Commercial Real Estate Credit —
Ann Arbor, MI
The state of disclosed CRE credit in this market · MI
The read
$469M of CMBS across 29 loans. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2027 ($131M, 28% of the book). Distress is flat in the filed record — 0.0% as of 2026-07. 6 on-the-ground distress events in the past year (76 jobs).
Overview
CMBS
Submarkets
Local Banks
Jobs & Demand
On The Ground
Loading map…
The CMBS properties our stress model flags here, plus recent store closures and layoffs. Stressed is a wider net than distressed — the distressed figure above counts only loans already in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, while these dots also include performing loans facing maturity or coverage pressure. Property dots sit at the center of their ZIP code, not the building — they show where stress concentrates, not which asset. Closures and layoffs are pinned to address where we have it. Open any dot to the building and the loan behind it →
A Clean Filed Record in Ann Arbor, With 2027 the Year to Circle
Ann Arbor carries $469M of CMBS across 29 loans, and by the measure that matters to a servicer, the book is quiet: distress sits at 0.0% as of July 2026, and the filed record has been flat. There is no special-servicing or 60-plus-day story to tell here yet, and a median DSCR of 1.71 says the performing loans are covering their debt with room to spare.
The pressure point, such as it is, sits on the calendar. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2027, when $131M — 28% of the book — comes due, with the balance spread across 2029, 2030 and 2031. Every one of those maturity years shows a 0.0% distress rate today, so the question is refinancing capacity into those windows, not current delinquency.
Below the loan tape, the on-the-ground record is thin but not blank: six distress events over the past year, five of them store closures and one layoff notice accounting for 76 jobs. Office-using employment is off 4.3% year over year even as the metro's unemployment rate eased to 4.2%. For now the securitized book and the local economy are telling a consistent story — steady — and 2027 is the date to keep on the desk.
CMBS Distressed UPB
under $1M / 0.0%
in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent
CMBS Maturing ≤ 24mo
$153M
Local Banks (stressed)
0 / 3
Bank Early-Warning
1 flagged
Store Closures (1y)
5
Layoff Notices (1y)
1 / 76 jobs
0.06% of metro employment
CMBS Loans / UPB
29 / $469M
Unemployment · Jul 2026
4.2%
-0.7pp yr
Office-Using Jobs · 2024
34,305
-4.3% yr
How much CRE distress is there in Ann Arbor, MI right now?
Ann Arbor’s distress signals are mostly quiet across measurable legs: 0 of the 4 signals read elevated, and 3 of the 6 possible paired crossings agree on quiet, with the remaining 3 pairs unadjudicated because a side is blind. However, securitized loans in special servicing cannot be read here—their low numbers are an absence of MEASUREMENT, not evidence of no distress. Among measured legs, store closures stand at 5 closures at a rate of 3.74 per 100k jobs (rank 83 by count, 61 by rate of 392); layoff notices at 1 notice, a rate of 0.04% of employment (rank 212 by count of 386); and bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line at $178.0mm, a 6.69% share (rank 124 of 393). The CMBS leg is unmeasurable, so its distress level is unavailable. Overall, this is a low-stress read where measurement is possible, but the blind leg means the full picture is incomplete.
