Commercial Real Estate Credit —
Akron, OH
The state of disclosed CRE credit in this market · OH
The read
$549M of CMBS across 29 loans. Distress is rising in the filed record — 3.2% as of 2026-07. The heaviest maturity load lands in 2029 ($104M). 3 on-the-ground distress events in the past year.
Overview
CMBS
Submarkets
Local Banks
Jobs & Demand
On The Ground
Loading map…
The CMBS properties our stress model flags here, plus recent store closures and layoffs. Stressed is a wider net than distressed — the distressed figure above counts only loans already in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, while these dots also include performing loans facing maturity or coverage pressure. Property dots sit at the center of their ZIP code, not the building — they show where stress concentrates, not which asset. Closures and layoffs are pinned to address where we have it. Open any dot to the building and the loan behind it →
Akron's Filed Distress Ticks Up as the Maturity Wall Sets Up for 2029
Akron carries a modest CMBS book — $549M spread across 29 loans — and the filed record has begun to move. The distress rate reads 3.2% as of July 2026, and the direction is up. That is a small number on a small book, but the trend line is the story: what had been a quiet market is showing its first cracks in the servicer data. Median DSCR across the metro still sits at a comfortable 1.71, the kind of coverage that says most of this paper is paying as agreed even as the tally of trouble edges higher.
The timing pressure lands later this decade. The heaviest maturity load falls in 2029, at $104M — the single largest slug of paper coming due in the metro. For now the 2029 book shows no filed distress, but it is the year that concentrates the refinancing question, and desks watching Akron should mark it.
Beyond the loan tape, the on-the-ground signal is thin but not blank: three store closures over the past year, with no layoff notices filed. It is a small metro throwing off small numbers, but the same numbers all point the same way — a filed record that is rising off a low base.
CMBS Distressed UPB
$20M / 3.7%
in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent
CMBS Maturing ≤ 24mo
$150M
Local Banks (stressed)
0 / 2
Bank Early-Warning
0 flagged
Store Closures (1y)
3
Layoff Notices (1y)
0 / 0 jobs
CMBS Loans / UPB
29 / $549M
Unemployment · Jul 2026
3.6%
-1.4pp yr
Office-Using Jobs · 2024
57,926
-3.8% yr
How much CRE distress is there in Akron, OH right now?
Akron, OH shows a distinctly uneven distress picture: store closures are elevated, with 6 closures over the trailing year (2.14 per 100,000 jobs, ranked 70th of 392 metros by count and 155th by rate), while WARN layoff notices are quiet at 0 notices (ranked 313th of 386). Bank CRE over the noncurrent line reads $272.6mm (7.28% of allocated CRE, ranked 96th of 393 by count), which is not elevated, and securitized loans in special servicing sit at 2 rows (1.89% of the tape balance, ranked 66th of 335), also not elevated. Of the six pairwise comparisons, 0 show both sides elevated, 3 show both sides quiet, and 3 disagree — the disagreements all stem from store closures being hot while the other three legs read calm, suggesting tenant failures below the WARN filing floor and on buildings not held in this securitized tape, with no lender balance sheet yet reflecting the stress.
The figures behind this answer
| Signal | Level | Rate | Rank by count | Rank by rate | Reading |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| store closures store closures per 100,000 jobs |
6 closures | 2.14 per 100k jobs | 70 of 392 | 155 of 392 | elevated trailing 365 days to today
|
| layoff notices (WARN) workers on layoff notices as a share of the metro's employment |
0 notices | 0% | 313 of 386 | 308 of 386 | quiet trailing 365 days to today
|
| bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line share of the CRE lent into this metro that sits at a lender over the blended-noncurrent line |
$272.6mm | 7.28% | 96 of 393 | 106 of 393 | quiet
allocated 2026-03-31
|
| securitized loans in special servicing share of the securitized balance read here that is in special servicing |
2 loan records | 1.89% | 66 of 335 | 94 of 335 | quiet
floor 2026-07-29
|
6 pairs compared
0 both elevated
3 both quiet
3 disagreeing
0 unreadable — a side is blind
1 of four legs elevated
one metro, four independent feeds, each on its own denominator
