC Schedule RC-L as filed at 2026-06-30 —
the undrawn half of loans already written, which the balance sheet above does not show.
Banks in more than 5 states, single-branch bookers and banks that do not lend CRE are excluded —
313 banks holding $268.2B of national capacity not counted here.
Local Lenders — banks headquartered here, worst CRE noncurrent firstUnlock each bank’s early-warning flag →
| Bank | Total CRE | CRE / Capital* | Noncurrent CRE | Early Warning |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| American Commerce Bank, National Association | $332M | 257% total 369%
|
3.03% | 🔒 |
| Community Bank Of Pickens County | $366M | 211% total 399%
|
2.42% | 🔒 |
| Touchmark National Bank | $283M | 387% total 510%
|
2.26% | 🔒 |
| Citizens Trust Bank | $197M | 110% total 177%
|
1.62% | 🔒 |
| Promiseone Bank | $332M | 284% total 364%
|
1.01% | 🔒 |
| Metro City Bank | $1.5B | 148% total 288%
|
0.47% | 🔒 |
| Craft Bank | $150M | 218% total 330%
|
0.98% | 🔒 |
| Affinity Bank, National Association | $406M | 220% total 360%
|
0.46% | 🔒 |
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
Banks are matched to their HQ metro (a proxy for footprint). Noncurrent CRE = CRE-balance-weighted blend of multifamily / nonresidential / construction noncurrent (distress already arrived). Early Warning is a validated leading signal — the bank’s 30-89 early-delinquency rank among all CRE lenders this quarter, which has predicted ~2.3× forward CRE distress. Per-bank flags are on a plan.
Do the banks lending in Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA have the capacity to refinance its maturing CRE?
In Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA, the banks that qualify — 33 of them, against 22 excluded here — show $653.7mm of room after committed draws, against a 24-month CMBS wall of $756.6mm across 63 maturing loans, a wall-to-room ratio of 1.16 — above the median of 0.20 and 52 of 270 counting from the most strained, so local banks would need to absorb more than their remaining capacity. That said, the wall is CMBS only, so everywhere ratio here is an upper bound on how much of it local banks would have to absorb, and room is itself only a proxy built from deposit footprint rather than a measurement of lending footprint.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS maturing in the window
- $756.6mm
- … across this many loans
- 63
- Local bank room, before committed draws
- $1.72bn
- Committed construction draws
- $1.68bn
- Local bank room, after those draws
- $653.7mm
- Wall-to-room ratio
- 1.16
- Rank, most strained
- 52
- … out of this many metros ranked
- 270
- … before committed draws
- 0.44
- Population ranked against
- CMBS maturing within 24 months against regional/community bank room in this metro
- Qualifying local banks
- 33
- … excluded from the calculation
- 22
- Distressed share of this metro's CMBS
- 3.6%
- Total CMBS balance here
- $4.63bn
- Capacity band
- over
Compared against a median wall-to-room ratio of
0.20 across the ranked metros.