The figures behind this answer
| Signal | Level | Rate | Rank by count | Rank by rate | Reading |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| store closures store closures per 100,000 jobs |
5 closures | 3.74 per 100k jobs | 83 of 392 | 61 of 392 | quiet trailing 365 days to today
|
| layoff notices (WARN) workers on layoff notices as a share of the metro's employment |
1 notices | 0.04% | 212 of 386 | 210 of 386 | quiet trailing 365 days to today
|
| bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line share of the CRE lent into this metro that sits at a lender over the blended-noncurrent line |
$178.0mm | 6.69% | 124 of 393 | 112 of 393 | quiet
allocated 2026-03-31
|
| securitized loans in special servicing share of the securitized balance read here that is in special servicing |
1 loan records | — | — | — | cannot be read
not measurable 2026-07-29
|
6 pairs compared
0 both elevated
3 both quiet
0 disagreeing
3 unreadable — a side is blind
0 of four legs elevated
blind: securitized loans in special servicing
one metro, four independent feeds, each on its own denominator
{'coverage': "114 of 441 metros have at least one blind leg and 48 are blind on all four. Those 48 are the same metros the board's map cannot place and the metro resolver cannot name: one ZIP-to-CBSA crosswalk boundary, showing up three ways.", 'a_count_ranks_by_size': 'Elevation is computed on the COUNT, over a flat threshold, which is a size filter. New York is 2nd of 392 by store closures and 264th of the same 392 by closures per job — both true, and which one you lead with decides what the reader believes. Every leg carries both ranks over ONE population; quote the rate beside the count.', 'disagreement_is_not_severity': 'Where two legs disagree, that is usually a fact about WHICH mechanism is running, not an error in either feed and not a worse metro. The six pairs read different populations, and each note is a STRUCTURAL prior about those populations — nothing here measures a lead or a lag between two legs, so never report one as timing.', 'a_blind_leg_is_not_a_quiet_one': "A leg with no denominator, or whose numerator cannot be measured, reads LOW and means nothing. Each leg publishes a measurement state (allocated, floor, measured, no denominator, no rate, not measurable) for that reason. Never report a blind leg as 'no distress'."}
{'fork': 'a blind leg is not a quiet one', 'note': 'securitized loans in special servicing cannot be read here. Their low numbers are an absence of MEASUREMENT.'}
{'leg': 'closures', 'unit': 'jobs', 'as_of': 'trailing 365 days to today', 'value': 133668, 'measures': 'store closures', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'window', 'what_it_is': "all metro jobs, QCEW annual average — a SIZE normaliser, not a matched population: the feed spans retail, food service and pharmacy and no single QCEW sector covers it. The MATCHED read sits beside it as this leg's second reading"}
{'leg': 'warn', 'unit': 'employed', 'as_of': 'trailing 365 days to today', 'value': 183743, 'measures': 'layoff notices (WARN)', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'window', 'what_it_is': 'employed persons, BLS LAUS, not seasonally adjusted'}
{'leg': 'bank', 'unit': '$mm', 'as_of': '2026-03-31', 'value': 2662.3, 'measures': 'bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'stamp', 'what_it_is': 'bank CRE allocated to this metro by branch deposits'}
{'leg': 'cmbs', 'unit': '$mm', 'as_of': '2026-07-29', 'value': 465.0, 'measures': 'securitized loans in special servicing', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'stamp', 'what_it_is': "current balance on the non-pari-passu rows of this tape — the trust's slice, not the whole loan, on both sides of the ratio"}
Written from the figures above · CBSA 11460 · stress_metro · last changed 28 Aug 2026
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Which distress signals are elevated in Ann Arbor, MI, and which cannot be read?
Ann Arbor, MI is currently in a "watch" phase, with no elevated distress signals identified. The bank-side reading shows CRE exposure of $2.66bn (5.8% allocation), with 10.0% of that at risk at the 90th percentile; however, distressed lender CRE stands at $178.0mm and the number of distressed banks is zero. On the securitized side, the CMBS special servicing reading of $0.0mm (0.0% of metro UPB) is unavailable as a true measure — the tape carries one loan in special servicing with no balance, so the figure represents a data gap rather than an absence of distress. Store closures (5) and WARN notices (1) are present but not credit-material, and the reading overall is "thin," with materiality deemed "immaterial."
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS in special servicing
- $0.0mm
- … as a share of this metro's CMBS balance
- 0.0%
- Bank CRE lent into this metro
- $2.66bn
- … at risk at the 90th percentile
- 10.0%
- CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line
- $178.0mm
- Assets at those lenders
- $0.00bn
- … share needing no branch-deposit allocation
- 5.8%
- Legs agreeing
- 0
- Phase
- watch
- CMBS loans in special servicing
- 1
- Distressed banks
- 0
- Store closures (past year)
- 5
- WARN notices (past year)
- 1
an isolated signal, not a convergence
little to no distressed CRE dollars behind the signals; and the securitized side is NOT MEASURED here — all 1 loans in special servicing sit on tape rows carrying no balance, so the $0 is a gap in the tape, not an absence of distress
signals are present but neither credit-material nor ground-heavy
Written from the figures above · CBSA 11460 · geo_metro_signals · last changed 27 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Jobs & Demand — the labor market under the collateralWatch it change →
Every other zone on this page reads the credit — what the loan is doing.