{'coverage': "114 of 441 metros have at least one blind leg and 48 are blind on all four. Those 48 are the same metros the board's map cannot place and the metro resolver cannot name: one ZIP-to-CBSA crosswalk boundary, showing up three ways.", 'a_count_ranks_by_size': 'Elevation is computed on the COUNT, over a flat threshold, which is a size filter. New York is 2nd of 392 by store closures and 264th of the same 392 by closures per job — both true, and which one you lead with decides what the reader believes. Every leg carries both ranks over ONE population; quote the rate beside the count.', 'disagreement_is_not_severity': 'Where two legs disagree, that is usually a fact about WHICH mechanism is running, not an error in either feed and not a worse metro. The six pairs read different populations, and each note is a STRUCTURAL prior about those populations — nothing here measures a lead or a lag between two legs, so never report one as timing.', 'a_blind_leg_is_not_a_quiet_one': "A leg with no denominator, or whose numerator cannot be measured, reads LOW and means nothing. Each leg publishes a measurement state (allocated, floor, measured, no denominator, no rate, not measurable) for that reason. Never report a blind leg as 'no distress'."}
{'leg': 'closures', 'unit': 'jobs', 'as_of': 'trailing 365 days to today', 'value': 279753, 'measures': 'store closures', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'window', 'what_it_is': "all metro jobs, QCEW annual average — a SIZE normaliser, not a matched population: the feed spans retail, food service and pharmacy and no single QCEW sector covers it. The MATCHED read sits beside it as this leg's second reading"}
{'leg': 'warn', 'unit': 'employed', 'as_of': 'trailing 365 days to today', 'value': 344055, 'measures': 'layoff notices (WARN)', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'window', 'what_it_is': 'employed persons, BLS LAUS, not seasonally adjusted'}
{'leg': 'bank', 'unit': '$mm', 'as_of': '2026-03-31', 'value': 3742.5, 'measures': 'bank CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'stamp', 'what_it_is': 'bank CRE allocated to this metro by branch deposits'}
{'leg': 'cmbs', 'unit': '$mm', 'as_of': '2026-07-29', 'value': 635.0, 'measures': 'securitized loans in special servicing', 'available': True, 'as_of_kind': 'stamp', 'what_it_is': "current balance on the non-pari-passu rows of this tape — the trust's slice, not the whole loan, on both sides of the ratio"}
Written from the figures above · CBSA 10420 · stress_metro · last changed 28 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Which distress signals are elevated in Akron, OH, and which cannot be read?
In Akron, OH, the elevated distress signal is closures, with 6 store closures over one year against 0 WARN notices. CRE-credit distress itself is largely unreadable: the securitized dollar figure is a FLOOR because it is measured over 50.0% of the metro’s 2 special-servicing rows (the rest carry no balance), making the securitized side invisible here. Bank-side data show $3.74bn in bank CRE, with 7.2% at risk at the 90th percentile, but distressed lender CRE is $272.6mm with 0 distressed banks and no material distressed dollars behind the signal — this is a real-economy signal (closures/layoffs) rather than a CRE-credit event. The reading on whether CRE credit has been hit is unavailable; the phase is "obscured," not quiet.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS in special servicing
- $12.0mm
- … as a share of this metro's CMBS balance
- 1.9%
- Bank CRE lent into this metro
- $3.74bn
- … at risk at the 90th percentile
- 7.2%
- CRE at lenders over the noncurrent line
- $272.6mm
- Assets at those lenders
- $0.00bn
- … share needing no branch-deposit allocation
- 6.8%
- Signals reading elevated
- store closures
- Legs agreeing
- 1
- Phase
- obscured
- CMBS loans in special servicing
- 2
- Distressed banks
- 0
- Store closures (past year)
- 6
- WARN notices (past year)
- 0
the ground is deteriorating, and whether CRE credit has been hit here CANNOT BE READ: the securitized dollars are measured over 50.0% of its 2 special-servicing rows — the securitized side is invisible here, which is not the same as quiet
little to no distressed CRE dollars behind the signals; measured over 50.0% of this metro's 2 special-servicing rows — the rest carry no balance, so the dollar figure is a FLOOR
the ground is wobbling (closures / layoffs) but little CRE-credit distress sits behind it yet — a real-economy signal, not (yet) a CRE-credit event
Written from the figures above · CBSA 10420 · geo_metro_signals · last changed 27 Aug 2026
· Ask your own question →
Jobs & Demand — the labor market under the collateralWatch it change →
Every other zone on this page reads the credit — what the loan is doing.
This one reads the demand underneath it. Office jobs pay office rent;
office rent services the office loan. When the jobs go, the DSCR follows — but not for another year or two.
That lag is the whole point of looking here.
Unemployment · Jul 2026
3.6%
-1.4pp yr
Last 24 months
3.0%5.7%
Monthly metro unemployment (BLS LAUS) — the freshest labor signal there is,
about six weeks behind. Read the direction, not the level: a 4% metro that is rising and a 6% metro that is
falling are not telling you the same thing.