1.16 is ABOVE the median of 0.20, so this metro is MORE strained than the typical ranked metro
52 of 270, counting from the MOST strained — a LOWER rank number means MORE strain
{'room_is_a_proxy': 'Room is what regional and community banks could still write before the SR 06-26 concentration line, after deducting construction draws already committed. Deposit footprint is a proxy for lending footprint, not a measurement of it.', 'ratio_is_not_size': 'The most extreme ratios belong to the smallest metros. Read maturing_bal_mm beside the ratio — the map sizes bubbles by the wall, not the strain, for exactly this reason.', 'wall_is_cmbs_only': "The wall is the CMBS balance maturing within 24 months — the maturing debt this platform can see, not the metro's whole maturity load. Every ratio is an upper bound on how much of it local banks would have to absorb.", 'exclusion_artifact': 'A high ratio is as often an exclusion artifact as a credit event. Banks whose deposits do not indicate where they lend (nationals, card and charter banks) are excluded from the room, so a metro served mainly by those reads strained while its credit is simply invisible here. Check banks_qualifying against banks_excluded_here, and explained_by_exclusion.'}
Written from the figures above · CBSA 12060 · capacity_metro · last changed 13 Sep 2026
· Ask your own question →
Apartment-REIT Operating Read — same-store disclosures for this metro · as of 2026-07-30Set against the loan book →
Same-Store NOI
-2.7%
Same-Store Revenue
-0.2%
Occupancy
95.6%
Rent Growth
-0.6%
| REIT | SS NOI | SS Revenue | Occupancy | Rent | As Of |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CPT | -2.6% | +1.3% | 95.5% | +0.7% | 2026-07-30 |
| EQR | -6.2% | -2.0% | 96.2% | -2.6% | 2026-04-28 |
| MAA | +0.6% | 0.0% | 95.2% | 0.0% | 2026-07-29 |
Same-store operating results disclosed by public apartment REITs (AVB · EQR · ESS · MAA · CPT · UDR) for this market in their quarterly supplements. Directional market context — an operating trend, not a Verstavo score.
On The Ground — recent closures, layoffs & CRE bankruptciesTie these events to loans →
110 local distress events in the past year (9,964 jobs) — store closures, layoffs, and commercial real estate bankruptcies near this metro's collateral.
2026-10-24
LAYOFF
95 jobs · Bowdon
2026-10-19
LAYOFF
157 jobs · Atlanta
2026-10-19
LAYOFF
78 jobs · Atlanta
2026-10-19
LAYOFF
321 jobs · Atlanta
2026-10-03
LAYOFF
192 jobs · Suwanee
2026-10-01
LAYOFF
150 jobs · Ball Ground
2026-09-26
LAYOFF
761 jobs · Marietta
2026-09-26
LAYOFF
92 jobs · Lithonia
2026-08-31
LAYOFF
69 jobs · Atlanta
2026-08-29
CLOSURE
Atlanta
2026-08-28
CLOSURE
Atlanta
2026-08-28
LAYOFF
Atlanta
2026-08-24
CLOSURE
Atlanta
2026-08-24
CLOSURE
Atlanta
2026-08-19
CLOSURE
Atlanta
What has actually happened on the ground in Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA recently?
Over the trailing 365-day window, the Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA metro recorded 48 store closures and 62 WARN notices, with 9,964 jobs affected. Note that the jobs figure is a floor, since notices stating no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs. On the commercial-real-estate bankruptcy side, the reading is 0, though this is a STATE PROXY rather than a metro-native count, and it carries the caveat that bankruptcy filings carry the filer's state, not the property's location.
The figures behind this answer
- Store closures
- 48
- WARN layoff notices
- 62
- Jobs on those notices
- 9,964
- CRE-related bankruptcies
- 0
- Window, in days
- 365
STATE PROXY — bankruptcy filings carry the filer's state, not the property's location, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count.
affected_employees is nullable — notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, so this is a floor.
Closures are matched ZIP -> CBSA and only APPROVED rows count (a pending, machine-extracted row is not yet a closure). This mirrors the Metro Pulse page, not the convergence board — the board applies neither filter and counts higher. Layoffs take the same ZIP -> CBSA and review treatment, and a WARN notice counts if it affects >= 10 people or does not state a headcount (a NULL is not 'fewer than 10').
Written from the figures above · CBSA 12060 · geo_events · last changed 13 Sep 2026
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What this page can’t do
Everything above is a snapshot — one market, as it stands today, and
it’s yours to read. What a snapshot can’t tell you is when it moves: which loan slipped a DSCR band
this month, which bank’s early-warning rank crossed into the top quartile, which submarket started turning
while the headline number still looked fine. Distress doesn’t announce itself on the day you happen to check.
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CMBS covers the securitized slice of CRE; bank, closure and layoff signals widen the view.
“No data” in a zone means we don’t observe it here, not that there is no stress.
Employment is BLS (QCEW annual, LAUS monthly) — public data, and the demand leg under all of it.
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