This one reads the demand underneath it. Office jobs pay office rent;
office rent services the office loan. When the jobs go, the DSCR follows — but not for another year or two.
That lag is the whole point of looking here.
Unemployment · Jul 2026
4.2%
-0.7pp yr
Last 24 months
3.5%4.9%
Monthly metro unemployment (BLS LAUS) — the freshest labor signal there is,
about six weeks behind. Read the direction, not the level: a 4% metro that is rising and a 6% metro that is
falling are not telling you the same thing.
Jobs by CRE-relevant sector · 2024
Annual employment by sector (BLS QCEW, 2024; 133,668 jobs in the metro).
QCEW lags — it is the structural read, not the current one, and we pair it with the monthly unemployment above on purpose.
Office-using sums five supersectors; where BLS withholds any one of them for
disclosure, we show nothing rather than a number we know is too low — so a missing sector here means
“suppressed at the source,” not “zero.”
Sector Heat — CMBS distress rate by property type (metro vs national)See the loans behind the bar →
This metro's CMBS runs 0.0% distressed where its own property mix predicts 6.8% — $32M less than this book would carry at the rate each property type runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted and excluding this metro. The gap is measured; the cause is not.
No CMBS sector data for this metro.
Elimination — does the gap survive a control?
Each row re-prices this metro's book on a finer cell — its own property types, then those types split by loan size, then by vintage — always at the rate that cell runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted. A gap that shrinks toward zero is explained by the control; one that stays has ruled it out. What is measured is what survives, not a cause.
property mix alone
-6.8pp
… and loan size held fixed
-7.2pp
the gap is still there with loan size held fixed too
… and vintage held fixed
-6.4pp
the gap is still there with vintage held fixed too
The largest single contributor is Multifamily: 8 loans, $164M, running 0.0% where the same type runs 7.7% elsewhere — worth 2.7pp of this metro's own rate.
Maturity Wall — CMBS coming due by year, distress within eachSee what’s maturing →
$153M — 33% of the metro's balance — matures within two years; the red slice of each bar is already distressed.
Distress Trend — is this market turning?Track it quarter by quarter →
Realized distress is FLAT — 0.0% now (2026-07), +0.0pp over the year.
Same definition as the cards above — distressed means in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, dollar-weighted — on a different clock. The cards are today’s tape; this is the disclosed history panel, quarter by quarter, so you can read direction rather than level. Trusts file monthly, so a quarter is usually well covered within weeks of opening and the newest one shown is normally the current one; it is withheld only when its filed book falls below 60% of recent quarters.
Share of the metro’s CMBS in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, by quarter — a firmer, backward-looking read. A loan under 1.0x DSCR that is still paying is not counted here.
Submarket Heat — where in the metro the distress sitsOpen the submarket →
The top three submarkets hold $461M of the metro's $469M; each bar's colored share is its distress rate.
Bank Door — what the local bank sector could absorbSee it on every loan’s exit read →
$153M of CMBS matures here within two years.
The 5 regional and local banks that gather deposits here could write roughly
$386M more CRE before the 300% supervisory line, so the maturing balance is
0.40× that room.
The median metro sits at 0.12×.
Regional Bank Room
$386M
After Committed Draws
$275M / −29%
Maturing ÷ Room
0.40×
Banks In Footprint
5 / 0 at the line
The room above is already part-sold. Construction lending is a promise drawn
down over two or three years, and the undrawn part is an obligation the bank cannot decline while the borrower performs
— every one of those dollars lands in the same CRE book the 300% line governs. These banks
have $131M of construction committed and not yet
advanced, of which $111M
comes out of the room above, leaving $275M,
with 2 banks
whose entire remaining room is spoken for.
A bank with no room contributes zero here, never a negative one — capacity does not net
across balance sheets — so $20M of what has
been promised is not deducted at all, because there is nothing left to deduct it from. On today’s
capital that is funding already contracted which would cross the line as it draws.
SR 06-26 draws a second line at 100% of capital for construction and land:
2 more cross it
once their own commitments fund.