Jobs by CRE-relevant sector · 2024
Annual employment by sector (BLS QCEW, 2024; 279,753 jobs in the metro).
QCEW lags — it is the structural read, not the current one, and we pair it with the monthly unemployment above on purpose.
Office-using sums five supersectors; where BLS withholds any one of them for
disclosure, we show nothing rather than a number we know is too low — so a missing sector here means
“suppressed at the source,” not “zero.”
Sector Heat — CMBS distress rate by property type (metro vs national)See the loans behind the bar →
This metro's CMBS runs 3.7% distressed where its own property mix predicts 5.5% — $10M less than this book would carry at the rate each property type runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted and excluding this metro. The gap is measured; the cause is not.
No CMBS sector data for this metro.
Elimination — does the gap survive a control?
Each row re-prices this metro's book on a finer cell — its own property types, then those types split by loan size, then by vintage — always at the rate that cell runs elsewhere in the country, dollar-weighted. A gap that shrinks toward zero is explained by the control; one that stays has ruled it out. What is measured is what survives, not a cause.
property mix alone
-1.8pp
… and loan size held fixed
-1.5pp
the gap is still there with loan size held fixed too
… and vintage held fixed
-3.8pp
the gap is still there with vintage held fixed too
The largest single contributor is Office: 5 loans, $92M, running 0.0% where the same type runs 11.3% elsewhere — worth 1.9pp of this metro's own rate.
Maturity Wall — CMBS coming due by year, distress within eachSee what’s maturing →
$150M — 27% of the metro's balance — matures within two years; the red slice of each bar is already distressed.
Distress Trend — is this market turning?Track it quarter by quarter →
Realized distress is RISING — 3.2% now (2026-07), +3.2pp over the year.
Same definition as the cards above — distressed means in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, dollar-weighted — on a different clock. The cards are today’s tape; this is the disclosed history panel, quarter by quarter, so you can read direction rather than level. Trusts file monthly, so a quarter is usually well covered within weeks of opening and the newest one shown is normally the current one; it is withheld only when its filed book falls below 60% of recent quarters.
Share of the metro’s CMBS in special servicing or 60+ days delinquent, by quarter — a firmer, backward-looking read. A loan under 1.0x DSCR that is still paying is not counted here.
Submarket Heat — where in the metro the distress sitsOpen the submarket →
The top three submarkets hold $370M of the metro's $549M; each bar's colored share is its distress rate.
Bank Door — what the local bank sector could absorbSee it on every loan’s exit read →
$150M of CMBS matures here within two years.
The 10 regional and local banks that gather deposits here could write roughly
$196M more CRE before the 300% supervisory line, so the maturing balance is
0.76× that room.
The median metro sits at 0.12×.
Regional Bank Room
$196M
After Committed Draws
$142M / −28%
Maturing ÷ Room
0.76×
Banks In Footprint
10 / 1 at the line
The room above is already part-sold. Construction lending is a promise drawn
down over two or three years, and the undrawn part is an obligation the bank cannot decline while the borrower performs
— every one of those dollars lands in the same CRE book the 300% line governs. These banks
have $88M of construction committed and not yet
advanced, of which $54M
comes out of the room above, leaving $142M,
with 3 banks
whose entire remaining room is spoken for.
A bank with no room contributes zero here, never a negative one — capacity does not net
across balance sheets — so $34M of what has
been promised is not deducted at all, because there is nothing left to deduct it from. On today’s
capital that is funding already contracted which would cross the line as it draws.
SR 06-26 draws a second line at 100% of capital for construction and land:
4 more cross it
once their own commitments fund.
Counted — 10 regional & local CRE lenders
| Bank | Deposit share | CRE / Capital* | Room contributed | Noncurrent CRE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Portage Community Bank OH | 100.0% | 128% total 232%
|
🔒 | 0.50% |
| Hometown Bank OH | 100.0% | 152% total 466%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Northwest Bank PA | 0.4% | 109% total 145%
|
🔒 | 1.53% |
| The Farmers National Bank Of Canfield OH | 1.7% | 198% total 285%
|
🔒 | 1.02% |
| Dollar Bank, Federal Savings Bank PA | 0.3% | 168% total 187%
|
🔒 | 0.42% |
| Civista Bank OH | 2.7% | 261% total 329%
|
🔒 | 0.63% |
| Consumers National Bank OH | 4.3% | 188% total 336%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| Cfbank, National Association OH | 8.5% | 279% total 362%
|
🔒 | 0.53% |
| The Apple Creek Banking Company OH | 10.0% | 194% total 355%
|
🔒 | 0.00% |
| S&t Bank PA | 2.5% | 309% total 339%
|
🔒 | 0.24% |
Not counted — 13 banks with deposits here
These hold deposits in this metro but are left out of the capacity above, because for them deposit location stops indicating where they lend — or they do not lend CRE at all. Real money that could refinance here is deliberately not counted.