Counted — 5 regional & local CRE lenders
| Bank | Deposit share | CRE / Capital* | Room contributed | Noncurrent CRE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bank Of Ann Arbor MI | 58.7% | 212% total 294%
|
🔒 | 0.20% |
| Chelsea State Bank MI | 99.9% | 105% total 264%
|
🔒 | 2.01% |
| First Merchants Bank IN | 1.2% | 183% total 243%
|
🔒 | 0.59% |
| Bank Michigan MI | 26.1% | 274% total 446%
|
🔒 | 0.08% |
| Northstar Bank MI | 15.5% | 298% total 548%
|
🔒 | 0.92% |
Not counted — 10 banks with deposits here
These hold deposits in this metro but are left out of the capacity above, because for them deposit location stops indicating where they lend — or they do not lend CRE at all. Real money that could refinance here is deliberately not counted.
no CRE book — CRE under 100% of capital — not a CRE lender
Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Association OH · The Huntington National Bank OH · Pnc Bank, National Association DE · Keybank National Association OH · University Bank MI · Bank Of America, National Association NC · Fifth Third Bank, National Association OH · Citizens Bank, National Association RI
national — operates in more than 5 states, so deposits stop indicating where it lends
Old National Bank IN · Flagstar Bank, National Association NY
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
How to read this. It is not whether any particular loan can refinance — a borrower also reaches
national banks, life companies, agencies and debt funds. It is how much of this metro’s maturing volume the local
bank sector could absorb if it were the only door.
Banks are placed by deposit share (FDIC Summary of Deposits, June 2025) — a proxy for
where they lend, not a measurement; call reports carry no collateral geography. Room = 3× total risk-based capital less CRE held
(SR 06-26, the capital base the rule names — not book equity), from Q2 2026 call reports, apportioned by that share.
Committed construction comes from FFIEC Schedule RC-L as filed at 2026-06-30 —
the undrawn half of loans already written, which the balance sheet above does not show.
Banks in more than 5 states, single-branch bookers and banks that do not lend CRE are excluded —
313 banks holding $268.2B of national capacity not counted here.
Local Lenders — banks headquartered here, worst CRE noncurrent firstUnlock each bank’s early-warning flag →
| Bank | Total CRE | CRE / Capital* | Noncurrent CRE | Early Warning |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| University Bank | $158M | 79% total 133%
|
0.36% | 🔒 |
| Chelsea State Bank | $149M | 105% total 264%
|
2.01% | 🔒 |
| Bank Of Ann Arbor | $1.4B | 212% total 294%
|
0.20% | 🔒 |
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
Banks are matched to their HQ metro (a proxy for footprint). Noncurrent CRE = CRE-balance-weighted blend of multifamily / nonresidential / construction noncurrent (distress already arrived). Early Warning is a validated leading signal — the bank’s 30-89 early-delinquency rank among all CRE lenders this quarter, which has predicted ~2.3× forward CRE distress. Per-bank flags are on a plan.
Do the banks lending in Ann Arbor, MI have the capacity to refinance its maturing CRE?
In Ann Arbor, MI, the regional and community banks represented here appear to have ample capacity to absorb the maturing CMBS wall: with a maturing balance of $153.1mm across 8 maturing loans set against room_after_committed of $275.5mm, the wall_to_room reading of 0.56 implies the visible maturity load is well covered, and the room_before_committed figure of $386.0mm is larger still once committed_draws of $130.7mm are set aside. That said, only 5 banks qualify for this room calculation while 2 are excluded, so the figures rest on a partial view of local lending, and the $468.9mm of CMBS upb is the platform's visible maturing debt over the horizon rather than the metro's entire maturity load. The distressed_share of 0.0% offers no offsetting concern, and the reading is slack.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS maturing in the window
- $153.1mm
- … across this many loans
- 8
- Local bank room, before committed draws
- $386.0mm
- Committed construction draws
- $130.7mm
- Local bank room, after those draws
- $275.5mm
- Wall-to-room ratio
- 0.56
- Rank, most strained
- 74
- … out of this many metros ranked
- 270
- … before committed draws
- 0.40
- Population ranked against
- CMBS maturing within 24 months against regional/community bank room in this metro
- Qualifying local banks
- 5
- … excluded from the calculation
- 2
- Distressed share of this metro's CMBS
- 0.0%
- Total CMBS balance here
- $468.9mm
- Capacity band
- slack
Compared against a median wall-to-room ratio of
0.20 across the ranked metros.