no CRE book — CRE under 100% of capital — not a CRE lender
The Huntington National Bank OH · Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Association OH · Pnc Bank, National Association DE · Keybank National Association OH · Fifth Third Bank, National Association OH · Third Federal Savings And Loan Association Of Cleveland OH · Citizens Bank, National Association RI · U.s. Bank National Association OH
national — operates in more than 5 states, so deposits stop indicating where it lends
First National Bank Of Pennsylvania PA · Peoples Bank OH · Wesbanco Bank, Inc. WV · Woodforest National Bank TX · Flagstar Bank, National Association NY
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
How to read this. It is not whether any particular loan can refinance — a borrower also reaches
national banks, life companies, agencies and debt funds. It is how much of this metro’s maturing volume the local
bank sector could absorb if it were the only door.
Banks are placed by deposit share (FDIC Summary of Deposits, June 2025) — a proxy for
where they lend, not a measurement; call reports carry no collateral geography. Room = 3× total risk-based capital less CRE held
(SR 06-26, the capital base the rule names — not book equity), from Q2 2026 call reports, apportioned by that share.
Committed construction comes from FFIEC Schedule RC-L as filed at 2026-06-30 —
the undrawn half of loans already written, which the balance sheet above does not show.
Banks in more than 5 states, single-branch bookers and banks that do not lend CRE are excluded —
313 banks holding $268.2B of national capacity not counted here.
Local Lenders — banks headquartered here, worst CRE noncurrent firstUnlock each bank’s early-warning flag →
| Bank | Total CRE | CRE / Capital* | Noncurrent CRE | Early Warning |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Portage Community Bank | $150M | 128% total 232%
|
0.50% | 🔒 |
| Hometown Bank | $104M | 152% total 466%
|
0.00% | 🔒 |
* Two ratios, two perimeters.
The large figure is supervisory CRE over total risk-based capital —
construction, multifamily and non-owner-occupied nonfarm nonresidential. That is the book SR 06-26 draws its
300% line against, and it is what the red coloring and the room contributed are both measured on.
Total beneath it adds owner-occupied CRE — lending to a business on
its own premises — which the guidance deliberately leaves out. A bank can sit well above 300% on total CRE and
still be inside the line, with real room to lend; both are shown so the gap is visible rather than surprising.
Banks are matched to their HQ metro (a proxy for footprint). Noncurrent CRE = CRE-balance-weighted blend of multifamily / nonresidential / construction noncurrent (distress already arrived). Early Warning is a validated leading signal — the bank’s 30-89 early-delinquency rank among all CRE lenders this quarter, which has predicted ~2.3× forward CRE distress. Per-bank flags are on a plan.
Do the banks lending in Akron, OH have the capacity to refinance its maturing CRE?
In Akron, OH, the CMBS wall maturing within 24 months stands at $149.5mm across 11 loans, against regional and community bank room of $141.8mm after committed draws — a wall-to-room ratio of 1.05, against 0.76 before committed draws are deducted. With 10 banks qualifying and 5 banks excluded here, and a distressed share of 3.7%, the data place Akron at 55 of 270 counting from the most strained, so the local bank footprint looks strained relative to the $549.3mm CMBS UPB; the caveats note the wall captures only the CMBS balance maturing within 24 months, and the room figure is a deposit-footprint proxy rather than a measurement of lending capacity.
The figures behind this answer
- CMBS maturing in the window
- $149.5mm
- … across this many loans
- 11
- Local bank room, before committed draws
- $195.8mm
- Committed construction draws
- $88.5mm
- Local bank room, after those draws
- $141.8mm
- Wall-to-room ratio
- 1.05
- Rank, most strained
- 55
- … out of this many metros ranked
- 270
- … before committed draws
- 0.76
- Population ranked against
- CMBS maturing within 24 months against regional/community bank room in this metro
- Qualifying local banks
- 10
- … excluded from the calculation
- 5
- Distressed share of this metro's CMBS
- 3.7%
- Total CMBS balance here
- $549.3mm
- Capacity band
- over
Compared against a median wall-to-room ratio of
0.20 across the ranked metros.
1.05 is ABOVE the median of 0.20, so this metro is MORE strained than the typical ranked metro
55 of 270, counting from the MOST strained — a LOWER rank number means MORE strain
{'room_is_a_proxy': 'Room is what regional and community banks could still write before the SR 06-26 concentration line, after deducting construction draws already committed. Deposit footprint is a proxy for lending footprint, not a measurement of it.', 'ratio_is_not_size': 'The most extreme ratios belong to the smallest metros. Read maturing_bal_mm beside the ratio — the map sizes bubbles by the wall, not the strain, for exactly this reason.', 'wall_is_cmbs_only': "The wall is the CMBS balance maturing within 24 months — the maturing debt this platform can see, not the metro's whole maturity load. Every ratio is an upper bound on how much of it local banks would have to absorb.", 'exclusion_artifact': 'A high ratio is as often an exclusion artifact as a credit event. Banks whose deposits do not indicate where they lend (nationals, card and charter banks) are excluded from the room, so a metro served mainly by those reads strained while its credit is simply invisible here. Check banks_qualifying against banks_excluded_here, and explained_by_exclusion.'}
Written from the figures above · CBSA 10420 · capacity_metro · last changed 13 Sep 2026
· Ask your own question →
On The Ground — recent closures, layoffs & CRE bankruptciesTie these events to loans →
3 local distress events in the past year — store closures, layoffs, and commercial real estate bankruptcies near this metro's collateral.
2025-12-31
CLOSURE
Akron
2025-12-31
CLOSURE
Akron
2025-12-31
CLOSURE
Hudson
2025-05-30
CLOSURE
Hudson
2022-05-25
LAYOFF
18 jobs · Cuyahoga Falls/Summit
2021-03-01
LAYOFF
155 jobs · Akron/Summit
2020-12-03
LAYOFF
109 jobs · Akron/Summit
2020-10-20
LAYOFF
23 jobs · Twinsburg/Summit
2020-09-21
LAYOFF
32 jobs · Akron/Summit
2020-08-24
LAYOFF
21 jobs · Twinsburg/Summit
2020-08-13
LAYOFF
68 jobs · Twinsburg/Summit
2020-08-11
LAYOFF
80 jobs · Akron/Summit
2020-07-23
LAYOFF
55 jobs · Ravenna/Portage
2020-06-24
LAYOFF
28 jobs · Northfield/Summit
2020-06-17
LAYOFF
15 jobs · Twinsburg/Summit
What has actually happened on the ground in Akron, OH recently?
Over the past 365 days in Akron, OH, the on-the-ground footprint has been defined almost entirely by store closures, of which there were 3. Layoff activity has been quiet: warn_notices came in at 0, with jobs_affected at 0 — though that jobs figure is a floor, since notices stating no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs. On the bankruptcy side, cre_bankruptcies reads 0, but note this is a STATE PROXY — bankruptcy filings carry the filer's state, not the property's location, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count.
The figures behind this answer
- Store closures
- 3
- WARN layoff notices
- 0
- Jobs on those notices
- 0
- CRE-related bankruptcies
- 0
- Window, in days
- 365
STATE PROXY — bankruptcy filings carry the filer's state, not the property's location, so this counts CRE-likely filings in the states this metro's collateral sits in. It is not a metro-native count.
affected_employees is nullable — notices that state no headcount are counted but contribute 0 jobs, so this is a floor.
Closures are matched ZIP -> CBSA and only APPROVED rows count (a pending, machine-extracted row is not yet a closure). This mirrors the Metro Pulse page, not the convergence board — the board applies neither filter and counts higher. Layoffs take the same ZIP -> CBSA and review treatment, and a WARN notice counts if it affects >= 10 people or does not state a headcount (a NULL is not 'fewer than 10').
Written from the figures above · CBSA 10420 · geo_events · last changed 13 Sep 2026
· Ask your own question →
What this page can’t do
Everything above is a snapshot — one market, as it stands today, and
it’s yours to read. What a snapshot can’t tell you is when it moves: which loan slipped a DSCR band
this month, which bank’s early-warning rank crossed into the top quartile, which submarket started turning
while the headline number still looked fine. Distress doesn’t announce itself on the day you happen to check.
This page
One metro · one moment · you come looking.
Verstavo
Every metro · every month · it comes looking for you.
CMBS covers the securitized slice of CRE; bank, closure and layoff signals widen the view.
“No data” in a zone means we don’t observe it here, not that there is no stress.
Employment is BLS (QCEW annual, LAUS monthly) — public data, and the demand leg under all of it.
See the whole picture, not just the pulse.
Metro Pulse is the free, public read. The Verstavo platform goes loan‑by‑loan — stress
scores, maturity walls, special‑servicing transfers, bank CRE, and your own portfolio benchmarked
against the market.