0.56 is ABOVE the median of 0.20, so this metro is MORE strained than the typical ranked metro
74 of 270, counting from the MOST strained — a LOWER rank number means MORE strain
{'room_is_a_proxy': 'Room is what regional and community banks could still write before the SR 06-26 concentration line, after deducting construction draws already committed. Deposit footprint is a proxy for lending footprint, not a measurement of it.', 'ratio_is_not_size': 'The most extreme ratios belong to the smallest metros. Read maturing_bal_mm beside the ratio — the map sizes bubbles by the wall, not the strain, for exactly this reason.', 'wall_is_cmbs_only': "The wall is the CMBS balance maturing within 24 months — the maturing debt this platform can see, not the metro's whole maturity load. Every ratio is an upper bound on how much of it local banks would have to absorb.", 'exclusion_artifact': 'A high ratio is as often an exclusion artifact as a credit event. Banks whose deposits do not indicate where they lend (nationals, card and charter banks) are excluded from the room, so a metro served mainly by those reads strained while its credit is simply invisible here. Check banks_qualifying against banks_excluded_here, and explained_by_exclusion.'}
Written from the figures above · CBSA 11460 · capacity_metro · last changed 13 Sep 2026
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On The Ground — recent closures, layoffs & CRE bankruptciesTie these events to loans →
6 local distress events in the past year (76 jobs) — store closures, layoffs, and commercial real estate bankruptcies near this metro's collateral.
2026-05-03
CLOSURE
Ann Arbor
2026-04-06
BANKRUPTCY
CRE-linked bankruptcy
2026-04-06
BANKRUPTCY
CRE-linked bankruptcy
2026-03-09
LAYOFF
76 jobs · Ann Arbor
2025-12-31
CLOSURE
Ann Arbor
2025-12-31
CLOSURE
Ypsilanti
2025-09-30
CLOSURE
Ypsilanti
2025-09-30
CLOSURE
Ypsilanti
2025-05-31
LAYOFF
41 jobs · Ann Arbor
2025-02-28
CLOSURE
Ann Arbor
2024-10-31
CLOSURE
Ann Arbor
2024-02-15
LAYOFF
Ann Arbor
2023-04-07
LAYOFF
100 jobs · Ann Arbor
2023-02-23
LAYOFF
200 jobs · Ann Arbor
What has actually happened on the ground in Ann Arbor, MI recently?
Over the trailing 365, Ann Arbor, MI has seen 5 store closures and 1 WARN notice, with 76 jobs affected. CRE bankruptcies come in at 2, but this is a STATE PROXY — bankruptcy filings carry the filer's state, not the property's location, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count. Note also that the 76 jobs affected is a floor, since affected_employees is nullable and notices stating no headcount contribute 0 jobs.
The figures behind this answer
- Store closures
- 5
- WARN layoff notices
- 1
- Jobs on those notices
- 76
- CRE-related bankruptcies
- 2
- Window, in days
- 365
STATE PROXY — bankruptcy filings carry the filer's state, not the property's location, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count.
affected_employees is nullable — notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, so this is a floor.
Closures are matched ZIP -> CBSA and only APPROVED rows count (a pending, machine-extracted row is not yet a closure). This mirrors the Metro Pulse page, not the convergence board — the board applies neither filter and counts higher. Layoffs take the same ZIP -> CBSA and review treatment, and a WARN notice counts if it affects >= 10 people or does not state a headcount (a NULL is not 'fewer than 10').
Written from the figures above · CBSA 11460 · geo_events · last changed 13 Sep 2026
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What this page can’t do
Everything above is a snapshot — one market, as it stands today, and
it’s yours to read. What a snapshot can’t tell you is when it moves: which loan slipped a DSCR band
this month, which bank’s early-warning rank crossed into the top quartile, which submarket started turning
while the headline number still looked fine. Distress doesn’t announce itself on the day you happen to check.
This page
One metro · one moment · you come looking.
Verstavo
Every metro · every month · it comes looking for you.
CMBS covers the securitized slice of CRE; bank, closure and layoff signals widen the view.
“No data” in a zone means we don’t observe it here, not that there is no stress.
Employment is BLS (QCEW annual, LAUS monthly) — public data, and the demand leg under all of it.
See the whole picture, not just the pulse.
Metro Pulse is the free, public read. The Verstavo platform goes loan‑by‑loan — stress
scores, maturity walls, special‑servicing transfers, bank CRE, and your own portfolio benchmarked
against the market.